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EAST AND WEST: FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION AND CO-DEVELOPMENT

Andrei KOZYREV

PROFOUND CHANGES in Soviet domestic affairs are inseparable from revolutionary reforms in our foreign policy. This makes it possible not only to look for constructive solutions to a number of major problems but to propose practical ways of shaping international relations marked by cooperation and co-development among states, including those belonging to different social, economic and political systems.

This multifaceted task, naturally, cannot be accomplished by simply taking a decision and swearing from then on to put trust not in confrontation but in cooperation. It is important that the states on both sides of the "barricades" dividing different systems should regard each other not as class, ideological or geopolitical enemies, but as real partners. This requires compatibility and in many cases, convergence of their fundamental interests and values both in domestic and international affairs, which does not necessarily suggest a convergence of the systems themselves.

In his United Nations speech on December 7, 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev made a fundamental conclusion that there have already emerged forces in the world which one way or another encourage the entry into an era of peace. Evidently such forces cannot be found only in the external sphere of the existence of the two systems and their interaction (for instance, a common nuclear or environmental threat); they are formed, above all, in the process of their internal development as components of the changing world.

A TRUTHFUL HISTORY of the difficult path travelled by socialist and capitalist countries before reaching the present stage of civilisation, a history free from mutual accusations and malicious joy, is yet to be written. But it is true that capitalism today largely differs from what it had been when the two world wars, the Cold War, and local conflicts were associated with it. The sphere of its interests involving armed force is narrowing down, and the goals attainable by peaceful and legal means are expanding.

Capitalism has recovered from the losses it had incurred with the emergence of the socialist states. It has even mastered some methods of social organisation "borrowed" from the other system whose attractive power and, therefore, ideological challenge have greatly decreased in the eyes of the public, whether we like it or not. Imperialism has also recovered from the collapse of the colonial system, it has preserved itself as the highest stage of capitalism but lost for the most part its imperial quality, at least in territorial and administrative terms. (This,

Andrei Kozyrev, Cand. Sc. (Hist.), heads the International Organisations Department, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

incidentally, makes one doubt if the term itself is appropriate). In this process, most of the newly-free countries have joined its world economic ties and seek to be even more active there. An analysis of some main features of the internal and international situation of modern capitalism shows that, if it strives for social revenge, it is going to do so on economic rather than military-political lines.

The main social forces in capitalist countries, having gone through profound structural changes, rival or cooperate through established institutions on an ever wider scale. Operating in the conditions of rule of law, these forces act primarily as "differences within a single whole, and not as single entities in diversity", which, according to the idea expressed by Karl Marx in regard to the class society of Prussia, is the essence of forming a state.

As a result, the model of bourgeois democracy prevailing in the West (taking into account the existing national specifics) does not so much suppress (having learned during the class battles that action gives rise to counteraction) but considers, balances, and assimilates the interests of the main sections of society, the bourgeoisie playing the main role, of course. And in a number of cases the broad spectrum of political and ideological trends, including communist ones, does not seem to damage but, on the contrary, stimulates the immunity mechanism, making it respond quickly to internal and external changes. Both in domestic and international affairs the ruling circles in most countries in the West learn ever better in the struggle for survival and adaptation to the changing conditions that it is far more in their own interest not to act in keeping with some narrow class motives—though this occasionally occurs—but to observe definite rules and legal and ethical norms and reckon with public opinion in their own countries and elsewhere in the world. Recognition of these realities does not in the least mean concessions to anyone or renunciation of class positions. On the contrary, to ignore them would be tantamount to underestimating the influence and gains of democratic forces both within Western countries and in the world at large.

This civilised potential is put to use above all in the relations among highly-developed bourgeois countries themselves, even though inter-imperialist economic rivalry is sometimes so acute. No matter how often we put in ironical quotes the notions of American aid, including the Marshall Plan, as well as the notion of equality within the North Atlantic alliance the fact remains that West European countries and Japan have been developing rapidly and independently in the post-war years in close cooperation with the United States. In political and legal terms, coordination of interests and peaceful settlement of disputes now prevail among Western states. Powerful integrational processes are growing in North America, Western Europe and in the East around Japan, processes marked by elements of competition and struggle and elements of inter-penetration and mutual complementing within the framework of one capitalist economy. Despite the historical and cultural differences and the general rise of nationalism in the world, these countries and groups of countries have ever more similar political, legal and economic conditions to unite them which are expected to ensure the dynamic use of the built-in regulators of market economy and social stability, as well as the use of fruits of scientific and technological progress. In general, industrialised capitalist countries may still be largely regarded as parts of a single whole, though independent and specific ones. The political, military, financial and economic "centre of gravity" in this community of countries in the post-war period has been and, everything considered, will be in the foreseeable future in the United States, despite the increasing "multipolarity" of the modern world.

It looks like what is common among these countries and the potentials of their economic and political co-development are far deeper than the interests of joint confrontation with the other system, though, of course, the "outside threat" factor has been widely used, also by the United States, for uniting the West, primarily in the military-political sphere. In the future, evidently, the significance of this factor may be greater or smaller depending on the changes in world politics, but in the long run it is not decisive. It could well be reduced to the minimum, causing no disintegration of Western unity and—it must be specially stressed—not at the expense of this unity. Furthermore, the integration processes in the centre of capitalism, which one way or another is incorporating advanced states from its periphery, evidently lead to a greater seclusion and self-sufficiency of the highly developed countries within this system. It may be expected that the "economic" interest of these countries not only in socialist but also in many Third World states will be relatively decreasing while the technological gap between them and developing nations keeps widening. A significant sign in this respect is that, as it has been noted by observers, the desire by a part of Japanese businessmen to "develop" Siberia is waning, even though the political climate in Soviet-Japanese relations is notable better today than ever before.

I believe it is right for Soviet scientists to look into the current considerable weakening of the tendencies which were traditionally seen as the source of aggressiveness of the countries at the apex of capitalist development. Though it is obvious that the circles associating with the military-industrial complex will never give up their positions without resistance. I think their influence should not be exaggerated. Frederick Engels proved convincingly in his *Anti-Dühring* that violence is not the primary and predominant interest of bourgeois society, but is of a secondary, auxiliary character. "Force", he wrote, "is only the means, and the aim is economic advantage" (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 148, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1987). But precisely from the point of view of economic interests it is hardly reasonable today to speak of a military-political contest among Western powers for the division and recarving of the world or about their striving to seize and enslave other countries with the ensuing desire to make short work of socialism as the main obstacle to their aggressive plans.

Perhaps, on the contrary, the growing rivalry among the economic centres of power—the United States, Japan, and Western Europe—make them worry about their own global positions no less, if not more, than military rivalry with the USSR and strive, therefore, for speeding up their own social and economic advance. At the same time, the example of Japan and some other countries shows the US bourgeoisie that a country's competitiveness is only increasing if it is not overburdened with military spending. And in the United States itself arms manufacture is far from being the most profitable sphere of capital investment.¹ Moreover, the Pentagon's mammoth budget is a heavy burden on the taxpayer whose opinion has to be heeded one way or another by the elected parliaments and governments. And, last but not least, the militarisation of society does not necessarily match the sentiments of the ruling circles, including, for instance, the philosophy of limiting the influence of the state and its bodies, which is typical of American conservatism. As it has been repeatedly noted in this country and in the West, the price of not only modern nuclear and conventional arms but also of their possible use with fatal consequences on a global or regional (say, European) scale is becoming too high. Besides, the instinct of self-preservation and simple pragmatism are prodding the West towards

taking a new look at the admissibility and desirability of attaining by the force of arms the goals, of, for instance, economic expansion, which can be achieved far more effectively by coordinating trade and production with foreign countries. What the present high-technology corporations need, in the Third world, are not slaves or devastated deserts, but partners with an economically developed and socially stable infrastructures.

It remains a fact, however, that the militaristic and conservative circles in the West invariably join hands when it comes to a "Soviet military threat". But the chief motives behind that are not so much economic and "internal" as political and external. In other words, socially the military orders in major NATO countries are determined in terms of quality and quantity mainly by the assessment of an outside threat prevailing in these countries, a threat coming, above all, from the socialist countries and also from the hostile forces in the Third World.

II

THE FORCES advocating the entry into a peaceful period are growing stronger in the socialist countries as well. Our perestroika is such a decisive force capable in the course of its development of opening the way to a profound transformation of the relations between the states of the two systems. By shaping socialism under which the system serves man and not the other way round, democracy and openness bring out man's internal and external creative potential. Even in the first years of perestroika our country's security was strengthened not by building up military might. It was the first time in the post-war history, if not in our entire history. On the contrary, we have begun to revise our military doctrine in exclusively defensive terms and set to reducing the armed forces. The extent of confidence began to widen far beyond the bound of the usual outlook spectrum, revealing in the world a considerable potential of understanding and readiness for cooperation, which was so vividly displayed during the tragedy in Armenia.

Even in the first years of the Soviet Republic, Lenin was close to seeing that coexistence of the states of the two systems might turn not into a hostile confrontation or cautious indifference, but into active cooperation, including the convertibility of currency, internationalisation of the means of communication and establishment of a "world economy". The greatest interest and subject matter of such a policy would be to us, and to the West for that matter, the economy—the soundest basis for national and international security, the natural area of creative cooperation of states, whatever systems they may belong to. Lenin associated such a prospect to a great extent with the transformation of the socialist state itself. Its democratic domestic and foreign policies were expected, according to Lenin, to demonstrate ever more convincingly the attractiveness of a peaceful alternative by proving, in particular, that "We do not have to resort to force to win the sympathy and support of the bourgeoisie", not to mention solidarity of the working people abroad.

However, the dogmatic distortions and establishment of the administrative-command system greatly drained the capability of the new system to fulfill its historic mission of renovating social relations, including international ones, on humane principles. The frightful image of socialism which, far from asserting the generally recognised norms of civilisation, was ignoring them, flouting them in and outside the country, became deep-rooted. The "ultimate goal" of protection and propagation of ideals and principles of barracks-type socialism, the Third World including, replaced the goals of the democratic development of a new system. As a result, the alienation of the working people from power and from

the means of production in the country was in many ways "projected" outside as alienation of the country's real policy from the interests of the people. That increased Soviet society's alienation from the outside world and gave rise to greater contraposition, on ideological grounds, of the two "camps" as two monoliths hostile to each other in their "class" nature. Therefore the new image and quality of socialism and eradication of Stalinism are as important for the destinies of the world as the evolution of capitalism. Besides, they largely stimulate the process of "humanising" the other system.

Nothing in this is totally inconsistent with the fundamental tendencies of the development of modern capitalism and can well get along with the latter's interests, provided, of course, that every nation decides for itself which social system to choose; and this, again, is to be guaranteed and implemented through democratic institutions.

Perestroika emerged largely because the country did not want to find itself on the sidelines of scientific and technological progress. Incidentally, this process is our "natural ally" in the efforts to render international relations more civilised. The profound social and economic changes caused by perestroika in the countries of both systems confront us with much the same problems requiring similar or joint solutions. The search for the best ways of organising modern, highly technological, diversified, and computerised economy "on both poles" adds to the urge for combining diverse forms of economic management and ownership, socialisation of nature and some spheres of social life with increasing reliance on individual or group enterprise.

Historical experience plus the present-day realities promote the growing awareness that extreme, especially forcible, forms of ideological and political struggle, and intolerance bring no hope. The information revolution and the general rise in the cultural level of the population in the states of both systems are accompanied by recognition of all-human moral, ethical and cultural values. On that basis the criteria of social development tend to come closer together, reflecting ever more the spirit of concrete (by contrast with abstract or Messianic) humanism and generally recognised international political, legal, social and economic standards of meeting the requirements and of free self-expression of every individual. At the same time, new imperatives of internationalising social processes and efforts to solve global problems of the environmental protection, famine, diseases, backwardness, the mastering of new technologies, sources of energy and space, help overcome extreme bourgeois individualism and nationalism. On the whole, major preconditions for asserting the common human idea of preserving and developing one common civilisation and turning it into a material power are being provided in the social life in East and West alike.

III

OF COURSE, socialism and capitalism are alternatives of a social system, which presuppose sharp ideological argument between their advocates wishing ardently to prove that they are right. But opponents are not necessarily enemies, especially if an argument is not conducted with reference to such categorical notions as those used 50 or 70 years back—an economy managed by command and planning methods or a spontaneous market economy, egalitarian centralised distribution or unrestricted polarisation of wealth and poverty, dictatorship or hypocritical parliamentarism. Discussions seem to be focussed today more on the search for optimum solutions to the complex problems involved in the self-regulation and self-adjustment of social and economic processes in highly developed "post-industrial" society, while all the main differences

between the two systems remain. In fact it is more and more a question of not so much an irreconcilable ideological battle than of a comparison, sometimes tough but mutually useful, of arguments and facts.

One of the chief tasks at this juncture is to end the practice of treating any social problem ideologically by placing it in the context of an irreconcilable struggle between the two systems. The practice of ideologising the policy of states and relations between them speeded up painful processes in the history of the East and the West. It is evident now that both anti-communism and its dogmatic antipode serve, in keeping with the classical Marxist formula, exactly as ideologies reflecting false consciousness, or illusory reality.

Having no scientific or moral foundations of their own, they both reject common human values, each seeking arguments in the most odious excesses of the other. It is not surprising, therefore, that both so fiercely contradict the new political thinking. But most important is that behind them there are no objective laws of social development but only the specific interests and views of certain social groups.

West is the main source of confrontational thinking. But it was imposed not by capitalism as a system and not even by the entire class of the bourgeoisie, but, to quote Lenin, by "those people of the bourgeois camp who are inclined to settle the problem by war". Today, too, as it was said at the 27th Congress of the CPSU, not the entire ruling class of the United States (as well as of other capitalist countries) but only "its most egoistic groups linked to the military-industrial complex have other aims that are clearly opposite to ours."

Similarly, the thesis that class confrontation in the international arena is inevitable is not an unavoidable concomitant of socialism. Far from that. It was made a state-policy dogma by Stalinism, in fact, for the same purpose as the notorious thesis of aggravation of the class struggle within socialist society. Later, dogmatism was given a shot in the arm in the period of stagnation. It provided an opportunity for acting according to a definite pattern, for justifying lack of initiative, empty verbiage and any miscalculations in domestic and foreign policies, even economic difficulties, by references to "the aggressive nature of imperialism". The inertia of social mentality, too, made itself felt. The harsh lessons of hammering in Stalinist dogmas have left deep scars in mass consciousness. The familiar black-and-white picture from textbooks showing American imperialism as the only source of all misfortunes make easier for those who are inclined to intolerance, oversimplification and xenophobia to function. In a word, the image of a "class and ideological enemy" is most suitable for the administrative-command system. Therefore, to destroy that image is a major task of perestroika.

Various schemes of false consciousness with a racist, religious or other tinge, adopted by some governments as state policy turned to be a veritable plague of the 20th century, in conditions when the world was becoming integral. To sure that disease became a categorical imperative for the survival and progress of mankind confronted with global threats. Therefore a historic merit of perestroika is that it set the task of deideologising international relations. According to Karl Marx, a state exists to reflect some community of interests and views of various groups of society in a specific form of state interest. The sphere of the state is politics, not ideology.

To be sure, the old reality should not be succeeded by a new one, that of "illusory reality" of ideological lull outside the state sphere or in the area of some serene interaction among states. If the former does not exist at all, then the latter is unlikely even between allies. Under the outer "crust" of ideology-influenced East-West confrontation there has always existed, and will remain for some time, a complex of political,

economic, territorial, national, and other contradictions which have for ages been turning the history of international relations into a record of disputes, conflicts and even wars. This adverse legacy affected from the outset the relations with the other system, complicating still more the new and hard task of rendering them constructive.

The ideological pressure should be removed from the policy of state at least to start a practical solution of old and new problems and find out the possibilities, difference and misunderstandings typical of real inter-state relations. The value of deideologisation is in that it brings into play moral principles in politics, returning into it all-human norms, such as a critical attitude to oneself and benevolence towards others, tolerance and self-restraint, tact and openness, honesty and decency. In other words, the goal set in place of "class" irreconcilability is the one formulated by Karl Marx: "to vindicate the simple laws of morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of private individuals, as the rules paramount of the intercourse of nations".

IV

DEIDEOLOGISATION of inter-state relations cannot, of course, cancel the struggle and exchange of ideas on the international level. In this sense, it is expected to rectify the deformities of the period of Stalinism and stagnation which created a situation in which socialism was secluded, selfrestricting its contacts, thus giving cause for talking about it as a sectarian and, ultimately, "dead-end" path of development. Such, in fact, was the administrative-command system. And the more it felt that, the more it was deafening itself with hymns of self-praise, the more fiercely it prohibited and persecuted the ideas and values that were not its own, the "alien" morals and culture, labelling "bourgeois" any different opinion and the very thought of a pluralism of views.

But it is just as logical that socialism, which has taken the path of democratisation and openness and has set out to establish a dynamic self-developing economy, can no longer imagine itself outside the common civilisation and isolated from the entire diversity of ideas, of cultural and intellectual values which have filled the world today, competing with each other in it and, taken together, making up its wealth. The possibility of having access to this diversity, of an independent choice of what is more appropriate and valuable for creative development largely determines the quality of life of each nation, and each man. The freedom of choice and self-expression in the community of other people and nations have always been and will be among major human values.

This, naturally, also refers to the ideas about the best models and ways of social organisation. Such ideas were and will be advanced by individual persons and organisations, political parties and national and international movements. They do not recognise state frontiers and inevitably defy or side-track any bans which are a sign of the weakness of those who imposed them. With up-to-date means of communication and mass media it is absurd to speak of a confrontation of some ideologically secluded "monoliths", and of preserving any "closed societies" in general.

Even in the first years of the Soviet Union's existence, Lenin emphasised that "a state is strong when the people are politically conscious". It is strong when the people know everything, can form an opinion of everything and do everything consciously. This thought is especially topical in the present conditions of the renovation of socialism and competition of ideas. This idea has been, in fact, universally recognised, which is a sign that international relations are growing more democratic.

Thus, UN documents repeatedly affirm that states interested in reliable

internal and international stability should guarantee their citizens freedom to seek, find and disseminate information and ideas by any means, notwithstanding state borders. The evolution of the general European process shows that this sphere is becoming a sphere of cooperation and co-development of the states of the two systems as the agreements reached are being implemented. This is invaluable for the destruction by both sides of the "image of the enemy" and provision of spiritual and moral guarantees against making a fascist or any other totalitarian and aggressive ideology part of a policy pursued by any state.

BY DEMOCRATISING societies and relations among them deideologisation is setting the stage for a gradual demilitarisation of interstate relations. The false thesis of inevitability of confrontation materialised to a great extent in the wasteful arms race which gained a momentum of its own. The excessive amount of nuclear weapons capable of destroying all life on the earth many times over is a monumental expression of the cult of strength, and of its impotence.

The rectification of this situation in the context of general lessening of war danger is a major area where not only a balance of interests of the states belonging to the two systems but also convergence of these interests are possible. This is seen from the current process of agreed disarmament and the implementation of confidence-building measures in the military field.

While buildup of arms requires secrecy, their elimination requires openness. Without openness one cannot determine the structure and disposition of armed forces on the lowest levels or ensure mutual sense of security. Transition from an economy of armaments to that of disarmament poses still greater demands on openness of societies. For each country to be able to draw up a national plan for re-conversion of military production, it is essential to have comprehensive data of both military and civilian sectors, and the broadest discussion of all issues with participation of production experts, scientists and the public. I would think that the same principles are applicable to openness as to disarmament: reaching of parity on the lower levels, above all through elimination of asymmetries. In practical terms this means equalising the regimes of secrecy of the USSR and the USA to be followed by joint work to reduce them further.

While in the field of openness it is we who will have to go a longer way at the start, when it comes to solving another fundamental problem, that of overcoming the socio-economic, political and psychological inertia of the arms race, great difficulties evidently lie in store for the states of the other system. At the same time, I believe, we, too, should not adopt an oversimplified approach to this objectively hard problem. Its practical solution can be achieved, it seems, through the improvement of the constitutionally appropriate mechanism of open and truly democratic monitoring of work of relevant departments and the supervision of them in keeping with the new powers of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR which, according to the country's Constitution, shall determine the main measures in the area of defence and in ensuring state security. This is also the task of the corresponding committee of the Supreme Soviet.

More opportunities can be found here not only for the study and use of the experience gained for many years in a number of capitalist countries in using parliamentary procedures, but also for establishing interaction with the legislative bodies of these in order to work jointly to achieve a coordinated reduction of military spending, conversion, etc. In general, parliaments could become the major organising, coordinating

and guiding centres of cooperation and co-development of states belonging to the two systems in military-political and other fields.

Only by stepping up the efforts all along the line of confidence-building and demilitarisation of policy would we be able to give a realistic answer to the question of whether the other system is capable of abandoning militarism. Without revolutionary restructuring of our home and foreign political practices, the discussion on this question will merely be a scholastic exercise leading us away from the tasks of renewal.

The lowering of the levels of armament and military danger in the Third World should become the common concern of the states of both systems. The escalation of regional conflicts and the spread of terrorism jeopardises stability in which both the developed and developing countries are interested. The causes of conflicts in that zone lie in political, social and economic backwardness, while there is a vast variety of national, religious and other contradictions. It looks hopelessly outmoded to approach practically any conflict in this motley and original world from the positions of a peculiar presumption of guilt and speak of "the aggressive circles of imperialism" which have come out to suppress the "liberation struggle".

The variants of social development grow in number within the "central" systems of capitalism and socialism. And in the Third World the variety of socio-political trends is especially great. Therefore it is only logical that the non-aligned movement rejects any attempts to distort the character of the struggle of nations for independence and human dignity by squeezing it into the context of East-West confrontation.

The period of perestroika is encouraging in this sphere as well. The decision on troop withdrawal from Afghanistan was followed by a chain reaction of positive changes in unblocking regional situations. The turn from "principled" confrontation to interaction with the United States and other Western countries, including in the UN Security Council, shows that in this sphere, too, a balance of interests of the states belonging to the two systems is possible.

It is extremely hard, of course, to help settle old and complicated regional conflicts, for this requires a display of realism and political self-control, activity at the negotiating table and self-restraint in unilateral actions, above all in military sphere. For us it is not a surrender of "class positions" but, on the contrary, it is fulfilment of our internationalist duty before the peoples of developing countries whose main objective is not to square ideological accounts but to get out of the quagmire of violence and backwardness.

VI

THE 20TH CENTURY is often called an epoch of technology. True enough, the knowledge of ways and methods of using the vast natural forces has given man unprecedented opportunities. At the same time the retardation of the "technologies" of social processes, including those on the international level, led to the threat of the civilisation's self-destruction. Therefore the cooperation and competition of states with different social systems in developing and introducing optimum technologies in the production and social areas will play a decisive role for the fate of each system and for the civilisation as a whole.

It has now been generally recognised that an effective and truly democratic organisation of society presupposes a guarantee of the entire range of political, civil, social and economic human rights listed in the Universal Declaration and other international documents on human rights. The Vienna accords open up broad vistas for East-West cooperation in this field in the framework of the general European process. Most

important here is to achieve strict accordance of national legislation and the administrative rules and practice in one's own and in other countries with international standards and obligations. This is precisely the way to forming a community of rule-of-law states, to humanising and democratising their home and foreign policies or, in other words, to co-operation in guaranteeing stability and civilised attitudes within societies and in relations among them and to generally acceptable compatibility of states belonging to different systems, with their sovereignty and originality remaining intact, and therefore to providing a sound basis for their coexistence and cooperation.

Another point to note here is that the way for people to restrain the omnipotence of capital[†] and ultimately to socialism, goes precisely through the guarantee of man's rights and liberties, through democracy. Socialism itself is perfected through democracy. Therefore promotion of international cooperation in ensuring the basic rights and liberties is also our internationalist duty, the main lever of the social renovation of the world. This is precisely the criterion—and not abstract declarations of a “socialist choice”—that should to a large, if not decisive, extent be used in judging the level of progressiveness of a given regime in the Third World and our “ideological” leanings, while naturally, promoting normal economic and diplomatic relations with the largest possible number of countries.

Besides, the introduction of more advanced technologies in the scientific, technical and economic spheres, including establishment of all-round international technological exchange, greatly depends on the democratic level and stability of political systems. It is not without reason that the objective of our perestroika—to democratise the political and economic system—coincides with the general tendency of giving priority in home and foreign policies of a growing number of states to dynamic social and economic, scientific and technological development in conditions of stability, law and order.

This is only logical. The world economy is becoming an integral mechanism, and no country, whatever its social system, can develop normally outside it. The status of a country in the world community will ultimately be determined by its competitiveness on the world market of technology, goods and services with combined the highest democratic standards. Therefore the profound reforms of our entire economic and social organism, which will bring into play the internal levers of competitive economic development and will place our enterprises in conditions of competition and free business relations with foreign ones are not just an internal need of the country's development but the indispensable condition for its occupying a worthy position in the international arena and, in the final analysis, for its security.

To join the international division of labour, to establish the broadest exchanges with the more industrialised countries parallel with ensuring really dynamic and mutually beneficial cooperation within the CMEA framework should be among the key priorities for all our foreign-policy activity. “We cannot rest content with a diplomatic victory. We need more than that. We need genuine trade relations”, stressed Lenin at the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). In a document he approved, which had been drawn up by Georgy Chicherin, it was pointed out that “since its inception, the Soviet government has set itself economic cooperation with other powers one of the main aims of its policy. It has always declared its readiness to make available sufficient profit to foreign capitalists...”

Lenin's idea that one should “learn socialism from the organisers of the trusts”, for “socialism is... the assimilation and application... of what has been created by the trusts” is topical today as well, in methodologi-

cal terms. Probably, in the present-day context, this may mean the application of not only the best standards in production but also the more effective mechanisms of regulating a self-adjusting economy. The sharing of experience in planning and prognostication is also useful. Besides, marketing, taxation and investment policy, financing and organisation of research programmes, management and the use of the most up-to-date computer systems allowing to lessen the excesses of spontaneous market activity by establishing direct ties between the consumer and the producer, and so on, are worth studying. I believe that the search for the most expedient, in economic and social terms, combinations of various forms of ownership and their interaction may become a sphere of not only rivalry but also of mutually enriching exchange of experience and cooperation.

Our glasnost has shown that we share many social problems with the states of the other system. Among these problems are drug addiction, organised crime, prostitution and inevitable differences in the living standards, and provision of social stability in the conditions of the operation of market mechanisms, especially in periods of structural changes and economic reforms. Parallel with studying the practice of the socialist countries, we could learn a great deal in this sense from the West and from the so-called new industrial societies having modern experience (positive and negative) of speeded up modernisation and structural improvements, of joining world economic ties as producers and suppliers of manufactured goods, including highly technological ones, establishing joint ventures and other forms of cooperation with international corporations, and so on.

This is especially important, in particular, because so far we have little experience in ensuring social stability otherwise than in the conditions, and with the help of, egalitarianism and non-economic redistribution of material benefits. The learning of the world's best experience in protecting and encouraging enterprise with the introduction of a progressive tax, the entire arsenal of the means of using positive and preventing negative effects of market mechanisms, aid to low-income persons while preserving incentives for intensive labour, naturally, in the conditions of such indisputable achievements of socialism as the absence of unemployment and social protection, should become one of our primary interests in the sphere of international cooperation.

And, last but not least, a natural and truly unlimited area of convergence of interests and of pooling political will and intellectual and material resources of states with different social systems is the solution of all-human problems, especially those concerning environmental protection. There simply does not exist any reasonable alternative to an ecologically and economically sound so-development, and to cooperation in combating famine, epidemics, and natural disasters.

HAVING MADE its historical choice in favour of socialism, the Soviet people have defended and proved by their immense achievements and sufferings their right to have a worthy place and important role in the community of other countries. Perestroika, leading our society to a higher level, opens the way to and brings about the need to promote cooperation with socialist countries and establish normal, civilised relations with all nations, above all with the most advanced states of the other social system. In this way, perhaps, for the first time in our history real conditions are being provided for meeting the historic aspirations of the

Foreign Affairs in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

Alexander Dzasokhov, Acting Chairman of the Committee. This is our third sitting. There are many matters claiming our attention. We must carefully discuss the items which I wish to propose putting on the agenda.

First, we must hear a report by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the "Main Directions and Forms of the Ministry's Participation in the Fulfilment of the Tasks of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on the International Affairs". The report will be presented on behalf of the Ministry's leadership by Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky. The fact that this subject finds itself in our field of vision at the very beginning of the Committee's work is perfectly understandable. We are badly in need of evolving optimum forms of cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as with other government agencies and public organisations of an international character. The word "cooperation" shouldn't mislead anyone here. We are all well aware of the relationship between the Supreme Soviet and its Committee, on one hand, and departmental entities, on the other.

Second, we must discuss draft Provisional Rules of the Ratification of International Treaties of the USSR by the USSR Supreme Soviet. If endorsed, the draft will be submitted to the Supreme Soviet. Accomplishing such tasks helps us work out the procedure of drafting international legal documents.

Third, the question of ratifying the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) and victims of non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II). A relevant report will be submitted by Yuri Rybakov, Doctor of Law, member of the Foreign Affairs Ministry Collegium.

Fourth, the question of ratifying the Soviet-Turkish Consular Convention of April 27, 1988. We have reached preliminary agreement that this matter will be reported by Victor Zelenov, Chief of the Foreign Affairs Ministry's Consular Department.

Vladimir Petrovsky will now speak on the first item.

Vladimir Petrovsky. In addressing you when his nomination for the office of Foreign Minister was submitted for discussion, Eduard Shevardnadze outlined our vision of the main directions and forms of the Ministry's participation in the work of the Committee on International Affairs. We are convinced that active involvement of the Supreme Soviet in the foreign policy process will make it possible to preclude undemocratic decision-making behind closed doors on matters of vital importance to the country and to place the framing and implementation of the foreign policy of the Soviet state under the people's control. The Foreign Affairs Ministry has made a most serious study of the speeches given at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and at the early stage of the Supreme Soviet Session and intends to take account in its work of all the recommendations made by speakers. A long-term guideline for us is the decision of the Congress of People's Deputies on the "Main Lines of the Home and Foreign Policy of the USSR" and the Congress' Message to the Peoples of the World. I see my task in detailing the ideas and considerations regarding the Ministry's participation in the Committee's work which Eduard Shevardnadze set out in his speech. We hold that the Ministry should establish close contact with the Supreme Soviet from the very first.

Of course, this is no easy task. We must begin by overcoming stereotypes of shaping and implementing foreign policy. I should mention that even in countries with parliamentary forms of government there is no simple solution to the problem of the relationship between diplomatic agencies and legislative bodies. We all know, for instance, that relations between the US State Department and Congress are characterised by both rivalry and partnership and breed many problems.

What we plan to build is relations based not merely on partnership but on co-creation, confidence and mutual understanding.

Fully respecting the Committee's powers, we expect it to reciprocate by appreciating the specifics of its constitutional functions in the foreign policy process as well as the role of the Foreign Ministry as an executive agency, that is, an agency whose mission is to pursue foreign policy in practice by carrying out diverse diplomatic actions.

Strictly speaking, this approach flows from the concept of a law-governed state in which there is a separation of the functions of party and public organisations, on one hand, and of government bodies, on the other, as well as a division of competence inside the state mechanism itself between diverse power and administrative structures. We believe it is important in searching for adequate ways and means for our cooperation to take into account Lenin's idea of the relationship between the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. The Bolsheviks contributed an uncommon practice to that model, one they had used as members of the State Duma. Although the Duma's involvement in international affairs was limited to approving the budget, they succeeded not only in making their case but in creating a political climate which prevented or, at any rate, complicated the adoption of decisions at variance with the people's interests.

We ought probably to take a close look at foreign experience. Borrowing it automatically is out of the question, of course. For all its diversity, that experience is evidence that the separation of executive and legislative functions as well as the distribution of jurisdiction inside parliaments, between chambers and commissions, are a steadily unfolding and improving process. These issues still give rise to controversy. And there is nothing wrong with this in countries having developed parliamentary systems. Be that as it may, the chief trend is unmistakably towards a further division of jurisdiction between legislative and executive authorities, towards making foreign policy practice more flexible and efficient on a solid legal, constitutional basis.

Now that we are laying the foundations for working relations between the Foreign Ministry and the Committee, I feel we should see to the provision of a reliable legal basis for foreign policy, to making it as efficient and fruitful as possible in creating favourable external conditions for perestroika at home. A major part of the Foreign Ministry's work in the period ahead will undoubtedly be to assist the Committee in every way in the area of legislative initiatives relating to the international activity of the Soviet Union. This is a task of tremendous importance also because the Supreme Soviet is setting out to draft a new Constitution. The Committee will apparently have to concretise certain provisions of the Constitution to preclude their arbitrary interpretation. The Foreign Ministry would be prepared to take a most active part in this work of the Committee on International Affairs.

The Committee will presumably discuss on a regular basis draft laws on foreign policy submitted to the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Work on proposals and amendments to what may be called the law of laws of our international activity is therefore likely to become a priority. I mean, in particular, the adoption of a Law on the Procedure of Concluding, Executing and Denouncing International Treaties. It could probably lead off relations between the legislative and the executive authorities involving foreign policy. Ratification of international treaties should be the decisive phase in the assumption of international obligations by our country.

and, at the same time, an instrument of the people's approval of the effort of foreign policy staff. The high demands now made by the Supreme Soviet and its echelons imply that henceforward participants in talks, primarily our diplomats, will need to painstakingly work out the details of every agreement. Bungling in this matter, if any, should be brought to light by competent people's controllers at the stage of ratification in the Supreme Soviet. For our part, we are prepared to offer Committee members the advice they may require.

To make our policy more efficient, we should think about the most advisable ways of building our relations in the context of the avalanche of international commitments made by the Soviet Union. Every year our country signs not only accords of a fundamental nature but hundreds of state-to-state, inter-governmental and interdepartmental agreements in line with the prerogatives of the executive power. In 1988 alone, Soviet institutions signed over 400 international agreements. Of course, the Supreme Soviet needs to know about all these agreements. I refer to the American practice of so-called executive agreements signed by the president and the secretary of state as well as by other members of the cabinet. They are not submitted to Congress for ratification but members of the Foreign Affairs Committee can familiarise themselves with the documents. I believe Committee members would be interested in studying this practice and in devising their own system of approaching various treaties and agreements.

As for discussing treaties at the drafting stage, we think the Committee is aware of the possibility of taking part even though this entails certain practical and legal difficulties. International usage includes the method of consulting with members and committees of parliament in the course of talks. It seems to me that we could hold hearings on the work of delegation heads during talks, include deputies in delegations to talks or, say, send them abroad for a time to acquaint themselves with the progress of talks on the spot.

Lastly, there is nobody and nothing to prevent deputies from stating their views on talks under way, in particular by setting them out in the form of resolutions. Take, for instance, the current Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons. The Foreign Ministry could address the Committee to inform it of the results of the round now going on in Geneva. Opinions could be expressed and assessments made by the group of people's deputies that intends to look into the talks on the spot before long and will gain a complete idea of developments at the negotiating table. We are also prepared to inform the Committee about the work now being carried on in Geneva to sign a Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and on the current Vienna talks on reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe.

The Committee might want to hear a report by the Ministry on the whole range of disarmament talks rather than on particular talks. Discussion should involve not only diplomats but officials of other agencies, all the more so since the Defence Ministry is drawn extensively into military political talks.

We would also like, at the Committee's convenience, to set out our strategic approach to international organisations and our concept of membership in them. In the future we could discuss progress reports on specific initiatives, such as the Murmansk, Vladivostok or Krasnoyarsk proposals regarding the Arctic and Asia-Pacific areas.

The problem of terminating an international commitment can hardly arise frequently but still it can. While denunciation of treaties in other countries is the responsibility of the executive, our Constitution entrusts the act to the USSR Supreme Soviet. The procedure to be followed by the Supreme Soviet in this case apparently calls for scrutiny.

Another line of cooperation between the Ministry and the Committee is discussion of the sections of the draft State Budget relating to the funding of

the Ministry and the foreign policy activity of the state generally as well as to Soviet membership of international organisations. This is a particularly important matter now that we are setting up a system safeguarding our country against unwarranted expenditures. We need the greatest economic austerity, and the budget should understandably be drawn up with due regard to the radical improvement in the situation in Europe and the world. We must not forget, however, that safeguarding peace and security by political means has a price. To meet the outlays of international organisations in time is our moral and direct legal duty flowing from our adherence to the statutes of these organisations. What we have here is, in effect, a long-range investment that will enable us to spend somewhat less on foreign policy. Take, for example, the funding of the peace-making effort of the UN and other international organisations. As far as its amount is concerned, it is nowhere near the spending necessitated by our unilateral involvement in a regional conflict. Instead of requiring direct participation, it helps set up what is on the whole fairly efficient international mechanisms not only controlling conflict situations but averting them.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is preparing to cooperate with the Committee as closely as possible also in the Committee's fulfilment of its control functions in respect of enforcing laws on the foreign policy activity of our state passed by the Supreme Soviet and of meeting international obligations assumed by our state. Priority attention must be given in this sector to the situation over disarmament. It would clearly be advisable to discuss shortly the progress made by the Soviet Union and United States so far in implementing the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. I think there are valid reasons for this. The treaty, ratified slightly more than a year ago, is generally effective. But there seem to be those who don't like this, to judge by groundless allegations in the US Senate about "violations" of the treaty by the Soviet Union. We believe the Supreme Soviet could take a perfectly explicit stand on the issue. Thereby it would give expression to the political role of the deputies' control over how we accomplish our foreign political tasks and meet our obligations.

A further subject is control over implementation of the accords reached at the Vienna meeting, in particular on human rights. I think we all appreciate the need to hold a special Committee meeting in September this year. If the Committee calls for discussing the matter the Foreign Ministry is prepared to present a detailed report.

Among questions deserving sustained attention are those of international environmental cooperation, especially in terms of greater participation by us in international agreements and programmes. We are now working on the problem in line with Mikhail Gorbachev's statement in London about joining international obligations. We consider it necessary to accede to obligations we haven't assumed as yet, primarily the obligation to keep Europe environmentally clean. I think the parliament could pronounce itself on this also.

It is desirable that the Committee invite to its meetings on such matters representatives of various ministries and departments, the public and the press. However, in view of the sensitiveness of some questions—for it is there and concerns above all military-political and personnel matters—provisions should be made for meeting also behind closed doors. We are now advancing to maximum glasnost but closed meetings are common in many foreign parliaments. We shouldn't overdo it but we must provide for such meetings, which would enable us to share relevant information with you.

One of the Committee's major tasks and hence a sphere of its cooperation with the Foreign Affairs Ministry is to ensure that internal legislation is adequate to international standards. You know that our country is now doing much in this sense, primarily within the European process. This work is far from finished. The Committee could join in drafting laws of great international significance, such as a law on the press and other mass media, on our civic

associations, trade union rights, youth, freedom of religion and religious organisations, and so on.

Also important is the problem of revising the existing procedure of guaranteeing implementation of international treaties of the Soviet Union. This procedure implies a very intricate, unsystematised and temporally unlimited transformation of international treaty provisions into internal standards. In practice it boils down to numerous decisions, orders and instructions, often contradicting each other, issued by various Union executive bodies. We don't think the procedure in its present form makes it possible to ensure proper conformity of the Soviet Union's internal legislation to commitments made under international treaties.

A law-governed state presupposes the supremacy of international law as well. In building a socialist law-governed state, we will have to keep largely to universally recognised international standards, meaning those applying not only to the military-political, economic and ecological spheres but to socio-economic standards, which we often ignored in the past for ideological reasons.

International organisations, the International Labour Organisation among them, have gained immense experience in solving socio-economic problems. Present-day international standards reflect universal and not group, let alone narrow class, interests, as some of our publications occasionally claimed in the past. I am sure it is very important to take this circumstance into account as we carry on our perestroika.

Committee hearings on proposals for appointing ambassadors could be a line of joint work, it being understood that the decree actually appointing a candidate is signed by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

I must say outright, however, that in practice we will be faced, as in the case of treaty ratification, with the problem of workloads. We now have 122 representations abroad.

Consideration could be given to, say, a procedure under which the deputy Foreign Minister responsible for personnel would inform the Committee every six or three months about planned transfers of ambassadors. On the basis of that information, the Committee would select candidates and hold hearings. Needless to say, it would be for the Committee itself to decide on the criteria of selection. Candidates could be chosen according to the country in question or the extent to which they are known to Committee members. The need to present a candidate to the country where he is expected to serve as ambassador poses a problem to be borne in mind.

As regards specific forms of participation in the Committee's work by the Ministry, there are ample opportunities for this. First of all, the Committee could invite the minister, his deputies and other high-ranking diplomats to speak at its meetings. Also, it could reserve time for hearing the minister and other senior officials of the Ministry on specific matters. And as far as answering deputies' questions is concerned, the Committee would probably have to draw on the experience of other countries. There are definite rules everywhere. In Britain, for instance, an MP is not allowed during query time to put more than two verbal questions to a minister. The Speaker of the House of Commons has the right to rule a question out of order, and the minister has the right to refuse to answer it if he considers it out of order. There is a list of 30 categories of such questions, and 18 of them concern foreign policy. These restrictions are hardly suitable for us but they may contain some positive things that do not contradict our principle of maximum openness. But the practice calls for detailed study, I suppose.

In shaping foreign policy, it is generally important to establish the highest standards for democracy and openness. We are going to supply the Committee with the requisite information, doing it promptly and accurately. Some of it will be confidential and should understandably be treated as such in accordance with normal diplomatic usage.

With regard to discussing sensitive matters, we should, I believe, take account also of American practice, which shows that the flow of information diminishes as soon as a leak occurs, and there is a direct logical connection between these two things.

It would probably be right to lend a regular character to hearings on concrete problems with the participation of Soviet diplomats serving in foreign countries and international organisations. This is only an American phenomenon for the time being, for nowhere else does the parliament conduct hearings on the performance of ambassadors. Europeans don't do it. They consider that such hearings make it very difficult for ambassadors to continue serving abroad.

It seems to us that the advantage provided by discussion in the Supreme Soviet makes up for likely disadvantages by giving ambassadors insight into the public mood. We suggest beginning such hearings, if there is no objection, with a report by the Soviet Permanent Representative in Vienna on our role in the International Atomic Energy Agency, a role intimately linked with satisfying our practical needs, in particular the need to realise our proposal for a safe regime of nuclear power generation. After that the Committee would do well to hear our representative to UNESCO. We are ready to aid the Supreme Soviet in planning the dispatch of groups of people's deputies to international forums. Specifically, we propose, first, to send to the 44th Session of the UN General Assembly due this year a delegation that could not only address it but meet with representatives of other countries. Second, we propose sending a group of deputies to this year's General Conference of UNESCO. This event having a direct bearing on progress in science and culture, attending the conference could be very valuable.

Besides, the Foreign Affairs Ministry could organise information work by regularly briefing deputies on current foreign policy issues, the results of state visits, important international events.

We see the interparliamentary ties now developing as a vast sphere of activity for us. We now have really great opportunities to intensify and extend them. For instance, we could establish close ties with the French parliament both through the Committee on International Affairs and other committees of the Supreme Soviet. During Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to France, that country's MPs voiced readiness for extensive cooperation with us on all levels. In view of the French parliament's particularly favourable attitude we ought to think about setting up something like a parliamentary group of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Voice from the audience. Such a group has already been formed.

V. Petrovsky. That means that we have fallen behind your decisions. We are also prepared to offer expert advice on membership of People's Deputies of the USSR in the Interparliamentary Union and on their cooperation with parliamentary organisations of Europe and other continents.

We consider it advisable to help our deputies and Committee members establish contacts with official representatives of foreign countries. I think regular meetings could be held with ambassadors here in Moscow. It might be useful to invite foreign statesmen to address Committee meetings. I, for one, have had occasion to address foreign affairs committees in Italy, Norway and Australia. I can tell you that actions of this nature greatly benefit the speakers themselves and that most of them are greatly appreciated by MPs, who see them as a source of first-hand information. Such addresses are generally timed to coincide with relevant hearings and supply extra initial information helping form an objective idea of this or that issue.

One other thing. In practical terms we consider that the function of connecting link between the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Committee on International Affairs, of a working relationship between us, should be performed by the new Division for Relations with the USSR Supreme Soviet which the Ministry has set up under Ambassador at Large Vsevolod Oleandrov.

This report to the Committee can hardly presume to be a complete exposition of our vision of the lines and forms of cooperation with the Committee. It is merely a tentative outline, and there can be no doubt that our cooperation will gain in scope and substance in step with progress in Soviet democracy and political and legal reform. But the important thing today is, in our view, to get down to work with good intentions and a common desire to make perestroika a success.

Thank you.

A. Dzasokhov. Thank you, Vladimir Fyodorovich. Any questions Cde. Petrovsky? If there are none let us exchange views. Who would like to take the floor, please? Gennady Yanayev.

Gennady Yanayev. As both a member of the Committee on International Affairs and a man who has been associated with the Foreign Affairs Ministry for 20 years past, I hail your report, which demonstrates the Ministry's readiness for constructive cooperation with the Committee. I believe all that you said here coincides in essence with the preliminary discussions held by Committee members. I hail the spirit of real openness, of honest and constructive cooperation, which you showed in speaking here today. I am sure it is a reflection of the spirit now prevailing in the Foreign Affairs Ministry. We note with satisfaction that of all the spheres covered by perestroika, it is probably in foreign policy that we have made the greatest headway.

I am very glad that you have brought up the question of ratifying the conventions and recommendations on social problems and labour worked out by the International Labour Organisation. I am speaking here as a person involved in this one, for the past two years I have not only represented the Soviet trade unions but participated in the work of ILO as a member of its Governing Body. It seems to me that our role in the ratification of labour standards set by social conventions is still inadequate. As an official, a Secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, I encounter a traditional, routine approach to many progressive standards set by these conventions and recommendations. Can I look forward to our taking fresh stock of the social standards and recommendations adopted under conventions so that we may improve our performance a bit? I would like to propose it in the hope of mutual understanding.

Now for another point. An international conference on conversion is to be held next year under UN auspices, and I think we have established proper working cooperation with the Foreign Affairs Ministry in preparing for the conference. We have been discussing this for a long time now, and I was gratified to hear you actively support the idea. Mikhail Gorbachev has said that we must work out a national plan to convert two or three plants and that we will be ready to share with the world community the results of research or the programmes we are now drawing up in this field.

Preparations for the conference in Moscow have raised some practical questions that should be dealt with by both the Foreign Affairs and the Defence Ministries. They concern, in particular, the possibility of visiting defence plants. V. Lobov as a Committee member and I will discuss the matter on our own but I think it might be advisable for the Committee on International Affairs to join in this work, in the planning and holding of what is going to be a very important conference. Let us think of the form in which we could cooperate on this.

Lastly, speaking of the conversion, I must say that every year we take the floor at the ILO general conferences on behalf of Soviet working people and the Soviet Union to stress the need for ILO to set about discussing disarmament problems.

ILO has circulated a questionnaire which may be described as a starting point to seriously tackling the problems of disarmament, conversion, and so on, in that organisation. The questionnaire follows the UN pattern. The Americans have presented their answers. As for us, we seem to be held up by

inertia and have presented no answers yet. The result is that after my every statement at the ILO I am told: Mr. Yanayev, what are you talking about? You should first ask the Soviet government to answer the questionnaire, if only in part, for only then will you have the moral right to speak of disarmament. I believe we will find a solution but I am speaking of this to emphasise that for our Committee as well, conversion is a pressing issue.

It is worthy of special note that the Committee includes leaders of many public organisations. We consider the international activity of public organisations an important factor for peace and security, and I earnestly ask the Foreign Affairs Ministry to take account of the component of people-to-people diplomacy, in particular in doing its share of work under the Vienna accords.

I think the first experiment in presenting the Foreign Affairs Ministry's position to this Committee was successful. I thank Vladimir Fyodorovich and, in his person, the Foreign Affairs Ministry for showing readiness to cooperate honestly and constructively.

A. Dzasokhov. Good. Thank you, Cde. Yanayev. I now ask Nikolai Neiland to speak.

Nikolai Neiland. I, too, wish to thank Vladimir Petrovsky for his very interesting report.

Frankly speaking, I had expected him also to touch on the 15 Union Republics' role in the shaping of our foreign policy. Let me remind you that their role in the past was more significant. The Soviet Union's delegations to talks were vested with appropriate powers by all republics, and the delegations' composition reflected the multinational character of our state. Subsequently the role of the Union Republics, as indeed that of the whole Federation, underwent changes for the worse, I am sorry to say. It increased somewhat in 1944. One can see that the staffs of the Union Republics' Foreign Affairs Ministries increased and decreased alternately. That is all past history, however. As for the present time, let us say frankly that with perestroika processes under way, the role of Union Republics, including their role in foreign policy, is growing. Two years ago there was what I would call a historic meeting at the Foreign Ministry to which Eduard Shevardnadze presented a report. But the report didn't clear up everything—there are still many moot points. Take the Consular Service, for one. It is a special problem for the Baltic republics because there are still countries who don't recognise us. It is still unclear whether we may apply directly to an embassy in Moscow. There are instructions allowing this but, on the other hand, they do not. We now have consular partners in Leningrad but there are problems even there. The proportion of those going abroad with passports issued by the Foreign Ministries of Union Republics has increased sharply. In Latvia, for example, where 1,000 passports were issued every year for travelling abroad, their number this year has already reached 14,000.

There is also the problem of the republics' participation in regional conferences on issues affecting their interests. When, in late April, the former head of our Committee on Environmental Protection was holding talks in Stockholm on problems of the Baltic Sea the Baltic republics were not represented at all. This was a paradox, as you will realise, and the Swedish press certainly noticed it at once.

We seem, I think, equal partners. I say "seem" because the Foreign Affairs Ministry is a government institution with a very long record. Our Committee, too, seems to have a record of its own (formerly we had standing house commissions for foreign affairs) but I prefer to say nothing about that record because everybody knows what it is like. I therefore wish to suggest that our partner, the Foreign Affairs Ministry, inform the Committee of how it takes account in its work of proposals coming from Union republics. I don't have to tell you that this is important to public opinion in the Union Republics. I admit that lately people have been asking us what the Union

republics' Foreign Ministries are doing. It is interesting to note that nobody asked anything five years ago. But now they do, which means that interest in our activity has grown. This makes it very important for the Foreign Affairs Ministry to take an explicit stand.

One other point. Cde. Petrovsky has suggested that the Committee hear reports by ambassadors and participate in the selection of candidates for the office of ambassador. I said to myself as I listened to him that our diplomats in big countries are generally professionals while in small countries we have many people (I will not name them but their names are largely an open secret) who were posted there to these countries although they had a very vague idea of them, spoke no foreign language, and so on. I wish to stress, expressing the opinion of many of my colleagues on the Committee, that an ambassador's is a professional job, not an occupation. To appoint anyone ambassador should not mean sending him into political exile, transferring him from one office armchair to another, or rewarding him for loyal service. Every one of us could probably name several people who would hardly have slipped through the Committee's "sieve" had the situation been different. I think we must do our utmost to prevent anything like that happening again.

A. Dzasokhov. Thank you.

Genrikh Borovik. I wish to support for my part the high opinion of Vladimir Petrovsky's report expressed here. We know the position of the Foreign Affairs Ministry very well, in particular its openness also to public organisations. The serious proposals made by the deputy Foreign Minister offer us real opportunities for fruitful cooperation, all the more since we are now in a position to apply directly to the Division for Relations with the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

I would like to comment briefly on the idea of combining our work with that of non-governmental peace organisations.

What matters isn't that, say, Valentina Tereshkova, Fyodor Burlatsky, several other colleagues and myself represent such organisations. The important thing is that we are now primarily people's deputies and Committee members and are going to participate in its work precisely as its members and to convey to our society all the unclassified information we can. But we must think about our line of cooperation within the triangle formed by the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the Committee on International Affairs and non-governmental peace organisations.

The Soviet Peace Committee plans to found a peace university which is to start functioning this autumn. We have invited one of our party and government leaders as well as the ambassadors of France, the United States and some other countries to attend the inauguration of the university. I think it might be useful for the committee to use the opportunity for asking the foreign ambassadors to address it at a public session. This could attract a most representative audience.

Our ambassadors could reciprocate, likewise publicly. It wouldn't be a bad idea.

I think the proposal for sending deputies to talks is interesting. I wonder whether we should suggest here that representatives of public organisations be sent along with deputies.

I believe it would also be a good idea for the Foreign Affairs Ministry's new echelon to be called the Division for Relations with the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs and Non-Governmental Peace Organisations, which would mean assigning it an additional function. If this were done the triangle could be used more effectively.

Lastly, Vladimir Petrovsky suggested here that the Committee meet in open session. I think that would provide a further opportunity to invite prominent spokesmen for peace-organisations.

A. Dzasokhov. Speakers will please observe the time limit. Fyodor Burlatsky has the floor.

Fyodor Burlatsky. I think we did well to invite a leading Foreign Affairs Ministry official, who will help us see our way clear to selecting questions for discussion and forms of cooperation. We will return to what was said here and work out counter-proposals. Right now I would like to call your attention in a preliminary way to several points of interest to both sides.

First, mention was made here of the influence which the Committee and the Foreign Affairs Ministry should exert on progress in internal legislation. This is vastly important for the country and its international prestige. We plan to hold a meeting on the subject in September but this isn't enough. One would like both Committee members, in particular members of the Subcommittee on Humanitarian and Scientific Cooperation, and Foreign Affairs Ministry officials to join in drafting even now. In attending a meeting of the Committee on Legislation, I realised on acquainting myself with the draft law on the press how very necessary it is for specialists in international affairs to step in.

Second, it might be useful—provided the Foreign Affairs Ministry was willing and concurred—to have either the Minister or a member of the Ministry's leadership speak on the concept of Soviet foreign policy in the context of perestroika and the drafting of the Soviet Constitution and other laws. They could help us work out a definite programme. It is perfectly obvious that we must add new elements to the concept and search for ways to write them into current legislation. I am not going to elaborate—I believe the idea is clear.

Third, the idea of Committee members joining in foreign policy activity in practice is a very important one. I would suggest that this be done in part after the model used by the US Senate. You know that when the State Department wants to look into a problem, to analyse it more freely, take the initiative or assume the role of mediator in a regional conflict it sends Senators to various parts of the globe. It might prove useful to send people's deputies abroad not only as delegation members but also as mediators. I mean both on our own behalf and in common with members of other parliaments.

Shouldn't we draw up a plan for cooperation with the Foreign Affairs Ministry covering a definite period? Specifically, our Subcommittee would be interested—I hope its members back me on this—in laying such a plan in the context of preparations for the 1991 Moscow Session of the CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension.

I would like to conclude on a critical note. It seems to me that with due regard to suggestions made at the Congress of People's Deputies, the Foreign Affairs Ministry should look into how our embassies see to the needs of Soviet citizens abroad. There are many complaints, even deputies come up against problems, to say nothing of ordinary people. It has long been a tradition for the Foreign Affairs Ministry to operate only on high levels. That is the main thing, of course, and we all appreciate the importance of that activity. But nowadays, with democratisation on, there is probably a case for probing into the matter specially, for analysing it and doing appropriate explaining among diplomats so as to awaken them to the need to help Soviet citizens abroad rather than keep aloof from them.

A. Dzasokhov. Good. Kirill Mazurov will now speak.

Kirill Mazurov. Cde. Petrovsky presented a really interesting report. I support Cde. Borovik's proposal that the newly-established Foreign Affairs Ministry division also concern itself with public organisations. Our Union of War and Labour Veterans is linked with over a hundred foreign organisations and is participating in the activities of six international organisations. Leningrad will soon host an international congress which our organisation is going to attend. But it isn't all smooth sailing in our relations with the Foreign Affairs Ministry. When we want the Ministry apparatus to enlighten us on some ques-

tion we get no recommendation as to who we should keep in constant touch with.

As regards the proposal that we Committee members be posted in greater measure on our foreign policy service, it would be desirable to have a leading Foreign Affairs Ministry official speak to us from this rostrum on a regular basis, at least once in three months, on major events in the world and foreign policy moves of the Soviet state.

A. Dzasokhov. Thank you. Does anyone else wish to speak? Shall we conclude the debate? Would you like to answer the questions, Vladimir Fyodorovich? Please.

V. Petrovsky. I wish to give my thanks—not just as a matter of protocol—to those here who spoke of our work with appreciation. We are doing our best to operate in close contact with the public, nor is it merely because this is in keeping with somebody's style but because it's an objective necessity. In attending international conferences and forums, we realise that we cannot carry on diplomacy in the traditional sense of the word, that is, as something closed and isolated from people-to-people diplomacy and from parliaments. The world is interdependent today, and therefore all structures engaged in foreign policy are closely interlocked. We proceed from this objective reality and stand for expanding the most diverse ties. You know that there are also proposals put forward at the level of our country's leadership and directed towards a broad restructuring of relations between, say, international and public organisations, toward bringing into being parallel assemblies of social forces that would contribute their concrete ideas to the activity of intergovernmental organisations. But as well as carrying out these plans, we probably need to work hard at diverse levels, on every "floor" of cooperation. It was suggested here that the Foreign Ministry apparatus have a special subdivision in charge of work with public organisations. I must tell you that the Department of International Organisations does have such a subdivision. But it might be advisable to merge this unit with the Division for Relations with the Supreme Soviet. Let us think together how this could be done. Let us first see how the new division functions, and afterwards let us modify its work accordingly.

It is a development of immense importance that with a political reform on, bringing national legislation into harmony with international commitments is becoming the main line. I fully subscribe to what Gennady Yanayev said here about social legislation. The process is currently asking a good many questions but many of them have already been answered in a whole number of international standards regarding, say, provision for old, poor and disabled people, settlement of social conflicts or measures to end tensions. Nor are the answers prompted by ideological considerations—they take account of the need to balance the interests of various countries and are based on international experience. I think we need to take inventory.

Now for conversion. We are working on the problem. I can tell you that at a meeting of socialist countries in Minsk which discussed preparations for the 44th Session of the UN General Assembly and is over now, the participants reached agreement on jointly submitting the problem of conversion to the session. I think the proposal voiced here for drawing the public into this process should be heeded by both our country and other socialist countries. We are working out this problem and will include it in our concrete proposals, which are likely to hold an important place at the upcoming session.

A further question raised here concerned personnel, the procedure of appointing ambassadors. We have stated our conception of the problem, we are not imposing any restrictions. When speaking of assigning ambassadors to the more important countries, please remember that there is the problem of workloads and of moving fast. However, the Committee itself should decide on its approach to the problem and establish its criteria of selecting candidates. As for us, we are ready to notify the Committee in time. Mention

was made of appointments known as political. We had many such appointments in the past, nor were they all fortunate. But from what international practice indicates, there is no avoiding all such appointments. At present, however, we have in the Committee on International Affairs an echelon which is going to help us solve these problems according to the prospective appointees' competence, experience and knowledge. Discussion also led to questions about our approach to the procedure of concluding treaties. Speakers made interesting proposals which we are ready to work on in collaboration with the Committee.

About the Union republics. What I spoke about in my report was primarily relations with the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the USSR. But this didn't imply anything like underestimating the role of the Union Republics. Indeed, we consider that the Union Republics must play a growing international role, must fully exercise their powers as laid down in the Constitution of the USSR. We already have concrete ideas about this. During Federico Mayor's stay in Moscow, we called outright for cooperation between the Union Republics and UNESCO. I think our delegations to the coming session of the UN General Assembly will include representatives of our republics. At all events, this trend will be promoted as we see it.

About complaints against our embassies. They are justified. I must tell you that not long ago this topic was discussed very frankly at a special Foreign Affairs Ministry meeting. Present here is the Chief of the Consular Department who can say specifically what steps are being taken in this connection. In late November and early December, for the first time in the history of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, all Soviet ambassadors and permanent representatives will hold a meeting to be addressed by the Minister. One of the main items on the agenda will be the problem of taking care of the interests of Soviet citizens on all levels. I mean all citizens carrying Soviet passports and either travelling or living abroad. This is a very serious and important matter. We would welcome your participation in this discussion. We are starting a relevant discussion in *International Affairs* by way of preparing for the coming meeting.

I suppose what will be discussed today is only a beginning, so to speak. This process will apparently unfold on a permanent basis. It is to be hoped that the tone set here will be reflected in all our practical efforts and our further cooperation.

A. Dzasokhov. I share the opinion voiced here that the Ministry offered a really interesting array of ideas and forms for use in our cooperation. Thus we have a reasonably large area for joint action. Recognising that there are favourable circumstances and prerequisites, I would like to make briefly some points.

First, as there is a vast variety of tasks, workloads as you rightly put it, we must single out and concentrate on priority tasks. This is my first point, which I see as fundamental.

Second, we must try to spare the Committee perfunctory duties. Unless we are strict in selecting questions to be dealt with by the Committee we are bound to doom it to effort bearing scant fruit. We must see to it that the questions submitted for discussion are important enough.

Third, a great interest is shown even now in extending ties with the Committee. It is shown by foreign parliaments as well as by embassies accredited to our country. I therefore support the idea expressed here that every meeting, especially with delegations arriving in our country, should be substantive in terms of contributing to the efforts of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. At the moment we are hosting a delegation of the French Commission for Defence, Foreign Affairs and Armed Forces. Yesterday I joined several members of the Committee on Defence and State Security in an hour-long conversation with the delegation. Suggestions were made during the meeting in favour of establishing partner relations. It occurred to me that in organising such

visits, we would do well to use information prepared by the Ministry. Regrettably, the idea of sounding out something, of posing questions for future discussion, as suggested by Fyodor Burlatsky never came up during our conversation with the French MPs. Yesterday we asked our guests to give us their views on the possibility of cooperation in "urging on" the conversion process. The question made then stop to think. This is probably the way to go about it also in the future.

Fourth, we should distinguish between the jobs of this Committee and its foreign counterparts. I think our Committee should closely combine efforts to ensure the conformity of our legislation to universally recognised international legal standards with growing cooperation with the Foreign Affairs Ministry and other entities concerned. This is why we also accept the proposal for the participation of members of the Committee on International Affairs in various activities.

A word about the publicity value of the problems we are discussing. There is no doubt that Committee meeting should be public as far as possible and should receive wide media coverage. We must remember that a document approved by the Committee or by the Supreme Soviet on the Committee's initiative authoritatively supports the efforts of our entire diplomatic service. I think this is something we mustn't underesimate. Generally speaking, the proposals made here are very interesting and echo our ideas. I move for putting the Ministry's report on file in our Committee to enable us to go back to it from time to time.

I move the following draft decision on the item under discussion: "The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs takes note of Cde. Vladimir Petrovsky's information. It welcomes the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR on the main lines and forms of its participation in the fulfilment of the tasks facing the Committee". This is my first point.

Second, the Committee finds it necessary to provide for regular reports to its meetings by leading Foreign Affairs Ministry officials on current problems of international politics.

Third, the Committee finds it necessary to draw the Foreign Affairs Ministry on a plan basis into the Committee's legislative and control activity with regard to meeting the international obligations assumed by the USSR.

Fourth, as a regular practice, there should be preliminary considerations at Committee meetings on a selective basis of candidates for the posts of ambassadors and permanent representatives of the USSR to international organisations.

You will recall that it was also proposed that the Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister in charge of personnel matters submit relevant proposals to us twice a year and that the Committee discuss them at special meetings. Incidentally, we usually look on this as a sort of secret rite. For instance, our ambassadors never know exactly when they are to be replaced. This is certainly very damaging to the prestige of our country.

Voice from the audience. Do we have to turn hearings into acts of approving ambassadors?

A. Dzasokhov. I believe there are two alternatives for our participation. One of them would consist in the prospective ambassadors addressing the Committee. The other alternative would consist in the Committee "okaying" candidates. I am against considering all candidates bar none but, even so, we need to decide on a common approach. Let us say that the Committee will periodically hear reports by ambassadors and permanent representatives on current aspects of their work. Afterwards the Committee could make it a permanent practice to consider proposals for the appointment of ambassadors. These are two different matters. Do you concur? The point is settled.

Lastly, the Committee recommends that the Supreme Soviet Secretariat take account in its plans of the suggestions made here by Committee members and the spokesman for the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Do you agree? Decided.

And now let me remind you that Eduard Shevardnadze said in his speech to this Committee and then to the Supreme Soviet that he was prepared to address the Session of the Supreme Soviet as Foreign Minister on current issues of the foreign policy of our state. I note with satisfaction the Minister's readiness to deliver such an address. But let us discuss when that should be done. It may well be that we will also hear another very important address to the Supreme Soviet in the wake of the top-level visits to Europe. After that we would proceed according to recommendations from the leadership of the Supreme Soviet.

Second item on the agenda: "Provisional Rules of the Consideration by the Supreme Soviet and Its Bodies of Questions Relating to the Ratification of International Treaties of the USSR". You will recall that on December 1, 1988, some amendments were made to the Constitution of the USSR. One of them stipulates that it shall be for the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to ratify and denounce international treaties. This implies that a relevant draft law must be submitted to the autumn Session of the Supreme Soviet. This will take time. The drafting is to be done both by this Committee and by other Supreme Soviet committees and the house committees concerned. Along with this, a number of international treaties signed by our country will have come up for ratification shortly. It might therefore be advisable to approve before the law is enacted Provisional Rules of Ratification for the guidance of members of the Supreme Soviet. You have a draft of the Provisional Rules. We will now exchange views on the draft, approve it and submit it to the Supreme Soviet on behalf of this Committee for discussion. Please be advised that as agreed with Sergei Alexeyev, Chairman of the Committee on Legislation, that committee will discuss the matter after us and then put together our suggestions and its own to submit them to the Supreme Soviet.

Please, comrades, who would like to comment? All the provisions of the draft have been agreed with the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Our colleagues in the Presidium apparatus have studied them for their part.

Ivan Laptev. I move writing into Paragraph 3 of the draft that the Committee on International Affairs may, with due regard to the nature and content of the international treaty submitted for ratification, examine, prepare and study it in a preliminary way in collaboration with other Supreme Soviet committees and house commissions. There is no need for any other general arguments.

A. Dzasokhov. Do you move deleting the enumerations of ministries, departments, and so on?

Voice from the audience. That is right because we are free to invite anyone to join in the Committee's work.

A. Dzasokhov. Shall we carry the motion on the understanding that we will invite experts whenever necessary? Very well. Any further comments?

Deputies. No.

A. Dzasokhov. The draft will go to another committee and then to the Supreme Soviet.

Third item on the agenda: "On Ratification of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions." I've already announced this item. Yuri Rybakov, Chief of the International Law Department of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, has the floor.

Yuri Rybakov. Comrade Chairman, comrade deputies, you have before you a proposal of the Soviet government for ratifying the protocols additional to the Geneva conventions of 1949 for the protection of victims of war. As you know, contemporary international law bans war as a means of settling international disputes. It considers aggressive war as the gravest international crime and places responsibility for starting such a war on the aggressor state. At the same time, international law recognises the legitimacy of individual and collective self-defence against aggression as well as armed struggle for freedom from colonial rule. Where war cannot be staved off, the behaviour

of all participants in it must follow international standards making up the content of international law in armed conflict.

The tragic experience of World War II necessitated the adoption in 1949 of the Geneva conventions on the protection of victims of war. There were four conventions: for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field; for the amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea; relative to the treatment of prisoners of war; and lastly, relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war.

The Soviet Union signed the conventions in 1949 and ratified them in 1954. By now the 1949 Geneva conventions have been signed by 166, or nearly all countries of the world except Myanmar, Bhutan, the Maldives and several other small countries.

The experience of the armed conflicts that have occurred since the adoption of the 1949 Geneva convention has shown that they don't provide adequate legal protection for war victims, especially in conditions typical of conflicts of the recent period, with military operations being carried on both by regular armies and by national liberation movements as well as by warring factions involved in civil war.

Besides, advances in military technology and its uses demanded a reinforcement of the humanitarian foundations of regulating hostilities according to law. The US war in Vietnam, which came to an end in 1973, abounded in, among other violations of international law, serious infringements by the American side of international humanitarian standards and added urgency to the problem. And so the 1974-1977 period saw the convening in Geneva of a diplomatic conference on international law applicable in armed conflicts. At its closing sitting in June 1977, the conference approved two protocols additional to the Geneva conventions on the protection of war victims: Protocol I relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, and Protocol II—relating to the protection of victims of noninternational armed conflicts. The 1977 protocols went a considerable way towards filling gaps in international humanitarian law. I must say that according to an analysis made by the International Committee of the Red Cross, nearly 150 of the 600 provisions contained in the documents—for they add up to a large book—are new legal standards. The Soviet Union took an active part in drafting the protocols and was among the first to sign them.

A word about the substance of the protocols.

Protocol I considerably extends legal protection for war victims, that is, civilians, medical staff and institutions, means of transport. It limits the right of the belligerents to choose means of warfare. Specifically, it prohibits so-called indiscriminate attack, that is, attack that may result in hitting civilian targets along with military ones, including power plants, dams and other facilities of a similar nature. Great credit is due to the Protocol for introducing an element of environmental protection into the laws and customs of conventional war, in particular by banning military operations inflicting lasting damage on the natural environment.

Provisions of fundamental significance bind the parties to conform their actions to the principle of humaneness by using a minimum of force and avoiding brutality in pursuing their aims. In developing, acquiring and introducing new weapons and in studying ways and means of warfare countries have an obligation to ascertain whether the use of these means is not banned by the protocol or by other standards of international law. It is prohibited to use hunger among the civilian population as a means of warfare. Persons belonging to civil defence organisation are accorded wide-ranging legal protection. There is an article on measures for the protection of journalists on dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict. The protocol deals with the obligation of the belligerents to establish the whereabouts of missing persons and return the remains of the dead.

For the first time in the history of international law, armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial rule, foreign occupation and racist regimes are classed as international conflicts. Serious violations of the protocol and the conventions are qualified as war crimes. There is an important innovation in the form of a mechanism of ensuring proper compliance by states and their armed forces with the standards set by the Protocol and the Conventions. Among other things, an international fact-finding commission shall be set up at the request of one of the parties to a conflict and with the consent of the other party to investigate serious violations of these documents. The commission shall report on the results of its work, including the results of investigating violations, to the parties and submit the necessary recommendations. It shall be set up after its competence is recognised on a reciprocal basis by 20 signatories to the Protocol. So far this has been done by 11 states, and therefore no commission has yet been appointed.

Protocol II regulates the behaviour of countries in internal armed conflicts. It is practically the first international legal document extending humane provisions of the laws and customs of war to internal conflict situations, that is, to civil wars. The protocol establishes general principles for applying humanitarian standards to those involved in an internal conflict irrespective of which party they belong to and establishes safeguards against arbitrary practices. It does not apply to internal tensions or unrest and hence does not cover individual acts of violence. Nor does it affect the sovereign rights of states, in particular the right of governments to use any lawful means for ensuring law and order and safeguarding the unity and territorial integrity of the countries concerned.

The Protocols additional to the Geneva conventions were opened for ratifying in December 1977 and became effective in December 1978. As of now, Protocols I and II have been ratified by 84 and 74 countries respectively. Most of the parties to both protocols are developing, small, neutral or socialist countries. They latter include Hungary, Laos, Yugoslavia and China. Some states have only joined Protocol I and others, only Protocol II. As regards big military powers, such as the United States, Britain, the FRG and Japan, they have yet to ratify the protocols. France has only ratified Protocol II, the US administration has taken a stand against recognising the international character of national liberation wars. Besides, it has alleged, with reference to standards constituting additional legal protection for guerrillas, that the protocol justifies terrorist methods of conducting military operations.

Some parties to the protocols have taken advantage of the right to formulate reservations and make statements either in signing and ratifying the protocols or in acceding to them. Various reservations have so far been made by 20 countries. The reservations and statements made by the Nordic countries, for example, come down to the idea that in meeting commitments under the protocols, these countries will proceed from their national legislations. Statements by Arab countries stress that their accession to the protocols doesn't at all mean recognising Israel. Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands have made statements of much the same kind as the United States did when signing. With reference to the records of diplomatic conferences, the statements describe the aim of the protocols as giving greater legal protection to victims of none but armed conflicts in which conventional weapons are used. They said that the protocol does not apply to international standards of using other means, that is, weapons of mass destruction, nuclear ones included.

Competent Soviet agencies which have studied the issue of reservations concerning the protocols are of the opinion that the Soviet Union can ratify both documents without making any reservations or interpretative statements whatever. They only propose making positive statements on Article 90 of Protocol I, in particular about recognising on a reciprocal basis the competence of the international fact-finding commission to be entrusted with

establishing violations of standards of the protocols and the Geneva conventions. Please note that the Soviet Union's proposal for ratifying the protocols comes 12 years after they were adopted at Geneva. The main reason for this is that throughout these years the Soviet Union has been calling on big military powers—the United States, Britain, France, the FRG and Japan—to come to terms on ratifying them simultaneously, which would have been the best solution both politically and juridically. Our country has made proposals to this effect at UN General Assembly sessions. Regrettably, our appeals have found no positive response as yet. I must say that the trend of ratifying the protocols or acceding to them has on the whole been such that many countries didn't become parties to them until lately. There were ten countries in 1984, seven in 1985, eleven in 1986 and five in 1987.

Spokesmen for some big military powers, including the FRG and Britain, which haven't joined the protocols, have intimated to us that by ratifying the protocols, the Soviet Union would make it easier for them to decide on joining these international agreements.

The US position is uncompromising for the time being.

In line with the philosophy of new political thinking, and with the current Soviet policy of humanising international relations and strengthening international law and order, it has now been found advisable to propose that the Soviet Union ratify these important international legal instruments. We feel that we would thus acquire the moral right to step up our effort both at government level and at the level of international parliamentary ties, people-to-people diplomacy and the Red Cross movement with a view to making the protocols truly universal instruments of international law, that is, to exerting positive influence on big military powers.

The provisions of the two protocols contain no international obligations unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Our country's commitments under the protocols contradict neither the Constitution nor the relevant provisions of Soviet legislation. Soviet ratification of the protocols would contribute tangibly to the humanisation of international relations and help extend in international humanitarian law the principle of humaneness, which along with the principle of military necessity forms a balanced basis for regulating according to law the conduct of states during armed conflicts.

I would like to conclude by expressing the hope that this Committee will endorse the government's proposal for ratifying the Additional protocols.

A. Dzasokhov. Interest in the Geneva agreements is great. Many participants in international forums recall how sharply and controversially the provisions of the agreements were interpreted in the past. I myself came up against this problem at the conference on racial discrimination in 1977, shortly after the protocols were signed. And so I ask: Wouldn't ratification result in any political embarrassments for us? Didn't, say, the Afghan problem create embarrassments for us? Why is it that we haven't yet ratified the protocols?

Y. Rybakov. A similar question could be put to any other big military power, including those that keep of the Afghan situation, at least nominally. The press may allege that we didn't join the protocols until after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. I have already pointed out, however, that our attitude was entirely different. As for political embarrassments due to the presence of our troops in Afghanistan in the past, the protocols are not retroactive, according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of International Treaties. In view of this, we don't expect ratification to cause any embarrassments.

G. Yanayev. I would like to repeat what may seem a naive question: Why did we refuse for 12 years to ratify the protocols? It is said that all through that time we were waiting for the other great powers to ratify them but I don't see that as a proper explanation. That is a nominal explanation. The main reason must still have been what Alexander Dzasokhov spoke about. The

Committee should certainly reject such nominal explanations, all the more because we have just put it on record that the United States still refuses to ratify the protocols, sticking to its earlier position.

A. Dzasokhov. Let us think, let us exchange opinions. Cde. Mazurov, please.

K. Mazurov. Wouldn't ratification of those documents involve difficulties for us, such as might be created by the Japanese and West German authorities, which are interested in ascertaining the burial places of their servicemen and in visiting those places? Besides, do the provisions of the protocols apply to guerrillas and other insurgents?

A. Dzasokhov. My question is: Has Pakistan signed the protocols?

Y. Rybakov. No, Pakistan hasn't joined them.

Generally speaking, the protocols contain many positive elements. Our delegation took a positive stand at the 1977 diplomatic conference and afterwards. All instructions were aimed at supporting the protocols. The Soviet position was fully put into effect in drafting the documents. Whether or not our explanation of the reasons for the delay in ratification is nominal or real is, of course, a matter for anyone to assess and take a stand on. What I have said about the Soviet attitude to the protocols is true. It's an incontrovertible fact that for many years we proposed that all big powers should ratify the protocols simultaneously. We also adhered to this position when our troops were still in Afghanistan although ratification at that time could have been used for propaganda against us.

As regards the problem of burial places, the protocols are not retroactive, which means that neither the FRG nor Japan have a formal right to complain. But the protocols in their entirety support the trend towards solving these problems in the humanitarian spirit now in evidence.

They cover national liberation movements and apply to guerrillas and other insurgents as participants in them.

The question was asked whether ratification shouldn't be put off. By contrast, spokesmen for the International Committee of the Red Cross are earnestly asking us to expedite it. They consider that this would help influence the United States, whose position is completely inflexible. We proposed to the United States joint ratification of the protocols but it stands pat. One reason for this stance of Washington is that during the 1977 diplomatic conference, some delegations said Protocol I banned the use of nuclear arms. Yet there is no outright ban. Actually, it does include provisions making the use of nuclear weapons practically incompatible with its substance. The Protocol is positive in this sense.

When working on the problem, we asked ourselves whether we should make any statement regarding nuclear arms. We came to the conclusion that there is no need for it. Had we stated that Protocol I didn't apply to nuclear weapons, the response would have been negative. And had we taken a different stand by stressing that there were provisions making it practically impossible to use nuclear arms, the Americans would have objected, and so you and we would have no opportunity for parliamentary work, for work through people-to-people diplomacy, through diplomatic channels, to induce the United States to accede to Protocol. The Geneva conventions and the protocols additional to them represent an important international legal instrument. I am convinced that we should ratify the protocols now and that we stand to benefit from this.

Anatoly Ananyev. I wish to make some comments that may sound emotional, wish to voice my sentiments. I read novels as a magazine editor but this time I had to read 100-odd pages of protocols. As a man engaged in people-to-people and not official diplomacy, I found it a hard task at first but afterwards I got into my stride and read all those pages. I'll tell you straight away that I stand for ratifying the protocols without qualification. This should be done regardless of the fine points there may be.

I was overwhelmed with recollections, terrible recollections of war. We didn't sign the convention on prisoners of war at the time. What that did to our soldiers is well known—millions of them were in concentration and not prisoner-of-war camps. There was a paragraph in our Field Manual—we need to know that, too—which said that Soviet soldiers should never surrender. That is why we refused to sign the convention. The result was a tragedy that claimed millions of lives.

When reading the protocols, I continuously visualised the vast panorama of human suffering. This is why we now say that we must ratify the protocols. Let us think of something more than the likely impact on today's life. We should think of a far more distant future. Life is complicated, and anything may happen. Of course, the protocols contain some completely new provisions that are very positive and important for us. The United States must have its reasons for opposing ratification but I don't think we should heed that.

Secondly, it is very important to see how the protocols will square with our laws, in particular our field manuals.

G. Yanayev. Shouldn't we contribute an article to the monthly *International Affairs* to spell that out?

A. Dzasokhov. Let us do it. Do you all have the Committee's draft opinion? Do you agree with it?

Deputies. We do.

A. Dzasokhov. That means we should prepare the item for the Supreme Soviet. Let us continue according to the agenda. I ask Victor Zelenov, Chief of the Foreign Ministry's Consular Department to present a report. He was appointed to his highly exacting job a relatively short time, and I wish him success on behalf of all of us.

Victor Zelenov. Comrade deputies, in conformity with Article 12 of the Law on the Procedure of Concluding, Executing and Denouncing International Treaties, you have before you a Consular Convention between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Turkish Republic. It is the 62nd bilateral consular convention that we have concluded or are preparing for conclusion. The talks on signing the convention went on for a long time. There were several meetings at the level of consular delegations and experts. The Soviet side sought the inclusion in the convention of provisions guaranteeing the inviolability of consular premises and consular mail and granting all the privileges and complete immunity to consular officials. The Turkish side proposed incomplete solutions for a long time, which prevented a compromise. In the end, however, we arrived at a certain balance of interests.

The convention in the wording you have before you guarantees the inviolability of consular premises and defines with a fair degree of completeness the function and status of consular officials, their personal immunity and the extent of privileges and immunity. The two sides stick to their respective conceptions of consular mail. A protocol to the convention defines the nature of their actions in this respect. On April 27, 1988, the two countries' deputy Foreign Ministers signed the convention in Ankara. Article 60 of the convention provides for its ratification by the Turkish and Soviet parliaments. In March 1989, Turkey's National Assembly ratified the convention in the form now before you.

The time that has passed since the signing of the convention has been marked by dynamic progress in Soviet-Turkish relations. We continue helping Turkey in the construction of plants and other facilities. Last year Soviet-Turkish trade was worth about 400 million rubles. There is an agreement on trade for the period ahead providing for a substantial increase. Scientific and technological ties are expanding. In March 1989, we agreed a programme for cultural and scientific exchanges, opened two-way road traffic via Sarpi on the Soviet-Turkish border and reached agreement on establishing a Soviet consulate general in Trabzon. The two sides are working on establishing a Turkish consulate general in Baku in addition to the one in Batumi, as well as

on the details of a bilateral consular agreement to simplify visa formalities. I am giving you but a general idea of the trend of relations with that country. The Soviet consular service is represented in Turkey by consulates general in Istanbul and Trabzon and a consular department in Ankara. We have 512 Soviet citizens serving in Turkey. Fifty-one Soviet citizens living in that country have been registered in our consulates there. Last year the number of citizens who visited their relatives in Turkey or the Soviet Union more than doubled against 1987. All this suggests that consular services covering bilateral ties must be performed on a solid legal basis. We believe the bilateral Consular Convention submitted to you meets this purpose.

The convention's entry into force will be a further step toward promoting good-neighbourly relations with Turkey. It will improve consular protection for our citizens on Turkish territory and enable our consular offices in that country to function more effectively. The convention will enable Soviet consulates in Turkey to contribute more effectively to the maintenance of our political, economic and humanitarian ties and contacts, which fully accords with the provisions of the Vienna document. In view of the foregoing, I ask the Committee to discuss the convention submitted to it and to recommend it to the Supreme Soviet for ratification if there is no objection.

Voice from the audience. We all remember the recent dramatic incident over our plane hijacked to Turkey. Could the convention be used somehow to influence the Turkish authorities?

V. Zelenov. Had we already had a legal document there would have been a more solid legal basis for all procedures of meeting with the hijacker, of contacts with him. The document would have enabled us to negotiate the matter with the Turkish government more persistently, giving stronger arguments and acting with better reason.

A. Dzasokhov. Shall we resolve to approve a recommendation for the Supreme Soviet to ratify the Soviet-Turkish Consular Convention? Motion carried.

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE IN A "COMMON EUROPEAN HOME"

Anders BJÖRCK

FROM NOW ON, representatives of the Soviet Union, of Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia can join in the deliberations of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly. This is indeed a remarkable development. President Mikhail Gorbachev spelt out many of its implications in a historic speech to the Assembly on 6 July 1989. The warm reception given to this speech by my colleagues in the Parliamentary Assembly—members of the national parliaments of our 23 member countries—testifies to their appreciation of the Soviet leader's understanding of what the Council of Europe stands for, as well as to their readiness to develop an operational role for our Organisation in the broader process of "pan-European" cooperation.

What, then, are the opportunities and parameters which the Council of Europe offers for the realisation of the concept of a common European home?

First, I must explain what the Council of Europe is. Then it will be easier to grasp the reasons for the changing phases of our relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe since the Second World War. Finally, we will be able to sketch, with a sense of historical perspective, the opportunities for cooperation which the Council of Europe represents.

ORIGINS AND SPECIFICITY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

THE ORIGINS OF the Council of Europe are sometimes traced to a War Cabinet communication of October 1942 of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill: "I look forward to a United States of Europe in which the barriers between the nations will be greatly minimised and unrestricted travel will be possible. I hope to see the economy of Europe studied as a whole. I hope to see a Council...". He followed this up with a radio broadcast and then, though no longer in public office, in his celebrated speech in Zürich of September 1946. The ideas and ideals were shared in mainland Europe, and were brought to forceful political expression through a "Congress of Europe" at The Hague in May 1948. The seeds were thus sown for the Council of Europe's statute, which was signed in London a year later on behalf of 10 governments—from countries of which all but two (Norway and Sweden) are today members of the 12-country European Community.

Anders Björck is President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe since May 1989. He was born in 1944 in the city of Nässjö (Sweden). In 1969 elected Deputy to the Riksdag (parliament) of Sweden from the moderate Coalition Party. Member of the party's leadership, Vice-President of the Riksdag's Constitutional Commission. Since 1976 works in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. This article was written specially for INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

Today, the Council of Europe has 23 member countries, including all 12 of the Community—which itself includes all 9 of the defence-oriented Western European Union.

Moreover, most countries of the Council of Europe also cooperate in the frameworks offered by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which has both Atlantic and Pacific dimensions to its membership, as well as in those of the Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations and of UNESCO.

SO WHAT MAKES THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE SPECIAL?

FIRST OF ALL, it continues to embody a gradualist intergovernmental approach to European questions. Although there is good and growing cooperation with the European Community, the latter reflects an integrationist vision of the future of Europe and is driven primarily by economic concerns—as today, above all, in the establishment by 1993 of a single market.

Secondly, the Council of Europe has sought increasingly in recent years to link the provision it makes for cooperation between its members to the criteria which determine and limit its membership—notably in regard to human rights.

Thirdly, the integration of the principles of “representative democracy” in its decision process—through the workings of our Parliamentary Assembly.

Let us start by looking at the second of these features, since the significance of granting “special guest” status in our Parliamentary Assembly to delegations from the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia can only be fully appreciated in the context of the criteria which determine our decisions on “full membership”.

THE HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSION

AT THE ROOT of these criteria is a very precise conception of the principles which should govern relations between the State and the individual citizen. As set forth in the Statute signed in London in 1949, these principles—which are declared to form “the basis of all genuine democracy”—are *individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law*. These principles are presented moreover as derivable from a common European heritage of “spiritual and moral values”.

Although not so easy to articulate simply and briefly, there is accordingly at the heart of the Council of Europe a quintessential concept which was given practical expression in the year following the Organisation’s creation through what still today is its most celebrated achievement: the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Convention is based on a “...profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance of the human rights upon which they depend.”

For the first time, among governments of European countries with “a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law”, and effective regional enforcement machinery was established, under which any person within the jurisdiction of a signatory State could lodge complaints against the government.

This was—and remains—a remarkable innovation in international law, to such an extent that “the right of individual petition” was made optional at the time the Convention was concluded in 1950. But today this right is accepted by almost all of the Council of Europe’s member

countries.¹ It represents the purest distillation of our Organisation's philosophy of the primacy of the individual in his or her relations with the State.

Our Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, inspired by and designed to give effective force to the principles of the Universal Declaration proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in December 1948, on its entry into force in 1953, thus established not only principles of international control of the actions of national governments but also a new status in international law accorded to the individual. The latter has direct access to an international control system consisting of an investigatory Commission and a Court, the aim of which is to ensure observance of the rights guaranteed under the Convention. This system is not designed to take the place of national systems but to provide an international guarantee in addition to the rights of redress in individual countries. Indeed, proceedings before the Strasbourg institutions cannot be started until all possible remedies available at national level have been exhausted.

There is no comparable system of international control elsewhere in the world, though encouraging developments are now underway in other regions—notably under the Inter-American Convention, which has similar machinery, and in Africa. Moreover, the constitutions of many countries which have become independent since 1953 contain guarantees of human rights directly inspired by the European Convention. Its effect is thus felt in regions of the world far beyond Europe.

There is however no disguising the fact that the concept of limitation of national State sovereignty in regard to the protection of the political and civil rights of individuals (a limitation, let us remember, derived from a country's shared heritage of "spiritual and moral values") is not easy to reconcile with the concept of the State as the expression of the collective rights of a people to particular forms of socio-economic development and culture. The discourse on human rights of the Council of Europe is thus not always concordant with that developed from time to time within the UN system.

THE PRINCIPLE OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

AS WE HAVE CELEBRATED in recent years the 300th anniversary of the British Revolution and the 200th anniversary of the American Constitution and this year the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution, the Council of Europe's distinctive linkage of values, principles and rights is very much in the forefront of our minds. It certainly gives us reason to rejoice in the developments which are making it possible today to open the deliberations of our Parliamentary Assembly to "special guest" delegations of the Soviet Union, of Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia.

And this brings me to the functioning of our Parliamentary Assembly—with approaching 200 representatives and an equivalent number of "alternates" from the national parliaments of our 23 member countries—as the third and, for the purposes of my exposition, the final aspect of the council of Europe which makes it quite distinctive on the international scene. Apart from the nine-country defence-oriented Western European Union (whose Assembly indeed has the same delegations as ours), there is no other intergovernmental organisation in which the deliberations *and decisions* of nationally-elected parliamentarians are an integral part of its functioning.

For this is the basic principle of the Council of Europe: a Committee of Foreign Ministers (or their Deputies, mostly resident in Strasbourg)—in addition to its own powers of initiative—takes decisions

on proposals contained in Recommendations of a Parliamentary Assembly.

As the Organisation has come to evolve, its Committee of Ministers is also faced with proposals arising from its "steering committees", from "conference of specialised ministers" and from individual governments. But the underlying principle of a dialogue between Foreign Ministers and nationally-elected parliamentarians retains its pristine and vital force—not least because this element of "representative democracy" in our composition is integrally linked to the operation of the human rights machinery. As Assembly parliamentarians, we *elect* the judges of the European Court from lists of candidates nominated by governments; and we *propose* candidates, for election by the Committee of Ministers, to the Human Rights Commission. Moreover, we also elect the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General of the Council of Europe and the Clerk (having rank of Deputy Secretary-General) of our Parliamentary Assembly.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE'S "OST-POLITIK"

THESE SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS of the Council of Europe help to explain some very sharp transitions in our relations hitherto with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.

Curiously, it is mostly forgotten that our "founding fathers" themselves believed in the concept of a "common European home".

When the Council of Europe was first set up, with Stalin in power in the Soviet Union, relations were non-existent. But the concept found expression in our Parliamentary Assembly through the establishment of its *committee on relations with European non-member countries*, which gave hearings to organisations representing refugees from Eastern Europe. This helped in fact to create an image, in some minds, of the Council of Europe as a "cold war" organisation, as some kind of ideological extension of the Western military alliance.

A first period of tentative moves towards constructive relations was initiated by British Secretary-General Peter Smithers in 1964. He insisted that the Council of Europe was open to cooperation with any European country prepared to respect the spirit and conditions of our Statute. This was endorsed by the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers. In 1967 he accepted an invitation to Warsaw to address the Polish Institute of International Relations. Unofficial talks on the possible adherence of Poland to our "European Cultural Convention" were cut short in 1968 following events in Czechoslovakia.

A second period of constructive moves was initiated in the aftermath of the signing of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975. The Parliamentary Assembly gave close and intense scrutiny to the negotiation of the Final Act, and thereafter to its implementation and monitoring. The renewed possibility of the Council of Europe as a frame for cooperation was accordingly then much in the mind of our Austrian Secretary-General Franz Karasek. These hopes disappeared with the onset of the war in Afghanistan in 1979.

Hopes revived with the new style of leadership in the Soviet Union inaugurated by President Mikhail Gorbachev and other far-sighted leaders, together with developments in the countries to which "special guest" status with our Parliamentary Assembly has just been accorded. Responses from the Council of Europe were not slow to emerge. Confirmation of the essentially open nature of the Council of Europe was given in 1985 in a resolution of the Committee of Ministers on European cultural identity, of which the following passage found a most welcome

echo in President Gorbachev's speech: "...common traditions and European identity as the product of a common cultural history are not delimited by the frontiers separating different political systems in Europe"; the Council of Europe was declared as standing"... in continued readiness for cultural cooperation". In 1987 our previous Secretary-General Marcelino Oreja (Spain), in an address to the Hungarian Academy of Science, urged a policy of "thinking European" rather than in terms of East and West. And in June this year, in an interview with *Izvestia*, our current Secretary-General, Catherine Lalumière (France) called for constructive proposals.

Naturally, the granting of "special guest" status by our Parliamentary Assembly is conceived as a bridge to participation in the life and workings of the Council of Europe which goes beyond cultural cooperation. For the latter indeed we have flexible arrangements under the European Cultural Convention which long permitted the full participation and contribution of Finland before it became a full member of the Council of Europe last May.

"SPECIAL GUEST" STATUS IN THE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

"SPECIAL GUEST" status arises from a renewal of contacts in the last two years between our Assembly and the national legislative assemblies of the four countries concerned. In particular, the visit to Strasbourg of a Supreme Soviet delegation in April 1987 was reciprocated last month when I led our own Assembly's delegation to Moscow. My predecessors had already laid the foundations for new relationships with Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia; and the whole set of these developments had in some sense achieved their consecration through the convening of the First Conference of Presidents of Legislative Assemblies of CSCE countries in Warsaw in November 1988.

The response thereto of our Parliamentary Assembly was given in the opening paragraphs of Resolution 917 adopted last May. I quote them in full:

"The Assembly,

considering that relations between the Council of Europe and certain Central and East European states have improved and intensified over recent years, and that this trend should be duly taken into account in its reflections on the future role of the Council of Europe;

believing that it is desirable to promote cooperation with the national legislative assemblies of these states;

expressing the desire that representatives of these legislative assemblies attend its plenary sessions,

decides to draw up a 'special guest' status for the national legislative assemblies of Central and East European states which will be invited to take part in its sessions under the following conditions..."

The significant conditions are that only countries will be invited which have shown their interest and which apply and implement the Helsinki Final Act and the instruments adopted at the CSCE conferences, together with the 1966 UN international covenants on civil and political rights and on economic, social and cultural rights; that the "special guest" delegations must reflect various currents of opinion within the national legislative assemblies which appoint them; and that the Parliamentary Assembly shall itself decide, at the opening of each of its annual sessions, on the renewal of the credentials of its "special guest" delegations, just as it does for all "full member" delegations.

The next step was to embody these provisions in our Rules of

Procedure. This was done on 5 July—on the eve of President Gorbachev's address—again by way of adoption of a resolution. The important specifications are that "special guest" delegates can speak in plenary debates with the prior authorisation of the Bureau of the Assembly but will not take part in votes. If credentials are contested on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph 4 of Resolution 917 (now incorporated in an article of rules of procedure), a joint meeting of the Committee on European Non-Member Countries and of the Committee on Rules of Procedure will be convened to examine the cause of complaint and report thereon to the Bureau. The Bureau consists of the President and 14 Vice-Presidents (reflecting geographical composition) and can meet in an enlarged gathering including the Chairmen of our five political groups—Socialist (121 members), Christian Democrat (82 members), European Democrat or "Conservative" (67 members), Liberal (51 members) and Communist (15 members). These groups, which express the plurality of opinions and political currents of our national parliaments, have become increasingly influential in the life of the Assembly in recent years and accordingly better organised; they also provide a natural link with the same political currents in the European Parliament of the 12-country European Community.

The final specifications are that participation of "special guest" delegates in the work of Assembly committees (in preparation for debates in plenary) will be left—in accordance with a longstanding philosophy of the Assembly in regard to respect for the autonomy of its subsidiary bodies as a pre-condition of their vitality—to the discretion of each committee; and that size of the "special guest" delegations will be 18 for the Soviet Union and six apiece for Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia.²

THE BUILDING OF A "COMMON EUROPEAN HOME"

I HAVE SAID that "special guest" status in our Parliamentary Assembly should be regarded as a bridge. But a bridge to what?

Personally, in the long term, I look forward to developments which will enable the countries concerned to become full members of the Council of Europe.

Meanwhile, it should be a bridge to closer involvement in the intergovernmental cooperative activities of the Council of Europe, for which the Assembly is not directly responsible but on which it exercises (or seeks to exercise) continuing influence and has provided, for many activities, the originating impulse.

It is thus that a "common European home" will be slowly built. And it is moreover not as if the ground was unprepared.

Since 1987 Yugoslavia has been a full participant under the European Cultural Convention, which in addition to culture covers education, sport and youth. The country has observer status at some of our specialised ministerial conferences and in some of our committees of experts, and an association agreement with our Social Development Fund.

In the fields of education and culture, both Hungary and Poland have been invited to accede to the European Cultural Convention and meanwhile to send observers to the committees of experts which operate thereunder. Both attended the Ministerial Conference on Sport in Reykjavik last month and have been invited to our Ministerial Conference on Education in Istanbul this coming October. The Soviet Union and East European countries are already regular participants in the pan-European conferences on educational research and on equivalence of university degrees and higher education qualifications which we organise in collaboration with UNESCO.

In the field of natural environment protection, both Hungary and Poland are invited to send observers to the monitoring committee of our Bern Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, and Hungary is invited to accede to the Convention; and Soviet experts took part last year in a wildlife protection workshop.

In the field of legal cooperation, Hungary is invited to accede to our Convention on Information on Foreign Law. The Hungarian Minister of Justice took part as an observer in the informal meeting of European Ministers of Justice held last month at The Hague.

In the media field, Hungary and Poland are invited to send experts to a "round table" on East-West audiovisual cooperation in Strasbourg this coming November, as part of the programme of our mass media steering committee.

Hungary and Poland are also invited to the symposium on historic towns in Cambridge this coming September, organised by our Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities.

In the field of health, Hungary and Poland are invited to send observers to our committee on rehabilitation and resettlement of the disabled.

And finally, Soviet experts are invited to join in a programme of research on earthquake prevention which is among activities promoted by our group for cooperation in the prevention of, protection against and organisation of relief in the event of major natural and technological disasters.

This brief list will already have given some impression of the range of our activities. The only area which by Statute, we shall not get involved in is defence. But in fact, on the intergovernmental side, we do nothing in agriculture, trade and economics, on the principle (which might always be challenged) that matters are being handled satisfactorily for our countries within other international or transnational organisations.³

Nor, as yet, do we run large-scale programmes, of the kind one finds in some major international science and technology organisations.

With less than 1,000 officials and a budget of \$60 million, and with over 120 intergovernmental committees and over 50 committees and sub-committees in the Parliamentary Assembly, it is clear that our role chiefly lies—with nonetheless spectacular exceptions in the shape of the Court and Commission of Human Rights, the Social Development Fund, the Cultural Fund, the Pharmacopoeia...—in organising the kind of meetings which either lead to concerted policy and action at national levels or in other international frameworks, or to specialised exchanges of experience as a catalyst to technical cooperation.

In fact, in the forty years we have been operating, we have brought to conclusion 130 legally binding European treaties or "Conventions"—which amount to the equivalent of 25,000 bilateral agreements. More recently we have launched a series of "public awareness" campaigns—on protection of the national environment, protection of the architectural heritage, "North/South" interdependence and solidarity.

Outstanding among our conventions are those against terrorism, on cross-border television, on the prevention of torture (the latter entailing the setting-up of an independent monitoring committee with far-reaching powers of inspection), on protection of the archeological heritage, on the legal status of migrant workers, on the peaceful settlement of disputes and in the fields of penal law and animal protection.⁴

As already explained, in the field of human rights the Parliamentary Assembly is involved in some of the processes of operating these conventions—which gives it a permanent vantage point of scrutiny, from which significant influence may occasionally be exerted.

There are also a number of intergovernmental steering committees to which the Parliamentary Assembly has access through representatives or observers, as well as to most of the specialised ministerial conferences.

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE'S DISTINCTIVE ROLE

"TO TRANSFORM international relations in the spirit of humanism, equality and justice and by setting an example of democracy and social achievements...": these words from President Gorbachev's address to us on 6 July 1989 might almost serve to epitomise the aspirations which underlie the Council of Europe's activities and programmes.

On the side of the Parliamentary Assembly, we are prepared to act as a forum for clarification of all aspects of a "common European home"—including politics, economics and technology, and the sustaining of good relations and exchanges across the Atlantic. Today, at least, in the words of President Gorbachev in Strasbourg: "...the Soviet Union and the United States are a natural part of the European international and political structure".

On the side of our Committee of Ministers, in the light of its recent 40th anniversary reassessment of the Council of Europe's role, it is clear that stronger relationships with the institutions, programmes and policies of the 12-country European Community are henceforth to be accompanied by strong, clear and positive responses to developments in Eastern and Central Europe—and that all initiatives for closer involvement of the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia in our intergovernmental work and activities are to be welcomed.

As stated in the *declaration on the future role of the Council of Europe in European construction* which the Committee of Ministers adopted on 5 May 1989, cooperation with East European countries "...should lead to the promotion of human rights, the rapprochement of individuals and groups across frontiers and the finding of solutions to the challenges of society today, thus contributing to awareness of Europe's cultural identity and of the heritage Europeans share in the values of democracy and freedom".

President Gorbachev has indicated some very precise areas for cooperation—such as satellite broadcasting and communications (as, for example, in "distance teaching"); science, culture and youth exchanges; environmental planning and transfrontier cooperation between regional and local authorities; comparisons of legal and social systems; protection of a shared cultural heritage, including minority languages... The Council of Europe will be ready to examine such opportunities—most notably in the fields of human rights, environmental protection and culture, but also on questions of legal harmonisation and terrorism.

In my speech of welcome to President Gorbachev in Strasbourg, I said that we were witnessing a new dimension in our efforts to unite Europe. I saluted the President's actions for disarmament and the establishment of a climate of peace and confidence. I said that the Council of Europe could not but steadfastly remain dedicated to its values of political pluralism, the role of law and respect for human rights. I said we could not be satisfied until our continent was rid of divisions inherited from the Second World War, which separated peoples sharing a common cultural heritage and a European identity.

We are at the beginning of a new era in the field of East-West relations. The invitation to President Gorbachev and the creation of "special guest" status were initiatives of the Parliamentary Assembly. First Vice-President Lukyanov told the Assembly delegation which I led in Moscow last June that cooperation between the Council of Europe and

the Soviet Union and other countries with "special guest" status should be increased "step-by-step". I foresee areas other than those mentioned in this article in which cooperation might take place in the future. I am also convinced that new methods of cooperation can be developed. The introduction of "special guest" status shows the flexibility and pragmatism which our Parliamentary Assembly can display.

The granting—and acceptance— of "special guest" status in our Parliamentary Assembly for delegations from the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia may seem relatively small steps in a long historical perspective. But only a few years ago such steps could scarcely have been imagined. May they be the prelude to giant strides in *perestroika*, *glasnost* and *détente*.

ANNEX "A": THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE⁵ IN FACTS AND FIGURES

Origins and Membership

THE COUNCIL, Europe's oldest (1949) and broadest-based political organisation:

- groups 23 West European democracies⁶;
- is distinct from the 12-nation European Community (Common Market);
- has its headquarters in Strasbourg;
- celebrates its 40th anniversary this year.

Aims

THE COUNCIL works for European unity:

- by defending individual rights and parliamentary democracy;
- through the development of Europe-wide agreements to standardise member countries' social and legal practices;
- by promoting awareness of a European identity transcending different cultures.

How It Works

THE COUNCIL is an intergovernmental organisation with:

- a Committee of 23 (Foreign) Ministers or their Deputies (Permanent Representatives);
- over 120 intergovernmental committees covering the Organisation's main fields of activity: human rights, legal cooperation, social and economic questions, education, culture and sport, youth, public health, environment and local government;
- a Parliamentary Assembly (not to be confused with the EEC's directly-elected European Parliament); President: Anders Björck (Sweden); Clerk of the Assembly: Heiner Klebes (Federal Republic of Germany) 354 MPs (177 representatives and 177 substitutes) from the 23 national parliaments representing nearly 400 million Europeans, whose work is prepared by 52 parliamentary Committees and subcommittees;
- a Secretariat housed in the Palais de l'Europe, Strasbourg (France);
- Secretary-General: Catherine Lalumière (France); 900 European officials.

Official Languages

FRENCH AND ENGLISH are the official languages. German and Italian are additional working languages in the Parliamentary Assemb-

ly; other working languages can also be used in the Parliamentary Assembly—such as, at the moment, Spanish, Dutch and Portuguese—at the expense of the national parliamentary delegations concerned.

Budget

Approximately 57,000,000 ECU or \$60,000,000 for 1989.

Some Practical Achievements

- 130 legally binding European treaties or conventions representing the equivalent of 25,000 bilateral agreements;
- recommendations to member states setting out policy guidelines on issues which are of major concern to governments;
- Europe-wide public awareness campaigns (nature conservation, architectural heritage protection, North-South interdependence and solidarity etc).

Major Council of Europe Conventions

HUMAN RIGHTS: The 1950 European Human Rights Convention provides a sophisticated monitoring and protection system through the European Commission and Court of Human Rights. Anyone in Europe can complain about an alleged breach of his or her rights under the convention for which redress appears unavailable in the national courts.

Each case (over 14,500 since 1950) proceeds through a 2-level system:

- first the Commission (composed of independent legal experts) decides whether the complaint is admissible under the Convention;
- if so, the Commission conducts an investigation to establish the facts and tries to reach a friendly settlement;
- if this fails, the case (160 to date) may go to the Court (made up of distinguished jurists);
- the Court, whose judgements are final, can award damages;
- the Council's Committee of Ministers is responsible for supervision of the enforcement of Court rulings.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS: The European Social Charter came into force in 1965. It guarantees the enjoyment of a wide range of fundamental rights: the right to work, fair wage, equal pay for equal work, social security, medical aid, vocational training and the right to organise, bargain and strike. The Charter also establishes a series of social and economic measures to protect the life of the family. It has provided the inspiration for a similar initiative in the European Community.

TORTURE: A convention to eradicate torture, providing for spot checks in places of detention was opened for signature in November 1987 and has entered into force.

TERRORISM: By declaring that certain acts of terrorism can no longer be regarded as political crimes for the purposes of extradition and mutual assistance, the 1977 Convention on the supervision of terrorists is an innovation in international criminal law.

DATA PROTECTION: A 1981 Convention is the only international agreement designed to prevent misuse of computerised data. It has served as a model for national legislation in several member countries.

WILDLIFE: Under the European Convention on the conservation of wildlife and natural habitats, nature protection, which by definition

transcends national frontiers, can be harmonised internationally. It entered into force on 1 June 1982.

CULTURE: The 1954 European Cultural Convention provides the basis for cooperation in the educational and cultural fields extending beyond the "23", at present to the Holy See and Yugoslavia. Practical achievements in this field include:

- establishment of European cultural routes;
- European Art Exhibitions;
- a new method for teaching foreign languages;
- European Music Year 1985 (in collaboration with the European Community);
- pilot educational projects in schools;
- promotion of human rights in school education;
- bursary scheme for teachers;
- European Cinema and Television Year 1988 (in collaboration with the European Community);
- "Eurimages", a European support fund for cinema and television productions.

HOOIGANISM: Following the May 1985 Brussels Heysel Stadium tragedy a European convention was drawn up to curb football violence at international fixtures. The legally binding agreement lays down practical measures to ensure crowd safety both inside and outside grounds.

TRANSFRONTIER COOPERATION: This Convention encourages and facilitates agreements between neighbouring regions and municipalities across frontiers in matters such as regional development environmental protection and the improvement of public services.

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT: The European Charter defines the constitutional and legal foundations of this key element of our democratic systems and provides for adequate structures and resources for the tasks local authorities have to undertake.

AUDIOVISUAL: The European Convention on Transfrontier Television.

COMING SOON: Subject on which conventions are being prepared include:

- insider trading;
- international bankruptcy.

Other Council of Europe Activities

DRUG ABUSE: The "Pompidou Group", the cooperation Group to combat drug abuse and illicit trafficking in drugs, coordinates member states' policies in this field.

YOUTH ACTIVITIES: Thousands of young Europeans have taken part in activities run by the European Youth Centre and the European Youth Foundation. The Centre aims to get young people to analyse and seek solutions to the problems which affect them. Every year more than a thousand young people stay at the Centre. Week-long courses enable them to compare ideas and learn efficient working methods. The Foundation provides financial support for the European activities of youth organisations.

CONFERENCE OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL AUTHORITIES OF EUROPE: Set up in 1975 this body meets in Strasbourg once a year and brings together elected representatives at local and regional government level. It discusses topics of political interest to local and regional authorities and sends recommendations and resolutions to the Committee of Ministers and other European and international bodies.

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT FUND: Set up in 1956 the Fund finances projects for the social and economic

reintegration of unemployed persons, people with no vocational training or no decent accommodation. It acts, especially on the employment front, as the motor of a social policy laid down by the Council of Europe. This fund enables housing, social and residential centres and vocational schools to be built and the existing infrastructure to be improved. Yugoslavia has associated member status. By the end of 1988, the Fund had provided loans for approximately US \$7,500 million (£4,400 million).

PHARMACOPOEIA: To protect the public against the faulty or fraudulent manufacture of medicinal products, the European Pharmacopoeia has established legally-enforceable standards for some 500 medicinal substances ranging from medicinal plants and simple chemical substances of natural and synthetic origin to more complex products including vaccines for human or veterinary use.

BLOOD: The Council has established a network of national blood transfusion centres and a European Bank of frozen blood of rare groups based in Amsterdam. In disasters or other emergencies, this allows blood to be delivered quickly between all member states.

CRAFT TRAINING: The Venice-based European Centre for training craftsmen in the conservation of the architectural heritage offers courses for masons, stonecutters, carpenters and stucco workers.

ANNEX "B": THE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY⁷

ESTABLISHED in 1949, the Parliamentary Assembly is a genuine European "political conscience" and a driving force within the Organisation. Proposals made by it have prompted initiatives in many key areas of the Council of Europe's work.

Its Structure

THE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY'S 177 full⁸ members are elected or appointed by national parliaments from among their own members. The number of representatives which each country sends to Strasbourg depends on the size of its population. All the main national political parties should be represented.

Five political groups have been formed in the Assembly: Socialist; European People's Party; European Democratic; Liberal, Democratic and Reformers; Communist. Some parliamentarians, however, do not belong to any political group.

Debates are prepared by 13 committees, which meet not only during but between plenary sessions. It is here that detailed examination of questions to be debated is conducted. Proposals are placed before the Assembly in the form of 'draft resolutions' or 'draft recommendation'.

The Assembly meets in the Chamber of the Palais de l'Europe in Strasbourg three times a year (in spring, autumn and winter). The plenary sittings are public. It also holds a summer session in one of the member states.

From among its own members the Assembly elects its President, who traditionally stays in office for three years, and 14 Vice-Presidents of different nationalities, who are elected for one year.

The Assembly also elects the Secretary General and Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe, the Clerk of the Assembly and the judges of the European Court of Human Rights.

Its Activities

THE ASSEMBLY'S debates deal with all aspects of European life.

The agenda for each session features a major debate devoted to international events. Prominent political personalities from all over the world have had occasion to contribute to these discussions.

The texts adopted by the Assembly put forward guidelines for national governments and parliaments. Initiatives taken by it have also resulted in many Conventions (international treaties), which form the basis of a truly European system of legislation; the best-known, the European Convention on Human Rights, not only lists these rights, but also protects them by means of an effective control system.

The Assembly regularly organises conferences, symposia and public parliamentary hearings on such topical issues as violence, genetic engineering, drugs, AIDS etc. These hearings take the form of a dialogue between parliamentarians and experts.

Every four years since 1983, the "Strasbourg Conferences", where members of the Assembly are joined by parliamentarians from non-European countries with pluralist democratic systems, have been a forum for discussion of the problems facing democracy world-wide.

The Assembly has tried to bring as many countries as possible into the Council of Europe. It welcomed Spain and Portugal among its members at the earliest possible opportunity and just recently admitted the Republic of San Marino and Finland.

The Assembly allows members and non-members of the European Communities to carry on a dialogue on an equal footing.

¹ Finland, which joined the Council of Europe in May 1989, expects to be in a position to ratify the Convention in the near future.

² 18 is the maximum number of representatives to the Assembly (together with 18 substitutes) which the largest full member countries of the Council of Europe may appoint.

³ This is in contrast to the Parliamentary Assembly, which has important committees on economic affairs and development and on agriculture and organises an annual plenary debate on the activities of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

⁴ More details are provided in Annex "A".

⁵ The Council of Europe is not to be confused with the "European Council", which is the name given to the periodical meetings of Heads of State and Government of the 12 countries of the European Community.

⁶ The Council of Europe member states: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom.

⁷ The Parliamentary Assembly comprises representatives of the 23 Council of Europe member states, who are elected or appointed by national parliaments.

The European Parliament comprises the directly elected representatives of the 12 member countries of the European Communities. It also meets at the Palais de l'Europe in Strasbourg.

⁸ Together with an equal number of "substitutes".

Soviet Foreign Policy at the Critical Stage of Perestroika

Alexander YANOV

SOVIET foreign policy has been such an obvious—and rare—success of perestroika that it was not, in fact, seriously discussed at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. At the Congress it was merely praised, and in general it was mentioned only as an example to be followed, or used to underscore the unending setbacks in domestic policy. Whatever criticism there was, it was but indirect, and entirely in a domestic-policy context.

Some rebuked it, for instance (which could be expected) for opening wide the country's door to the corrupt ideas of the West, which allegedly take away from Russia its future—the younger generation—which, in their view, is worse than a nuclear arms race. Just like it was written in a novel, "Not from Pershings shall we perish." And in general "it is better to die in a nuclear battle than to toe the devil's line".

There was nothing unexpected in that kind of criticism. The Russian New Right,¹ represented at the Congress by these deputies, is spearheaded against the Western "devil", advocating isolationism. New thinking looks as dangerous to them as to the most zealous "committeemen" in America, as the former members of the Committee on the Present Danger² are called.

Soviet foreign policy was criticised also from a different angle—again indirectly and again in a domestic-policy context—by deputy Nikolai Shmelyov. He said that the country still allowed itself huge unproductive spending (by American estimates, 6 to 8 billion dollars annually) on aid to Latin America, which is inadmissible when "our house is on fire". "This source alone", said Shmelyov, "would be enough to maintain the balance on the consumer market for a few years, the years we need to make ends meet and really take the path of reforms." Especially if we take into account, by Shmelyov's estimates, that the import of consumer goods, which could be bought with this money, is actually the best revenue in the Soviet budget: "The budget receives 8 to 10 roubles of profit from every ruble of currency spent on import (of consumer goods), and with a properly and clearly arranged structure of imports the profit can be increased even more".

If his calculations are correct, then the 6 to 8 billion dollars spent annually in Latin America is approaching the sum required for closing up the "black hole"—"the monstrous world's biggest budget deficit (in relation to the gross national product)" of the USSR.

And Shmelyov did not mention Africa, above all Ethiopia where a civil war is raging, where spending on aid may well be close to what is spent on aid to Latin America. Unfortunately, not only Shmelyov fai-

led to mention that. Not a word was said about these expenditures, or those in Latin American ones for that matter, by Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov either even though his report was so refreshingly outspoken. I would hate to think that these state budget expenditures were not mentioned only because Ryzhkov might not know their actual proportions.

IS THE SUCCESS SUFFICIENT?

THAT WAS, by and large, all the criticism of Soviet foreign-policy industry at the Congress. As I have already mentioned, it was a hardly noticeable shadow on its shining armor, for its successes are really astonishing. And not only in a purely political sense but also, for instance, because it has practically removed the nuclear war threat from the agenda of international relations, and because the wasteful arms race, which has been going on for four decades, has finally given way to real arms reduction.

What I have in mind is the direct economic contribution of foreign policy to perestroika, the profit, if you like, gained during the brief four years by this intellectual industry. Nikolai Ryzhov had this to say on that score: "...the peace initiatives of the Soviet state... allowed us to make a really revolutionary manoeuvre..., and the amount of money saved on defence in relation to the approved five-year plan will total almost 30 billion rubles". (To compare: the rise in pensions to the war veterans, invalids and low-income people, including collective farmers, that is, the real improvement of life for tens of millions of Soviet citizens, will amount to 20 per cent of the foreign-policy profit).

No sphere of material production has gained a profit even remotely resembling what foreign-policy industry has gained (especially if we add that perestroika in Poland and Hungary will cost the Soviet Union nothing).

Different people, naturally, may explain this triumph in different ways. It may be interpreted as, say, a victory of dynamic spirit over stagnant matter; of intellect over technology. It may also be said that foreign-policy industry requires no capital inputs, and so on. But for some reason the spirit was inert, not dynamic, all through the twenty years of Brezhnevism under Brezhnev, and all that time foreign policy was run at a loss, an immense, destructive loss. Besides, it takes enormous investments of capital, even if it is intellectual capital, to break within a few years the age-old stereotypes of international relations, not to mention ideological dogmas. It seems to me that the explanation of the triumph of Soviet foreign policy, including its economic success, should be sought in the political sphere, and not in the philosophical or economic one.

One way or another, nobody except the spokesmen for the Russian New Right argued at the Congress against the very fact of the success of Soviet foreign policy. The only question was whether this success was enough to hold on for the next few years, the critical stage of perestroika, when, as deputy Shmelyov predicted, the country will be confronted with the threat of a "financial catastrophe" and an "economic collapse".

The answer to this fateful question depends on which of the two mutually excluding concepts advanced at the Congress with regard to the dangers lying in store for perestroika you, the reader, are inclined to accept. I mean the choice you make between the concept of Nikolai Ryzhkov (and that of the Soviet government) and the alternative concept of Nikolai Shmelyov (which is backed up by the deputies of not only the Moscow delegation).

But before explain the two concepts and explaining my own choice, I will have, if only briefly, to introduce the reader to at least a few main

ideas on the basis of which I judge about perestroika and its future. Without such an introduction the reader may simply fail to understand either the terms used in this article, or my explanation of the success of Soviet foreign policy, or the grounds on which I have made my choice, not to mention the motives that determine my attitude to perestroika.

THEORETICAL DIGRESSION

ONE OF THE MAIN IDEAS which I have tried, not very successfully, though, to introduce through many of my books into the American debate on the Soviet Union is that a radical reform in Moscow may prove irreversible only if the Center-Right coalition, which has ruled the country since Stalin's death, is succeeded by a the Center-Left one.³ Despite all his reformist enthusiasm and the experience of a functionary, Nikita Khrushchev failed to form such a coalition, thus dooming the reform to failure (the same, incidentally, happened to his reforms launched by Pyotr Stolypin in the 1900s and those of Alexander II half a century before that).

Speaking in most general terms, I proceed from the experience of European history: only those nations which already had a strong, large and articulate middle class, the only social force capable of making political reforms irreversible managed to break through into political modernity. By contrast with other European countries, such a middle class had not taken shape in Russia during all the 500 years of its statehood.

This, in my view, explains why all Russian political reforms without exception suffered reversals. The inability of the reformist regimes in Russia to form a stable left-centrist coalition was merely a political reflection of the feebleness of its middle class.

What was worse, Russian autocracy seemed to have been putting spokes in the wheels of the middle class for centuries. At first serfdom stood as a solid rock hindering its growth. When at last the rock was demolished in 1861, the peasants were left in slavery to the communes which effectively performed the function of serfdom in that critical half a century before a debilitating system crisis hit the Empire. Instead of becoming a mass-scale basis of the middle class, peasant Russia was in fact turned into a giant ghetto for second-rate citizens being strangled by the lack of arable land and by communal bondage.

And when Stolypin finally freed the peasants from the commune, it was too late: despite the economic revival at the start of the century, the Russian middle class simply had no time left to gain the momentum enabling it to render the reform irreversible.

Speaking in abstract terms, if the Great Reforms of the 1860s had been consistent enough and included what Stolypin did half a century later, Russia could have possibly broken through to political modernisation as early as the 1880s, thereby avoiding the greatest national disaster we call Stalinism. Unfortunately, no viable Center-Left coalition was formed in the 1860s, and consequently the reforms were ultimately reversed. In the final analysis, Stalinism restored serfdom, and the peasant commune, as well as the police state. Everything which had been created in Russia during a whole century through remarkable reforms was destroyed—the civil society, rule of law state, peasant freedom, the middle class, weak as it was, though politically articulate.

Now, what are the main elements of the Russian political spectrum or, in other words, what do I mean by the Left, the Right and the Centre?

The Left, or "European", as I call it, wing of the spectrum, definitely including, in present-day conditions, the skilled part of the intelligentsia along with those of the working class, peasantry and middle managerial

elite, is, in fact, the Soviet middle class today. Its main interest is in defending the civil society from arbitrary rule by the state. Or, in other words, interested in the irreversibility of the political process and in ending incessant counter-reforms causing regular relapses of terror. The strength of the Left lies precisely in its being highly skilled, and that is why it fears no competition either on the part of the world market or on the part of world culture. Its most remarkable herald in the new time was Pyotr Chaadayev who advocated Russia's joining the European family of nations. Political modernisation is, in fact, in the irreversibility of this "joining".

The Right, or "Byzantine", as I call it, wing of the spectrum, comprising, so to speak, all its unqualified elements or, to be more precise, those which are incapable of competing on normal European terms of labour and creative work, is interested, naturally, in Russia's isolation, in maintaining the status quo.

The Centre, including the national leadership, which has always been fairly autonomous in Russia, may gravitate towards alliance with the "Byzantine" or with the "European" elements of the spectrum. In the former case, Russia will find itself in conditions of stagnation; and in the latter case, it will enter a period of reforms.

In this latter instance the Centre assumes an important function, resembling the one performed by the Democratic Party in the United States, that is, a function of social protection of the poor sections of society. The Centre provides equal opportunities for them and their children.

The real problem is that, apart from the three main elements of Russia's political continuum, there are marginal ones as well: the ultra-left and ultra-right. In normal conditions they do play no significant role and become active only in situations of systemic crises marking the final defeat of the reforms. It is then that they come to the fore in national politics, unexpectedly, as a rule, and seize the central roles in deciding the fate of the country, sometimes for decades to come. These are the parties of counter-reform, the heralds of catastrophic change.

The ultra-left lead the masses disillusioned in reform promising them a paradise on earth. The ultra-right kindle their imagination with the idea of saving the homeland from a worldwide plot against Russia. Amidst all chaos and disintegration caused by the collapse of reforms they appeal to the army as the supreme judge, as a traditional institution of Order. But what kind of order can be established in the country by the army? Its own barrack-type order. So, for all the substantial differences between the extreme elements of the spectrum, the practical results of their victory are always the same: the collapse of reforms means dictatorship inspired by ideas of counter-reform.

The country can be saved from this calamity, as I have already said, only by a powerful and lasting Center-Left coalition. Unfortunately, such a coalition has never been firmly established during all the five centuries of Russian statehood.

WHY SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY HAS BECOME PROFITABLE

THESE ARE, in brief, the theoretical prerequisites by which I judge about the future of perestroika. They are based on the fact that everything changes in Russian history, sometimes beyond recognition—the alignment of social forces in society, political regimes and ideological stereotypes, fashions and customs, even the language. The only thing that does not change is the major patterns of change itself. Dr. Arthur Schlesinger junior, my colleague at the City University of New York, holds the same

assumption as to the patterns of political change in the US. His recent book sums it all up in its title *The Cycles of American History*.

In any case, the reader probably understands by now how I explain the extraordinary success of Soviet foreign policy at the time of perestroika: it appears to be so far the only area in which the policy of the left-centrist coalition has been pursued without reservations.

While in economic policy the Centre still postpones the decisive choice, manoeuvring between the Left and the Right, in foreign policy the choice was made immediately and unambiguously. Here the Centre adopted the main ideas of the Left. Hence the breakthrough. Very simply, without such a breakthrough, without the immediate stabilisation of the political environment, the reform could not even have started.

The Centre realised also that without the support from the world community perestroika would not have had even the slightest chance of success. The support by the world community, which so far has materialised in the 30 billion rubles that I have mentioned before (plus the billions of dollars that will be spent on the radical reform in Poland and Hungary, not from your pocket) was precisely the first tangible result of the "sharp turn" in Soviet foreign policy. This policy has become profitable.

But far more is required of it, of course. If the military budget is going to be cut back by 30 to 50 per cent, then the foreign-policy industry should bring perestroika at least another 35 to 40 billion rubles. And that money would be more difficult to get than the first 30 billion which, to be frank, were lying about on the ground from the moment the "sharp turn" was introduced. I believe it is clear to the reader what I mean by "sharp turn": in this field the Centre has accepted unconditionally the traditional idea of the Soviet Left in the post-Stalin time—the priority of common human values over the class struggle. Only on this basis could the Center-Left coalition have taken shape in Soviet foreign policy. And this alone could have made it profitable.

IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE TO PERESTROIKA?

WITHOUT A NEW—and immediate—foreign-policy breakthrough perestroika may not last in the absence of a breakthrough, says Nikolai Shmelyov, "we shall have a nation-wide rationing system, a sharp depreciation of the ruble, the black market will run rampant, the consumer market will disintegrate, and that will be followed by a forced... return... to rigid command discipline in our national economy". Leonid Abalkin made an even harsher forecast at a press conference held for the Congress deputies at the Institute of Economics. His forecast goes beyond the bounds of economic realities. He warns about a danger of an abrupt turn to the Right if the economic situation is not stabilised within the next two years.

However, this situation was best described by Vasily Selyunin even before the Congress. "In the absence of a sharp turn", he warned "by the mid-1990s our economy will fall apart with all the ensuing consequences—social, foreign-policy, military, and others. Then it will be too late to fuss about democracy—dictatorship is more suited to periods of economic collapse."⁴

What has been described by all these representatives of the Soviet Left is what I call a systemic crisis, that is, a situation in which the national leadership loses control over the direction of political changes, and extremist groups get hold of the arena of national policy. In Weimar Germany such a situation set in between 1929 and 1933. I needn't remind the reader what it led to.

If we are to believe these experts, there is an alternative to perestroika, contrary to what was repeated many times at the Congress. This is a horrible alternative. It is irrational and, if you like, suicidal. But this does not make it less real. Wasn't the ultra-right alternative to the Weimer Republic suicidal and did that prevent it from winning? Wasn't Stalin's alternative to the NEP, in fact, mad? And did that stop it for a moment?

One way or another, the concept of the Soviet Left might be formulated briefly as follows: the Motherland is in danger, perestroika has reached a fatal line, our home is on fire. And if appropriate measures ("major changes") are not taken immediately, now, then by the mid-1990s it will be too late to put out the fire.

THE CONCEPT OF THE CENTRE

ONE CANNOT SAY that the concept of Nikolai Ryzhkov which he set forth in his programme statement to the Congress is entirely free of this concern. No, he admits that "the country, in fact, was led into an impasse", that "in the country the centrifugal tendencies have increased, strikes and meetings with doubtful aims have become more frequent, and nationalistic sentiments are been enkindled); that 9,000 enterprises (not counting collective farms) remain unprofitable; that "the existing economic system, in which egalitarian tendencies still persist, allows such enterprises to be well off at the expense of the labour collectives that work well", that is, it allows them to parasitise; and, most important, that "the situation in state finances keeps deteriorating" as a result, and "social tensions" are growing.

But despite all that, there is no reason for panic—our house is not on fire. There is still time. Gradual long-term measures are quite capable of coping with the crisis by the mid-1990s. Moreover, the opposite assessment of the situation, entirely alien to these concerns, "also has the right to exist".

The assessment is this: "The national income and the rate of production growth are increasing, and in no small proportions. The entire growth of industrial output has been achieved due to labour productivity... Profit is growing at unprecedented rates, and wages, salaries and social consumption funds are on the rise. A turn has been achieved in speeding up our housing construction, in building schools, hospitals, and kindergartens."

Such are the two concepts put forward at the Congress. It is between them that the reader is to choose. It is quite obvious that, by contrast with foreign policy, the Centre is not yet ready to team up with the Left in economic policy. Moreover, even though these words were not uttered at the Congress, the Centre is inclined to reproach the Left for alarmism. But still, from the point of view of the theoretical prerequisites set forth above, its position fills me with serious doubts.

THE CHOICE

IF THE PRESENT SITUATION is to be judged about by the extent of social tensions, then all purely economic calculations concerning the national income growth are irrelevant. Just imagine for a moment that the Foreign Minister of the USSR would say: we have come up with a series of remarkable foreign-policy initiatives. They have been perfectly planned. But, unfortunately, they all have come up against a wall. As a result, international tensions, far from decreasing, continue to grow. What would all remarkable initiatives be worth in that case? Whom would they interest except experts and reporters?

This is the first consideration which makes me doubt that the concept of the Centre is realistic. It has a dangerous tinge of economic fetishism amidst a social storm. It is very much like the attitude of American economists who until recently liked to contrast the alleged order and logic of the Chinese reform with the "chaotic" Soviet perestroika. What did they fail to see? In the situation of growing social tensions, the logic of the Chinese economic reform was built on sand. The political explosion smashed it within a few weeks, rolling back the economic reforms, not to mention political ones. It seems that the Chinese did not have their own Abalkin, or Shmelyov, or Selyunin. And even if there were such men, they were most likely accused of alarmism and panic-mongering.

The next consideration seems to me even more significant. It was said at the Congress: "We were largely using the trial-and-error method, and we gradually matured for more radical solutions". As a result of these trials and errors, the budget revenues turned out to be 40 billion rubles below the planned target. What is worse still, the budget expenditures simultaneously shot up, exceeding the planned target by 62 billion rubles. Hence the mammoth deficit of 100 billion. So the plan proved to be worth little in the end. Do we have any guarantees, the deputies could ask the government, that the plan for the next five years will be less disastrous?

Is our trial-and-error era over? Has a new management machinery allowing to draw really workable plans been built already? Is a mixed economy already in operation? Have the industrial monopolies already been eliminated? Has the lease system in the countryside already become the decisive factor of production? Wasn't deputy V.-E. G. Bresis, the Latvian Premier, right to say that "under the existing planning system it has not been possible, nor will it ever be, to produce a balanced plan"?

Now, it seems, we see that the remark concerning the economic results of the first four years of perestroika was not a slip of the tongue. The Centre is still manoeuvring between as incompatible as like genius and villainy. Even now it is not yet ready for a choice in domestic policy which it had made so resolutely in foreign policy four years ago.

People who deal with Soviet foreign policy know perfectly well that it is impossible to imagine its leader in such Hamlet-like position. Really, he could not possibly declare that there can be two opposite assessments, say, of the basic principle of Soviet foreign policy. Under no circumstances would he say that although the priority of common human values over the class struggle is beyond doubt, the view that the class struggle has a priority over these values also has the right to existence. This ability to remain uncompromising is precisely the meaning of the "cardinal changes" in Soviet foreign policy brought about by perestroika.

The reader understands, I am sure that I compare not the leaders but their positions, or, to be more precise, the political meaning of their positions. In one case we deal with the policy of the Center-Left coalition, and in the other case with the policy of the Centre which has already understood that it is impossible to live in the old way but has not yet ventured to ally in an irrevocable coalition with the Left. This policy of "gradual change" and delays is fraught, perhaps, with very grave consequences, if deputy Shmelyov (along with deputies L. Abalkin, G. Lisichkin, G. Popov, O. Bogomolov, and V. Tikhonov who go as far as to predict hunger in the Soviet Union if the mentioned drastic changes are not effected) is right.

As we all know, there exists, after all, such a thing as planning according to the worst scenario. This is not alarmism, it's professionalism.

But what can Soviet foreign-policy industry do, if perestroika has indeed entered its critical stage?

HOW CAN THE FIRE BE EXTINGUISHED?

IT SEEMS TO ME that Soviet foreign policy could influence the course of events in two ways: in a short-term way (by giving the economy a chance to close up the black hole of the financial crisis), and in a long-term way (by clarifying to the West the principled vision of Soviet future).

In the former case the objective, as I see it, is mainly financial political, while in the latter one it is mainly intellectual-political. In the former case the Soviet foreign-policy industry will have to deal with the recipients of Soviet aid in the Third World, and in the latter one with potential donors in the industrialised West. In both cases, however, the goal will be to narrow the gap between foreign-policy industry and its domestic policy basis, while its prerequisite is absolute glasnost.

I mean to say that foreign-policy industry would have to align publicly, before the whole world, with Nikolai Shmelyov's concept, in spite of all the domestic-policy inconveniences associated with this.

I admit that before the Congress it would have been simply impractical to raise the question at all. But the open clash of the two irreconcilable views on the Soviet future at the Congress (one of which proceeds from the worst case scenario—"the Motherland is in danger") makes the choice not only possible but inevitable for each conscientious citizen and each institution of the system.

Judge for yourself: the greater part of the 12 to 15 billion dollars which goes today to the recipients of Soviet aid in the Third World could be spent to reduce the budget deficit immediately, and saturated the market with foodstuffs and consumer goods. If the calculations are correct, these dollars could bring the budget 100 to 150 billion rubles of profit. That is more than enough for stabilising the financial and market situation in the USSR not by 1995 but already by tomorrow. The Soviet economy would thus have a necessary respite. The fire would be extinguished, and the systemic crisis prevented.

Of course, this operation will come up against considerable difficulties in foreign- and domestic-policy matters, and not all of them seem to be clear today. The recipients, naturally, will object, saying that their house is on fire, too, and that a considerable slashing of aid is brigandage and ideological betrayal, not to mention open violation of long-term agreements, that it is punishable by sanctions, fines, and so on. In a sense they will be right. But this would be an emergency measure: as the reader remembers, his own house is on fire. What is at stake, in fact, is survival of perestroika. And this is a question of the future of humanity.

It is not for me to teach Soviet diplomats how to cope with this difficulty. One thing is clear: its overcoming would require the complete exertion of energies and intellect, as was the case when the new thinking was formulated, and it would be, perhaps, its first test of strength. Because, apart from the emergency of this measure, principles, too, are involved. Are you, the reader, prepared to risk perestroika so that, say, Ethiopia can prevent the national self-determination of Eritrea? It is easy enough to see that these two things are incomparable.

The domestic-policy difficulty of this short-term plan is that a one-time injection, even of as many as 100-150 billion rubles, will change nothing in the Soviet economy unless this leads to the formation of a Center-Left coalition in domestic policy. The criterion here is simple enough. As distinct from today's concept of the government, the policy of the Center-Left coalition would demand a radical turn towards a mixed economy, that is, the "cooperativisation" or "privatisation", if I may say so, of at least 50 per cent of Soviet industry and 70 per cent of farming.

All enterprises that are dragging the Soviet economy down should become a leading element of its recovery. By 1995, the turn should be completed.

If anyone is vitally interested in such a sharp turn in domestic policy, it is Soviet foreign-policy industry.

The Center-Left coalition has given this industry a chance to reach, in fact, the level of the 21st century, while its domestic-policy rearguard is bogged down in the 1920s. Therefore the dilemma before it is clear: either it will be able to pull the rearguard up to its own level, closing the gap, or, sooner or later, the rearguard will drag foreign policy along into the past.

No doubt, if its contribution to perestroika reaches such vast proportions (that is, if the suggested short-term plan is fulfilled), exceeding 4 to 5 times over what has already been achieved, its share in Soviet policy making must increase proportionately.

In any case, the response of the Congress deputies shows clearly that in the event of a conflict, absolute support by the people and its representatives is ensured for it. As it was pointed out in *Izvestia* by Vladimir Nadein, "A clear line has divided the deputies' assessments of the foreign and domestic policies pursued by the government. Its initiatives in the international arena have won general approval. Its actions within the country have been sharply criticised." And the Congress deputies are now the supreme power in the country, aren't they?

In this sense the chances of Soviet foreign-policy industry for a kind of *qui pro quo*, that is, an exchange of 100-150 billion rubles capable of putting out the above-mentioned fire for a real restructuring of the economy do not look at all bad.

QUO VADISI

LET US ASSUME that the fire has been extinguished. What next? In the intellectual terms, the possible contribution of Soviet foreign-policy industry to the long-term prospects of perestroika seems far more difficult.

I have already mentioned (in my first essay in *International Affairs*) the paradox of American public opinion. The polls of 1988 have shown that the US public is sure that the Soviet Union no longer presents direct danger for America—another success of Soviet foreign policy—but it also believes that "the Soviets lie, steal and cheat and are doing everything to push ahead the cause of communism". What is worse, the American public is sure that "if we grow weaker, the Soviet Union will attack us or our allies at an appropriate moment". The opinion polls this year have confirmed that, and despite all the recent triumphs of Soviet foreign policy, the paradox, is still there.

How can one talk in this case about real partnership? Or about large-scale aid to Soviet perestroika? Who would help a potentially aggressive power who is waiting for the right moment to attack you or your allies? For decades Brezhnevism was rivalling Stalinism in cultivating this "presumption of perfidy".

The reader may be confident that it is a wrong presumption. But how can the US public be convinced this is so? It looks like the measures required for changing these views held by Americans should be even more sharp and unexpected than those which are required today for stabilising the market and finances.

Frankly speaking, I do not see any other way of doing this than by breaking the Stalin-Brezhnev prism through which people in the United States look at the USSR. They view it as an abnormal formation,

the last empire obsessed with the idea of changing the world according to their its pattern. But the meaning of perestroika exactly is to "find Russia's place in mankind", the idea bequeathed to us by Chaadayev, and to join, at last the civilised world.

Let us not delude ourselves: there is a long path from command-method economic management to a mixed economy, from confrontation to partnership, from a split Europe to a common European home, from a monstrous Eurasian empire to a great and free Eurasian common wealth from the reign of terror to the reign of law, from history which for centuries has served as an endless graveyard for political reforms to irreversible perestroika. But the main thing here is not the length of the path but the clarity of vision. Quo vadis? Where is Russia heading?

To "renovated socialism"? To a "new quality of socialism"? But what is the meaning of these pious terms? How will you make them comprehensible for the American public so that it will stop expecting perfidy from you? How will you make them comprehensible for yourselves?

LISTENING TO DEPUTY AITMATOV

AT THE START of this century, the Marxist socialist movement split. So many offensive terms were circulated to name that split! Some said: a revolution against reformism, orthodox Marxism against revisionism. Others replied: freedom against tyranny, realism against dogmatism.

What does the tragic experience of the century-long split really show? One wing of Marxist socialism appeared to be open to political modernisation, the other one closed its door to it. In my terminology this means that European Social-Democracy was initially capable of forming a Center-Left coalition and, therefore, of representing the middle class politically.

And the other wing?

Here is what Chinghiz Aitmatov said at the Congress: "One should think about the very system of society, about its basic properties, and its defects... One should not turn the notion of socialism into an icon... While we have been guessing, discussing and arguing what socialism should be or what it cannot be, other nations already have it, they have built it and enjoy its fruits. And we by our experience have stood them in good stead by showing how one should not build socialism. I mean the prospering rule-of-law societies of Sweden, Austria, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, Spain and finally Canada overseas. As for Switzerland, it is an example to be followed. The working man in these countries earns an average four or five times as much as our workers earn. We could only dream about the social protection and the living standards of the working people in those countries. This is exactly real and, if you like, labour, trade-union socialism, even though these countries do not call themselves socialist, but they do not feel worse for that. How we enslaved ourselves in the immobility of our socialism!.. The meaning of socialism is not in the term itself but in its essence... We should copy... the entire positive... experience of advanced, highly developed and civilised countries, the experience of the rule-of-law states. If we lack experience, we should learn how others can live under really existing socialism."

This is the position of the Soviet Left. Are you, my reader,, ready to share it?

Inspired by the ideas of the Center-Left coalition, Soviet foreign-policy industry has reached such summits of world politics that the harmful results of the century-long split lay open before our eyes. It is becoming an imperative for the coalition to convince Soviet society that it is right. Otherwise it will not be able to maintain the positions gained. There is practically nothing else left to it than to act as an enlightener of society and its political establishment, and also of the American public.

How is this to be done? Again, as during the discussion of its short-term contribution to perestroika, I see only one means—absolute openness and free public debate. Thank God it is possible in today's Moscow.

I MAY WELL BE WRONG in both my practical suggestions and theoretical prerequisites. You have every opportunity to argue against them. And prove that I am wrong. Prove it not so much to me than to yourselves.

I really have sinned here against many sacred a dogma. But is it for you to fear heresy? You who have repeated the feat of Galileo, who bravely attacked the barren "Ptolemais" paradigm of world politics sanctified by millenia? But you are the most daring heretics today in entire world foreign-policy industry. The only little thing left for you to do is to make the world, above all your own and the US public, believe in your new paradigm. Will you be able to do that?

¹ For more detail about the Russian New Right see: Alexander Yanov *The Russian Challenge and the Year 2000*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987.

² About former "committeemen" see: *International Affairs*, Feb., Mar. 1989.

³ For more detail see Fig. 3, "The Political Structure of Soviet Society" in: *The Russian Challenge and the Year 2000*, p. 296.

⁴ V. Selyunin, "The Beginnings", *Novy Mir* monthly, May 1988, p. 171 (in Russian).

EAST AND WEST: FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION AND CO-DEVELOPMENT

(Continued from page 13)

people expressed by Russian philosophers of the past. "The primary and the most precious benefit of the state," wrote Sergei Solovyov, "is independence, and then a possibility to express its existence in a more or less extensive activity and to take part in the common life of the most important states, the best representatives of humanity."

¹ Besides, practically all the military-industrial firms that are the Pentagon's biggest contractors appear to be widely diversified associations accounting for turning out a considerable amount of civilian goods whose share ranges from 5 to 80 per cent of the total cost of their output. *The Modern United States Today. Encyclopaedic Reference Book*, Politizdat, 1988, p. 365 (in Russian).

The author requested that his fee for this article be contributed to the fund for building a Memorial of Stalinism victims. He suggests that a building in downtown Moscow be used for the purpose and converted into a museum, library and pluralist discussions centre.

ON AFGHAN REALITIES AND LIFE IN GENERAL

Mikhail SHEMYAKIN

A WAR is considered unfinished until the prisoners of war are returned home. Much is still not known in full about the Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan who were taken prisoner. For this reason any new bits of information are important.

Functioning in the United States is the International Committee for the Rescue of Russian Prisoners of War in Afghanistan, which is headed by our countryman, the famous artist Mikhail Shemyakin. **International Affairs** interviewed him in New York.

Shemyakin: Let's not talk about politics, as I am not much of a politician. Our boys who were taken prisoner in Afghanistan is quite another matter—this is a part of my life. It is a big problem, but nothing really worthwhile has been written about it thus far. An unhealthy commotion is being stirred up around it, with poster-waving people overdoing it, playing on the nerves of mothers and talking about a jacked-up figure of prisoners of war. Today I think the truth has finally surfaced to the effect that there are far fewer Soviet POWs than assumed.

International Affairs: What is your estimate?

Shemyakin: This is not my estimate. I have spoken with Afghan mujaheddin, with detachment commanders, with high-placed people linked with major contingents and groupings. In California one commander of the mujaheddin—I can say that he is a rather civil person who graduated from a university in Germany and also has another higher education—gave me a more realistic figure. A couple of months ago another Peshawar Afghan came here and confirmed the figure. The newspapers frequently put the number at over 300. When I told him about this he simply smiled ironically. Generally speaking, such a figure is out of the question. I have studied the matter extensively enough.

International Affairs: Then what figure did he name?

Shemyakin: He said that there are "over 50 but less than 100" prisoners of war. This should have been said long ago, as we have had this information for a long time. Secondly, it should not be forgotten—and I know this for certain—that a number of people have gone to the side of the mujaheddin. They were not captured; they merely went over to the mujaheddin. Nor is the possibility ruled out that we are worrying about someone while he is perhaps tranquilly walking around in a turban.

Just recently I spoke with Afghan mujaheddin. They related an unusual occurrence to me. One soldier who had gone over to the mujaheddin became a rather active combat commander; he married an Afghan woman and they had two children. He was simply removed, he was ordered to be shot.

International Affairs: Why?

Shemyakin: Evidently because some people were envious of his success. I was shown amateur but well-done photographs. I saw our guys training mujaheddin. In one of them a lad is showing mujaheddin to fire missiles, in another he is explaining how to use the latest machine guns, and so on. There are other, rather delicate points.

International Affairs: How did your committee's activity develop?

Shemyakin: All sorts of things have happened. There have been serious difficulties and even blows to our prestige.

I have been engaged in Afghan affairs since 1983. Even then I was dead against this senseless bloodbath and called for an end to the pointless war. I had one of my big pictures auctioned off. It cost a great deal at the time, approximately 20,000 dollars. The money went to support the campaign against the war. Then I contributed money for a hospital.

International Affairs: Why precisely since 1983?

Shemyakin: It was in 1983 that I was approached by my friend Vladimir Bukovsky (we knew each other back in Russia), who was already engaged in the POW problem at the time. He asked me to help him in this endeavour. Vladimir had already ransomed five people. When his book was printed, he simply donated his royalties to redeem POWs. I believe he paid about 5,000 dollars per man.

Prior to that I did not know anything about the prisoners or about what I could do to help. I ran into former soldiers who had been released. I understood their horrible tragedy.

International Affairs: Who was the first lad you met?

Shemyakin: The first ones were those who lived with Makarenko, such as Ryzhkov and others. But I really don't want to mention them. All of them felt bad about the boys still in captivity.

International Affairs: Where are these boys now?

Shemyakin: Some of them have already returned. One of them was imprisoned back home in the passion of the moment. This is absurd. It was a good thing that the Soviet Deputy Minister of Defence and the Deputy Foreign Minister were in New York at the General Assembly Session at the time. I managed to have a talk with them. I recall that you took part in this meeting yourself. The lad in question was released, thank God. And others lost their fear of returning home.

International Affairs: Have you been to Afghanistan or Pakistan?

Shemyakin: No. My encounters with the mujaheddin took place here.

International Affairs: What kind of people are they?

Shemyakin: There are different kinds. There are groupings with wild commanders, and there are more civilised people.

You know the history of Afghanistan. Many attempts were made to seize their territory, but the Afghans always emerged victorious. And if the people who started all this had shown some interest in history perhaps this senseless bloodbath would not have happened. I consider this war, and any war in general, immoral, and the people who unleash wars and conflicts immoral, too.

You asked what kind of people they are. I have never agreed with the newspapers that call them all but bandits and thieves. I have always referred to them as mujaheddin, which means "fighter for the faith" or "fighter for freedom". These people were born in Afghanistan, and they have a right to uphold their ideas. They love their land; anyone loves his land and would act approximately as they do.

International Affairs: In your encounters with them, what has their attitude been to you, a Russian?

Shemyakin: To me, it was a very good one, so today, too, I have a chance to conduct negotiations with them about POWs and maintain normal relations. However, there are sometimes difficulties during meetings, especially with young people, with those who are separated from their parents, brothers and sisters, who have someone who has been killed or maimed. Especially when you begin speaking about compassion and humaneness, sitting against the background of a placard with photographs of mangled children. Have you ever seen the Afghan magazines that are published there? It's appalling! It is particularly gruesome to look at the children. For instance, when we began saying that understanding should, after all, be shown, that there is compassion, people need to be treated humanely, etc., they already forget about the fact that I have never marched on their land with a machinegun in hand

and that I was always against this war in general, and they begin screaming: Who will answer for this?

International Affairs: Which of the most prominent representatives of the mujaheddin have you met?

Shemyakin: Regrettably, I have not met any of the top leaders. I had a chance to meet Rabbani, but contacts were broken off after an article by a journalist attacking Ludmila Thorn, one of the first women here engaged in the POW problem—she brought 15 people out of captivity at risk to her life. She went there, to the refugee camp, three or four times.

The fact of the matter is that two people who are very famous in American circles are associated with our committee. They are Pulitzer Prize winner Robert Massie, who wrote the books "Nicholas and Alexandra" and "Peter the Great", and his wife Suzanne, who wrote the book "The Fire Bird", where she sings in praise of Russia. Generally speaking, she has been fascinated by Russia since her early years and she has an excellent command of Russian. Mrs. Massie was an adviser to Ronald Reagan on Russian affairs and had tea with him in the White House every week. Naturally, we had opportunities to put this question to the President direct. This was not a simple affair and we waited for the proper moment. All the more so since while in Moscow the President publicly promised to help out the prisoners of war. Mrs. Massie is a friend of Ludmila Thorn, who, incidentally, while carrying out extensive work of the POWs' release, has good ties with the mujaheddin. Many commanders stop at her home when they are in New York, and this is also a good channel for gathering information on the fate of all the Soviet officers and men held captive by the mujaheddin. And when a statement against Thorn's actions appeared, a scandal broke out that reached the White House. And we cannot do without Washington's help in this issue.

International Affairs: Where is the bulk of the POWs today?

Shemyakin: I have extensively studied in this matter. At one time they were scattered about Afghanistan; I was shown photographs of bases with the small houses in which they are kept. However, most of them are in Pakistan. I think this is due to the fact that it is rather difficult to hold POWs in custody. It was explained to me that there are four guards for each prisoner who keep watch day and night. There have been suicide and escape attempts. There was a small rebellion, too. The lads who took part in it were wiped out. You are also probably familiar with these occurrences—I think they have even been written about. I believe that now, what with the redislocation and transportation of detachments and with the hostilities, they simply don't have the time to bother with the POWs. This is another reason why information about where the lads are scattered is important. Naturally, I think they are, all the same, somewhere on the territory of Pakistan.

International Affairs: Do you have any contacts with the Pakistani authorities?

Shemyakin: It is very difficult to deal with them. You know, of course, that for many years now they have been stating that they have no POWs. They do not allow our committee on their territory. If, however, our efforts are successful, the return of the POWs will probably be from Pakistan. And the authorities will probably say that they were brought from Afghanistan just recently.

International Affairs: You know the head of the Afghan community here in the US. What contacts do you have with him?

Shemyakin: I have good relations with him; I dine at his home and he visits me. It was he who supported us and helped maintain trust in us on the part of the Americans and the mujaheddin.

International Affairs: What is your committee's action programme today?

Shemyakin: We have not given up our search for ways of stating our case before the current President. However, first we need to do some work on Capitol Hill. In Washington we held meetings with congressmen who possess real power and clout with the mujaheddin and can engage in the effort

to help the Soviet POWs. We are preparing for serious actions and are conducting talks to involve in these efforts the International Red Cross, Amnesty International and other organisations.

International Affairs: It is important that President Bush has expressed a readiness to furnish assistance in the effort to bring about the POWs' release.

Shemyakin: Yes, without the aid of the White House, the President and the US Congress, and without dealing with the mujaheddin and their leaders direct, no campaigns, no slogans, appeals, trips to Pakistan, etc. will help.

O. Zapertov, V. Turchin and other Afghanistan war veterans have come here, to New York, from the Moscow-based Soviet Public Coordinating Committee for the Release of Soviet Servicemen Captured in Afghanistan. We have discussed in detail guidelines for further actions. You can talk to them, too. They are here.

Zapertov: In the early 1980s, after the boys who had gone through Afghanistan returned home, they ran into a wall of alienation and indifference, especially on the part of the bureaucratic apparatus, and they began organising councils of Afghan war veterans. At the time the war in Afghanistan was hushed up; no one knew the truth about it. It was thought that we... were planting trees there, and the fact that zinc coffins were coming back was supposedly due to "bricks having fallen on guys' heads".

The main hero of the American feature film "Rambo", who fought in Vietnam, uttered the following: "I love my country and would like to see when I return from the war that it loves me, too." We Afghan vets thought the same thing. But when we came home we encountered something different—indifference, alienation and even resistance, especially by the bureaucracy.

So the POW problem loomed large over the incipient Afghan vet councils from the outset, when the mothers of men missing in action began turning to us.

After we left Afghanistan, the efforts to win the release of the POWs entered the decisive stage. We are boundlessly grateful to Mikhail Shemyakin and the International Committee for the Rescue of Russian Prisoners of War in Afghanistan for their work.

In the USSR this work is directed by the Coordinating Committee, which is headed by the secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. In effect, however, the work is done chiefly by our national association of councils of reservists and internationalist fighting men and patriotic defence organisations (it was formed in 1986 and is handling in the entire range of Afghan vets' problems). The POW problem is also being tackled by the Nadezhda (Hope) Public Committee.

International Affairs: What kind of ties do you have with the International Committee headed by Mikhail Shemyakin?

Zapertov: V. Turchin, an official of our association, and I have made two joint visits to the USA regarding this issue. During our last trip we met, together with members of the International Committee headed by Mikhail Shemyakin, with US congressmen who were linked with arms deliveries to the mujaheddin and with those who are concerned with human rights. They were the political figures Thomas Lantos, Reed Irvine, Schnabel, Don Ritter, Daria Rohrbacher and Milnor Roberts. We talked with them for nine hours. Later I met with the official representative of the mujaheddin in the USA, who is engaged chiefly in arms shipments and also with a representative of the Peshawar Seven who, at the Americans' request made a special trip to the USA from Pakistan to meet with us (I was requested not to mention his name in the press yet, and I promised not to).

We arrived at the following accord: two or three months later we were promised that the POWs would be given directly to us in Islamabad with the participation of representatives of our Embassy in Pakistan and of the International Red Cross.

We handed over lists of 313 persons missing in action (31 of them are

already in the USSR and 16, abroad). Both the Americans and the mujaheddin promised to provide us complete information about all the POWs.

Of course, both the Americans and the mujaheddin advanced their preliminary conditions. They want to find out the fate of the families of 109 persons and many thousands of those missing in action. Allegations were made to the effect that many mujaheddin POWs had been shipped off to the Siberia to work in camps there. When we asked for the names of these prisoners no answer was given.

The American congressmen expressed a readiness to come to the USSR to discuss the POW problem with the Soviet authorities, and also to go to Kabul together with Soviet parliamentarians to solve the problem of the captured mujaheddin.

I would like to stress that we felt the interest of the American officials in rendering assistance to gain the POWs' release, since such a humane action would naturally generate broad positive repercussions in the world.

International Affairs: What are your immediate plans?

Zapertov: We are working on an international auction in the West at which 30 lithographs donated by Mikhail Shemyakin and costing between 30,000 and 60,000 dollars each, a two-volume collection of the artist, and a three-volume collection of Vladimir Vysotsky's poems with illustrations by Shemyakin are to be sold. The proceeds will go to the POW release effort and to the disabled and to the families of Soviet soldiers killed in Afghanistan. The main thing now is to coordinate actions, and I think that we will be able to get our boys out of captivity and back home.

International Affairs: Mikhail, let's hope that the POW problem will be ultimately solved. Continuing the Afghan theme, we would like to ask the following question. Why is Jelalabad holding on so stubbornly?

Shemyakin: I think that there are various reasons. They are rather clear to me. The first is that there was a very unpleasant story—I've forgotten regarding which Afghan city, where the mujaheddin burst in and perpetrated a bacchanalia. They were recalled. The brother of this detachment's commander said later that he had never seen his brother in such a frenzy. Everything that we had been fighting for, he said, was literally reduced to naught in one or two days. Civilians were massacred, and ordinary pillaging and a blood-bath began. I think that this explains why many local people began fearing the mujaheddin. This squaring of accounts with those who were on the side of the Kabul regime naturally evoked fear in the residents. This is what the mujaheddin achieved when they took this city. The second reason is the following. Right after the Soviet troops withdrawal, some 60 to 70 soldiers of the Afghan army went over to the side of the mujaheddin. And what do you think—all of them were hacked to pieces and sent back with a letter to Najibullah saying that these people were, so to speak, not needed. For this reason people in Jelalabad and other cities know perfectly well that if they do not fight to the last man the same lot is in store for them. These elements—the fear of the local population and the soldiers' realisation that they are threatened with death, an agonising death—are doing their work.

International Affairs: But the mujaheddin can change their tactics and remove these apprehensions and fears.

Shemyakin: As far as I know, these are special people, people who appear somewhat wild to me. I think that such people like Rabbani—the more civil ones from this seven—have an excellent understanding of the situation and know that it is not all that easy to alter the mentality of or stop most of the mujaheddin, the majority of whom are illiterate, and who dream of breaking in somewhere and celebrating victory in the Oriental style. There is a power struggle in progress, and internecine strife is arising.

International Affairs: Your explanation as to why, contrary to all predictions, Jelalabad and Kabul are holding on boils down to fear. But on the

positive side, there must be something attractive and interesting for the people in the programme and politics of the Najibullah government.

Shemyakin: I am not very familiar with its programme. I have no idea what can happen there in principle. One thing I do know: the Soviet Union continues to provide considerable support to Kabul. This is no secret. Just as the Americans are not ceasing their support for the opposition. Were neither America nor the Soviet Union to render aid the picture would quickly become clear. For the time being, however, one is helping with weapons and the other, pulling out, has left behind much weaponry and are now helping with foodstuffs.

International Affairs: What can you say about the alignment of forces in the Peshawar Seven?

Shemyakin: I think that Hikmatyar enjoys less authority now. He has perpetrated a number of atrocities and made big miscalculations. I have spoken to a number of Afghans—elderly, serious people. They are very much afraid of the extremists themselves. One example is Habib Mayar, who is the son of the governor of Kabul, a very influential man. Naturally, he is worried about the present situation. This is what he told me: theoretically, we can never do without friendship with the Soviet Union; the border problem, trade, export, transport and haulage are but a few examples. All the same, we must arrive at some agreement, and our task is to establish peace with our neighbour.

I found it difficult to talk to many Afghans. Take Habib, for example. He was operated on in Moscow for a spinal problem. He said: at first we just did not understand what was happening. We had long grown accustomed to being friendly with Russian builders working in Afghanistan. There used to be a lot of Russians in Kabul. We lived together and were friends, and we had already begun studying Russian, went fishing and hunting together, we flew to Moscow, to fine hospitals for treatment, i. e., it never occurred to us that such a tragedy could happen.

International Affairs: Why, in your opinion, the Peshawar group cannot reach agreement with the Iranian one at all?

Shemyakin: I don't want to dwell on this topic because I am not very good at politics. But it seems to me that this is a problem of carving the big pie. They have their own rivalries there.

International Affairs: What is your forecast as to how the situation will develop? Thus far there is war, evidently civil war, there are no foreign troops. People cannot keep shooting at one another endlessly.

Shemyakin: Civil wars are the longest wars. It seems to me, judging by the reactions of the politically mature Afghans whom I've met, that everything will fall into place sooner or latter.

In Moscow, as I've read in the local press, one People's Deputy stated that it is high time to think about beginning to redress the damage caused by this war. It seems to me that in a short time Soviet experts will go back there and restore things. Once again Soviet lads will be blown up on their own mines while clearing away the ones they laid in some places. Once again someone will be building something, funds will again be funnelled there, as is usually the case. We will have to be friendly with such a neighbour all the same. They need to be friends with us, and the Russians need to be friends with them. So I believe that everything will stabilise. If, of course, completely fierce extremists do not come to power.

International Affairs: Is there such a probability?

Shemyakin: Regrettably, there are plenty of extremists in the Moslem world. I would not like to think about this, but one should always have a reserve of both the good and the bad. Muslims are a special people. My father was a Moslem, too, so I know a little about this. They are definitely tough people, although the Koran, which I read (I had one brought out of Russia by my friends—it is in Russian), teaches, like all other religions, kind-

ness and compassion. Moslems constantly read the Koran, speak about the importance of compassion in the name of Allah, etc. Generally speaking, all religions teach compassion, but often it was in the name of this religion that many bloody atrocities were perpetrated.

There is much that is contradictory in world history in general. I am, so to speak, gazing at this world sarcastically.

International Affairs: What specifically evokes sarcasm in you about the modern world and about contemporary people?

Shemyakin: I believe that this world is plummeting into an abyss irrespective of geographical facts and figures. As a religious person, I believe that everything must come to pass according to the Scriptures, and I think that the environment is being destroyed with such indomitable energy that air, water and vegetation will probably become the most expensive things on Earth very shortly. An unusual film was released several years ago; it is called "The Green Sun". It is, so to speak, a story about what is in store for the world. Only the rich would be able to afford living in islets of ungraded environment—they will have green grass and plenty of air under glass covers. There are very funny groups of policemen who protect them. They are sometimes able to get for their friends tomatoes which grow in the greenhouse. Tears are coming from the eyes of the old man who is sitting and looking at one of these tomatoes and admiring its redness, and smelling it. He recalls that once when he was a boy he saw such fruit and vegetables—now they are strange to him. This is the future we are facing.

But let us take the present day. Forget about the casualty figures for the past wars which any schoolboy knows! We are used to the fact that thousands of people can perish in air and other disasters. Wars are constantly being waged all over the world. It seems to me that man has never been as merciless, he has never been as disgraceful towards himself and his fellow man as in our century. Therefore, this critical attitude to the world comes through in my works.

International Affairs: How much time do you give humanity?

Shemyakin: Everything depends on technology. The more it develops and the more we are wished "well" by our scientists, the less chances we have of survival. I am somewhat of a Moslem in this regard. Moslems correctly say that man should not cross certain thresholds in his knowledge, for he is too primitive in his moral principles. I will never forget how during a talk with a Frenchman in Paris he quoted someone's words: the idea of communism is simply brilliant, I am all for it, but we are such bastards that we have yet to mature enough for this idea; we have not matured morally to implement it.

I am probably a big pessimist. It is not for nothing that my favourite philosopher is Schopenhauer. I frequently observe our life and picture humanity as a small family.

Take, for example, the life of our immigrant circles. It would seem that we have little to squabble about; we are outcasts or we left our native land of our own free will—there are not all that many of us. Just look at what is going on in "our family" alone—discord, squabbles, hatred, etc. Put it on a grand scale, arm it to the teeth, and there you're—all set for a holocaust.

THE LESSON FOR TODAY

WORLD WAR II broke out fifty years ago.

Earlier anniversaries of the event were seen by Soviet politicians and historians as perfectly convenient. A criminal policy of appeasing Nazism; betrayal by Daladier and Chamberlain, who delivered Czechoslovakia to Hitler. A British admiral who chose the slowest ship to travel to Moscow for the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks. Intractable Poles and unyielding Finns. Against this background, the Soviet Union looked like the only peacemaker, one championing a collective security system. Faced with an anti-Soviet front, the Soviet Union took an absolutely logical if forced step by signing a non-aggression pact with Germany that put off the Nazi invasion.

There is no getting away from history or destiny. Today, when the international situation of the Soviet Union is more solid than ever and the war menace is receding, with Europeans saying that the postwar period is over, that remote war has overtaken us once again. Many things, including the very foundations of our federation, find themselves at stake on this anniversary of World War II. History has in effect posed a challenge to our society, and the truth about the past is the only weapon for meeting the challenge.

Under these circumstances, objectivity and fidelity to the facts are what we obviously need first and foremost. The inevitable price of concealing the truth is negativism on the part of those whom it is concealed from. But it would be unproductive to merely substitute the plus sign for the minus sign or vice versa. Using more black than white in painting history does not make it more authentic than if white were preferred. Currently it is often argued that the Western democracies considered it morally unacceptable to seek agreement with the Stalin regime, but the argument does not sound very convincing. Britain and France could and did do business with any regime. They were undeterred by bloodshed, especially when the blood was foreign, provided their rulers regarded the operation as meeting their interests. No evidence has yet been found such as could justify Chamberlain and Daladier, who disgraced themselves even in the eyes of their own peoples. Nor is there any evidence disproving their bid to direct Nazi aggression eastwards, something which placed the Soviet Union in a trying situation. Besides, there is no reason to deny the seriousness of Soviet intentions in favour of establishing a collective security system in Europe.

It follows that we need not completely rewrite history. The task is different. Without desecrating the memory of victims by whitewashing the West, objective historians and wise politicians must add to the general picture of World War II the details that are missing. Looking back, one gets the idea that the prehistory and early history of the war were made of an absurd succession of mistakes and miscalculations, with shortsightedness shown here, flexibility lacking there and somebody misunderstanding somebody else. But the more you delve into the atmosphere of the period, the stronger the feeling that the policy of all the participants in the drama was all but fatally predetermined by their class principles, by the character of the political regimes involved, by historical experience.

WITH REGARD TO the Soviet policy of the time, you are struck by a circumstance hardly noticed by our historians: no matter by what noble or amoral means the Soviet Union tried to safeguard its security or what efforts it exerted to this end, the results were invariably meagre and mostly counter-productive. It seemed as if inherent in the Stalinist totalitarian system was a gene of self-destruction. Nothing revealed this more strikingly than the situation around the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact.

Anyone who analyses the situation prevailing in the summer of 1939—the manifest deadlock at the talks with Britain and France, the persisting likelihood of an Anglo-French deal with Hitler, the inevitable prospect of an attack on Poland, the fact that the Soviet Union was unprepared for war, the danger of its having to face the Nazi war machine all alone, and so on—will find it hard to avoid the conclusion that the signing of the pact was forced by the circumstances. But it is fair to ask: What was the reason for a situation where an accommodation with Germany turned out to be almost the only alternative?

What, indeed? Why was it, for instance, that Poland, realising the imminence of a Nazi invasion, refused the Red Army permission to cross Polish territory none the less? Permission for this was both a reasonable requirement and a necessary condition if the Soviet Union was to conclude a military treaty with Britain and France that could have safeguarded Poland against the Nazi threat. The answer is, essentially, that the Polish leadership was short of common sense and gripped by anti-Soviet emotions. But didn't Poland refuse also because the Stalin regime terrified that former province of the Russian Empire?

Let us recall the Soviet Union's plight in 1939. The regime had disrupted the military machine built by talented military leaders whom even German generals found nothing wrong with seeking knowledge from. It has executed the makers of this machine and replaced them with unquestioning mediocrities or inexperienced beginners. By the late 1930s, the contradictions plaguing speeded-up industrialisation had gone from bad to worse, and the economy found itself unbalanced and practically reduced to a state of crisis. Numerous specialists who had survived the revolution had been destroyed along with newly-trained specialists, and as for designers of military technology, they had been transported to prison camps. All this had come about at a time when there was an unmistakable smell of gunpowder in Europe and the Far East. It would be futile to attribute such behaviour to foreign political circumstances, British treachery, a shameless Hitler, and so forth. The disruption of the country's defences was the price paid for bolstering the leader's inner political positions. The Stalin regime had put itself in a situation where, in August 1939, it really had no option but to strike a hurried bargain with fascism.

The volteface failed to cure the regime's policy of suicidal tendencies. To be sure, the pact helped gain time to heal the wounds and prepare for war. Geostrategically, that is, even leaving legal, moral and other issues on one side, it is perfectly understandable that in the given situation there should be a desire to expand the territory of the country and create a buffer zone against the threat of aggression in the northwest, west and southwest. But what were the results of the efforts to strengthen security?

Repressive measures against the population of the newly-acquired areas virtually cut the social ground from under the regime's feet. The Soviet-Finnish war almost brought on what would basically have been unthinkable before: military operations against the Soviet Union by Britain, France and even Sweden. The bungled Finnish campaign led Hitler to the conclusion that the Red Army was no serious adversary and that war against it would be easily won. In June 1941, territorial

acquisitions won the country days but lost it some of the finest troops which the regime, showing would-be foresight, had stationed along the new border. And what about the fact that warnings coming from everywhere and naming the day when Germany planned to invade the Soviet Union were ignored and their bearers ground into "camp dust"?

There is no ascribing all that solely to Stalin's miscalculations. What we had was the fallacy of a system, the innate inability of a totalitarian regime to respond adequately to reality. In struggling to survive, such a system either overlooks real threats and hits its own backers or reacts—even when it is aware of a danger—so stupidly and criminally that both its own people and neighbours become victims.

Hitler, well knowing that he was going to attack the Soviet Union, calmly went on acquainting the Soviet side with models of his newest military equipment (as late as June 1941, Soviet pilots were testing German aircraft that were the last word in designing). He did so for all that the Red Army exceeded the Wehrmacht many times over in tanks and planes; nor were they all "obsolete in design", as many of our analysts still delude themselves into believing. This constitutes a further devastating indictment of the system. A corporal formed a more exact idea of that system than today's wise men of COCOM, who pore endlessly over lists of "strategic items" to be barred from socialist countries.

THE TOTALITARIAN PATHOLOGY inherent in the genetic code of society may come out even several generations later, when society bears little resemblance to its ancestor. Is there a cure for an evil heritage? We cannot help thinking about this now that time bombs planted fifty years ago have begun to explode.

The Baltic republics are astir, and the Union capital is debating the authenticity of a secret protocol. Everybody realises that there was an agreement between Hitler and Stalin on giving each other a free hand in their respective "spheres of interests", yet we are still arguing about whether Molotov could have signed the protocol in Latin letters. We are aware of the danger threatening the integrity of our Union but our response still comes down in the main to an attempt to keep everything intact except for some face-lifting.

Fortunately enough, every crisis is both a threat and an opportunity. An opportunity for renewal and restructuring. Present movements, however uncommon the forms they may occasionally take, offer an opportunity to modernise society, to overcome impasses and antiquated forms of government, to pave the way for the solution of many problems which only seem insolvable for as long as we try to tackle them without going beyond existing structures.

Will we be able to use this opportunity? Or will we allow the situation to get out of hand, thereby provoking developments fraught, as in 1939, with measures which future historians echoing their predecessors will slyly describe as "forced"?

WHAT SHALL WE BUY IN AFRICA?

Grigori POLYAKOV

BY THE MID-EIGHTIES, economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and African countries had entered a new and complex stage marked by, among other things, a drop in the growth rate and absolute volume of deliveries of complete plant. These were the main "convenient" indicators which we went by for a long time in evaluating our technological aid to the region.

Now that we can no longer keep up the pace chosen in the sixties and seventies, even optimists realise that what was believed to be passing negative concomitants of our economic ties with Africa has become a durable trend such as will take a lot of effort, time and resources to eliminate. Gaining in relevance against this background along with steps to improve forms of technological aid already tested in practice are a search for and the development of non-traditional lines of cooperation.

It is long since experience revealed the miscalculations of our concept of cooperation with developing countries. Today it is time to see what we have missed and how this has affected and goes on affecting our cooperation with African countries.

SEEKING A POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING of the Third World, we tried for a long time to impose our development model on newly-free countries. Our approach to cooperation with Africa was not based on fostering the strong points of our economic partners. In helping Africans build a "new, independent economy", we created more and often, starting practically from scratch, enclaves whose economic performance was inadequate and which made the economies of the African countries concerned largely similar to ours, thereby undermining the foundations of cooperation.

On completing a large steel plant or hydroelectric station, we used to move on to other projects of a similar type. The organisations responsible for building them bothered little about effectiveness. They saw schedules and the amount of resources used as the important thing. No wonder many African countries, particularly the poorest, found it very hard to bear the cost of such technological aid. As a result, cooperation on some agreed lines had to be suspended and an increasing number of African governments asked us to reschedule payments on economic credits. Incidentally, writing off economic debts is in the interest of those directly responsible for this kind of mismanagement. Indeed, it would be anything but easy today to stay on the old path without

covering one's traces. And so they seek to cancel old debts to be able to make more trips abroad and more deals of the same kind.

A departmental approach and the lack of a *khozraschet* mechanism in our foreign economic relations largely predetermined the formation of a vicious circle. Operating in it, the Foreign Trade Bank rescheduled payments on credits, the Ministry of Foreign Trade purchased goods of African origin on the London Stock Exchange, paying for it in hard currency, and the State Committee for Economic Relations, building ineffective projects, continued searching for further traditional spheres in which to invest money diverted from the Soviet economy. In the process the Ministry and the Committee reached plan targets, which meant that the situation suited them fine. Yet Africans liked this state of affairs less and less.

First of all, they had to pay for this kind of aid sooner or later. Second, fewer and fewer countries wanted large power or steel plants. Last but not least, the economic situation in Africa changed.

We shut our eyes to all that as we searched for more "Ajaokutas"¹ but it transpired that the majority of African governments could afford no such projects. Their chief problem is how to feed a growing population, settle accounts with creditors and use what is left to the best advantage and as speedily as possible for economic development. Besides, African countries are under such strong pressure from the IMF and other international organisations, which have long been busy teaching Africans *khozraschet*, that all economic independence is out of the question for the time being.

Compensation is one of the negative instances of solving new problems by old methods. It is true that we have recognised the need to join actively in providing the prerequisites for the repayment of credits and in developing our cooperation partners' export industries. Also, we have rightly defined agriculture as the main line of aid to African countries, where natural conditions (tropics and subtropics) are more propitious for farming than in the Soviet Union. But while delegations succeeded one another and more talks are held, countries of the region have yet to start supplying us with goods we need. Perhaps we should not expect it in view of the critical food situation on the continent.

However, Ethiopia, which was hit by drought hardest of all in 1984 and 1985, met its commitments, none the less, by delivering fruit, vegetables, meat and other food products to its Arab neighbours. Like other African countries, it prefers to spend its export earnings on buying wheat and other foodstuffs produced at lower cost in countries where the climate is more severe. That country knows by experience that the price of blindly imitating others is too high: as a consequence of converting some state farms producing export crops to grain production in the 1979-1980 period, exports fell off while food imports had to be increased.

So why is it that Africans are not eager at all to accept our proposals for building up the export potential of their agriculture? Besides, is this so very profitable for ourselves, seeing that we must bear further substantial expenses in order to get back what we have lent?

Countries of Tropical Africa certainly take account of the experience of cooperation with Soviet organisations. Too many agroindustrial facilities put in operation with technological assistance from us survive, if at all, thanks solely to subsidies from the governments concerned.

We may note in passing that there are many ways of making up for losses in the state sector. Regardless of whether they consist in artificially raised purchase prices, direct subsidies out of the budget or just forgiveness of debts, the main source on which African states draw for

this kind of charity is higher taxes levied on the peasants, or the majority of the population. Peasants account for the bulk of agricultural output, which varies from 30 to 45 per cent of GDP. Thus our aid hits those who receive it—peasants using spades and hoes are made to pay for loss-making tractor plants. While abiding by the letter of theories refuted by practice, we forget that the peasants are those for whose sake revolutions were accomplished in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and elsewhere. I am sure the Africans themselves cannot shut their eyes to this.

It may be the reason why agreeing now, seemingly promising projects is so difficult, for there is no guarantee that they will prove effective. After all, should they prove unprofitable, deliveries of their output would make it impossible to repay old debts. In fact, repaying credits granted for the construction of compensation projects would be a problem (for profit made by these enterprises is the only source that can be drawn on to pay old or new debts). In countries where the state sector in both industry and agriculture has long been operating at a loss, prospective customers understandably see compensation projects to be realised in conformity with old practices as most hazardous undertakings. And then, do we quite realise, to be frank, where this attempt to catch a train that left long ago can get us? Can Soviet organisations which build agroindustrial facilities abroad guarantee—given the present state of affairs and standard of organisation—that the designing and construction of compensation projects and, above all, their operation will meet world standards? As the output of these enterprises is earmarked for export anyway, with production costs considerably above the world average levels for similar commodities, there can be no question of profitability. We would again find ourselves in a vicious circle and have to pay for such mistakes in our own oil and gas.

The world found a solution to this problem long ago—in the form of joint ventures, consortiums and other associations functioning successfully in market conditions, that is, forms of economic cooperation which we traditionally rejected. We now talk less about capital export and its inevitably sad consequences for developing countries. Many of these, known as new industrial countries, have found a place for themselves in the world division of labour. The past 15 to 20 years have seen them develop up-to-date economies, which they owe to imports of financial resources, the latest technologies, achievements in science, and so forth. I must note that our attitude to joint ventures has changed. True, the change is rather ideological or propagandistic since the experience of joint ventures abroad is still restricted to trade, all our talk about them notwithstanding. The main reasons for this situation are that we have no precise and integral concept, elaborate legal, organisational and financial basis, nor competent personnel. Be that as it may, now that excitement over joint ventures has subsided somewhat, we have reason to state that joint ventures in production are not the form of cooperation which we should begin with as a means of substantially improving mutually beneficial economic relations with Africa in the short term.

The ineffectiveness of old, traditional forms of assistance and the fact that we are not prepared to promote forms of cooperation in use everywhere else make scientists and executives sceptical of the prospects of furthering economic contacts with the continent. Indeed, the general logic on which we have based our arguments so far suggests that for the reasons listed above, developing cooperation on a compensational basis as its only possible form (in view of the distressing monetary and financial situation of the majority of African countries) is out of the question in the foreseeable future.

Do we have to spend so much on building up the partner's export po-

tential right now? Besides, is this task limited to developing new large tracts of land and organising up-to-date state farms or joint ventures?

Take, for example, Ethiopia. Ninety per cent of its post-revolutionary exports to the Soviet Union is fuel oil, a product of the Aseb Oil Refinery built with Soviet aid in the sixties. It is only in the last two years that we have been able to import about 15,000 tons of Ethiopian coffee. Hides, skins, oilseed, legumes, spices and other traditional Ethiopian exports are still beyond our reach. They are delivered only in a while and in small quantities. There are many reasons for this. It is a fact, however, that in the twenties and thirties we supplied Ethiopia with oil products in exchange for a wide range of commodities. Currently we are getting fuel oil for our oil, which we are delivering at a discount, and what is more, the Ethiopians may refuse to sell their product if they find our prices unacceptable. This is, by the way, a consequence of our ill-advised industrialisation theory, for no substantial deposits of iron ore, coal or hydrocarbon fuel have been discovered in Ethiopia so far.

The new concept of cooperation that already finds clear expression is written with regard to Ethiopia into a long-term programme for cooperation up to 1993/1994 and calls for the establishment of new state farms whose profitableness is very questionable. If I were to disregard this concept I could suggest that to bring about a considerable increase in traditional Ethiopian exports to the Soviet Union, there is no particular need, at least at the early stage, to build new production facilities. Cooperation should be aimed at using the potential already there as fully as possible and at restoring and then exceeding the prerevolutionary level of production of these commodities, with the capacities the same as before, so to say.

IF THEY WERE to forget for a while the dry figures appearing in the reports of our trade missions and to carefully study data furnished by the African press and international statistics, even the most incorrigible sceptics would have to recognise that the majority of African countries have considerable opportunities for export. Every year sees 225,000 head of cattle, 750,000 goats and sheep, 100,000 camels, 10,000-15,000 tons of coffee and other commodities smuggled out of Ethiopia alone. Yet Ethiopia's tanning and meat-packing industries use only 60 to 70 per cent of their capacities. We send one team of specialists after another to that country but cannot solve the problem of raw materials for its meat-packing plant. We are trying to do so by setting up fattening facilities comparable to American ranches as if we forgot about the fate of similar projects put into operation with Soviet aid in other African countries. Why raise bull calves instead of prevailing on peasants to raise them? The latter themselves would bring their extra bull calves to sell and thus solve the raw materials problems, that headache of our exports. In other words, what is to be done to combat smuggling and encourage state trade? This would benefit both ourselves and the Ethiopians.

Many African countries are trying in vain to put an end to smuggling by merely banning it. However, they really have no other means at their disposal. To induce the peasants to sell their produce to state organisations, it is necessary to have goods they need flow in the opposite direction. I mean textiles, footwear, clothing, implements, fertilisers, household appliances, or all that local industries will be unable for a long time to come to produce in quantities meeting domestic demand. What Africa gets today in exchange for scarce agricultural raw materials is goods marked "Hongkong". While the quality of these goods is far from

satisfactory, their prices suit the Ethiopian population, and this is important.

By selling such goods, the ASEAN countries earned many dollars which they spent afterwards on developing modern branches of the economy, thereby paving the way for the current boom. As for Soviet organisations, they show little interest in adjusting the possibilities we have today to Africa's potential. We fight for doubtful projects and then use goods credits for the financing of internal expenditures by supplying materials which our own economy is short of.

We seem to forget that the Soviet Union is one of the world's biggest producers of consumer goods. According to the State Committee for Statistics, billions worth of unsold consumer goods pile up every year in the storehouses of our trade ministries, consumers' cooperatives and other entities. The existence of this sum cited in the Committee reports is arguable in view of our mismanagement. It is to be hoped that the situation will be studied by impartial analysts. Still, I would like to note that, for a long time to come, we will have sufficient quantities of such goods for Africa. We can supply the continent with textiles, footwear, knitted goods, pans and other items to help it without ignoring our own interests.

But there are admittedly essential distinctions between the interests of the state and those of various government departments.

During a conference at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Africa, a representative of Centrosoyuz was asked whether that organisation was interested in working out variant forms of cooperation making it possible to obtain scarce agricultural raw materials from African countries in exchange for goods that did not sell on our home market. I got no reply but this did not surprise me because no department would want to wash its dirty linen in public even for a lot of money. It would lose face if it did, and that would rob it of the monopoly enabling it to take the cream of consumers' cooperatives all over the Soviet Union.

A substantive study of the problem of delivering our consumer goods to some African countries is long overdue.

By applying traditional forms of assistance, we could use such goods to fund internal expenditures which building cooperation facilities entails. This would be better than supplying Africa with oil products, iron, steel reinforcement, cement, glass and other items we ourselves need.

What about non-traditional lines? Since we already have some experience of joint ventures in precisely this field, why not begin with trade? As a start, we could found, for instance, a Soviet-Tanzanian or Soviet-Ethiopian trading company that would use its subsidiaries to supply goods to peasants for cash or by contract in exchange for their produce. Some may argue that the batches would be too small, that there would be the problem of sanitary control and low effectiveness, and so on. Yes, but European countries import farm products from Africa even by air and it pays.

Those who feel uneasy about the political effect of our cooperation and consider it dishonourable and detrimental to our prestige to export commodities falling short of world standards should remember two things. First, nobody would hold it against us if we sold African countries cheap goods provided that they had not been rejected as unfit for use. Second, large sections of the African population would finally get real support from our country, something which is quite important politically as well.

Humanising aid and getting it to concrete people is a tactic long used by Western countries in Africa and elsewhere. We, however, build oil refineries and deliver oil. What does the average African know about this? Majority of the people in African countries only use modern transport

from time to time. So let us think of a situation where goods which everybody could afford to buy were to appear on the empty shelves of cooperative stores. Peasants would no longer want to sell coffee, livestock, skins, oilseed on the black market because they would be in a position to exchange all this for goods they needed, without running the risk of being penalised for smuggling.

Such joint companies could plan the volume of trade by signing contracts with peasant cooperatives and individual farmers.

In five to seven years' time, having accumulated some capital and experience, they could also engage in production by setting up small enterprises to supply peasants with goods. They could, for instance, build a plant to manufacture improved implements and spare parts for simple farm equipment. Specialists estimate that replacing the traditional iron tip of the wooden plough by a tip made of alloyed steel increases the productivity of peasant labour by 10 to 15 per cent. At the level of the country, this means a far greater increase in agricultural output than two or three new, up-to-date state farms could provide. I may as well add that the cost of building about a hundred repair shops for handcraftsmen would not exceed that of setting up a machine and tractor station.

Joint ventures in trade and then in production, by helping extend our economic ties with African countries, would also create definite prerequisites for more active use of traditional forms of cooperation given a serious revision of its lines and priorities.

Life has shown that it is high time we called a halt to gigantomania. This applies primarily to cooperation with Africa, where countries that seemed recently to be doing well are now racking their brains for a solution to the problem of their "Ajaokutas". The record indicates that our foreign trade organisations were wrong to fight shy of minor projects. Indeed, some microdams built in five or six months prove far more effective than a major irrigation project, in whose case precontract preparations alone take four or five years to complete. A small plant making farm implements in a country having no oil of its own is more useful than a tractor assembly plant. We can hardly expect our economic ties with Africa to intensify unless we bear this in mind.

What stands in the way of new lines of cooperation? A good deal of dissatisfaction with science has been expressed of late. I venture to affirm that the years of perestroika have seen Soviet Africanists face up to practice at last. But how many useful proposals lie buried in the archives of ministries and departments? This is a question that scientists or executives can hardly answer. I am repeatedly told that such ideas, if allowed to be discussed in public, might harm cooperation and undermine the prestige of Soviet foreign trade organisations. Such fears voiced by these "defenders" of the reputation of their country conceal much more than mere incompetence or their reluctance to think and act in a new way.

There still continues wastefulness in financing some African nations' projects. However, this wastefulness only superficially appears a consequence of guideless mistakes or miscalculations. As a matter of fact, it is not quite so. To a large extent our wastefulness often stems from departmental interests, for some of the organisations and apparatus view it as a warrant of their further existence and prosperity.

¹ Ajaokuta, the largest steel plant in Tropical Africa, is being built in Nigeria with Soviet aid.

MILITARY CONSTRAINTS ON CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Alexander CHIKVAIDZE

PRESIDENT George Bush visited Canada a mere three weeks after taking office. It was his first trip abroad. "Beginning with Canada" has become a tradition with US presidents demonstrating the "special relationship" between the two countries.

The process of rapprochement between Canada and the United States was predetermined by both their geographical proximity and the similarity of their social, economic and cultural development. As time passed ties grew into close cooperation. Not that the two countries' views, let alone their national interests, fully coincide. Canada is trying to pursue a more flexible foreign policy with due regard to its geopolitical situation and with the aim of playing an international role as much in keeping with its economic potential and political leverage as possible.

Canada's involvement in the continental military plans and activities of the United States is a factor seriously limiting its foreign policy approaches. The dimensions of Canadian-US military political cooperation are reflected in numerous bilateral agreements. As far back as August 17, 1940, the two countries signed the Ogdensburg Declaration establishing general principles for their military cooperation and setting up a Permanent Joint Board of Defense. A noted American scholar William Arkin commented on the event as follows: "Canada is integrated into virtually every aspect of US military policy: some 70 treaties relating to defense; over 2,500 bilateral military cooperation 'agreements'; membership in NATO and the bilateral North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD); membership on two permanent bilateral planning bodies; bilateral land defense plans with the United States; integration of early warning, testing, training, and communications; and a virtual joint naval policy in the Pacific. Trying to decipher the treaties, agreements, arrangements, notes, and plans is like peeling an onion"¹

This abundance of agreements is no indication, however, that Canada is an equal partner in the bilateral military political alliance and fully shares in the framing of a common military policy. There are a great many facts pointing the other way. In January 1985, the US Strategic Air Command (SAC) disclosed plans for deploying nuclear depth bombs at Canadian bases "in an emergency". *The Globe and Mail* reported that the then Minister of National Defence Robert Coats had emphatically denied the likelihood of the deployment of depth bombs, saying that "the only agreement with the United States is for overflights by Strategic Air Command bombers carrying nuclear weapons", and adding that these flights would be carried out under an advance agreement between the two countries.²

Yet the Minister failed to mention that US bombers would be allowed not only to overfly Canada but to land there. According to SAC regula-

Alexander Chikvaidze is a post-graduate at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the United States and Canada.

tions, the Canadian Forces Base Cold Lake is one of the six bases where B-52 planes of the 93rd Bombardment Wing stationed at the Castle Air Force Base in California are to be dispersed in a crisis. Each of SAC's bomber wings has at least four dispersal bases. In a crisis, KC-135 Aerial refuelling planes and RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft would be dispersed at Canada's Goose Bay, Nainia and Yellowknife bases.³

During a visit to Washington in December 1985 which members of the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence undertook to study Canadian-US military agreements, they were presented with a list of accords on defence and joint defence production. The list, drawn up by the Canadian Ministry of National Defence, comprised 364 agreements, notes and memorandums on military cooperation. It complemented treaties and agreements published earlier. But eight accords were missing from the new version. They had to do with the most acute issues relating to nuclear weapons, in particular the agreement of July 27, 1967, on the deployment of nuclear depth bombs and the agreement of March 18, 1969, on the use of Canadian ports by US nuclear-powered warships. A further accord dropped from the list was the one of January 1, 1976, on joint NORAD and SAC war games (code-named Snowtime). It was intended to test NORAD monitoring and interception systems, SAC aircraft and radio countermeasures systems.⁴

It is safe to say that the Canadian government is not in a position to exercise permanent control over the vast set of problems surrounding bilateral military political cooperation. Canada often signs an agreement it does not really need under pressure from Washington, which subsequently plays the chief role in how the agreement is carried out. As a result, Washington has virtually secured the right to wake by itself decisions bearing on the defence of North America, proceeding from the assumption that Canada does not necessarily have to know everything.

Washington is out to closely tie in NORAD modernisation plans with the implementation of SDI. When, in 1981, the agreement on NORAD was extended for a further term the reservation saying that Canada's membership of NORAD did not bind it to adopt active anti-missile defence measures on the continent was left out. In giving the reason for this, the Canadian government said that the Soviet-US ABM Treaty of 1972 banned the development and deployment of such systems.⁵ But President Reagan's presentation of the SDI programme and Washington's special interpretation of the ABM Treaty lent importance to the absence of that reservation from the agreement on NORAD.

Stephen Clarkson, a Canadian analyst, wrote that the NORAD agreement was renewed again on March 15, 1981, during Reagan's visit to Canada, "with one potentially significant change: it had become the North American Aerospace Defense Command, recognising Canada's potential participation in American space surveillance".⁶ The North American Air Defence Modernisation Agreement signed on March 18, 1985, will cost seven billion dollars, the United States being expected to put up 88 per cent of this amount and Canada, 12 per cent. It also provides for updating the Dew Line system set up in the late 1950s.

Under the common programme, modernisation of the North Warning System (NWS) will cost 1.5 billion dollars, with the United States contributing 60 per cent and Canada, 40 per cent.⁷ The new system is to be made up of 13 long-range and 39 short-range radars deployed in northern areas of Alaska and Canada, including Labrador, as well as of US AWACS and Canadian CF-18 aircraft.⁸ Added to it will be trans-horizon radars on North America's eastern, western and southern

borders. The last three of the 11 long-range radars situated on Canadian territory were set up in November 1988. As for building and deploying 36 short-range radars in Canada, it is to be started in 1990 and completed in 1993.⁹

The purpose of the NWS is to update the system of spotting aircraft flying in from the North Pole; to guarantee the interception of bombers carrying cruise missiles before these are fired, and to spot and track the cruise missiles themselves; to assure Canada general observation of the approaches to the country's northern areas on the understanding that it will coordinate tracking on its territory with US interests by warning its ally of an imminent bomber attack.

The United States regards the NWS as a provisional solution necessitated by the technical complexity of and the huge expenditures involved in a complete change to air-based and space-based radar stations.¹⁰

Clearly, the agreement on modernising the NWS poses a threat to Canada's future in that the country is getting involved more and more in US military preparations. In an interview with *Time* in March 1985, US Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger said that under a certain set of circumstances, the United States might deploy anti-missile systems in Canada to intercept cruise missiles and bombers. Canada took exception to his statement, and the White House hastened to put things right by declaring that the United States was not going to site any anti-missile systems in Canada.¹¹ Nevertheless, Washington is seeking more extensive military cooperation with Ottawa.

During their Washington meeting on March 18-19, 1986, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and President Ronald Reagan extended the agreement on NORAD for a further five-year term. Despite the Canadian government's assurances that the extension had nothing to do with the Star Wars programme, there are growing fears that Canada will be involved still more in US preparations for space war.

The Canadian government is divided on the Star Wars programme. Speaking at the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in December 1984, Charles Clark, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, said that Cabinet members in his country differed on SDI. But in January 1985 he supported SDI in addressing the House of Commons even though he specified that Canada had no desire to join in research under the programme. At the same time, he declined to comment on two very doubtful arguments given by the Americans: one, that SDI did not contradict the 1972 ABM Treaty, and two, they had to counter Soviet research with research of their own.

Whereas prior to the Mulroney-Reagan meeting in Quebec in March 1985 Ottawa refused to participate in research, afterwards it made statements of a different nature. In response to an offer made at the meeting by Reagan, who said American industry was willing to share with its Canadian counterpart technology related to SDI, Mulroney, Clark and Minister of National Defence Nielsen said they reserved the right to make their choice in view of likely advantages in the area of employment and additional sources of revenue.

For its part, the 26th Meeting of the Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group (May 17-20, 1985) came out in favour of SDI. One of the Canadian delegates said that Canada should join in the SDI programme because of two reasons. The first is the need to restore and strengthen Canada's research capability in "high tech" areas. Secondly, the government needs to establish closer ties and friendship with the United States and increase Canadian influence in Washington.¹²

However, neither argument sounded convincing, for SDI research is to be rigorously classified, with Canada kept out. Canada's consent to join in implementing the Star Wars programme will make it still more

dependent on the United States rather than adding to its influence in Washington. Mindful of the public mood in his country, Mulroney stated on September 7, 1985, that "Canada's own policies and priorities do not warrant a government-to-government effort in support of SDI research. Although Canada does not intend to participate on a government-to-government basis on the SDI research program, private companies and institutions interested in participating in the program will continue to be free to do so."¹³

Many assessed the Canadian government's decision as a public expression of disagreement between Mulroney and Reagan. But given the opposition parties' attitude, a positive response from Canada would probably have caused greater damage to the "special relationship" between the two countries. Ottawa's refusal does not, of course, imply that Canada is staying out of SDI. Its geographical location and its cooperation with the United States on North American defence matters are bound to involve the country in SDI sooner or later. It is obvious, however, that major technological projects within the framework of SDI may create serious difficulties for Canada's aerospace industry should Canada be completely shut out of them. George Bell, President of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, was right in saying: "The government has taken a position which allows them to evolve to a future position as the developments take place and as they see the analysis of the research taking place. It has left itself open for Canadians to participate."¹⁴

In the early 1980s, the USAF worked out the North American Air Defence Master Plan to modernise the continent's air defences as proposed by Congress. In March 1982, the plan was submitted to Congress and provided the basis for updating NORAD. It came into being before the United States announced the SDI programme but it constituted a stage on the road to Canada's eventual direct or indirect involvement in the programme. The next step towards Canadian involvement in the militarisation of space was a military project known as Strategic Defence Architecture 2000 (SDA 2000). It envisages developing "a concept for integrated defense against Soviet bombers, cruise and ballistic missiles."¹⁵ Phase I of SDA 2000, started in December 1982, "was to ascertain designed to project the air-breathing threat to the year 2000" and evolve defence techniques against such a threat. Phase II's aim, which began in 1984, was to explore an anti-missile defence system whose use would depend almost entirely on decisions concerning SDI. "There is an obvious convergence with SDI because SDI's purpose is to explore the technologies to find out which can be promising," said US General Robert Herres, Commander-in-Chief of NORAD and the US Space Command.¹⁶

That Canada was being drawn into the SDI programme was confirmed in April 1986 by the Air Force announcing Canadian-US talks on plans to work out a system to be called the Air Defence Initiative (ADI). The purpose of the plans was to develop technologies for monitoring, interception and battle control during a bomber and cruise missile attack.

It is believed that Canada can take part in the work of the Pentagon's Interagency ADI Steering Committee and that it can do so either through its membership of the US-Canadian Aerospace Defence Advanced Technology (ADAT) Working Group or by presenting its proposals to the committee. "ADAT," said USAF Brigadier-General Robert Rankine, the committee chairman, "is the key to Canadian participation. It is exactly the correct organisation to coordinate US investments in ADI with Canadian investments that might be relevant to North American air defence modernisation."¹⁷

Another problem of importance to Canada is that of the eventual sta-

tioning of certain elements of SDI on its soil. Should Canada join in a relevant programme, components of an ABM system equipped with nuclear arms could become part of it. Under the SDI programme, work is also going on to develop sensor technologies that could be used in ABM systems of interest to Canada.

It follows that coming to the fore once again is Canada's dependent status within the military alliance with the United States. Notwithstanding Ottawa's formal refusal to join in SDI, the Pentagon sees Canadian territory as a potential area for the siting of components of the Star Wars programme. And it is important to note the stance of the Canadian government itself, which does not seem to rule out the possibility of joining in SDI some time in the future.

On coming to power in September 1984, the conservative Mulroney government approved the US-Canadian agreement signed in Washington on February 10, 1983. The agreement allows the United States to test cruise missiles on Canadian territory and authorises the Pentagon to use the territory and airspace of its northern neighbour. However, it bans nuclear, chemical or biological materials of military uses.

Air-based cruise missiles are the main system being tested in Canada. Tests are conducted in winter, since in the event of their being used against the Soviet Union it is probably from northern areas that they would be fired.

On February 7, 1989, President Bush's National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, told a White House press conference before the President's trip to Canada that the Canadian government had agreed to continued cruise missile tests on its territory.¹⁸

All of Ottawa's arguments to the effect that the agreement on American cruise missile testing in Canada was reached within the framework of NATO are untenable. The two North American countries signed it on a strictly bilateral basis. It was fresh evidence of Ottawa's support for US plans in the name of "solidarity", for Canada itself is not interested in acquiring such a weapons system.

In 1984, President Reagan proposed to Canada, Japan and the West European members of the European Space Agency that they should join in building a major manned space station. In April 1985, the Canadian Prime Minister signed with the United States a Memorandum of Understanding concerning the aims of building a space station and the stages of the project. In January 1986, Canada announced that its role in the project would be limited to building an important part of the station, namely, a Mobile Service Centre (MSC).

Originally the total cost of the station was estimated at 12 billion dollars and that of the Canadian part of the project, at 220 million dollars for research from 1986 to 1991 and at 800 million dollars for the same purpose from 1991 to 2000.¹⁹ In mid-1988, however, Canada's share came to be set at 1,850 million dollars.²⁰ The MSC is to play a key role in assembling the station in orbit and in running it as well as in various operations to be carried out by astronauts.

The MSC is expected to be delivered to the Kennedy Space Centre in 1991, and its first components are to be placed in orbit by 1995. The whole amount of work is planned to be completed by 1997. Canada intends to send one astronaut every two years for six month's work at the station.

By agreement between the two countries involved in the project, the station is to serve exclusively peaceful purposes. In early 1987, however, information coming in from the United States indicated an increasing interest in the project on the part of the Pentagon. US allies understandably resented this, and so NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) hastened to assure them that the station would only be

used for "peaceful purposes consistent with international law".²¹ But Ted Hallas, editor of Aerospace Canada International, admitted that the Pentagon insisted on NASA refusing to sign any international agreements restricting the use of the station for any ends whatever. It was said to be very hard to decide which of the systems developed by the companies involved in the project might be used for military purposes.²² Thus, while having to work on a major component of the station and to spend a substantial amount of money on it, Canada is unaware of or rather shuts its eyes to the future uses of the space station.

In June 1987, the Mulroney government published the Defence White Paper. This 15-year programme for building up Canada's armed forces provides for the purchase of 10 to 12 nuclear-powered submarines, new tanks, six frigates, new deck-based anti-submarine helicopters, six long-range patrol aircraft, transport planes and CF-18 planes to replace ones that have served their time or have been damaged beyond repair as a result of accident.

The White Paper says that Canada plans to revise its military political priorities in Europe. Contrary to its earlier commitment to send one brigade and two reinforced fighter squadrons to northern Norway in case of war, Canada now intends to concentrate its troops in the FRG, where the 4th Canadian Mechanised Brigade is stationed.

Also worthy of note is what the White Paper says about measures to build up the country's military power in the Arctic region and step up the role of its naval forces by creating an up-to-date navy equal to operating in three oceans. The main provision of the programme is the plan to buy 10 to 12 nuclear-powered attack submarines equipped with conventional weapons. On hearing that Canada might buy one or several submarines, the Pentagon took a most sceptical view of the idea.

The United States does not recognise Canada's sovereignty over the Northwest Passage linking northern Alaska with America's East Coast. This is because Washington fears that recognition would set a precedent for other countries and that some future government of Canada might bar US waships from the passage.

Many in the US Congress saw in the Canadian government's plan to purchase attack submarines a bid to establish sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. Refuting this view, the Commander of the Canadian Maritime Forces said: "We did not go to SSNs because of the Arctic. We went to SSNs because they do the job that has to be done in the Pacific and in the Atlantic and because they give us a capability in the Arctic. If the Arctic did not exist, the recommendation would have been the same."²³ Five or six of the 10 to 12 SSNs would be deployed in the Atlantic, three or four in the Pacific and one or two in the Arctic.²⁴ No secret was made of the readiness of Canadian nuclear-powered submarines in the North Atlantic and northeastern areas of the Pacific to join in NATO operations against the Soviet Union. And tracking in Arctic waters by Canada would likewise be directed against Soviet submarines.

In January 1989, it was reported that Canada might renounce nuclear-powered submarines altogether. The report was associated with the transfer of Perrin Beatty, one of the most outspoken advocates of the programme, from the post of Minister of National Defence to that of Minister of National Health and Welfare. Commenting on it, Prime Minister Mulroney stressed that Canada was still set on implementing the programme but added that it would be carefully reconsidered with due regard to the government's financial resources.

In April 1989, the Federal Government of Canada published its budget. Thereupon the Ministry of National Defence declared that some of the programmes put forward in the White Paper were being given up or reduced. Specifically, Canada renounced the purchase of nuclear-po-

wered submarines, six extra long-range patrol aircraft, CF-18 planes in place of aircraft which had served their time or were disabled through accidents. The Ministry also made substantial cuts in its plans for the purchase of new tanks and other equipment.²⁵

FROM WHAT international developments suggest, the foreign policy of the present Canadian leadership shows a measure of independence in evaluating world events, the state and prospects of East-West relations, and ways and means of settling conflicts and solving the paramount problem of preserving and strengthening world peace. Speaking to a joint meeting of the two houses of the US Congress in April 1988, Prime Minister Mulroney pointed out that both Canada and the United States must uphold their sovereign interests. "...We can have different views of the world, just as we clearly have different responsibilities in the world."²⁶

There is no denying, however, that the close military political relations that have shaped up between the United States and Canada impose certain restrictions on the latter's options in regard to foreign policy alternatives, the pursuit of an independent foreign policy and greater sovereignty. In light of this reality, the recent abolition or reduction of certain of Canada's programmes for building up and updating armaments is bound to have a positive effect.

¹ *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1986, p. 4.

² *The Globe and Mail*, Jan. 13, 1985.

³ *The Globe and Mail*, March 15, 1985.

⁴ See *Canadian Policy with Respect to Future Defence Cooperation with the United States. Presentation before the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence*, Washington, D. C., Dec. 3, 1985, pp. 4-6, 10.

⁵ *The Globe and Mail*, Feb. 17, 1986.

⁶ Stephen Clarkson, *Canada and the Reagan Challenge. Crisis and Adjustment, 1981-1985*. Toronto, 1985, p. 256.

⁷ *The Globe and Mail*, Apr. 1, 1985.

⁸ *Aerospace Canada International*, Sept./Oct. 1987, p. 31.

⁹ *Aerospace and Defence Technology*, Jan./Feb. 1989, p. 34.

¹⁰ See David Cox, *Trends in Continental Defence. A Canadian Perspective*, The Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Ottawa, Ontario, Occasional Papers, No. 2, Dec. 1986, p. 35.

¹¹ *Time*, Apr. 1, 1985, p. 25.

¹² See *US Congress. Senate. Twenty-Sixth Meeting of the Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group. May 17-20, 1985, 99th Congress, 1st Session*, Washington, 1985, p. 24.

¹³ Quoted from "The Washington Summit, March 18-19, 1986, Background Papers", *External Affairs Canada*, 1986, p. 37.

¹⁴ *Aerospace Canada International*, March/Apr. 1986, p. 17.

¹⁵ Quoted from *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1986, p. 4.

¹⁶ *Aerospace Canada International*, March/Apr. 1986, p. 17.

¹⁷ *Aerospace Canada International*, Sept./Oct. 1987, p. 28.

¹⁸ *Briefing by Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser, Federal News Service*, The White House, 1989, Feb. 7, p. 5.

¹⁹ *Aerospace Canada International*, May/July 1986, p. 25.

²⁰ *Aerospace and Defence Technology*, July/Aug. 1988, p. 10.

²¹ *Aerospace Canada International*, May/June 1987, p. 4.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Ronald O'Rourke, *Canadian Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine Program: Issues for Congress*, Congressional Research Service, Updated Sept. 29, 1988, p. 14.

²⁴ *The Washington Post*, Jan. 31, 1989.

²⁵ *Aerospace and Defence Technology*, May/June 1989, pp. 32-33.

²⁶ *Congressional Record*, 1988, April 27, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, USG, 1988, p. H2619.

LINKS IN TIME. HALF A CENTURY AGO. EUROPE ENTERED THE WAR

AROUND THE NON-AGGRESSION PACT

[Documents of Soviet-German Relations in 1939]

International Affairs jointly with the Historical Diplomacy Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs introduce our readers to documents pertaining to the conclusion of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty of August 23, 1939, and Soviet-German Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28, 1939.

Outstanding is the issue of the documents known as the secret additional protocol to the treaty of August 23, 1939, and other confidential protocols. Their texts were published in the West and have been a subject of lively discussions. *It is a fact that neither Soviet nor West German archives have the originals of the secret additional protocol. The text is reproduced from a photostat in the West German possession.* Yet, the developments after August 1939, and diplomatic materials, including those we reprint here, give reason to believe that an agreement could be reached during negotiations in Moscow that dealt with the two countries' spheres of interests, though it has not been ascertained sufficiently what the form of that agreement was. Authoritative judgements in this respect were made by Politburo Member, Secretary of the CPSU CC Alexander Yakovlev in his replies to the questions of the newspaper *Pravda* (*Pravda*, August 18, 1989).

A complete set of these documents is to be published by Politizdat Publishers in *The Year of Crisis. September 1939-September 1939* (in Russian).

TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

August 23, 1939

The Government of the German Reich and
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Desirous of strengthening the cause of peace between Germany and the USSR, and proceeding from the fundamental provisions of the Treaty of Neutrality, which was concluded between Germany and the USSR in April 1926, have reached the following agreement:

Article I

The two Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any act of violence, any aggressive action and any attack on each other either severally or jointly with other Powers.

Article II

Should one of the Contracting Parties become the object of belligerent

A reference to the Foreign Policy Archive of the USSR (USSR FPA) indicates that this is the first publication of the particular document. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS assessment of developments involved in 1939 agreements is expressed in the editorial comment THEME OF THE MONTH—"The Lesson for Today".

Worthy of interest, we think, is the story of diplomatic developments around the pact of August 23, 1939 recounted by Valentin Berezhkov in "Stalin's Error of Judgement" published in September issue of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

action by a third Power, the other Contracting Party shall in no manner lend its support to this third Power.

Article III

The Governments of the two Contracting Parties will in future maintain continual contact with one another for the purpose of consultation in order to exchange information on problems affecting their common interests.

Article IV

Neither of the two Contracting Parties will join in any grouping of Powers whatsoever which is aimed directly or indirectly at the other Party.

Article V

Should disputes or conflicts arise between the Contracting Parties over questions of one kind or another, both Parties will settle these disputes or conflicts exclusively by means of a friendly exchange of views or if necessary by the appointment of arbitration commissions.

Article VI

The present Treaty shall be concluded for a period of ten years with the proviso that, in so far as one of the Contracting Parties does not denounce it one year before the expiry of this period, the validity of this Treaty shall be deemed to be automatically prolonged for another five years.

Article VII

The present Treaty shall be ratified within the shortest possible time. The instruments of ratification will be exchanged in Berlin. The Treaty shall enter into force immediately upon signature.

Done in duplicate in the German and Russian languages.

Moscow, August 23, 1939

With full power of the
Government of the USSR:
V. Molotov

For the Government
of the German Reich:
J. Ribbentrop

Izvestia, August 24, 1939

SECRET ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

On the occasion of the signature of the Non-Aggression Treaty between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the undersigned plenipotentiaries of the two Parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the question of the delimitation of their respective spheres of interest in Eastern Europe. These conversations led to the following result:

1. In the event of a territorial and political transformation in the territories belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern frontier of Lithuania shall represent the frontier of the sphere of interest both of Germany and the USSR. In this con-

nection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna territory is recognised by both Parties.

2. In the event of a territorial and political transformation of the territories belonging to the Polish State, the spheres of interest of both Germany and the USSR shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narev, Vistula, and San.

The question whether the interests of both Parties make the maintenance of an independent Polish State appear desirable and how the frontiers of this State should be drawn can be definitely determined only in the course of further political developments.

In any case both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly understanding.

3. With regard to South-Eastern Europe, the Soviet side emphasises its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares complete political *désintéressement* in these territories.

4. This Protocol will be treated by both parties as strictly secret.

Moscow, August 23, 1939

For the Government of
the German Reich:
J. RIBBENTROP

With full power of the
Government of the USSR:
V. MOLOTOV

Copies from West German archives

GERMAN-SOVIET BOUNDARY AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR consider it as exclusively their task, after the disintegration of the former Polish state, to re-establish peace and order in these territories and to assure to the peoples living there a peaceful life in keeping with their national character. To this end, they have agreed upon the following:

Article I

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR determine as the boundary of their respective national interests in the territory of the former Polish state the line marked on the attached map, which shall be described in more detail in a supplementary protocol.

Article II

Both parties recognise the boundary of the respective national interests established in Article I as definitive and shall reject any interference of third powers in this settlement.

Article III

The necessary reorganisation of public administration will be effected in the areas west of the line specified in Article I by the Government of the German Reich, in the areas east of this line by the Government of the USSR.

Article IV

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the

USSR regard this settlement as a firm foundation for a progressive development of the friendly relations between their peoples.

Article V

This treaty shall be ratified and the ratification shall be exchanged in Berlin as soon as possible. The treaty becomes effective upon signature.

Moscow, September 28, 1939.

By authority of the
Government of the USSR:
V. MOLOTOV

For the Government
of the German Reich:
J. RIBBENTROP

Pravda, September 29, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL PROTOCOL

The Government of the USSR shall place no obstacles in the way of Reich nationals and other persons of German descent residing in its sphere of influence if they desire to migrate to Germany or to the German sphere of influence. It agrees that such removals shall be carried out by agents of the Government of the Reich in cooperation with the competent local authorities and that the property rights of the emigrants shall be protected.

A corresponding obligation is assumed by the Government of the German Reich in respect to the persons of Ukrainian or White Russian descent residing in its sphere of influence.

Moscow, September 28, 1939.

For the Government
of the German Reich:
J. RIBBENTROP

By authority of the
Government of the USSR:
V. MOLOTOV

Copies from West German archives

SECRET ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, on concluding the German-Russian Boundary and Friendship Treaty, have declared their agreement upon the following:

Both parties will tolerate in their territories no Polish agitation which affects the territories of the other party. They will suppress in their territories all beginnings of such agitation and inform each other concerning suitable measures for this purpose.

For the Government
of the German Reich:
J. RIBBENTROP

By authority of the
Government of the USSR:
V. MOLOTOV

Moscow, September 28, 1939

Copies from West German archives

SECRET ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

The undersigned plenipotentiaries declare the agreement of the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR upon the following:

The Secret Additional Protocol signed on August 23, 1939, shall be amended in item 1 to the effect that the territory of the Lithuanian state falls to the sphere of influence of the USSR, while, on the other hand, the province of Lublin and parts of the province of Warsaw fall to the sphere of influence of Germany (cf. the map attached to the Boundary and Friendship Treaty signed today). As soon as the Government of the USSR shall take special measures on Lithuanian territory to protect its interests, the present German-Lithuanian border, for the purpose of a natural and simple boundary delineation, shall be rectified in such a way that the Lithuanian territory situated to the southwest of the line marked on the attached map falls to Germany.

Further it is declared that the economic agreements now in force between Germany and Lithuania shall not be affected by the measures of the Soviet Union referred to above.

For the Government
of the German Reich:
J. RIBBENTROP

By authority of the
Government of the USSR:
V. MOLOTOV

Moscow, September 28, 1939

Copies from West German archives

SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The undersigned, being duly empowered thereto by the German Government and the Government of the USSR, pursuant to article 1 of the Boundary and Friendship Treaty concluded in Moscow on September 28, 1939, between Germany and the USSR, have agreed upon the following:

The boundary line between the respective national interests in the territory of the former Polish state shall have the following course:

Beginning at the point located on the IGORKA River at the mouth of a nameless brook which comes before the village of PSCHETOK and which follows into the IGORKA River at a distance of about 2,300 meters northeast of the intersection of this river with the SHONDOWY-KOPZEWO road, the boundary shall run in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the point located on the TSCHERNAJA GANTSCHA River opposite the northwestern edge of the village of SHONDOWY.

Thence the boundary ascends along the TSCHERNAJA GANTSCHA River to the mouth of the MARYCHA River. From this mouth the boundary shall follow a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the northern shore of JEDRYNO Lake. Thence the boundary shall follow a straight line to be determined to the point located opposite the mouth of the WOLKUSHANKA River on the TSCHERNAJA GANTSCHA River and further, ascending this latter river, to the point lying south of the village of OSTRYNSKE. Thence the boundary shall run at first in a southwesterly and then in a northwesterly direction along the ravine to its northwestern end and then, on a straight line to be determined, running in a northwesterly direction to the point lying at the northeastern edge of the village of TSCHARNY BRUD. From here the boundary shall run in a northwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined to the railroad bridge across the BLISNA River at the northern edge of the village of SCHTSCHEBRA so that the village

of SCHTSCHEBRA shall be on the USSR side and the village of BLISNA on the German side. Continuing, the boundary shall descend the BLISNA River to the junction of the roads SUWALKI-SCHITSCHEBRA II and RATSCHKI-SCHTSCHEBRA II, so that the fork of the road and the village of SCHTSCHEBRA II shall remain on the German side and the village of SCHTSCHEBRA I on the USSR side.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a northwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point located north of the village of TOPILOWKA and then shall bend slightly in a southwesterly direction and run, on a straight line to be determined, to a point located on the former Russo-German Reich border, which is located at a distance of about 900 meters southwest of the village of PRUSKA MALA, which shall remain on the German side.

Thence the boundary shall continue generally in a south-westerly direction along the former Russo-German border up to the point where the latter intersects the PISSAISSA River.

Thence the aforesaid boundary shall descend along the PISSAISSA River to its confluence with the NAREW River and then descend this river to the mouth of a nameless brook which flows into the NAREW River between the town of OSTROLENKA and the village of OSTROWA.

Thence the boundary shall ascend the brook to the eastern edge of the village of LAWY (South).

From the eastern edge of the village of LAWY (South), the boundary shall continue in a southeasterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the southern edge of the village of SUSSK, and continue, also on a straight line to be determined, to a point situated on the TROSCHYN-RABENDY road approximately 400 meters southwest of the edge of the village of TROSCHYN.

Thence the boundary runs in a south-southeasterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the crossroads south of the village of STYLENGI and then shall turn towards the southeast and continue, on a straight line to be determined, to a point on the OSH River south of the village of BUTSCHIN, so that this village shall remain on the USSR side, and the village of SAOSHE on the German side.

Thence the boundary shall ascend the OSH River to a tributary on the left which flows into the OSH River between the villages of SOKOLOWO and ROGOWEK, then along this tributary to a point located 1,200 meters east of the village of MALINOWA-STARE.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a southeasterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point on the OSTRUW-MASOWE-ZKA-SCHABIKOWO road, approximately 700 meters south of the brick works, so that the SALESZE estate, the village of LUBEJEWO-NOWE and the aforesaid brick works shall be on the USSR side; the village of SALESZE, the village of PSHOMY and the village of LUBEJEWO on the German side.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a southeasterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, up to a point on the BROTSCHISKO River, approximately 500 meters northwest of the western edge of the village of NOWA ZOLOTORJA, so that the village of UGNEWO shall remain on the German side.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a southeasterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point on the road, approximately 350 meters south of the village of PETZKI.

Thence the boundary shall run in a southeasterly direction to a point on the SAPADNYI BUG River approximately 1,500 meters east of the edge of the village of NADBUSHNE.

Thence the boundary shall ascend the SAPADNYI BUG River to the mouth of the SOLOKJA River.

From the mouth of the SOLOKIJA River, the boundary shall run along this river to a point located opposite the northwestern edge of the village of UGNUW.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a northwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the southern edge of the village of CHODYWANTZE, so that the village of PSCHEDNO and the village of NOWOSSJULKI shall remain on the USSR side and the village of MYSLJATIN and CHODYWANTZE on the German side.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a northwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point located approximately 1,300 meters north of the northeast edge of the village of SHURAWZE.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point located on the KRINITZA Brook, opposite the southeastern edge of the village of SHILKA.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the southeastern edge of the village of BSHESSINA, then the boundary shall continue in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point approximately 800 meters northwest of the village of PISUNY.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, up to LUWTSCHA Brook and shall reach this brook opposite the southwestern edge of the village of GARBY and thence shall ascend along this brook up to the SIGLY farm.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a southwestern direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point on the GNOUNIK Brook opposite the southeastern edge of the village of GORAJETZ and shall then descend this brook to its intersection with the GORAJETZ-ZETSCHANUW road.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the eastern edge of the village of ZETSCHANUW.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the western edge of the village of DACHNUW, so that the NOVY farm shall remain on the German side.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the southeastern edge of the village of FUTORY and thence approximately westward, on a straight line to be determined, to a point on the northwestern edge of the village of SABJALA, so that the LJATOSCHIN farm and the village of USCHKOWTZE shall remain on the USSR side.

Thence the boundary shall continue in a northwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point on the PSCHIKOPA Brook opposite the northwestern edge of the village of DOBTSCHA, so that the village of MILKUW shall remain on the USSR side and the village of DEGELNJA on the German side.

Thence the boundary descends the course of the PSCHIKOPA Brook to its confluence with the PSCHILUBEN River and then follows this river downstream to its confluence with the SAN River.

Thence the boundary shall ascend the course of the SAN River to its source, so that the SJANKI and USHOK railroad stations shall remain on the USSR side.

Note 1: At non-navigable rivers and brooks the boundary line shall be the middle of the main branch of such rivers and brooks. At navigable rivers, the boundary line shall be the middle of the main channel of navigation.

Note 2: Those portions of the boundary which have been determined by lines to be agreed upon, shall be defined in detail at the demarcation of the boundary.

Note 3: The boundary line determined by this protocol has been entered in black upon the attached Russian map to the scale of 1 : 100,000

II

The boundary line determined in section I of this Protocol shall be marked on the ground by a mixed German-Russian Commission.

The commission shall erect boundary monuments, prepare a detailed description of this line and enter it on a map to the scale of 1 : 25,000:

The commission shall commence its work on October 9 of this year.

The description of the course of the boundary prepared by the foregoing commission and a map of this line shall be confirmed by both Governments.

III

This Protocol, which is subject to ratification, takes effect immediately upon signature. The exchange of ratifications shall take place in Berlin within the shortest time possible.

This Protocol has been done in four copies, of which two are in the German and two in the Russian language, both texts being equally authentic.

Signed in Moscow on October 4, 1939.

By authority of the
Government of the USSR:
V. MOLOTOV

For the Government of
the German Reich:
F. W. SCHULENBURG

Bulletin of the USSR Supreme Soviet, No. 10(73), March 29, 1940

TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, VYACHESLAV MOLOTOV, WITH THE AMBASSADOR OF GERMANY TO THE USSR, WERNER VON SCHULENBURG

August 15, 1939

Schulenburg apologises for the insistence with which he has asked for Comrade Molotov's audience today. But this insistence is the character of the questions he would like to set out.

Schulenburg announces that he knows from Astakhov's conversation with Ribbentrop that the Soviet Government is interested in the negotiations but he finds it inexpedient to continue them in Berlin. Comrade Molotov replies that we consider Comrade Astakhov insufficiently experienced and therefore we find it necessary to conduct these negotiations here.

Schulenburg announces that he has been requested to set forth the instruction he has received from Berlin orally, but he would like to read it out (for the full text of the instruction see Appendix). Schulenburg asks for the instruction he has read out to be brought to Comrade Stalin's knowledge, on behalf of Ribbentrop. Comrade Molotov replies that in view of the importance of the statement made by Schulenburg, he will give a reply to it after having informed the Soviet Government of this statement. But even at this point he can welcome the German Government's desire expressed in this statement to improve the mutual relationship with the USSR. As for Ribbentrop's arrival in Moscow, for the exchange of opinion to be productive, it is necessary, in Comrade Molo-

tov's view, to make appropriate preparations. Comrade Molotov underlined that what he has just said is a tentative judgement on this proposal.

Comrade Molotov then tells Schulenburg that at the end of June Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Italy telegraphed us about his conversation with Ciano. Ciano, in the conversation with the Chargé d'Affaires, mentioned the existence of a "Schulenburg plan" in Berlin, as Ciano said, having the aim of improving Soviet-German relations. The "Schulenburg plan" appeared to propose: 1) Germany's contribution towards a settlement of relations between the USSR and Japan and the ending of border conflicts with it; 2) the conclusion of a non-aggression pact and joint guarantees for the Baltic countries; 3) the conclusion of a wide-ranging economic agreement with the USSR. Comrade Molotov asks Schulenburg to what extent this report from Rome corresponds to reality.

Schulenburg turned quite red at first and then said that Ciano had received that information from Rosso with whom Schulenburg had conferred about an improvement of Soviet-German relations only in broad terms. Schulenburg confirms that in that conversation he spoke about a settlement of relations between the USSR and Japan, with no reference to any joint guarantees for the Baltic countries. Nor was there any reference to details, and this plan merely sets forth Rosso's assumptions. Comrade Molotov says that he does not see anything incredible in the proposals contained in the above-mentioned "Schulenburg plan", all the more so since a trade and credit agreement appears to be coming near to implementation, and there is a perspective improvement of political relations between Germany and the USSR, as can be seen from the Ambassador's statement today. Schulenburg declares that all that he has told Rosso with regard to the Baltic Sea and the possible improvement of relations between the USSR and Japan is reflected in the instruction he has read out today. Schulenburg adds that his latest proposals are even more concrete.

Comrade Molotov tells Schulenburg that proceeding from our experience we know that Germany did not seek until recently to improve the relationship with the USSR. And if we now see that Germany does seek to improve it, we naturally welcome this desire and view it positively. Comrade Molotov adds that this is exactly how he views the Ambassador's statement today. He has mentioned the "Schulenburg plan", Comrade Molotov continues, because it follows the same line as that of Schulenburg's statement today.

Schulenburg asks whether he can take the points of the "plan" cited by Comrade Molotov as the basis for further negotiations. Comrade Molotov points out that it is necessary to speak of it in more concrete terms. We are counting on a positive outcome of the Soviet-German economic negotiations. As to Soviet-Japanese relations, Comrade Molotov asks whether Germany can exercise any influence on these matters or it is inexpedient to put the question this way at this particular moment. Schulenburg replies that although there is nothing about it in the instruction, Ribbentrop has pointed out to Comrade Astakhov that he has his own concept in relation to Japan and that Ribbentrop has told the Ambassador earlier on that he has an opportunity to exercise "his by no means minor influence on the position of Japan".

Comrade Molotov asks Schulenburg whether the German Government has any definite opinion on the subject of a non-aggression pact being concluded with the USSR. Schulenburg replies that this issue has not yet been discussed with Ribbentrop. The German Government does not hold either a positive or a negative position on the matter. Comrade Molotov declares that since both Ribbentrop and Schulenburg have spoken about "updating" and reinforcing the Soviet-German agreements as they stand, it is important to find out the German Government's opinion on the question of a non-aggression pact or something like it.

Schulenburg asks whether he should consider the points mentioned by Comrade Molotov as a prerequisite for Ribbentrop's arrival. Comrade Molotov declares that he will summon Schulenburg expressly to give him a reply to today's statement. Before Ribbentrop's arrival, it is necessary, in Comrade Molotov's opinion, to lay certain ground for decision-making, not just negotiating. It is pointed out in the German statement today that, first, there is no time to waste, that time is pressing, and that, second, it is desirable to prevent events running ahead of us and confronting us with a fait accompli. Therefore, in the German Government is positive about the idea of a non-aggression pact or a

similar idea and if such ideas comprise Schulenburg's statement today, then it is necessary to speak about it in more concrete terms.

Schulenburg announces that he will cable the content of today's conversation to Berlin, underlining the Soviet Government's special interest in the points mentioned by Comrade Molotov.

In conclusion, Schulenburg asks Comrade Molotov to expedite the reply to the statement made today.

The conversation lasted for one hour and forty minutes, with forty minutes taken up with writing down the text of Schulenburg's statement (instruction), because the Ambassador did not wish to hand over the paper it was written on.

Transcript by V. Pavlov

USSR FPA, stock 0745, list 14, folder 32, file 3, pp. 33-36

Appendix

Memorandum Handed by Schulenburg to the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR on August 15, 1939

1. The contradiction between the national idea, exemplified by National Socialist Germany, and the idea of world revolution, exemplified by the USSR, has in past years been the sole cause for the alignment of Germany and Russia in ideologically separate and hostile camps. The developments of the recent period seem to show that differing philosophies do not prohibit a reasonable relationship between the two States, and the restoration of new, friendly cooperation. The period of opposition in foreign policy could therefore be brought to an end once and for all and the way opened to a new future for both countries.

2. There exist no real conflicts of interests between Germany and Russia. The living spaces of Germany and Russia touch each other, but in their natural requirements they do not overlap. Thus there is lacking all cause for an aggressive attitude on the part of one country against the other. Germany has no aggressive intentions against the USSR. The Reich Government are of the opinion that there is no question between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea which cannot be settled to the complete satisfaction of both countries. Among these are such questions as: the Baltic Sea, the Baltic States, Poland, South-Eastern questions, etc. Over and above such matters political cooperation between the two countries can only have a beneficial effect. The same applies also to the German and Russian economies, which are complementary in every sphere.

3. There is no doubt that German-Russian policy today has come to an historic turning-point. The decisions with respect to policy to be made in the immediate future in Berlin and Moscow will be of decisive importance for the development of relations between the German and the Russian peoples for generations. On these decisions will depend whether the two peoples will some day, again and without any compelling reason, take up arms against each other, or whether they pass again into a new friendly relationship. It has gone well with both countries previously when they were friends and badly when they were enemies.

4. It is true that Germany and Soviet Russia, as a result of years of ideological opposition, today face each other distrustfully. A great deal of accumulated rubble will have to be cleared away. It must be said, however, that even during this period the natural sympathy of the Germans for the Russians never disappeared. The policy of both States can be built anew on that basis.

5. The Reich Government and the Soviet Government must, judging from past experience, take into account that the capitalistic Western democracies are the implacable enemies of both National Socialist Germany and Soviet Russia. They are today trying again, by the conclusion of a military alliance, to drive Russia into war against Germany. In 1914 the Russian regime collapsed as a result of this policy. It is compelling interest of both countries to avoid for all future time the destruction of Germany and Russia in the interests of Western democracies.

6. The crisis which has been produced in German-Polish relations by English policy, as well as English agitation for war and the attempts at an alliance which are bound up with that policy, make a speedy clarification of German-Russian relations necessary.

Otherwise matters might, without Germany contributing thereto, take a turn which would deprive both Governments of the possibility of restoring German-Russian friendship and in due course clarifying jointly territorial questions in Eastern Europe. The leadership of both countries, therefore, should not allow the situation to drift, but should take action in the proper time. It would be fatal if, through mutual ignorance of views and intentions, the two peoples should finally drift apart.

As we have been informed, the Soviet Government also feel the desire for a clarification of German-Russian relations.

Since, however, according to previous experience this clarification can be achieved only slowly through the usual diplomatic channels, I am prepared to make a short visit to Moscow in order, in the name of the Führer, to set forth the Führer's views to Mr. Stalin. In my view, only through such a direct discussion can a change be brought about, and it should not be impossible thereby to lay the foundations for a final settlement of German-Russian relations.

USSR, FPA, stock 0745, list 14, folder 32, file 3, pp. 37-39

TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS WITH THE AMBASSADOR OF GERMANY TO THE USSR, SCHULENBURG

August 17, 1939

Schulenburg announces that he has already received a reply from Berlin. Evidently, the men in Berlin are working fast, he adds. He would like to read out this reply, on behalf of the German Government. Schulenburg notes that the points set out by Comrade Molotov on August 15 coincide with the German Government's wishes.

Then Schulenburg read out the reply he had received from the German Government (see Appendix).

At this point, Schulenburg remarks on his own behalf that the cause about joint guarantees for the Baltic states has been included in this reply because, as it seems to the German Government, the Soviet Government so desires. We, Schulenburg adds, have not quite understood whether Comrade Molotov repeated, in the conversation on August 15, the plan set out by Rosso, or expressed thereby the desire of the Soviet Government itself as well. The German Government, in bringing this up, thought it would meet the desires of the Soviet Government. Comrade Molotov declares that this point needs to be clarified.

As regards the reference to the need to take into consideration the prospect of serious events taking place, Schulenburg explains that Germany does not intend to tolerate the Polish acts of provocation.

In addition to the instruction he has read out, Schulenburg, in compliance with a private injunction, asks Comrade Molotov to begin negotiations with Ribbentrop this or the following week. In consequence, at Ribbentrop's bidding, Schulenburg asks for a speedier reply.

Comrade Molotov says that he already has a reply to the German proposals of August 15 and can hand it to Schulenburg in writing. I must tell you, Comrade Molotov adds, that Comrade Stalin has been informed of the matter at issue and the reply has been drawn up in agreement with him. Comrade Stalin shares what I am telling you on behalf of the Soviet Government. While explaining the Soviet Government's reply which has been read out, Comrade Molotov emphasises that the point it makes is that, before starting negotiations about an improvement of political relationships, it is necessary to bring off the negotiations on the trade and credit agreement. That will be the first step to take towards improved relations. The second will be either a reaffirmation of the 1926 Treaty, which Schulenburg must evidently have had in mind speaking about the updating of treaties, or the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty plus a protocol on matters of foreign policy the Contracting Parties are interested in.

Moving on to the question of Ribbentrop's arrival, Comrade Molotov declares that we appreciate the German Government's move in raising the issue, underlining the seriousness of its intentions by the offer to send a distinguished political leader to Moscow, as distinct from the British who have sent a second-rate official, Strang, to Moscow. But it is necessary to make the appropriate preparations before Ribbentrop's arrival and we will not fuss too much over this at this point.

Comrade Molotov asks Schulenburg whether it is not possible, without making any fuss, to do what can obviously be done towards improving the mutual relationship. Then Comrade Molotov asks Schulenburg for his assessment of the prospects for the first and latest moves. As for the trade and credit negotiations, Schulenburg replies, his impression is that the agreement is just around the corner. Schulenburg will send a telegram to Berlin on the second move and ask for a draft treaty. But Schulenburg sees some difficulties with regard to an additional protocol.

Comrade Molotov declares in reply that it is necessary to have a draft non-aggression pact or a reaffirmation of the old treaty of neutrality. It is necessary to do one thing or the other at the German Government's discretion. It would be good to receive an outline of the pact and it will then be possible to pass over to the protocol.

Schulenburg says there can be only one paragraph to talk about whether to conclude a new non-aggression pact or reaffirm the old treaty of neutrality. The major emphasis, in his opinion, will be on the protocol and it is, therefore, desirable to receive at least a sketch of the protocol from the Soviet Government. The protocol will be a document of great importance, Schulenburg stresses, because the very process of drawing it up will raise such issues as that of guarantees for the Baltic countries etc. Comrade Molotov says that he did not possess the German Government's reply on the subject of a non-aggression pact, which has not been raised by the German Government at all before. Today's reply has to be examined. Now, the issue of the protocol is not specified for the time being. In drawing it up, both the German and the Soviet side will, incidentally, consider the issues touched upon in the German statement of August 15. The initiative in drawing up the protocol must come not only from the Soviet, but from the German side as well. Naturally, the issues touched upon in the German statement of August 15 cannot form part of the treaty, but must form part of the protocol. The German Government should think that over. It must be presumed that treaty will comprise 4-5 points, rather than one, as Schulenburg thinks. Schulenburg declares that he has no doubt that the German Government is prepared to submit a draft pact. The Chief of the Law Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will cope perfectly well with such a task as drawing up a draft treaty. But he will, evidently, run into difficulties in drawing up the protocol and, therefore, it is desirable, to make the work easier, to have a tentative outline of what it must contain. For instance, the issue of the guarantees for the Baltic countries remains an open question. Perhaps, it is necessary to reflect in the protocol the statement of August 15, which says that Germany will take into account the interests of the USSR in the Baltic Sea?

Comrade Molotov replies that the content of the protocol must be a subject of discussion. The trade agreement is already being finalised, and it is necessary to draft a non-aggression pact, or a statement of reaffirmation of the 1926 Treaty and, while considering the matter, it will be possible to get down to more specific questions regarding the substance of the protocol.

Schulenburg promises to ask Berlin for the draft treaty. As for the protocol, he will ask for it to be drawn up on the basis of the German statement of August 15, bringing in the general statement about Germany's consideration for the interests in the Baltic.

Transcript by V. Pavlov

USSR FPA, stock 0745, list 14, folder 32, file 3, pp. 40-43

Appendix

Memorandum Handed by Schulenburg to V. M. Molotov on August 17, 1939

1. The points brought up by Mr. Molotov are in accordance with German desires. That is, Germany is prepared to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and, if

the Soviet Government so desire, one which would be undenounceable for a term of twenty-five years. Further, Germany is ready to guarantee the Baltic States jointly with the Soviet Union. Finally, it is thoroughly in accord with the German position, and Germany is prepared, to exercise influence for an improvement and consolidation of Russian-Japanese relations.

2. The Führer is of the opinion that, in view of the present situation, and of the possibility of the occurrence, any day, of serious events (please at this point explain to Mr. Molotov that Germany is determined not to endure Polish provocation indefinitely), a basic and rapid clarification of German-Russian relations, and of each country's attitude to the questions of the moment, is desirable. For these reasons I am prepared to come by aeroplane to Moscow at any time after Friday, August 18, to deal, on the basis of full powers from the Führer, with the entire complex of German-Russian questions, and, if the occasion arises, to sign the appropriate treaties.

USSR FPA, stock 0745, list 14, folder 32, file 3, p. 44

Appendix

Memorandum Handed by V. M. Molotov to Schulenburg on August 17, 1939

The Soviet Government have taken note of the statement of the German Government, transmitted by Count Schulenburg on August 15, concerning their desire for a serious improvement in the political relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.

In view of the official statements of several representatives of the German Government, which have not infrequently had an unfriendly and even hostile character with reference to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, up till very recently, have proceeded on the assumption that the German Government are seeking an occasion for clashes with the Soviet Union, are preparing themselves for such clashes, and not infrequently justifying the need for their increasing rearmament by the inevitability of such clashes. Not to mention the fact that the German Government, by means of the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact, were endeavouring to create, and have created, the united front of a number of States against the Soviet Union, into which, with especial persistence, they enticed Japan.

It is understandable that such a policy on the part of the German Government has compelled the Soviet Union to take serious steps in the preparation of defence against possible aggression by Germany against the Soviet Union, and consequently to participate in the organisation of a defensive front of a number of States against aggression.

If, however, the German Government now undertake a change from the old policy in the direction of a serious improvement in political relations with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government can only welcome such a change, and are, for their part, prepared to revise their policy in the sense of a serious improvement in respect of Germany.

Adding to this the fact that the Soviet Government have never had, and will not have, any sort of aggressive intentions towards Germany, and that now, as previously, the Soviet Government consider a peaceful solution of the questions at issue in the field of relations between Germany and the Soviet Union as entirely possible, and that the principle of the peaceful coexistence of different political systems represents a long-established principle of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, the conclusion can be reached that, for the re-establishment of new, improved, political relations between the two countries, there are now at hand, not only a real basis, but also the prerequisites for undertaking serious and practical steps in this direction.

The Government of the Soviet Union are of the opinion that the first step towards such an improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and Germany could be the conclusion of a trade and credit agreement.

The Government of the Soviet Union are of the opinion that the second step, to be taken shortly thereafter, could be the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, or the reaffirmation of the Neutrality Pact of 1926, with the simultaneous conclusion of a special

protocol defining the interests of the contracting parties in this or that question of foreign policy, and forming an integral part of the pact.

USSR FPA, stock 0745, list 14, folder 32, file 3, pp. 45-46

TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS WITH THE AMBASSADOR OF GERMANY TO THE USSR, SCHULENBURG

August 19, 1939

It is 14:00 hours. Schulenburg apologises again for the insistence with which he has sought an audience today, but says it is the urgency of the matter that required it. Comrade Molotov remarks that whenever business requires it, there is no point in putting it off. Schulenburg warns him that everything that Ribbentrop has communicated to him corresponds to Hitler's views.

Schulenburg declares that the German Government finds Comrade Molotov's latest statement to signify the Soviet Government's positive reaction to the issues raised by Schulenburg. Under normal conditions, these issues could be settled through ordinary diplomatic channels. But the present situation is not ordinary and, in Ribbentrop's opinion, speedy methods are necessary to settle the issues. Berlin is apprehensive about the possibility of a conflict between Germany and Poland. Further events do not depend on Germany. The situation has been strained so much that a minor incident is enough to entail serious consequences. Ribbentrop thinks that it is necessary to clear up the mutual relationship between the USSR and Germany before such a conflict breaks out, because it will be difficult to do so when it does. Schulenburg considers that the first step—the conclusion of the trade and credit agreement—has already been taken. The issue of mutual guarantees for the Baltic countries, the non-aggression pact and the influence on Japan have also been cleared up. Therefore, Ribbentrop attaches great importance to his arrival and considers it necessary to get down to the second stage as soon as possible. Ribbentrop would have unlimited powers from Hitler to conclude any agreement the Soviet Government might wish.

The issue of the non-aggression pact appears to be clear and simple. In the German Government's opinion, it must consist of the following two points:

- 1) the German Government and the Soviet Government pledge themselves not to resort to war or any other use of force under any circumstances;
- 2) this Treaty shall enter into force immediately and operate without termination for a term of 25 years.

Comrade Molotov asks whether the whole treaty should indeed consist of only two points, and remarks that there are typical treaties which could be used in drafting the pact. It is necessary to see what elements of the Soviet and German pacts could be used. Schulenburg replies that he would not object to those pacts being used. Hitler is prepared to take into account whatever the USSR may wish. Now, the pact submitted to the Soviet Government corresponds to a similar pact between Germany and Latvia. Comrade Molotov adds that we have non-aggression pacts with Poland, Latvia and Estonia. It would be desirable to know whether the German Government has any objection to one of these pacts being taken as the basis in drafting the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. If the German Government has no objections in this respect, let it indicate which particular pact it would consider a reputable to itself.

Schulenburg once more insists on Ribbentrop's arrival, which Hitler, too, considers to be of tremendous importance. Ribbentrop could conclude a protocol that would comprise the issues already mentioned as well as any new ones which could arise. There is no time to be lost, Schulenburg adds.

Comrade Molotov promises to refer everything Schulenburg has said to the Soviet Government, which must discuss it. Comrade Molotov emphasises that we consider, as he already told Schulenburg last time, that Ribbentrop's arrival would be of positive sig-

nificance. But decisions to be taken must be more or less prepared before Ribbentrop comes. We do not consider it necessary to limit ourselves to diplomatic correspondence and we appreciate the significance and highly value Ribbentrop's arrival. We have already indicated the stages of preparation. The first one is near completion. The second move can be undertaken within a short space of time.

Comrade Molotov then asks whether he has correctly understood that the German Government wishes a new pact concluded, rather than the 1926 Treaty reaffirmed.

Schulenburg replies that one can infer from the telegram. His own feeling is that the German Government has opted for a new pact.

Comrade Molotov says that it will be desirable to know which of the pacts the USSR has with Poland, Latvia, or Estonia is the one that the German Government could accept as the basis for a non-aggression pact with the USSR. The issue of the protocol which must be part and parcel of the pact is a serious matter. It is up to the German Government to think of the issues that must form part of the protocol. We are thinking of that, too. The Soviet Government reckons with the German Government's opinion that the issues we are discussing must not be put off for too long. But before Ribbentrop's arrival, we must be certain that the negotiations will produce definite decisions, all the more so since we have not yet taken even the first step—that is, we have not yet signed a trade and credit agreement.

Schulenburg once more insists on Ribbentrop's coming so as to arrive at definite results before the conflict breaks out. He has no doubt, he says, that there must be no difficulties either in drawing up the protocol.

Comrade Molotov asks whether the German Government's desire to expedite the current negotiations can be explained by the German Government's interest in the issues of German-Polish relations, notably that of Danzig. Schulenburg replies in the affirmative, adding that these are the issues which are the starting point for the desire to take into account the interests of the USSR before the events in question come about. Schulenburg holds that the preparations Molotov has been speaking about are already over and stresses that they are ready to meet all of the Soviet Government's wishes.

Comrade Molotov, while stressing the seriousness of our attitude to these matters, declares that we do what we say. We do not go back on our words and we would wish the German side to hold the same line. As for the trade and credit agreement, as well as the political negotiations, we have not hindered these matters. Comrade Molotov restates his view about Ribbentrop's arrival. Our approach with regard to these matters has been set forth in the Soviet Government's reply. After the first step, the second one can be taken, but the first step has not yet been taken. We must have it announced that agreement has been reached, but we cannot do this yet. In Berlin, they are in a hurry. Schulenburg repeats, winding up the conversation.

It is 16:30 when Comrade Molotov announces that he has communicated the substance of today's conversation to the Government and he hands over the text of the draft pact to simplify further work. On reading out the pact, Comrade Molotov announces that Ribbentrop could come to Moscow on August 26-27 after the publication of the trade and credit agreement.

Transcript by V. Pavlov

USSR FPA, stock 0745, list 14, folder 32, file 3, pp. 47-51

Appendix

Draft Soviet-German Pact Handed by V. M. Molotov to Schulenburg on August 19, 1939

Draft

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Germany, desirous of strengthening the cause of peace among the nations and proceeding from the fundamental provisions of the Neutrality Treaty which was concluded in April 1926 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Germany, have reached the following agreement:

Article 1

The two Contracting Parties undertake to desist reciprocally from any act of violence and any aggressive action whatsoever against each other, or from an attack on each other either severally or jointly with other Powers.

Article 2

Should one of the Contracting Parties become the object of an act of violence or attack by a third Power, the other Contracting Party shall in no manner whatever lend its support to such acts by that Power.

Article 3

Should disputes or conflicts arise between the Contracting Parties over questions of one kind or another, both Parties undertake to settle these disputes and conflicts exclusively by peaceful means through mutual consultation or, if necessary, through the creation of suitable arbitration commissions.

Article 4

The present Treaty shall be concluded for a period of five years with the proviso that, unless one of the Contracting Parties denounces it one year before the expiry of that period, the validity of the Treaty shall be deemed to be automatically prolonged for another five years.

Article 5

The present Treaty shall be ratified in as short a time as possible, whereupon the Treaty shall enter into force.

Postscript

The present Pact shall be valid only if a special Protocol is signed simultaneously, covering the points in which the Contracting Parties are interested in the field of foreign policy. The Protocol shall be an integral part of the Pact.

USSR FPA, stock 01745, list 14, folder 32, file 3, pp. 52-53

CREDIT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GERMAN REICH AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[August 19, 1939]

Representatives of the Government of the German Reich and representatives of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have conducted negotiations with each other on placing additional Soviet orders in Germany, and have come to the following agreement:

I

(1) The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will cause the Trade Delegation of the USSR in Germany, or the importing organisations of the USSR, to place additional orders to the amount of 200 million Reichsmark with German firms.

(2) The additional orders shall be placed exclusively for supplies for capital investment purposes, that is in particular for:

- Equipment of factories,
- Installations,
- Fittings of various kinds,
- Machinery and machine tools of all kinds,
- Construction of apparatus,
- Equipment for the naphtha industry,
- Equipment for the chemical industry,

Products of the electro-technical industry,
Ships, vehicles, means of transport,
Measuring instruments,
Laboratory equipment.

(3) The usual spare parts for such supplies are also included. There are further included contracts for technical assistance and bringing installations into operation, where these are stipulated in connection with orders placed under this Credit Agreement.

(4) The value of individual orders shall not be less than 50,000 Reichsmark.

(5) Not included in the additional orders, are orders for so-called current business. Such are, in particular:

Raw materials,
Semi-finished products,
Spare parts (other than those mentioned in paragraph 3),
Chemical products,
Consumer goods,
Articles of daily use.

(6) The Trade Delegation and the importing organizations shall be free in the choice of firms when placing orders. German firms shall likewise be free to decide whether, and to what extent, they wish to accept orders under this Agreement.

(7) Orders from List A will be placed within a period of two years from the date of the conclusion of this Agreement. By the end of the first year from the conclusion of this Agreement, the value of the orders shall not exceed 120 million Reichsmark.

(8) Orders will be placed by the Trade Delegation, or, with joint liability of the Trade Delegation, by the importing organisations of the USSR.

(9) The German Government undertake to give the Trade Delegation and the importing organisations of the USSR the necessary assistance in placing orders, in each individual case where required, particularly in respect of delivery dates and the quality of the goods.

(10) The delivery terms for orders placed under this Agreement shall be the normal ones and the prices for such supplies shall be reasonable.

(11) Article VII of the German-Soviet Agreement on Trade and Payments, of December 19, 1938, shall also apply to orders placed under this Agreement.

II

The German Government declare that the German Gold Discount Bank ("Dego") has given them an undertaking to finance the additional orders to the amount of 200 million Reichsmark on the following terms:

(1) The Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Germany shall deposit bills of exchange with "Dego". These bills shall have an average term of seven years and shall be drawn for each individual transaction in such a way that

30 per cent of the amount of the order shall run for 6½ years,

40 per cent of the amount of the order— 7 years,

30 per cent of the amount of the order— 7½ years.

The bills of exchange shall be drawn by the importing organisations of the USSR and endorsed for acceptance by the Trade Delegation of the USSR. The bills shall be drawn in Reichsmark and shall be payable in Berlin.

(2) On the basis of the bills of exchange, "Dego" shall make a credit available to the Trade Delegation and the importing organisations of the USSR, which shall be used to pay the German firms cash in Reichsmark. "Dego" will not require endorsement of this credit by the German suppliers.

(3) The bills of exchange shall bear 5 per cent interest per annum. This shall be paid by the Trade Delegation to "Dego" at the end of each quarter through the Trade Delegation's current account with "Dego". The interest shall be covered by bills of exchange if "Dego" so requires.

(4) The Trade Delegation of the USSR in Germany shall have the right to redeem before maturity the bills of exchange deposited with "Dego", in accordance with pa-

paragraphs (1) and (3) of this article, in which case interest will be paid only for the period that has elapsed.

III

The agreement of the technical method of payment, in accordance with Article II of this agreement, will be concluded between "Dego" and the Trade Delegation of the USSR.

IV

Orders shall be placed in accordance with the provisions laid down in the General Delivery Conditions, the Arbitration Agreement, and the Final Protocol, signed on March 20, 1935, by the Russia Committee of German Industry, on the one side, and by the Trade Delegation, on the other side, with amendments which may be agreed on in an exchange of letters between the appropriate agencies of both sides (see Appendix).

(1) The Government of the USSR give an undertaking to take measure for the delivery to Germany of the goods set out in List C, to the minimum values indicated therein, within two years from the conclusion of this agreement. The prices of these goods shall be reasonable.

(2) Delivery of, and payment for, the Soviet goods shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the German-Soviet Agreement on Trade and Payments, of December 19, 1938.

(3) Should the Agreement of December 19, 1938, not be extended during the term of this Agreement or, in the event of extension, be amended, it shall continue to apply unless otherwise agreed upon, until such time as all bills of exchange and interest on the credit have been paid up and the amounts paid in for Soviet deliveries of goods have been used for the redemption of all bills of exchange, including also previous ones.

(4) This applies also to Articles VII and VIII of the above-mentioned Agreement of December 19, 1938.

(5) The German Government undertake to issue permits promptly for the import of Soviet goods into Germany, to an amount sufficient to cover at due date the credit provided for in this Agreement, and the payment of interest thereon, as well as to meet all other liabilities on USSR bills of exchange in Germany. With this object in view, the two Governments shall, in due time, enter into negotiations for drawing up annual lists of such goods the import of which into Germany meets the requirements of German economy on the one hand and Soviet possibilities and interests on the other.

(6) The German Government further undertake to render assistance to the Trade Delegation of the USSR in Germany and to the Soviet importing organisations in placing orders and obtaining supplies of other goods set out in List B, against the free amounts resulting from the sale of Soviet goods in Germany.

VI

At least 60 per cent of the German supplies shall be carried by German ships, if available, at rates which are usual and normal in view of the freight situation on the Germany-USSR run. The remainder of the German supplies shall be carried by Soviet ships, using German seaports.

VII

(1) Should difficulties arise in placing and duly executing the orders provided for in this Agreement, or in the delivery of other goods—against the credit as well as against the current proceeds resulting from Soviet exports—the two Governments shall immediately enter into negotiations for the purpose of removing such difficulties. If no

settlement is reached the further obligations of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under Article V of this Agreement, regarding the execution of measures for the delivery of Soviet goods to Germany, as set out in List C, shall be suspended until the ratio provided for in paragraph (3) of this Article is reached.

(2) The same shall apply in the event of difficulties arising in the delivery of Soviet goods to the extent provided for in Article V of this Agreement: the two Governments shall immediately enter into negotiations for the purpose of removing such difficulties. If no settlement is reached the further obligations of the German Government under Article I of this Agreement, in connection with facilitating the placing and due execution of orders against the credit, shall be suspended until the ratio provided for in the following paragraph of this article is reached.

(3) In the cases referred to in this article, the Government concerned shall not be released from their obligations to take all measures to reach, in the shortest time, a ratio between the orders in accordance with Lists A and B on the one hand and the contracts for the supply of Soviet goods, in accordance with List C, on the other hand, corresponding to the totals of these Lists. In this connection the two Governments shall take the necessary measures for the execution of the orders and contracts in accordance with the terms contained therein.

VIII

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature.

Done in duplicate in the German and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the
USSR:
Y. BABARIN

For the German Government:
Dr. J. SCHNURRE

Berlin, August 19, 1939

USSR FPA, stock 03a, file 05—Germany

List A

of Certain Items of Equipment to be Delivered by German Firms under the Credit Agreement of August 19, 1939, between the USSR and Germany

Name of Goods	Reichsmark million
1. Wheel lathes. Special railway machinery. Heavy-duty merry-go-round machines up to 2,500 mm in diameter. Turning machines with a swing of 455 mm and upwards, planing machines with a planing width of 2,000 mm and more, edge planing machines, boring machines with a bore diameter of over 100 mm, grinding machines weighing upwards of 10,000 kg, boring machines with a spindle diameter of 155 mm and more, facing lathes with a face-plate diameter of 1,500 mm and more, broaching machines weighing 5,000 kg and more, slotting machines with a stroke of 300 mm and more, deep drilling machines with a bore diameter of upwards of 100 mm, big radial-drilling machines with a spindle diameter of over 80 mm.	
Automatic bar-stock machines with a bar-stock diameter of upwards of 60 mm. Semi-automatic machines. Multitool lathes. Automatic multispindle machines to produce bars of over 60 mm in diameter. Gear-cutting machines to produce pinions over 1,500 mm. Big Hydraulic presses, friction presses, crank presses, tearing machines, edging presses, forging hammers of over 5 tons.	
Machinery: rolls, shears, bending machines, wire-rope machines, cutting-off machines, etc.	125.0
2. Bridge, forge shop, swing and floating cranes	5.5

3. Wire, sheet and thin iron sheet mills	5.0
4. Air, hydrogen, gas and other compressors	5.1
5. Linde process units, various special equipment for sulphuric acid, powder and other chemical factories. Fischer plant for coal liquefaction, Winkler generators and high-pressure nitrogen hydrants	13.0
<i>Footnote: the delivery of Fischer coal liquefaction plant, Winkler generators and high-pressure nitrogen hydrants shall begin in the middle of 1942.</i>	
6. Various electrical equipment: explosion-proof motors, oil switches, transformers	3.3
7. Equipment for the coal-mining industry: air hammers loading machines, conveyers	0.5
8. 100- to 200-hp tugs, floating ship repair shops, 20 trawlers	3.0
9. Turbines with 2,500- to 12,000-kW generators and 600- to 1,200-hp diesel engines	2.0
10. 350- to 750-hp locomobiles	2.8
11. Instrumentation	4.1
12. Optical instruments	2.3
13. Some items of armament	28.1

Total 200.0
Million Reichsmark

On behalf
of the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:
Y. BABARIN

On behalf
of the Government of
Germany:

Dr. SCHNURRE

List B

of Certain Items of Equipment and Other Goods to be Delivered by German Firms in Accordance with the Credit Agreement of August 19, 1939, between the USSR and Germany for the Account of the Free Sums of Current Soviet Export Earnings

Name of Goods	million Reichsmark
1. Turning machines with a swing of up to 450 mm, machine lathes, turret lathes, production machine tools (Produktionsbänke), milling machines, screw-cutting machines, polishing machines, automatic 60-mm-rod machines, special machines, wire-working machines, automatic cutting machines, hydraulic and mechanical fast-operating planing machines, double-bearer planing machines, drilling and marking machines, radial-drilling machines, multi-spindle drilling machines, gear-cutting machines to produce pinions of up to 1,500 mm in diameter, eccentric presses, trimming presses, riveting presses, air and steam hammers, operating under a pressure of up to 5 tons	42.0
2. Fischer coal liquefaction units and various special equipment for nitrogen, sulphuric acid, powder and other chemical enterprises	10.5
3. Sheet duralumin	1.5
4. Metals and metal specialties: non-ferrous semifinished items of heavy and light metal, thin sheet, steel wire, cold-rolled strip, thin-walled tubes, brass strip, quality steel	14.5
5. Chemical goods, dyes, semi-finished chemicals	4.9
6. Items of armament	30.0
7. Miscellaneous items, such as printing machines; internal combustion engines, material-testing machines, fittings and fixtures, pneumatic machines and pumps; blank and building machinery, paper-making and paper-working machines; machines for the food industry, textile machines, machines for the leather and footwear industry, electrodes, spare parts, instrumentation, etc.	16.6
Total	120.0

Orders for the types of equipment and other goods mentioned in the present list may be

On behalf of the
Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:
Y. BABARIN

On behalf of the
Government of
Germany:
Dr. J. SCHNURRE

List C

of Goods to be Delivered from the USSR under the Credit . . Agreement of August 19, 1939, between the USSR and Germany (million Reichsmark)

1. Agriculture	
Fodder grain	22.00
Oilcake	8.40
Linseed oil	0.60
2. Forestry	
Timber	74.00
3. Industry	
Platinum	2.00
Manganese ore	3.80
Petrol	1.20
Gas oil	2.10
Lubricating oils	5.30
Benzol	1.00
Paraffine	0.65
Oakum	3.75
Turbo-waste	1.25
Raw cotton	12.30
Cotton waste	2.50
Spinning rags	0.70
Flax	1.35
Horsehair	1.70
Processed horsehair	0.30
Pyrolusite	1.50
Phosphates (half in concentrates)	13.00
Asbestos	1.00
Chemical and pharmaceutical products and medicinal herbs	1.60
Resins	0.70
Fish bladder (Häusenblasen)	0.12
Down and feather	2.48
Bristle	3.60
Fur-skins	5.60
Pelts for furriery	3.10
Furs	0.90
Poplar and aspen matchwood	1.50

180.00

The goods hereby mentioned shall be delivered by the USSR in the space of two years to the total value of 90,000,000 Reichsmark annually so as to have half of the said good delivered as far as possible in the first year and the other half in the second year.

On behalf
of the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:
Y. BABARIN

On behalf
of the Government of
Germany:
Dr. ISCHNURRE

CONFIDENTIAL PROTOCOL

In connection with the Credit Agreement between the German Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed today, the undersigned have agreed as follows:

The German Government will refund $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent per annum of the interest agreed upon and paid, so that an actual interest rate of $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent per annum on the credit

will remain. This refund will be made at fixed repayment dates, to be agreed upon between "Degeo" and the Trade Delegation, in such a manner that 10 per cent of the interest paid by the Trade Delegation for each accounting period will be refunded at the repayment dates. Payment of such amounts shall be made in Reichsmark into one of the special accounts opened under the Agreement on Trade and Payments of December 19, 1938, of the Trade Delegation of the USSR in Germany, or of the National Bank of the USSR.

The amounts payable may be used in accordance with Article IV of the said Agreement on Trade and Payments.

It is understood that the right, specified in paragraph 17 of Article IV of the above-mentioned agreement of December 19, 1938, of using the balances in the special accounts for payments of interest, extends also to the interest on the credit which is the subject of the Credit Agreement signed today between the German Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

For the Government
of the USSR:
Y. BABARIN

For the German Government:
Dr. J. SCHNURRE

Berlin, August 19, 1939

USSR, FPA, stock 03a, file 05—Germany

FINAL PROTOCOL ON THE GERMAN-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON TRADE AND CREDIT

August 19, 1939

I. After examination of their full powers, which were found to be in due form, the Contracting Parties signed the Credit Agreement between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and exchanged copies of this document.

II. The documents set out below, being integral parts of the Credit Agreement above referred to, were signed and delivered:

1. List A of German deliveries;
2. List B of German deliveries;
3. List C of Soviet deliveries;
4. Confidential Protocol regarding refund.

For the Government of the USSR:
Y. BABARIN

For the German Government:
Dr. J. SCHNURRE

USSR, FPA, stock 03a, file 05—Germany

Appendix

Berlin, August 19, 1939

My Dear Herr BABARIN,

In connection with the Credit Agreement signed today, you expressed the desire that the German Government should lend their assistance so that the proposed USSR orders in Germany may be successfully placed and executed.

To this I have the honour to declare that the German Government will, as heretofore in individual cases, give assistance to the Trade Delegation and the Soviet importing organizations in the placing and execution of orders.

The German Government will further see to it that representatives of the Trade Delegation of the USSR and of the Soviet importing organizations may visit such firms as are prepared to undertake deliveries, in order to ascertain the quality of the articles to be ordered. The German Government will also see to it that representatives of the Trade Delegation of the USSR and of the Soviet Importing Organisations are

given the opportunity, after placing an order, of visiting, upon previous notice, the factories of the suppliers, for the purpose of ascertaining the position on, and progress of, the order, to undertake the requisite inspections in the case of special orders and to effect the expert passing of the goods.

The Trade Delegation of the USSR in Berlin will in such cases immediately inform the Reich Ministry of Economics of the opening of negotiations on orders with firms, so that the Reich Ministry of Economics may exert its influence in the sense of this letter.

With the assurance of my highest consideration,

Dr. J. SCHNURRE

USSR, FPA, stock 03a, file 05—Germany

Appendix
Berlin, August 19, 1939

My Dear Herr SCHNURRE,

I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of today, which reads as follows:

"In connection with the Credit Agreement signed today, you expressed the desire that the German Government should lend their assistance so that the proposed USSR orders in Germany may be successfully placed and executed.

"To this I have the honour to declare that the German Government will, as heretofore in individual cases give assistance to the Trade Delegation and the Soviet importing organizations in the placing and execution of orders.

"The German Government will further see to it that representatives of the Trade Delegation of the USSR and of the Soviet importing organizations may visit such firms as are prepared to undertake deliveries, in order to ascertain the quality of the articles to be ordered. The German Government will also see to it that representatives of the Trade Delegation of the USSR and of the Soviet Importing Organizations are given the opportunity, after placing an order, of visiting, upon previous notice, the factories of the suppliers, for the purpose of ascertaining the position on, and progress of, the order, to undertake the requisite inspections in the case of special orders and to effect the expert passing of the goods."

The Trade Delegation of the USSR in Berlin will in such cases immediately inform the Reich Ministry of Economics of the opening of negotiations on orders with firms, so that the Reich Ministry of Economics may exert its influence in the sense of this letter.

I declare myself in accord with the contents of this letter.

With the assurance of my highest consideration,

Y. BABARIN

USSR, FPA, stock 03a, file 05—Germany

SOVIET PRESS REPORT ON SIGNING OF A TRADE AND CREDIT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USSR AND GERMANY

August 19, 1939

On August 19, after extensive and successful negotiations, a Trade and Credit Agreement between the USSR and Germany was signed in Berlin.

On the USSR side the Agreement was signed by Trade Representative Y. Babarin, on the German side by Herr Schnurre.

The Trade and Credit Agreement stipulates that Germany shall extend credits to the USSR to the amount of 200 million Reichsmark for a period of seven years at 5 per cent interest for purchase of German goods within two years of signing this Agreement.

The Agreement also provides for the USSR to deliver goods to Germany within the same period that is within two years to the amount of 180 million Reichsmark.
Izvestia, August 21, 1939

TELEGRAM OF ADOLF HITLER TO JOSEPH STALIN

August 21, 1939 *

Herr STALIN, Moscow

1) I sincerely welcome the signing of the new German-Soviet Commercial Agreement as the first step in the re-shaping of German-Soviet relations.

2) The conclusion of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union means to me the establishment of German policy for a long time. Germany thereby resumes a political course that was beneficial to both States during by-gone centuries. The Government of the Reich are therefore resolved in such a case to accept all the consequences of such a far-reaching change.

3) I accept the draft of the non-aggression pact that your Foreign Minister, Herr Molotov, handed over, but consider it urgently necessary to clarify the questions connected with it as soon as possible.

4) The substance of the supplementary protocol desired by the Government of the Soviet Union can, I am convinced, be clarified in the shortest possible time if a responsible German statesman can come to Moscow himself to negotiate. Otherwise the Government of the Reich are not clear as to how the supplementary protocol could be cleared up and settled in a short time.

5) The tension between Germany and Poland has become intolerable. Polish demeanour toward a great Power is such that a crisis may arise any day. Germany is at any rate determined, in the face of this presumption, from now on to look after the interests of the Reich with all the means at her disposal.

6) In my opinion, it is desirable, in view of the intentions of the two States to enter into a new relationship to each other, not to lose any time. I therefore again propose that you receive my Foreign Minister on Tuesday, August 22, but at the latest on Wednesday, August 23. The Reich Foreign Minister has the fullest powers to draw up and sign the non-aggression pact as well as the protocol. A longer stay by the Reich Foreign Minister in Moscow than one to two days at most is impossible in view of the international situation. I should be glad to receive your early answer.

Adolf HITLER

USSR FPA, stock 0745, list 14, folder 32, file 3, pp. 63—64

LETTER OF THE CC CPSU(B) SECRETARY JOSEPH STALIN TO REICHSKANZLER OF GERMANY ADOLF HITLER

August 21, 1939 **

Reichskanzler of Germany
Herr HITLER

I thank you for the letter.

I hope that the German-Soviet non-aggression pact will bring about a decided turn for the better in the political relations between our countries.

The peoples of our countries need peaceful relations with each other. The assent of the German Government to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact provides the foundation for eliminating the political tension and for the establishment of peace and collaboration between our countries.

* Handed by German Ambassador Schulenburg to Molotov at 3 p. m.

** The letter was handed by Molotov to German Ambassador Schulenburg at 5 p. m.

The Soviet Government have instructed me to inform you that they agree to Herr von Ribbentrop's arriving in Moscow on August 23.

J. STALIN

USSR FPA, stock 0745, list 14, folder 32, file 3, p. 65

SOVIET PRESS REPORT ON SOVIET-GERMAN RELATIONS

August 22, 1939

With the Soviet-German Trade and Credit Agreement concluded, there the question of improving political relations between Germany and the USSR has come up. The exchange of opinion on the subject between the Governments of Germany and the USSR has established a desire of both sides to defuse tension in political relations between them, remove the threat of war and conclude a non-aggression pact. In this context, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Herr von Ribbentrop, is due in Moscow within days for appropriate negotiations.

Izvestia, August 22, 1939

TELEGRAM OF THE AMBASSADOR OF FRANCE TO THE USSR, PAUL-EMILE NAGGIAR, TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE, GEORGES BONNET

August 22, 1939

The Havas News Agency has received permission from the Soviet Press Service to publish the following:

"The negotiations on a treaty of non-aggression with Germany can in no way interrupt or slow down the Anglo-Franco-Soviet discussions. There are peace-making moves: one directed towards lessening international tension, and the other towards preparing the ways and means of action to check the aggression, should it occur."

I recommend comments if not exactly in these terms, at least in such a spirit and with the greatest tranquility.

The game thus played requires great circumspection, and we must not do or say anything to permit German propaganda to speak of a failure in the East of our peace programme to resist aggression.

Reprinted from *Documents diplomatiques français, 1932-1939*, 2 série, t. XVIII, p. 282.

TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE, GEORGES BONNET, TO THE AMBASSADOR OF FRANCE TO POLAND, LEON NOËL

August 22, 1939

In view of the new prospect created by the announcement of the forthcoming signing of a German-Soviet non-aggression pact, it seems to me to be necessary to try and make further efforts as a matter of the greatest urgency vis-à-vis Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly with a view to removing, before it is too late, the only obstacle to the conclusion of trilateral accords in Moscow.

The only way to counter the Russo-German Exercise would be by the Polish Government immediately granting at least the tacit right of signature allowing General

Doumenc to take up a firm stand on behalf of Poland with regard to the sole probability of war in which Russia would come to the latter's aid.

Even if, as, undoubtedly, the Polish Government will object, this solution proved ineffective, it would nevertheless lead to Russia being held responsible as would Poland if she persisted in her refusal.

On the contrary, any possibility of coming to agreement with the Soviet Government, which can yet be secured by the Polish Government's positive reply, would permit us to limit the significance of the prospective German-Russian agreement both in the spirit and in the letter, by raising, at least, the question of its compatibility with the commitments assumed by the USSR in respect of France and Great Britain at the same time.

Please make a special point along these lines, emphasizing most emphatically that Poland cannot refuse, either morally or politically, to try this last chance to save the peace.

In conclusion, you should imperatively remind them that France, which has constantly maintained an attitude of friendship with regard to Poland, granted her appreciable credits, supplied her with military equipment, and rendered her most diverse assistance, today has the right to require her to weigh the entire gravity of her refusal.

If you receive a positive response, please inform Naggiar immediately by telegram about it.

Reprinted from *Documents diplomatiques français, 1932-1939*, 2 série, t. XVIII, pp. 283-284.

TELEGRAM OF THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN ENGLAND, I. M. MAISKY, TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR

August 22, 1939

The news which was received in London late at night on August 21 about Ribbentrop's forthcoming flight to Moscow for negotiations on non-aggression has caused the greatest excitement in the political and government quarters here. The feeling has been one of surprise, confusion, irritation and fear. This morning the mood verged on panic. By the end of the day things could be seen to settle down to a certain extent, but deep anxiety still remains. One indication of this is the British Government's decision to call Parliament for August 24 and re-adopt within a single day the Protection of the Realm Act which had been in force during the last war and was abrogated upon the coming of peace. This Act vests the Government with emergency powers in matters of national defence. The reaction to the projected Soviet-German pact changed considerably during the day. At first, it was interpreted as spelling the end of the trilateral negotiations and the change-over of the USSR to a position of absolute neutrality with Germany given a free hand in Europe. The view that came to prevail by the evening was that there had been no disastrous change in the situation, after all, that the trilateral negotiations can continue and that the signing of the trilateral pact is by no means ruled out since all the Soviet non-aggression pacts contain a clause providing for the possibility of their immediate cancellation in the event of an act of aggression being committed against a third party by one of the signatory Powers.

Today I have had to confer with a large number of people, including Lloyd George, Duchess of Athol, Greenwood, Churchill, and Degville (organiser of a group of British MPs) and others. My general impression is that the shock the British have experienced will do them good, although, perhaps, its significance will take time to digest. Lloyd George is well disposed: he finds that the Soviet Government has shown even too much patience in the negotiations with Britain and France.

He had expected a blow from us earlier on. The Labour position is weaker. Greenwood is totally disconcerted over the events which have taken place and I had

to tell him quite a few bitter words in reply to his complaints and misgivings. Parliament will go into session on August 24. To judge by certain symptoms, one can expect it to pass off under the banner of national unity.

Ambassador

USSR FPA, stock 059, list 1, folder 300, file 2077, pp. 233-234

Published, abridged, in *Soviet Peace Efforts on the Eve of World War II. Documents and Records*, Moscow, 1971, p. 631 (in Russian).

TELEGRAM OF THE AMBASSADOR OF FRANCE TO POLAND, LEON NOËL, TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE, GEORGES BONNET

August 23, 1939

In pursuance of my previous telegram.

Since the closing passages of your telegram No. 633-635 reached me late at night, I could contact Beck only at 10 a.m. today.

In conferring with him, I upheld the arguments prescribed by Your Excellency with all the persistence which the circumstances require.

I insisted that if Poland abandoned her intransigence, she would assure the continuation of the military talks in Moscow and could precipitate a failure, partial, at least, of von Ribbentrop's visit; that, on this assumption, the situation created by the German-Russian exercise can rebound to our advantage and Germany would have to face all kinds of difficulties on that account without deriving the benefit she expected.

I also pointed out that the question of the responsibility of Poland, confronting a greater threat than anybody else, with her very survival at stake, will be raised in the most serious manner if she persisted in her purely negative position. Beck was shocked, but gave no answer for the time being and left me to participate in a ceremony under the chairmanship of Mościcki, during which he intended to talk with other Polish leaders. At 12:15 I found myself again in his office in company of my British colleague who had joined me in this undertaking.

In the end, we succeeded in getting Beck to agree only to the formula indicated in my Telegram 1242.

Nevertheless, it seems that this formula can give General Doumenc sufficient opportunities to conduct negotiations.

Beck refused to do anything more than that, alluding, above all, to Poland's desire to avoid getting into trouble as she suspects the USSR was seeking to involve her.

Giving us his consent, in the long run, the Minister deemed it necessary to repeat that the Polish Government was, nevertheless, still averse to the idea of Russian troops being moved into its territory.

Reprinted from *Documents diplomatiques français, 1932-1939*, 2 série, t. XVIII, pp. 354-355.

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF POLAND JOSEF BECK, TO POLAND'S DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS

August 23, 1939

Considering the new situation which has arisen as a result of Ribbentrop's arrival in Moscow, the French and British Ambassadors in a further overture voiced the desire of their Governments that by re-starting the military negotiations for limiting the

possibilities and spheres of operation of the German-Soviet treaty, they could change the situation in the tactical sense. In this connection, we are once more being asked for a "tacit consent" to the military delegations in Moscow expressing the confidence that Polish-Soviet military co-operation is not ruled out in the event of war.

I declared that the Polish Government does not believe that these moves can be productive. Yet, to facilitate the position of the Franco-British delegation, we have worked out a certain formula, while I repeated, not to be disclosed, our reservations regarding the passage of troops.

The formula would run like this: "The French and British Staffs are confident that in the event of joint action against the aggressor, co-operation between the USSR and Poland in certain conditions is not ruled out. In view of this, the Staffs consider it necessary to draw up any plans along with the Soviet Staff."

I took the opportunity to restate categorically that I am not against this formula only with the view of easing the tactics. Our position of principle is this, however: the standpoint in respect of the USSR is final and remains unchanged. I once more referred to the impropriety of the Soviets discussing our relations with France and Britain without turning to us.

Reprinted from *Międzynarodowe tło agresji Rzeszy Niemieckiej na Polskę w 1939 roku*, Warsaw, 1986, p. 156.

TELEGRAM OF THE AMBASSADOR OF FRANCE TO THE USSR, PAUL-EMILE NAGGIAR, TO THE AMBASSADOR OF FRANCE TO POLAND, LEON NOËL

August 25, 1939

I agree with what you have stated in your telegram No. 24.

If Poland had given its tacit consent right from the start, this could have helped avoid the suspension of the military negotiations after the very first contact and would not have borne out the Russian impression that we have nothing ready with regard to the basic problem in spite of its urgency and the five months of political negotiations. Besides, it was necessary to declare Poland's tacit consent as authentic, not just as consent which is not ruled out and is possible.

But, having done so, it was necessary to go further and induce Poland to take up a more open position. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how anyone could hope to get the USSR to assume any commitments against Germany, which had been treating it so carefully, if the Poles and the Romanians, having our guarantees, would still hear nothing of Soviet aid.

Hitler did not hesitate to do what Beck, with out guarantee assured, was refusing to do. He put up with Stalin in spite of everything he had said or done against the USSR, and, basing himself on the hard facts of relations of long-standing between the two countries, got down to talking with the new Russia as Power to Power, thereby consigning Poland to her place, so pronounced between the united Germans and Russians.

Reprinted from *Documents diplomatiques français, 1932-1939*, 2 série, t. XVIII, p. 498.

INTERVIEW OF THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET MILITARY MISSION K. Y. VOROSHILOV, ON THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE MILITARY MISSIONS OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE

August 27, 1939

An *Izvestia* staff writer has put a number of questions to the head of the Soviet Military Mission, Comrade Voroshilov, to which he has given the following answers.

Question: What have the negotiations with the Military Missions of Britain and France ended in?

Answer: In view of the serious differences which have come to light, the negotiations have been suspended. The military missions have left Moscow for home.

Question: May we know what these differences are about?

Answer: The Soviet Military Mission considered that the USSR having no common border with the aggressor can provide assistance to France, Britain and Poland only in the event of its forces being allowed to pass through Polish territory, since there is no other way for Soviet forces to come into contact with those of the aggressor. Just like British and American forces in the last world war could not have taken part in the military co-operation with the armed forces of France, if they had no opportunity of operating on the territory of France, so the Soviet armed forces could not take part in military co-operation with those of France and Britain, unless allowed to pass through the territory of Poland.

In spite of so evidently correct a position, the French and British Military Missions did not agree to the stand taken up by the Soviet Mission, and the Polish Government openly declared that it did not need any military aid from the USSR and would not accept any.

This circumstance made military co-operation between the USSR and the said countries impossible.

That is the basic reason behind the differences. On that, the negotiations broke off.

Question: Has anything been said during the negotiations about helping Poland with raw materials and military equipment?

Answer: No, nothing has been said about it. Helping with raw materials and military equipment is a matter of trade, and there is no need at all for any pact of mutual assistance, let alone a military convention, to be concluded to provide Poland with raw materials and military equipment. The USA, just as a number of other states, has no mutual aid pacts or any military convention with Japan, but it has been selling raw materials and military equipment to the Japanese for two years already, in spite of the fact that Japan is at war with China. The subject brought up during the negotiations was about helping with troops, not with raw materials and military equipment.

Question: The *Daily Herald* diplomatic correspondent writes that the military mission of Britain and France have asked the Soviet Mission whether the USSR has prepared to supply Poland with aircraft and ammunition and keep the Red Army in readiness on the border, and that the Soviet Military Mission had supposedly replied to that with the proposition "to occupy Wilno (Vilna) and Nowogrudek in the North-East and also the Lvov, Tarnopol and Stanyslaw Voivodships in the South-East, as soon as the war broke out, and that the Red Army could have given the Poles military aid from those regions, should it be required".

How do you see this statement of the *Daily Herald* diplomatic correspondent, is it true to fact?

Answer: This is a lying assertion from start to finish, and the man who made it is an impudent liar and the paper which has printed this lying assertion of its diplomatic correspondent is a slanderous newspaper.

Question: the Reuters agency has announced over radio: Voroshilov told the leaders of the British and French Military Missions today that in view of a non-aggression treaty concluded between the USSR and Germany, the Soviet Government considered any further negotiations with Britain and France pointless.

Does that statement by Reuters correspond to reality?

Answer: No, it does not correspond to reality. It is not because the USSR has concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany that the military negotiations with Britain and France have broken off, but, on the contrary, the USSR has concluded the non-aggression pact with Germany as a result, incidentally, of the fact that the military negotiations with France and Britain have reached a deadlock because of insurmountable differences.

**TELEGRAM OF THE AMBASSADOR OF FRANCE
TO THE USSR, PAUL-EMILE NAGGIAR, TO THE MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE, GEORGES BONNET**

August 27, 1939

TASS news agency was to have released Marshal Voroshilov's interview for the press. If you do not have the text, please tell me and the Embassy will cable it to you.

I call your attention, among other things, to the fact that he is speaking about a possibility of providing Poland with raw materials and military equipment and that this is what he describes as aid which can be given to Poland on a commercial basis, with no mutual aid pact or military convention required.

This is an important statement. In spite of all the unpleasant things for Poland, which are to be found in the previous comments in respect of that country, whose refusal to accept Russian military aid has been made public, one can infer that the USSR, in the absence of a pact we want it to conclude and in spite of the non-aggression treaty with Germany, is prepared to offer supplies. But, after all, the Poles themselves wanted its aid limited to that. So it could be possible to continue envisaging this limited Russian support, which we intended to secure for the Poles, excluding positive military aid they did not want because it implies a passage through their territory, which, besides, our mission did not have to discuss under instructions they had on arrival.

In anticipation of that, nothing has actually changed in the balance of the French, British, Polish and German forces because, as General Doumenc has told me, Russia's positive military aid to Poland has never figured in our calculations. If, as one can hope, Turkey on her part, abides by her commitments, Hitler will be sensationally discredited in Moscow, having achieved nothing like a real change of the existing military balance to his advantage.

So, the deal of August 23 is not a perfidious blow to Poland and to us, as Germany wished.

The greatest danger under the present circumstances would come if France and British flinch and succumb to the impression that everything has been lost.

By taking premature action on the assumption that Bolshevik Russia has gone over to the camp of Hitler's Germany, with arms and resources, we would be playing into the latter's hands. The game thus played remains very tense. There are different tendencies inside the Government of the USSR. While there is strong mistrust and rancour in respect of Britain, the feeling towards us is more subtle. Just yesterday a speaker in a public meeting enthusiastically praised France and her army.

I recommend once more the greatest presence of mind in the evaluation of the events.

Reprinted from *Documents diplomatiques français, 1932-1939*, 2 série, t. XIX, pp. 90-91.

**EXTRACTS FROM A SPEECH BY VYACHESLAV MOLOTOV,
CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS
AND PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE USSR**

August 31, 1939

The international situation has not changed for the better since the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet. On the contrary, it has become even more tense.

The steps taken by some governments towards removing this tension have proved to be manifestly inadequate. They have produced no results. This applies to Europe. There has been no change for the better in East Asia either. Japan still occupies with

her forces the major cities and a considerable portion of the territory of China, without desisting from hostile acts in respect of the USSR either. In that region, too, the situation has been further strained.

The conclusion of a treaty of non-aggression between the USSR and Germany, removing the threat of war between Germany and the Soviet Union is a matter of tremendous positive significance in this context. To give a fuller assessment of the significance of this treaty, I shall have to comment first on the negotiations which have been conducted with representatives of Britain and France in the last few months.

You know that the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations on a pact of mutual assistance against aggression in Europe have been going on ever since last April. True, the British Government's first proposals were, of course, totally unacceptable. They ignored the major prerequisites of such negotiations—the principles of reciprocity and equal obligations. In spite of that, the Soviet Government did not refuse to negotiate and, in its turn, put forward its own proposals. We took into account the fact that it was difficult for the Governments of Britain and France to change course abruptly from an unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union, which they pursued until quite recently, to serious negotiations with the USSR on terms of equal commitments. Yet the subsequent talks did not prove worthwhile.

The Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations went on for four months. They helped clear up a number of issues. At the same time, they showed the representatives of Britain and France that the Soviet Union has to be seriously reckoned with in international affairs. But these negotiations ran into insurmountable obstacles. I do not, naturally, mean individual wordings or particular points of the draft treaty (pact). There were more essential things at issue.

The conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance against aggression had any sense only in the event of Britain, France, and the Soviet Union coming to agreement on certain specified military measures against an aggressor's attack. Therefore, not only political but also military negotiations with representatives of the British and French armies took place in Moscow during a certain period of time. However, nothing has come out of the military talks. These talks broke down because Poland, which was to have been jointly guaranteed by Britain, France, and the USSR, refused military aid from the Soviet Union. There was no way of overcoming Poland's objections. Moreover, the talks have shown that Britain did not really strive to overcome Poland's objections, but in fact supported them. Understandably, in the face of such an attitude of the Polish Government and its major ally to the prospect of military aid from the Soviet Union in the event of aggression, the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations could not produce good results. After that it became clear to us that the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations were doomed to failure.

What have the negotiations with Britain and France shown?

The Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations have shown that the position of Britain and France is full of glaring contradictions.

Judge for yourselves.

On the one hand, Britain and France demanded Soviet military aid for Poland against aggression. The USSR was, of course, ready to meet that demand, provided it would get appropriate assistance itself from Britain and France. On the other hand, it was Britain and France, too, who at the same time let Poland emphatically reject military aid from the USSR. Now, try, in these conditions, to reach agreement on mutual assistance when aid from the USSR is in advance declared to be unnecessary and imposed.

Furthermore, on the one hand, Britain and France guaranteed the Soviet Union military aid against aggression in exchange for appropriate aid from the USSR. On the other hand, they hedged their aid in with such reservations as regards indirect aggression as could have turned that aid into fiction and give them a formal legal ground for denying aid and leaving the USSR all alone in the face of an aggressor. Now, try and distinguish such a "pact of mutual assistance" from a pact of more or less disguised swindle.

Now, on the one hand, Britain and France stressed the importance and seriousness of the negotiations about a mutual assistance pact, calling on the USSR to treat the

matter in the most serious way and to work for the earliest possible solution of the issues connected with the pact. On the other hand, they were themselves extremely slow and not serious at all about the negotiations, leaving the job to second-rate officials without sufficient powers. Suffice it to say that the military missions of Britain and France arrived in Moscow without specified powers and without the right to sign a military convention of any kind. Moreover, the military mission of Britain arrived in Moscow without any mandate at all and it was only at the demand of our military mission that it presented its powers in writing when the talks were just about to be suspended. But even those were most indefinite powers, that is, not of full value. Now try and distinguish such an unserious attitude to the talks by Britain and France from light-minded play at negotiations designed to discredit the very essence of the talks.

Such are the intrinsic contradictions of Britain's and France's positions in the negotiations with the USSR which caused them to break down.

Where is the root of these contradictions in the position of Britain and France?

The point, to put it in a few words, is this. On the one hand, the British and French Governments fear aggression and, for that reason, would like to have a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union because that would make Britain and France stronger themselves. But, on the other, the British and French Governments fear lest the conclusion of a serious pact of mutual assistance with the USSR should give more strength to this country, to the Soviet Union, which turns out to be contrary to their position. It has to be admitted that they have allowed these fears to take precedence over other considerations. Only in this context can one understand the position of Poland, following instructions from Britain and France.

Now, for the Soviet-German treaty of non-aggression.

The decision to conclude a treaty of non-aggression between the USSR and Germany was taken after the military negotiations with France and Britain had reached a deadlock because of the insurmountable differences I have mentioned. Since these negotiations had shown that there was no ground for counting on the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact, we could not fail to consider other possibilities for ensuring peace and removing the threat of war between Germany and the USSR. If the governments of Britain and France did not want to reckon with that, that is their right. Our responsibility is to think of the interests of the Soviet people, of the interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. All the more so since we are firmly convinced that the interests of the USSR coincide with the basic interests of the peoples of other nations.

But that is only one side of the matter.

There had to be yet another circumstance for the Soviet-German treaty of non-aggression to come into existence. There had to be a change in Germany's foreign policy towards good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union. Only with this second factor present, only when we clearly saw the German Government's desire to change its foreign policy with a view to improving relations with the USSR was the basis found for the conclusion of the Soviet-German treaty of non-aggression.

Everybody knows that political relations between Germany and the USSR have been strained during the last six years since the National-Socialists came to power. You know, too, that in spite of differing outlooks and political systems, the Soviet Government strove to maintain normal business and political relations with Germany. There is no need, at this point, to review individual aspects of these relations over the past few years, and, after all, you know them quite well. It is worth, however, recalling the explanation of our foreign policy, which was given at the 18th Party Congress a few months ago.

Speaking of the shape of our relations with other countries, Comrade Stalin said that our objectives in the field of foreign policy were:

"1. To go on conducting a policy of peace and strengthening business ties with all nations;

"2. To use caution and not to allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by instigators of war accustomed to having others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them."

As you see, in his conclusions Comrade Stalin said that the Soviet Union stands for closer business links with all nations. But, at the same time, Comrade Stalin warned against the instigators of war anxious to involve this country in conflicts with other countries, in their interests.

Exposing the clamour raised by the British, French and North American press about the German "plans" to capture the Soviet Ukraine, Comrade Stalin said then:

"The object behind this suspicious clamour appears to be to fill the Soviet Union with fury against Germany, vitiate the atmosphere and provoke a conflict with Germany without any apparent reason for it."

As you see, Comrade Stalin hit the nail on the head, exposing the scheming of West-European politicians seeking to set Germany and the Soviet Union by the ears.

It must be admitted that in this country, too, there were some short-sighted people who, obsessed with oversimplified anti-fascist agitation, forgot about this provocative work of our enemies. Comrade Stalin, considering this circumstance, suggested even then that there was a possibility of different, not hostile but good-neighbourly relations being established between Germany and the USSR.

We can now see that Comrade Stalin's statements have generally been rightly understood and practical conclusions drawn from them in Germany.

The conclusion of the Soviet-German treaty of non-aggression indicates that Comrade Stalin's historic prevision has proved to be perfectly correct.

As early as this spring, the German Government proposed resuming trade and credit negotiations. Negotiations were soon restarted. Mutual concessions made agreement possible. This agreement, as you know, was signed on August 19.

This was not the first trade and credit agreement with Germany under the present government. But this agreement compares favourably not only with the 1935 agreement, but also with all previous agreements, let alone that we have had not a single economic agreement, as favourable as this one, with Britain, France or any other country. The agreement is good for us by its credit terms (seven-year credit) and it gives us an opportunity to order a considerable additional supply of equipment we need. Under this agreement, the USSR is to sell Germany a specified amount of our surplus raw materials for her industry, which is quite in the interest of the USSR. So why should we refuse such an advantageous economic agreement? Just to please those who would like the Soviet Union to have beneficial economic agreements with other countries? Yet it is clear that the trade and credit agreement with Germany is wholly and entirely in the interest of the national economy and in the interest of the Soviet Union's defence. Such an agreement is in full accord with the decisions of the 18th Congress of our Party, which approved Comrade Stalin's directions about "strengthening business ties with all nations".

When the German Government expressed the desire to improve political relations as well, the Soviet Government had no reason to refuse to do so. It was then that the question of concluding a non-aggression treaty came up.

Some voices we hear today betray an incomprehension of the simplest principles which underlie the incipient improvement of political relations between the Soviet Union and Germany.

Some pretend to be as naive as to ask: How could the Soviet Union go for improved political relations with a fascist-type state? Is that possible? But they forget that the point at issue is not our attitude to the domestic order of another country, but a relationship between two states. They forget that we stand by the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and, accordingly, by that of allowing no interference of any kind in our own internal affairs. They also forget about an important principle of our foreign policy, which Comrade Stalin formulated, back at the 18th Party Congress, in this way:

"We stand for peace and for the consolidation of business links with all countries; we stand and shall stand by this position as long as these countries abide by the same kind of relationship with the Soviet Union and as long as they avoid trying to hurt our country's interests."

The meaning of these words is perfectly clear: the Soviet Union is anxious to have

good-neighbourly relations with all non-Soviet countries as long as these countries abide by the same position in respect of the Soviet Union.

In our policy towards non-Soviet countries we have stood and do stand by the well-known Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of the Soviet state and capitalist countries. One could cite a large number of examples to show how this principle has been actually applied. But I shall limit myself to just a few. We have had, for instance, a treaty of non-aggression and neutrality with fascist Italy since 1933. It has not occurred to anybody so far to speak up against this treaty. And that is understandable because such a treaty responds to the interests of the USSR; and it conforms to our principle of peaceful coexistence of the USSR and capitalist countries. We have non-aggression treaties also with Poland and some other countries which everybody knows as half-fascist. But these treaties have never been called in question either. Perhaps, it will not be beside the point to remind you that we do not have treaties even of that kind with some other, non-fascist, bourgeois democratic countries, say, with Britain. However, that is not our fault.

Our political relations with Germany have been based since 1926 on a treaty of neutrality, which was prolonged already by the present German Government in 1933. This treaty of neutrality is still in force.

The Soviet Government had even before considered it desirable to take a further step forward in improving political relations with Germany, but the circumstances have made it possible only now. True, we have not been negotiating a pact of mutual assistance, as with Britain and France, but only a treaty of non-aggression. Nevertheless, the international significance of the Soviet-German treaty can hardly be overestimated in modern conditions.

That is why we took a positive view of the arrival of the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, von Ribbentrop, in Moscow.

The 23rd of August, when the Soviet-German treaty of non-aggression was signed, must be considered a date of great historic importance. The treaty of non-aggression between the USSR and Germany is a turning point in the history of Europe, and, indeed, not of Europe alone.

Until yesterday the fascists of Germany had been pursuing a hostile policy towards the USSR. Indeed, yesterday we were enemies in the domain of foreign relations. Today, however, the situation is different: we are no longer enemies. Political art in the field of external relations does not consist in increasing the number of enemies for our country. On the contrary, political art consists in reducing the number of such enemies and in converting yesterday's enemies into good neighbours maintaining peaceful relations.

History has shown that enmity and wars between this country and Germany did harm, not good, to our countries. Russia and Germany suffered most in the war 1914-1918. That means the peoples of the Soviet Union and Germany have nothing to gain from enmity between them. On the contrary, the peoples of the Soviet Union and Germany need peaceful relations with each other. The Soviet-German treaty of non-aggression is putting an end to enmity between Germany and the USSR, and that is in the interest of both countries. The differing outlooks and political systems must not and cannot be an obstacle to the establishment of good political relations between both states any more than they can impede good political relations between the USSR and non-Soviet, capitalist countries. Only the enemies of Germany and the USSR can seek to incite and whip up enmity between the peoples of these countries. We have stood and do stand for friendship between the peoples of the USSR and Germany, for the development and flourishing of friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the German people.

The major significance of the Soviet-German treaty of non-aggression resides in the fact that the two largest nations of Europe have agreed to put an end to enmity between them, to remove the threat of war to live in peace. That means narrowing down the field of possible armed clashes in Europe. Even if such clashes cannot be avoided, they will be reduced in scale. The only ones who can be displeased with this state of things are the instigators of an all-out war in Europe, that is, those who, while paying lip-service to peace, want to set all Europe on fire.

The Soviet-German treaty has been the target of numerous attacks from the British, French and American press, above all, from some "socialist" newspapers serving their "own" national capitalism, that is, serving those gentlemen who pay them well. Obviously, you cannot expect such gentlemen to tell the real truth.

Some allege that the conclusion of the Soviet-German treaty of non-aggression has interfered with the negotiations with Britain and France about a pact of mutual assistance. This lie has already been stigmatised in Comrade Voroshilov's interview. What has actually happened, of course, is just the opposite. The Soviet Union has concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany in view of the fact, incidentally, that the negotiations with France and Britain had run into insurmountable differences and ended in failure through the fault of British and French ruling circles.

We are even blamed for having no clause in the treaty to the effect that it shall be terminated if either Contracting Party finds itself embroiled in a war under circumstances that might give somebody a seeming excuse for qualifying it as an attacking side. But those who blame us forget, for some reason or other, that there is no clause or proviso of that kind either in the Polish-German treaty of non-aggression signed in 1934 and ended by Germany in 1939 contrary to Poland's wish, or in the Anglo-German declaration of non-aggression signed just a few months ago. So why can't the USSR afford to do what Poland and Britain did long ago?

Finally, there are some who are trying to read more into the treaty than is actually said there. They do so by spreading all kinds of conjectures and insinuations to provoke mistrust of the treaty in some countries. But all this does no more than attest to the hopeless impotence of the enemies of the treaty, who are increasingly exposing themselves as the enemies both of the Soviet Union and Germany, seeking to provoke war between these two countries.

We see all that as further evidence to bear out Comrade Stalin's affirmation that it is necessary to be extra wary of the instigators of war accustomed to having others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them. We must be on the look-out for those who think they stand to gain from bad relations between the USSR and Germany and from their hostility between themselves, and who want no peace and good-neighbourly relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.

When we see inveterate imperialists taking this line, we can understand that. But we cannot pass over the fact that extra zeal has been displayed in this sense recently by some leaders of the socialist parties of France and Britain. Those gentlemen have indeed been in a fuss, laying themselves out, to say the least. They want the USSR to be definitely involved in a war on Britain's side against Germany. Have they lost their senses, those warmongers who have run amuck? Do these gentlemen find it so difficult to grasp the meaning of the Soviet-German treaty of non-aggression, whereby the USSR is under no obligation to get involved in a war either on Britain's side against Germany or on Germany's side against Britain? Do they find it so difficult to understand that the USSR is pursuing and will pursue its own self-determined policy guided by the interests of the peoples of the USSR alone? If those gentlemen are so eager to fight, they may just as well fight among themselves, without the Soviet Union. We would see what sort of fighters they are.

In our eyes, in the eyes of the entire Soviet people, they are the same kind of enemies of peace as all the other warmongers in Europe. It is only those who want yet another great bloodbath, yet another shambles of nations, it is only they that want to set the Soviet Union and Germany by the ears; only they want to wreck the incipient restoration of good-neighbourly relations between the peoples of the USSR and Germany.

The Soviet Union has come to sign a treaty with Germany, confident that peace between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Germany meets the interests of all nations, the interests of general peace. Every sincere champion of peace will see that for himself.

This treaty responds to the basic interests of the working people of the Soviet Union and cannot make us less vigilant in defending these interests. This treaty is reinforced by our firm confidence in our forces and in their full readiness in the event of any aggression against the USSR.

This treaty (just as the abortive Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations) shows that no important issues of international relations, let alone the issues of Eastern Europe, can any longer be resolved without the active participation of the Soviet Union and that any attempts at by-passing the Soviet Union and resolving such issues behind its back are bound to fail.

The Soviet German treaty of non-aggression marks a turning point in the development of Europe, a turn towards improved relations between the two largest nations of Europe. This treaty not only removes the threat of war with Germany, narrows down the field of possible armed confrontations in Europe and serves, therefore, the cause of general peace; it must assure us further opportunities for the growth of our forces, the strengthening of our positions, and the continued enhancement of the Soviet Union's influence on international development.

There is no need to dwell on individual clauses of the treaty here. The Council of People's Commissars has every reason to hope that the treaty will have your approval as a political document of paramount importance to the USSR.

The Council of People's Commissars is hereby submitting the Soviet-German treaty of non-aggression to the Supreme Soviet for consideration and asking for it to be ratified.

Izvestia, September 1, 1939

**TELEGRAM OF THE MILITARY ATTACHÉ OF THE USSR
EMBASSY TO POLAND P. S. RYBALKO AND SOVIET
AMBASSADOR TO POLAND N. I. SHARONOV TO THE USSR
PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR DEFENCE AND PEOPLE'S
COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

Most urgent
Received by telephone
September 1, 1939

To: People's Commissar of Defence,
People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs

On September 1 at 6 a.m. without a declaration of war, as the Second Section reports, German bomber planes raided Puck, Gdynia, Katowice, Cracow, Tcew and Warsaw. Warsaw raid repelled. Second raid of Warsaw at 8.50 repelled. Third raid at 10.00 results unknown. Danzig occupied by German troops. Fighting on Westerplatte. Wehrmacht's land forces crossed the borders in directions of Mlawa, Krynica, Diadowo and Upper Silesia. Fighting is on. The Second Section unable to report details of the situation on the front.

RYBALKO, SHARONOV

USSR FPA, stock 059, list 1, folder 296, file 2046, p. 266

**TELEGRAM OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO GREAT
BRITAIN I. M. MAISKY TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR**

September 3, 1939

The following official notices has been received by me today for passing on to the Soviet Government:

(Continued on page 143)

THE YEAR 1939 IN THE NUREMBERG FILES

**Yuri ZORYA,
Natalia LEBEDEVA**

LESS THAN A MONTH after the Munich deal, the Nazis began direct preparations for the seizure of Poland. The claim to Danzig, first laid by them in October 1938, was merely a cover and pretext for further action. The annexation of Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939, which they got away with as they had before, considerably improved the strategic positions of the Third Reich and whetted the appetites of its leaders. In early April the Weiss Plan for attacking Poland was adopted, and on April 11 Hitler signed the following directive for the Wehrmacht:

"The aim is... to destroy Polish military strength, and to create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements of defence. The Free State of Danzig will be incorporated into Germany at the outbreak of the conflict at the latest. Policy aims... at limiting the war to Poland, and this is considered possible in view of the internal crisis in France and British restraint as a result of this..."¹

Detailed and conclusive evidence of this plan as well as of other plans of the Nazi leadership can be found in the files of the International Military Tribunal, which sat in Nuremberg from November 20, 1945, to October 1, 1946. Hundreds of thousands of official documents of the Reich from the archives of the Nazi party, the High Command of the German Armed Forces, the Gestapo, SS, SD, Foreign Ministry and other entities had fallen into the Allies' hands. By sifting this vast amount of evidence, the tribunal carried out what may be called an autopsy of fascism's criminal policy.

But the IMT accomplished something more than that. It did also bring out the mistakes and miscalculations made by the governments of the anti-Hitler coalition countries before the war.

It was not accidental that many archive documents shedding light on the nature and origins of World War II and the attitude of Germany and other Western powers were classified in our country. Even today these materials are very hard of access. For instance, documents of the Special Archives of the Chief Archive Directorate of the USSR, which are of immense interest to historians, are still practically inaccessible. Only recently did it become possible to draw more extensively on certain records of the Central State Archives of the October Revolution of the USSR, including records of the Nuremberg Trial of the Major German War Criminals. They include records of the Government Commission for the Organisation of the Trial of the Major German War Criminals set up in 1945 as well as of the Nuremberg trial itself in which mention is made of secret protocols to the Soviet-German treaties of 1939.

For the first time ever, the Nuremberg trial made public a record of Hitler's speech to a meeting on May 23, 1939, attended by Göring,

Yuri Zorya has a Candidate of Science degree (Mil.). Natalia Lebedeva, Cand. Sc. (Hist.), is a senior researcher at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World History.

Keitel, Raeder (Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy) and others. It was at that meeting that Hitler announced his intention to attack Poland, saying that there was no solving Germany's economic problems without invading foreign countries. "Danzig," he told his audience, "is not subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of expanding our living space in the East... There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision: To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity... We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be fighting. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive."² While bearing in mind the likelihood of war with Britain and France, he was doing his utmost to avoid fighting on two fronts.

The prosecution also submitted a number of other military and diplomatic documents indicating that the Nazis were speeding up preparations for aggression against Poland. Prominent among these documents were three records of a meeting held on August 22, 1939, in Obersalzberg, where Hitler addressed the commanders of all of Germany's armed services. The records were found among the papers of the German Foreign Ministry. We reprint here some passages from them, including those never published in our country before.

"Ever since the fall of 1938 ... I have been resolved to go with Stalin... Stalin and I are the only ones to be looking ahead. Thus I will in the next few weeks hold out my hand to Stalin on the German-Soviet border and proceed together with him to a redivision of the world.... Colonel-General von Brauchitsch has promised me to finish the war with Poland in a few weeks. If he had reported that this would take as much as two years or a year I would not have ordered the attack and would have signed a treaty with Britain and not with Russia. We cannot afford to fight a protracted war. I got to know those wretched worms, Daladier and Chamberlain, in Munich. They are too cowardly to attack us. They cannot impose a blockade. By contrast, we have autarky and Russian raw materials. Poland shall be devastated and settled by Germans. My treaty with Poland was merely aimed at gaining time. In short, gentlemen, Russia will go through what I will have done to Poland. After Stalin's death—he is a very sick man—we will defeat Soviet Russia. And then the sun will rise on German world domination...."

"We will go on sowing unrest in the Far East and Arabia. We are masters and look on these peoples as at best lacquered monkeys itching for the whip."

"The situation is more favourable to us than ever. My only worry is that Chamberlain or some other scoundrel may come to me to offer mediation. He would be kicked downstairs.... No, it is too late for that. The attack on Poland and its destruction will start early on Sunday morning."

"I will pit several companies in Polish uniform against Upper Silesia and the Protectorate. I don't care whether or not the world will believe it. The world only believes in success...."

"I was convinced that Stalin would never accept British proposals. Russia has no stake in the preservation of Poland, and Stalin knows that his regime will come to an end regardless of whether his soldiers win or lose the war. Litvinov's discharge played a decisive role. I proceeded gradually in changing relations with Russia. We entered into political talks in connection with the trade treaty. We proposed concluding a nonaggression pact. After that there came a multifaceted proposal from Russia. Four days ago, I took an important step which resulted in Russia answering that it was willing to sign the treaty. Personal contact has been established with Stalin. Ribbentrop will sign the treaty the day after tomorrow. Poland is now in the situation in which I wanted it to be."³

The record says that the speech was heard with close attention and great enthusiasm and that Göring danced on the table while some sat in pensive silence.

CONCERN about possible exposures of the great powers' prewar policy was unmistakable during the Nuremberg trial. Realising that the subject might come up, Robert Jackson, Chief Prosecutor for the United States, said in his opening speech that his country did not desire to enter into discussion on the complicated prewar currents of European politics and hoped the trial would not be protracted by their consideration.

The prosecution took certain steps to prevent the accused and defence from levelling counter-charges against the countries which had established the IMT. On November 9, 1945, a meeting of the Chief Prosecutors' Committee resolved on the initiative of the US and British delegations to allow no political attacks from the defence against the countries conducting the trial and to draw up a list of questions to be barred from discussion in court. The day before the trial opened, November 19, the following report was sent to Vyshinsky in Moscow:

*"...The prosecutors are determined to avoid delicate questions and to prevent the accused from engaging in discussion or involving the court in it. They have therefore found it desirable to exchange, before the beginning of the trial, a list of questions which shall not be discussed at it so as to override them at once during the trial.... Rosenberg demanded the summoning of a witness to prove that people in the Baltic region were exiled, resettled, and so forth, also under Soviet rule. The Prosecutors' Committee defeated the attempt, stating that it was not for the court to discuss the policy of other states."*⁴

The report aroused a lively interest in Moscow, where Stalin and his closest entourage were following the trial. The Soviet government set up a Commission for the Organisation and Conduct of the Nuremberg Trial to direct the work of the Soviet delegation. In line with instructions from Stalin, the Commission's work was guided by Molotov, with Vyshinsky exercising direct control. The Commission comprised leading officials of the Public Prosecutor's Office of the USSR, the Ministry of Justice, the state security service and some other agencies and organisations. The activity of the Soviet delegation was kept under rigid overt and covert control. All its important addresses, such as the chief prosecutors' opening speeches, were circulated to Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Zhdanov, Gorshenin (Prosecutor-General of the USSR), Rychkov (Minister of Justice of the RSFSR) and Dekanozov (deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR).

The atmosphere in which the Commission had to function was often tense due to the activity of state security officers present in Nuremberg who often misinformed their leadership. At a Commission meeting held in Moscow on November 16, 1945, deputy Minister of State Security Kobulov said: *"Our men now in Nuremberg report to us on the behaviour of the accused during examination. Göring, Jodl, Keitel and others behave defiantly. Their answers often contain anti-Soviet attacks but our investigator, Cde. Alexandrov, does little to parry them. The accused contrive to make themselves out to be ordinary officials executing the will of the High Command. Raeder, who was examined by the British, said the Russians had tried to recruit him and that he had testified under duress."*⁵

Alexandrov pointed out in a report to Gorshenin that no attacks had been made against the Soviet Union or himself during examination.

*"...I ask you," he wrote, "to call a halt to various false rumors about the examinations of defenders carried out to date, for these rumors are creating an unhealthy atmosphere and are a hindrance to further work."*⁶

On instructions from the Commission, Vyshinsky went late in November 1945 to Nuremberg, where the Soviet delegation drew up the first list of questions under his direction and then discussed it. The delegation meeting resolved:

"1. To approve the list presented by Cde. Vyshinsky and comprising questions whose discussion at the trial is impermissible (the list is attached)."

"2. To instruct Cde. Rudenko to reach agreement with the other prosecutors on refraining from all mention of certain questions, so that the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France and other United Nations may not become the object of criticism from the accused..."

It was also resolved to instruct Cde. Rudenko and Cde. Nikitchenko to look in advance through all documents coming in from other delegations and intended for presentation to the court and to insist that these documents be approved by the Prosecutors' Committee.

Cde. Rudenko and Cde. Nikitchenko shall state in regard to every document their opinion on whether or not it is acceptable from the point of view of Soviet interests. If necessary, they shall prevent the submission of undesirable documents to the court and their disclosure by it.

Attached to these minutes signed by Vyshinsky was the following document:

"List of Questions"

"1. The attitude of the Soviet Union to the Versailles Treaty.

"The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 and all issues having any relation to it.

"3. Molotov's visit to Berlin. Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow.

"4. Questions concerning the Soviet socio-political system.

"5. The Soviet Baltic republics.

"6. The Soviet-German agreement on exchanging the German population of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia with Germany.

"7. Soviet foreign policy and, in particular, the question of the Straits, of the alleged territorial claims of the USSR.

"8. The Balkan question.

"9. Soviet-Polish relations (the questions of the West Ukraine and West Byelorussia)."'

On December 1, 1945, the British were the first to present to their colleagues for consideration a document in fulfilment of the decision adopted on the 9th of November and confirmed on the 29th by the chief prosecutors. Deputy Chief Prosecutor for Great Britain David Maxwell-Fyfe sent Rudenko the following letter:

"Dear General Rudenko,

"In accordance with the decision adopted at the Chief Prosecutors' meeting on November 29, I enclose for your information a copy of the British Memorandum on Likely Political Attacks and on how the British Delegation intends to react to those attacks. Similar letters have been sent to Mr. Jackson and Mr. Dubost.

Truly yours,

David Maxwell-Fyfe."

The enclosed text of the memorandum on likely political attacks said:

"If the accused try, in giving evidence or through counsel for the defence, to make any political attacks on governments, the Prosecutor for Great Britain will immediately object to such attacks under Art. 18 and 20 of the Statutes. The Prosecutor for Great Britain will also take steps against all countercharges against the policy of Great Britain

irrespective of which section of the Indictment they cite. Likely counter-charges against governments fall into three periods:

"A. The period before the outbreak of the war.

"B. The German attack on (1) Denmark and Norway;
(2) Belgium and the Netherlands.

"C. The German attack on Yugoslavia and Greece.

"Likely attacks against so-called British imperialism in the 19th and early 20th centuries or against the behaviour of Great Britain during the Boer War will be strictly opposed on our part as irrelevant..."⁸

At the meeting of the Prosecutors' Committee on December 3, Robert Jackson again proposed that all prosecutors should adopt a common position on issues whose discussion should be prevented. He stressed that it was important to have memorandums from all the chief prosecutors on the matter so as to make a relevant presentation to the tribunal afterwards, at an informal meeting with it.⁹

Two days later, the Commission of the Soviet part of the prosecution met again to continue the debate on the procedure of drawing up a list of questions to be barred from discussion. It resolved to prepare a memorandum for the Prosecutors' Committee on the questions to be ruled out and to approve it at a Commission meeting on December 6. It did as decided but never presented the memorandum to the other chief prosecutors. This may have been because clearing the matter with Moscow made it impossible to act promptly.

From what Vyshinsky wrote on a copy of the Soviet list on January 20, 1946, it followed that the matter had been reported to and agreed with Molotov.¹⁰ It seems, however, that no final decision was reached and the matter was set aside for a time because there was no urgent need until March (that is, while the prosecution stage of the trial was still on) to stop any attacks from the accused or the defence.

The Soviet delegates saw to it that the British prosecutor excluded from his speech a reference to documents about the "Vlasovites", Hitler's speech on the Polish question and the record of a conversation by Hitler and Ribbentrop with Ciano in Obersalzberg on August 12, 1939.¹¹ During that conversation Ciano was informed of Germany's intention to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union and attack Poland before the end of August.

AFTER THE PROSECUTION had finished submitting evidence, the defence, realising that the documents involved were irrefutable, decided to obstruct the trial by preferring counter-charges against the governments of the anti-Hitler coalition. To stave that off, the prosecutors for the four Allied countries began to coordinate their activity even more carefully. On March 8, 1946, Jackson called on the chief prosecutors for the Soviet Union and France to present lists of questions, as the British delegation had done in December 1945. In a letter addressed to the chief prosecutors for these countries, he wrote:

"At the Chief Prosecutors' meeting on November 9, 1945, we discussed the likelihood of political attacks from the defence against representatives of our countries, especially over the policy of Britain, Russia and France in connection with the accusation about waging aggressive wars.

"The same meeting resolved that we would all oppose those attacks as irrelevant and that as the United States entered the war at a later date and was far removed from direct operations, attacks against the United States would be fewer, and hence the position of US representatives is somewhat more convenient for preventing political discussion.

"Besides, it was agreed that each delegation would compile a memo-

random.... There is still no information from the Soviet and French delegations.

"Besides, it was agreed that each delegation would compile a memorandum.... There is still no information from the Soviet and French delegations.

"I have reason to believe that the defence plans to attack Soviet policy by calling it aggressive towards Finland, Poland, the Balkans and the Baltic States, French policy in the West and the treatment of prisoners of war. Also, there will probably be a series of attacks of the kind indicated by Sir David in his memorandum.

"I am calling your attention to this because I rule out the possibility of the United States supporting any propositions of which it has not been informed beforehand. What I mean is that some issues may necessitate advance clearing with our State Department and military authorities. Besides, witnesses may well touch during cross-examination on subjects that would require special consideration, and this can be done more easily when the viewpoint of the delegations concerned is known.

"The US position on all such issues is that all attacks of this nature from the defence shall be treated as irrelevant. If such political attacks take the form of public debate (public discussion) everyone will find himself in an awkward situation unless the US representative knows the viewpoint of his colleagues and therefore finds it impossible to take a supportive stand on these issues."¹²

On March 11, the Soviet delegation responded to the suggestion of the chief prosecutors for the United States and Britain by presenting its list of questions to be ruled out at the trial.

"On reading your kind letter of March 8," Rudenko wrote in reply to Jackson, "I am glad to advise you that I fully accept your proposals. I share your opinion and consider for my part that in conformity with Art. 18 of the Statutes of the International Military Tribunal, the Prosecutors' Committee should adopt joint measures to firmly preclude all attempts by the defendants or counsel to take advantage of the current trial for the consideration of questions having no direct relevance to the case.

"I appreciate the timeliness of your letter. At this stage in the hearing of the case, some defendants and their lawyers already attempt to provoke discussion on questions irrelevant to the case and to distort the meaning of various acts of the governments of the Allied countries with the aid of false information whose refutations would entail loss of time and hence an unwarranted delay in the trial.

"In accordance with the suggestion made in your letter, here is a rough list of questions to be barred from discussion for the reasons mentioned above:

"1. Questions about the socio-political system of the USSR.

"2. Soviet foreign policy:

"(a) the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 and questions relating to it (the Trade Treaty, the establishment of frontiers, negotiations, and so on); (b) Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow and the November 1940 talks in Berlin; (c) the Balkan question; (d) Soviet-Polish relations.

"3. The Soviet Baltic republics.

Sincerely yours,

Lieut.-General

R. Rudenko

*Nuremberg, March 11, 1946."*¹³

It is indicative that not one of the delegations took advantage of the ticklish situations which arose at the trial time and again to present the policy of Allied governments in an unfavourable light. They never

did so either when the Munich policy was discussed or when the question of Soviet-German relations in the 1939-1941 period was brought up.

In submitting evidence of the annexation of Czechoslovakia by Germany, the US and British prosecutors described the activity of Britain and France before and during the 1938 Munich conference as having delayed the outbreak of war, frustrated or at any rate held up implementation of the Nazis' Grön Plan. At the same time, they did their best to avoid the subject and often interrupted defendants who touched upon it.¹⁴ They never asked the defendants a single question to ascertain details of the Munich deal.

Still, the testimony of the accused and of witnesses for the defence invited the conclusion that had it not been for the Munich deal, the Wehrmacht would have been unable to achieve its goal. Keitel, for one, testified at the trial that in 1938 Germany was not prepared for war. "We were extraordinarily happy,—Keitel said, that it had not come to a military operation because throughout the time of preparation we had always been of the opinion that our means of attack against the frontier fortifications of Czechoslovakia were insufficient..." Field Marshals Manstein and Rundstedt testified in a similar vein.¹⁵

DOCUMENTS DISCLOSED at Nuremberg showed that Hitler did not seize Czechoslovakia by force but received it as a gift from London and Paris. One of the defendants, Hjalmar Schacht, said during a cross-examination that Hitler "did not take it with violence.... The Allies presented him with the country".¹⁶

Also revealing was what Göring told Gilbert, a forensic psychiatrist, in describing the Munich meeting. "Actually, the whole thing was a cut-and-dried affair. Neither Chamberlain nor Daladier were in the least bit interested in sacrificing or risking anything to save Czechoslovakia. That was clear as day to me. The fate of Czechoslovakia was essentially sealed in 3 hours... Not the slightest objection to anything. I was simply amazed at how easily the thing was being managed by Hitler. After all, they knew that Skoda etc. had munitions plants in the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia would be at our mercy. When he suggested that certain armaments which were across the Sudeten border should be brought into the Sudeten territory as soon as we take it over, I thought there would be an explosion. But no—not a peep. We got everything we wanted."¹⁷

It is worthy of note that when the time came for Göring to testify, none of the prosecutors asked him any questions about Munich. The defence, however, did not miss the chance to uphold its allegations about the joint responsibility of the leading European powers for the outbreak of World War II. "What would have happened," asked one of the lawyers, had the Czechs refused to cede the Sudetenland to Germany after the Munich deal?"—"O, we raised the issue with Chamberlain and Daladier. Both replied: "Then we shall make the Czechs do".¹⁸

The prosecutors' cooperation and mutual support came out very clearly when the signing of the Soviet-German Treaty of August 23, 1939, was discussed and there ensued a debate on the existence of a secret protocol to it.

A mere four days after the Soviet delegation had presented its memorandum listing the questions whose discussion should not be allowed, Hess's lawyer, Alfred Seidl, was supplied with an affidavit by Friedrich Gaus, ex-chief of the Legal Department of the German Foreign Ministry. An official holding the rank of ambassador, Gaus had accompanied Ribbentrop on his trip to Moscow from August 21 to 24, 1939. The

affidavit contained a brief account of the talks and a detailed exposition of a secret protocol to the non-aggression pact of August 23.

The controversy over the existence of such a protocol started more than forty years ago, during the Nuremberg trial, and is still on. It is therefore worth saying more of how the matter was treated at the trial.

Seidl believed that Gaus's affidavit made it possible to "reverse the trial" and therefore insisted on its being discussed. He met no objection because Rudenko, having no Russian translation of the affidavit and knowing nothing about its content, allowed it to be submitted to the tribunal.¹⁹ Subsequently, during the examination of Ribbentrop, Seidl had him admit the signing of a secret protocol. The court was compelled to accept Gaus's affidavit as proof submitted by the defence. Paragraph three of the affidavit as read in court said:

"...Besides the Non-aggression Pact there were negotiations for quite some time on a separate secret document, which according to my recollection was called a 'secret agreement' or 'secret additional agreement' and the terms of which were aimed at a demarcation of the mutual spheres of interest in the European territories situated between the two countries. Whether the expression 'spheres of interest' or other such expressions were used therein I do not recall. In the documents, Germany declared herself politically disinterested in Latvia, Estonia and Finland but considered Lithuania to be part of her sphere of influence. Regarding the political disinterest of Germany in the two Baltic countries mentioned, controversy arose when the Reich Foreign Minister, in accordance with his instructions, wanted to have a certain part of the Baltic territory exempted from this political disinterest; this however was rejected on the part of Soviets, especially on account of the ice-free ports in this territory..."

*The Foreign Minister had put in a call to Hitler... (who) authorized to accept the Soviet standpoint. A demarcation line was laid down for the Polish territory.... Moreover, an agreement was reached in regard to Poland stating approximately that the two powers would act in mutual agreement in the final settlement of questions concerning his country..."*²⁰

Paragraph five of Gaus's affidavit read that during the negotiations on a second Soviet-German treaty held roughly a month later (the negotiations took place on Soviet initiative), the secret protocol was altered, with the result that henceforward Lithuania, too, was excluded from the German sphere of interests but for a small territory cutting into East Prussia. However, the demarcation line on Polish territory was shifted farther east. It was not until later, not until early 1941 or late 1940, as far as I remember, that the German side renounced also that 'Lithuanian jut' as a result of diplomatic negotiations.²¹

How Stalin, Molotov and Vyshinsky reacted to the discussion of Gaus's affidavit in court and to the recognition of that document as evidence is not hard to imagine. Moscow immediately sent instructions for daily reports on the course of court sessions to be wired to Molotov.

But Seidl did not confine himself to submitting Gaus's affidavit. He obtained somewhere a photocopy of the secret protocol and tried to read the text in court. The court demanded to know the source of the document, for without this it could not judge its validity. Seidl declined. But in his recollections published afterwards, he offered the following explanation: "After the examination of Reichsminister von Ribbentrop early in April, the following incident occurred. I was sitting during an intermission on a bench in the foyer. Suddenly a man of about 35 sat down beside me. 'Dr. Seidl,' he said, 'we have been following with a great interest your attempts to introduce the secret supplementary protocol attached to the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, as added evidence.' Thereupon he handed me an unsealed envelop with two sheets

in it. I began reading them. When I was through I discovered to my amazement that my interlocutor had disappeared. One of the typewritten sheets began as follows: 'Secret Protocol to the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23.' I still do not know the man who handed me those sheets. There are many indications, however, that those who had played into my hand belonged to the American side, that is, the US prosecution or an American secret service."

According to Seidl, he approached the British prosecutor, Maxwell-Fyfe, and the latter told him that he, too, had such a copy and recommended that he acquaint Rudenko with the document. But Rudenko refused to talk with him. This was done in his stead by Nikolai Zorya, Assistant Chief Prosecutor for the USSR, who said on hearing out the lawyer that he considered the conversation pointless. Seidl believes that Zorya acted on instructions from Rudenko. Describing the episode, he writes: "Incidentally, General Zorya lost his life by accident when cleaning his pistol." ²²

After Seidl refused to reveal the source of the protocol, the tribunal forbade the document to be read in court, considering it untrustworthy. But Seidl did not desist from attempts to have the secret protocol recognised as evidence. On April 17, he proposed summoning as a witness Gustav Hilger, former councillor of the German Embassy in Moscow, who had participated in the talks on the Soviet-German pact in August 1939, and Weizsäcker, Ribbentrop's deputy. Speaking of this, the British prosecutor, Maxwell-Fyfe, said:

"...First of all witness Hilger... I believe that the witness is in the United States, and that there is a report suggesting that he is too ill to travel..."

"The other application is about a witness Von Weizsäcker...." ²³

"The Prosecution, of course, loyally accept the decision of the Tribunal on the admissibility of the Gaus affidavit, but they respectfully submit that that does not affect this point. What is desired is to call witnesses as to the course of the negotiations before these treaties—before an agreement was arrived at in respect to these treaties—and that is a point which we have had several times; and, of course, while all circumstances have a slight difference, the Tribunal have—as far as I know—ruled universally up to now that they will not go into antecedent negotiations which have resulted in agreements.

There is also the position that, of course, Dr. Seidl has put in the Gaus affidavit, and he has had his opportunity to examine the Defendant Von Ribbentrop; and the Prosecution respectfully submit that to call two secondary witnesses—without any disrespect to their position in the German Foreign Office, they are witnesses of a secondary importance compared with the Defendant Von Ribbentrop—to discuss these negotiations seems to the Prosecution to be going into irrelevant matter and entirely unnecessary for the purposes of this case..." ²⁴

WHILE PRESSING for the presentation of copies of the secret protocol, Seidl received a second affidavit from ex-ambassador Gaus, who admitted that the text of the document which the lawyer had coincided in the main with that of the protocol signed in Moscow in August 1939. ²⁵

During the examination of Weizsäcker, former state secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, on May 21, 1946, Hess's lawyer reverted to the matter. Rudenko objected but the tribunal permitted the lawyer to ask the witness whether any accord had been signed on August 23, 1939, besides the Non-Aggression Pact. After Weizsäcker had said "yes", Seidl asked him whether he had read the document. The answer was "yes" again.

Thereupon the following exchange of views took place between participants in the session:

DR. SEIDL: *I have before me a text and Ambassador Gaus harbors no doubt at all, that the agreements in question are correctly set out in this text. I shall have it put to you.*

THE PRESIDENT: *One moment, what document are you putting to him?*

DR. SEIDL: *The secret addenda to the protocol of 23 August, 1939.*

THE PRESIDENT: *Is that not the document—what is this document that you are presenting to the witness? There is a document which you have already presented to the Tribunal and which has been ruled out. Is that the same document?*

DR. SEIDL: *It is the document which I submitted to the Tribunal in my documentary evidence and which was refused by the Tribunal, presumably because I refused to divulge the origin and source of this document. But the Tribunal granted me permission to produce a new sworn affidavit by Ambassador Gaus on the subject in question.*

THE PRESIDENT: *You have not done it! You have not done it.*

DR. SEIDL: *No, but I should like, Your Honour, to read this text in order to stimulate the memory of the witness and to ask him whether in connection therewith, as far as he can remember the secret agreements are correctly reproduced in this document.*

GEN. RUDENKO: *Your Honours! I would like to protest against these questions for two reasons. First of all, we are examining the matter of the crimes of the major German war criminals. We are not investigating the foreign policies of other states. Secondly, the document which defence counsel Seidl is attempting to put to the witness has been rejected by the Tribunal since it is—in substance—a forged document and cannot have any probative value whatsoever.*

THE PRESIDENT: *Where does the document which you are presenting come from?*

DR. SEIDL: *I received this document a few weeks ago from a man of the Allied side who appeared absolutely reliable. I received it only on condition that I would not divulge its origin, a condition which seemed to me perfectly reasonable.*

MR. DODD: *Mr. President, I certainly join General Rudenko in objection to the use of this document. We do not know the source at all, and anyway it is not established that this witness does not remember himself what this purported agreement amounted to.*

THE PRESIDENT: *Dr. Seidl, you may ask the witness what his recollection is of treaty without putting the document to him. Ask him what he remembers of the treaty or the protocol.*

von WEIZSACKER: *It is about a very incisive, a very far-reaching secret addendum to the non-aggression pact concluded at that time. The scope of this document was very extensive since it concerned the partition of the sphere of influence and drew a demarcation line between areas which, under given conditions, belonged to the sphere of Soviet Russia and those which would fall in the German sphere of interest. Finland, Estonia, Lithuania,²⁶ Eastern Poland and, as far as I can remember, certain areas of Romania were to be included in the sphere of the Soviet Union. Anything west of this area fell into the German sphere of interest.... I believe that I have herewith given you the gist of the secret agreement and of the subsequent addendum.*

DR. SEIDL: *Can you recall—this is my last question—if this secret addendum of 23 August 1939, although, contained an agreement on the future destiny of Poland?*

von WEIZSACKER: *This secret agreement included a complete re-direction of Poland's destiny. It may very well have been that explicitly*

or implicitly such a redirection had been provided for in the agreement. I would not, however, like to commit myself as to the exact wording.

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, did you see the original of the secret treaty?

von WEIZSACKER: I saw a photostat of original, possibly the original as well. In any case I had the photostatic copy in my possession, I had a photostatic copy locked up in my personal safe.

THE PRESIDENT: Would you recognise a copy of it if it was shown to you?

von WEIZSACKER: Oh, yes, I definitely think so. The original signatures were attached and they could be recognised immediately.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

(a recess was taken)

THE PRESIDENT: The tribunal has been considering whether it ought to put to the witness the document in the possession of Dr. Seidl, but in view of the fact that the contents of the original have been stated by the witness and by the other witnesses at that it does not appear what is the origin of that document which is in Dr. Seidl's possession, the Tribunal has decided not to put the document to the witness. The Tribunal will now adjourn.

(The tribunal adjourned until 22 May, 1946 at 10.00 hours.)" ²⁷

As the defence persisted in its efforts, the Prosecutors' Committee on May 30 discussed on Rudenko's initiative the activity of the defence aimed at dividing the prosecutors. Maxwell-Fyfe agreed with the Chief Prosecutor for the USSR, who said that Dr. Seidl's request was irrelevant and ill-intentioned. Dodd, who represented the US delegation at the meeting, said for his part that the allegation of counsel that he had the document from an unknown US officer was malicious. Assuming the transfer to have taken place, he added, the officer had certainly exceeded his powers.²⁸ Thereby the American representative indirectly admitted the possibility of the US side having made the text of the secret protocols available to the lawyer Seidl. The meeting resulted in the four chief prosecutors adopting on June 1, 1946, a message to the tribunal reading:

"...The petition submitted by Seidl, counsel for the defence of the accused Hess, on May 22, 23 and 24, 1946, and intended to annex to the records of the trial 'copies' of the so-called 'secret supplementary protocols' to the treaties of August 23, 1939, and September 28, 1939, is a repetition of attempts to return the court to the examination of points that have already been settled.

"In the past the Tribunal rejected the lawyer's request for placing on file these obviously 'defective' documents, which are 'copies' of photocopies kept in an unknown place and certified 'from memory' by Gaus, an accomplice in the crimes of the accused Ribbentrop.

"However, lawyer Seidl's renewed request concerning the same matter shall be refused not only because the documents submitted by him are defective.

"The request shall be ruled out also because it is a rare manifestation of the tactic adopted by counsel for the defence with a view to diverting the attention of the Tribunal from ascertaining the personal guilt of the defendants and at turning the actions of the states which have established the Tribunal to try the major war criminals into an object of investigation.

"All of Seidl's statements, like the documents themselves which Seidl asks the court to place on file, are devoid of any probative value either for Frank's case or for Hess's.

"The reference to the original source of these documents, said to have been received from an 'unknown US serviceman', who allegedly handed

Seidl a 'copy of photocopies' under obscure circumstances, is plainly provocative.

"There is no need to point out how such a distortion of judicial procedure would contradict the Statutes of the Tribunal and damage objective judicial investigation should Seidl succeed if only in part.

*"On the strength of the foregoing, we object to granting lawyer Seidl's petition of May 22, 23 and 24, 1946, and ask the Tribunal to rule them out."*²⁹

The court found the Committee's arguments conclusive and granted its request. But Seidl, questioning the legitimacy of the Soviet Union's participation in the trial, accused it in his speech of committing aggression against Poland in conjunction with Germany. The court ruled that this passage be excluded from the speech and prevented the accusation from being included in the minutes.

The signing of a supplementary Soviet-German agreement on August 23, 1939, was last mentioned, without indicating its form, by the accused Ribbentrop, who said:

"When in 1939, I arrived in Moscow and met with Marshal Stalin he did not discussed with me the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the German-Polish conflict within the framework of the Briand-Kellog Pact but gave me to understand that unless he got half of Poland and the Baltic countries without Lithuania and the port of Libava, I might as well fly right back.

*"Waging war was not apparently seen there in 1939 as a crime against the world, otherwise I cannot account for Stalin's telegram after the completion of the Polish campaign, which read: 'Friendship between Germany and the Soviet Union, based on blood shed jointly, promises to be lasting and solid'."*³⁰

THUS EVEN WHILE, in 1946, the International Military Tribunal was still in session there came evidence confirming the signing of and revealing the content of a supplementary secret accord between the Soviet Union and Hitler Germany. No original of the protocol has been found in Soviet or other archives. But subsequent developments and diplomatic correspondence confirmed that in August 1939 the two countries reached agreement on their spheres of interests (roughly along the line of the Narew, Vistula and San rivers.

History inevitably brings out the true significance of overt or covert events of the past. The fact that the veil of secrecy is now falling from deeds of earlier years is a fresh indication that no secret pacts or deals affecting the destinies of nations can be concealed. As regards the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, its assessments diverge even 50 years on. Still, it is now more obvious than before that the treaty constituted a link in the chain of tragic events which ended in the flames of a world war.

¹ Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (henceforward IMT), Vol. VII, p. 342.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 488.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 26, pp. 523 and 524.

⁴ Central State Archives of the October Revolution of the USSR (henceforward CSAOR), Fund (F.) 7445, Inventory (I.) 2, Document (D.) 8, pp. 57-58 (in Russian).

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.

⁶ *Ibid.*, D. 391, p. 60.

⁷ *Ibid.*, I. 2, D. 391, pp. 28, 43-46.

⁸ *Ibid.*, I. 2, D. 404, pp. 12-14 (translated back from Russian).

⁹ See CSAOR, F. 7445, I. 2, D. 391, pp. 28-30.

¹⁰ See *ibid.* D. 404, pp. 27-28. Written in Vyshinsky's hand on a copy of the

Soviet "List of Questions" is: "Cde. Gorshenin. If this question still arises please settle it after submitting your draft for approval to V. M. Molotov, to whom I have reported the matter in a preliminary way. A. Vysh(insky). Jan. 20."

¹¹ *Ibid.*, I. 2, D. 391, pp. 28-30.

¹² *Ibid.*, D. 8, pp. 47-48 (tr. back from Russian).

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

¹⁴ See *IMT*, Vol. X, p. 177. The British prosecutor, for one, sternly interrupted Raeder, former commander-in-chief of the German Navy and a participant in the March talks, who tried to speak about them. "We all know that," the prosecutor said. "The point is perfectly clear."

¹⁵ *IMT*, Vol. X, p. 509.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, p. 21.

¹⁷ G. Gilbert, *The Nuremberg Diary*, 1948, p. 91.

¹⁸ A. Poltorak, *From Munich to Nuremberg*, Moscow, 1961, p. 81 (in Russian).

¹⁹ See CSAOR, F. 7445, I. 1, D. 36, pp. 74-75. Asked by Lord Lawrence, President of the Tribunal, whether there was a Russian text of the document, the British prosecutor, David Maxwell-Fyfe, replied that for lack of time no Russian translation had been made and that it was the Russian colleagues' kindness that had made it possible to continue discussing Gaus's affidavit.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, D. 38, pp. 3-12.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Alfred Seidl, *Der Fall Rudolf Hess, 1941-1987*, Munich, 1988, pp. 90-96.

²² Seidl, op. cit., pp. 170-176.

CSAOR, F. 7445, I. 2, D. 6, pp. 259 and 328. Extract from an official biographical note on the members of the Soviet delegation: "...Assistant Chief Prosecutor for the USSR, State Councillor of Justice 3rd Class (rapporteur on "Aggression against the USSR" and "Deportation to Slave Labour"), born in 1907... He served in the Red Army in the Field during the war... He took part in the historic fighting at Stalingrad..."

Extract from the official notice: "I regret to announce to the team of Soviet officials at the Nuremberg trial the tragic death of Nikolai Zorya, Assistant Chief Prosecutor for the USSR, on May 23, 1946, in an accident resulting from careless handling of arms. R. Rudenko, Chief Prosecutor for the USSR."

Currently the Public Prosecutor's Office is conducting an additional inquiry into the circumstances of Nikolai Zorya's death.

²³ The quoted documents carry the modern spelling of the name.

²⁴ CSAOR, F. 7445, I. 1, D. 42, pp. 368-369 (tr. back from Russian).

²⁵ *Ibid.*, I. 2, D. 404, pp. 81-84.

²⁶ This is in the record.

²⁷ CSAOR, F. 7445, I. 1, D. 52, pp. 36-43.

²⁸ See CSAOR, F. 7445, I. 2, D. 8, p. 19.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, D. 404, pp. 78-79 (tr. back from Russian).

³⁰ Seidl, *Der Fall Rudolf Hess* (op. cit.), pp. 251-252.

"INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS" GUEST CLUB. SOVIET AMBASSADOR. USSR EMBASSY

VETERANS SPEAK OF THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

THERE ARE VETERANS in diplomatic service, as anywhere else. Their professional experience is a valuable intellectual part of Soviet diplomacy. *International Affairs* jointly with Council of War and Labour Veterans of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a discussion in which veterans of Soviet diplomatic service took part:

Dro Chalyan, Counsellor, 1st Class; worked at the USSR Embassy to the USA at the United Nations Secretariat, and at the Soviet Mission at the UN in New York in 1950-1970s;

Anatoli Chistyakov, USSR representative at the European office of the UN in Geneva, USSR Ambassador to Switzerland in 1968-1973;

Georgi Farafonov, USSR Ambassador to Iceland in 1975-1979;

Boris Kazantsev, USSR Ambassador to Bolivia in 1975-1981;

Andrei Ledovsky, USSR Ambassador to Burma (Myanma) in 1959-1966;

Leonid Musatov, USSR Ambassador to Mali, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Madagascar in 1960-1980.

Alexei Roshchin, permanent representative of the USSR in the Committee (Conference) on Disarmament in 1966-1977;

Sergei Slipchenko, USSR Ambassador to Zambia and Tanzania in 1965-1980;

Vladimir Snegirev, USSR Ambassador to Nigeria and Cameroon in 1960-1980;

Nikolai Sudarikov, USSR Ambassador to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to Australia in 1960-1980;

Vladimir Yerofeyev, USSR Ambassador to Senegal and Gambia in 1962-1966, permanent representative of the USSR at international organisations in Vienna, 1975-1979.

International Affairs. You all took part one way or another in shaping and implementing Soviet foreign policy for decades. What do you think about the diplomacy of the past, considering the present-day view on our problems and our foreign policy and its goals? What is your reaction to the current criticism of our diplomacy of the past years? Do you see a link between the past and the present? What can and must new political thinking take over from the past of Soviet diplomacy and what should be discarded? What could you advise the present generation of diplomats, those who plan and pursue our foreign policy today?

Sudarikov. Among the Soviet veteran diplomats who are now retired there are about 100 former ambassadors and some 300 diplomatic officials. What do they think about? What do they do? As I talk with friends and when I analyse my own sentiments, I often ask myself and others this question: are we all satisfied with what we have done and, looking back at the path we traversed, would we act in the old way or would we adopt a new approach?

I think that we would act in the new way in a number of cases. And we should have acted differently then and should have firmly defended our views and assessments. We should have tried to express our own

opinion clearer and use it when appropriate. But the situation did not allow that. Ambassadors were in a straight jacket of formal limitations. They were normally given instructions: "Visit so-and-so and tell him this and that, and report the result." Most of them, wishing to be disciplined reported: "The visit has been made, a report communicated."

I'll tell you also how foreign policy decisions were made in the past. I shall only talk about what I witnessed either as the ambassador or a department head, or as a member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. No team work, no joint discussion at the Collegium of Foreign Ministry ever existed in fact. The work of the Collegium was merely formal. And the attitude to it was like this: it should be tolerated since it exists. The leadership had no desire to have questions discussed jointly, no wish to have group thinking.

And one more thing: a stereotyped approach to the instructions issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its representatives abroad. We sometimes called them a "carbon copy" when we received a dispatch saying "pay a visit here and there" and the capitals to be visited were named. That was really a carbon-copy method. And our friends felt that. I remember that a Chinese leader (I worked in Beijing then) once told me with a smile: "Well, comrade chargé d'affaires, a message to all and a copy to Beijing."

Yet each country is individual, and the leadership in each country is just as individual, with its own specifics which should be reckoned with. I must admit that we ignored the national ways of thinking in various countries. We overlooked the fact that the socialist countries and their leaders developed and improved and had their own approaches. But we applied the stereotype of our own views and assessments to all of them. If something did not fit into that stereotype, it was declared unscientific and therefore abnormal. At that time everything fit exactly into a stereotyped pattern.

Some of the fraternal countries advanced a thesis of reliance on their own strength. This is a good idea. But it was looked upon with a smile, only because the thesis has been formulated not by us, but by somebody else. That was a wrong attitude and did us only harm.

Yerofeyev. Yes, we did many reckless things in the past. The period that started in 1955, marked by the spirit of Geneva, was considered a period of detente, and major proposals on arms reductions were made then. But the Hungarian events in 1956 destroyed everything and the spirit of Geneva was waning. Then in 1960 things began to improve and seemed to be approaching detente again. Incidentally, the word "detente" had never been used before. It is an element which was introduced in our foreign policy later. So, in the early 1960s, the relations with the United States began to improve, but the Caribbean crisis in 1962 worsened the international situation once again. In 1966, the situation was getting better again, and relations with France and other European states were developing on a broad scale. Then the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 worsened those relations for a long time. In 1975, the signing of the Helsinki Final Act marked the start of a period of detente, and in 1979 the Afghanistan events dramatised the situation. Thus, proletarian internationalism as applied to socialist countries and international affairs was exercised so that it introduced elements of violation of the policy of peaceful coexistence declared by us.

Ledovsky. What did us great harm in the past was the adamant unchangeability of our positions on any matters—a result of a black-and-white perception of the world: you imperialists are to blame for everything and we are Communists and so are always right. Now we are departing from that. But we must not go to another extreme and go as far—which is done by some—as be ready to admit everything and

to blame ourselves for most of the evils, if not all, in the world. Of course we must admit what we really are to blame for.

Recently I took part in a conference of Soviet and American historians on problems of the postwar world. The subject of the argument was whether both sides had an opportunity to avoid confrontation, the cold war and the extreme intensification of tensions. If there was such an opportunity, why wasn't it used? And whose fault was it? Many accusations were levelled at the Americans. But we, too, felt uncomfortable with regard to many questions.

Roshchin. No doubt, the West is mainly to blame for starting the cold war. Let's take the Berlin crisis. Full responsibility for this crisis which poisoned the atmosphere in Europe for many years to come rests for the most part with the West. However, I do not think the West alone is to blame. Our foreign policy in the postwar years was sharply confrontational and was marked by bias and distrust for partners. This was most clearly seen in the UN speeches by Andrei Vyshinsky when he was Minister of Foreign Affairs and then a permanent representative of the USSR in that organisation. His speeches contained many sharp attacks on representatives of Western and other countries. It sometimes even caused scandals. In such conditions it was hard to expect a normal, civilised attitude.

Slipchenko. Our history, our past, our foreign policy should be perceived as such, without shading or rewriting. What was really bad should now be looked upon as a lesson of history and corrected, and the good things should be used.

Not all people know, perhaps, about the relations between Stalin and Mussolini in the 1930s. I know because we seamen took part in a secret operation, one of those conducted by Stalin together with Mussolini. At that time one of our research institutes designed a double-barrelled artillery gun. We packed its parts into boxes and shipped them to the Italians for their Venetian arsenal. I don't know what happened with that gun later. At that time we had diverse relations, even confidential with Mussolini. He, for instance, asked Stalin to send to him a scenario of the demonstrations held in Red Square on May 1 and November 7. Stalin sent him the scenario and Mussolini copied those demonstrations. I happened to watch one of them, where Mussolini was present. What did Mussolini do for us? He built several torpedo boats, but most of them were sunk in the Black Sea in the first days of the war.

To my mind, more should be written in our political literature about Soviet-Italian relations in the prewar period and in the first years of World War II.

Yerofeyev. I have always felt deeply that we were constantly losing friends. We had so many friends after the October Revolution and then after the war, after our great victory! A vast number of them. And not only among Communists and left-wingers. We were losing many of them. Remember 1939? The Soviet-German pact was a heavy blow for our friends. The war sharply boosted our prestige, but later our interference in the affairs of the socialist countries always placed our friends in a difficult situation. Perestroika today is winning great sympathies for us in the world, but not all its aspects are understood so far by our friends. We should explain in good time all the changes in our course or in its main directions. We are not attentive enough towards our friends.

Now a few words about the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. It lags far behind NATO organisationally. We are calling for the elimination of the two alliances, above all their military organisations. But if NATO would suddenly agree to the elimination or limiting of the military

structures of both alliances, what would remain of our Warsaw Treaty Organisation? Practically nothing.

Kazantsev. After World War II our relations with Latin America were becoming fairly good. The interest in the Soviet Union was great, indeed, then. I remember that in 1956 we looked into the possibility of normalising relations with Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, and other countries. Velasco Ibarra, the then president of Ecuador, said in a conversation with us: We cannot forget the insulting utterances about our state and our delegates in the UN made by your representative Vyshinsky. That left a very negative impression on the country's public opinion. We have to wait. Some sections of the public will not understand us if we make some active diplomatic moves now.

At that time we had an insufficiently considered approach to assessing statements and actions by certain public sections or governments in Latin American countries. For instance, in the early 1950s there was an incident with two diplomatic couriers in Caracas, the capital of Venezuela. A telegram from Caracas said they had been placed in a separate room at the airport. Our embassy official tried to enter that room but Venezuelan policemen did not allow him that. Then Stalin ordered that diplomatic relations be broken off. So the relations were severed, and it took more than twenty years to normalise them.

Or take the peace proposals advanced by Latin American governments. Mexicans, for instance, were the first to propose the signing of a treaty on establishing a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. We also stated that we were in favour of establishing nuclear-free zones in the world, but for many years we refused to sign and ratify the additional protocol to that treaty, despite the insistent requests made by Latin Americans.

Slipchenko. Our attitude to the Third World, including Africa, was insufficiently considered either. I mean military cooperation.

I'll tell you how in the recent past I, being the ambassador to an African country, won a war against Alexei Zakharov, our ambassador to a neighbouring country. That was a war fought between two African states, to which we were ambassadors, by Soviet weapons on both sides. Moreover, our military experts were on both sides of the frontline. In the heat of the hostilities we received a telegram from Moscow that weapon deliveries to both countries were discontinued. As a result I was about to be sent away from the country because our refusal to supply ammunitions paralysed the combat operations. But our relations were saved by our own mismanagement. One of the fraternal countries, not knowing about our decision, signed an agreement on supplying the ammunition for our weapons to the tune of \$5 million. The country where I was ultimately won the war, and the defeated country severed relations with us. This is a vivid example of how in some cases commercial interests in military cooperation prevailed over a political approach.

Musalov. In our economic cooperation with the Third World countries we also made a big mistake: from the first years since the establishment of relations with these countries we provided so-called technical assistance, granting credits to be spent on our deliveries of machines and equipment, construction materials and the sending of experts. But what could they do with the credits and the equipment when their own facilities were poor and local means were absent. We had proposed many times that Soviet construction organisations be set up and that turn-key projects be built in the Third World. That would be cheaper and more profitable to us: they could pay us back with their produce on a compensation basis.

It is surprising that at present we have no conceptual policy with regard to the Third World and Africa. There is a policy with regard to

America. Now we are active in propounding the idea of a common European home. We have a policy also on the Asia and Pacific region, but we have no policy on Africa. Evidently this must be corrected. The interdependence of the world should be seen not only in relation to the Western countries but perhaps to the countries of other continents as well.

The countries of so-called socialist orientation are a special question. A great deal of debate has been going over this issue in recent years, and different judgements have been voiced. Some even go so far as saying that the revolutionary process in Africa has stopped, that the term "socialist orientation" had been inaccurately invented by our command system, and so on. Some even point out that we have no socialism and that the Soviet Union is going through some period of transition from capitalism to socialism. I think such an idea was mentioned in an article by Vladimir Stupishin. To my mind there are many wrong judgements in these matters. Such judgements cause harm to our relations with the progressive countries in the developing world. Sergei Slipchenko here was right to say that our relations with Africa not only become complicated but are entering an impasse. So should we tell Africans: wait, we haven't yet built our socialism and are going through a so-called transition period?

Of course they understand that we have an economic reform and do not have enough means to help others. But at the same time they ask us: But what should we do? Ask the West for help. And the West, too, is, on the whole, changing its attitude to Africa. Take the United States, for instance. Until the 1970s they either kept the progressive African countries in isolation, or, to counterbalance them, created its own models in the so-called moderate African countries, in special zones. Something like a capitalist zone was established in the Horn of Africa to counterbalance Ethiopia and other countries. And beginning in the mid-1970s, the United States started active cooperation with progressive African countries, rendering them assistance on easy terms, in order to oust us from Africa.

Chistyakov. In my view, economic work at our embassies was underestimated in our foreign policy until recently, until 1985 as far as I know, and in general little attention was paid to this problem.

I remember that after the war we criticised the Marshall Plan sharply and, on the whole, fairly, but at the same time we underestimated our participation in international organisations, European and broader ones. At that time the European Economic Commission already began to function. It was obviously insufficiently used, though its Executive Secretary, well-known scientist Gunnar Myrdal, a Swedish economist, regarded our proposals with great interest. When Vyacheslav Molotov was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the directive was to take part in the work of international organisations as little as possible. Meanwhile other international organisations were being set up, and our participation in them would have been very useful. For instance, the organisation on traffic schedules for passenger and cargo trains in Europe or the World Health Organisation, which we left and then joined again. In a word, we had no clear policy on expanding cooperation in international organisations at that time. That was our great omission.

Myrdal, by the way, said at that time that the only force that could hold the positions of general European cooperation was social democracy. But at that time we did not work properly with the social-democratic movement either.

It seems to me also that we failed to understand well enough the significance of aid to developing countries. I was in Indonesia in the

1960s. We were received by Sukarno. I should say he behaved a bit too freely as regards Soviet aid to his country. For example, he insisted on the construction of a stadium with 100,000 seats, like the Luzhniki stadium in Moscow. Only it was to be not cylinder-shaped but be made in the form of an upturned wine glass, so that there would be much sunlight and a roof protecting spectators from heat. The project required great inputs on our part. But the stadium was never used for sports—an army unit was stationed there. And we were hard up ourselves at that time.

Yerofeyev. It was asked here how much we are to blame for the foreign policy mistakes of the past. The question looks one-sided to me. We also contributed to the achievements of our foreign policy, and the part we played in the miscalculations and our part in the successes are roughly the same. Doing our job, we fulfilled the mission assigned to us at that time by the party and the government. There did emerge certain doubts, but it was practically impossible to make use of them. For ten years I was an assistant on foreign policy matters to Vyacheslav Molotov, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and I can say what the situation in the secretariat was like, for instance, when speeches were being drafted. Molotov used to dictate his speeches himself, he never asked anybody to draft them. When the text became readable, he distributed it among his assistants. If upon reading the draft speech, we suggested some substantial corrections, it usually caused his irritation, though he took into account some minor things later. But when after the fifth or sixth reading we had no more suggestions, he would tell us didactically that when a man works he always has suggestions and remarks to make. At that time we took it hard.

Roshchin. I'd like to add a few words about Molotov. On June 12, 1939, the editorial in *Izvestia* brought forward arguments in favour of rapprochement with Germany. That article said, among other things, that we had no treaties on mutual assistance either with France or with Britain. I telephoned S. P. Kozyrev, to tell him we shouldn't have written that, since we had signed a treaty on mutual assistance with France. We did not denounce it. Kozyrev sent me to Molotov. "What is that you didn't like in the editorial?" Molotov demanded. I explained. He swore at me. Soon I had to leave the Foreign Ministry. (Later, however, I discovered that that *Izvestia* issue had been removed from libraries. The editorial had been written by Molotov and agreed with Stalin.

So this is how we could influence decision-making.

Yet another example is from later times, from the years of the Afghan affair. In his answers to a *Pravda* correspondent Leonid Brezhnev said: "It was not an easy decision for us to send a Soviet army contingent to Afghanistan, but the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government were fully aware of their responsibility, considering all the circumstances." Many in the Foreign Ministry doubted the correctness of that decision from the beginning. One of our Ministry officials who often read lectures addressed an audience. Everything went smoothly. After one such lecture, he was invited in another room where he was asked questions as usual. One of the questions concerned the decision to enter Afghanistan. He said it had been a wrong decision. That became immediately known at the Foreign Ministry and after that he was severely reprimanded and debarred from reading lectures for six months. This demonstrates vividly enough the attitude to a personal opinion of a diplomat at that time.

Sudarikov. Initiative and any independent approach to some or other

question were not encouraged. They were frowned upon. Everything was overorganised.

Ledovsky. It is alarming that in the discussion going on in the country we often speak irresponsibly on the Afghan issue. This is a very complex problem. What is irresponsible in it is that the very idea of internationalism is attacked, and our soldiers, who fought, not sparing their lives, fulfilling the government's assignment, are insulted. One can sometimes hear: What do we need this Afghanistan for? How much does Cuba or Ethiopia cost us? Some count how much this and that costs us.

Internationalism was not invented by us, we had taken it over from Lenin. We have been applying the principle of internationalism as long as the Soviet Union has been in existence. I should like to draw your attention to the fact that imperialism, too, has its own internationalism and it adheres to it very strictly from its own positions. If we see how much imperialism spends on its internationalism, I will not be mistaken to say that the figure is many times larger than what we spend. Take US expenditures. Look how many billion dollars it provides for Pakistan, dictatorial regimes, etc. We must not ignore that. I'm absolutely certain that there is something wrong in our advocacy of internationalism, and it should be corrected. But it is clear that by extending aid to foreign countries we aid ourselves, for in this case we build up our own positions.

Slipchenko. Yes, proletarian internationalism is a very interesting subject. How to relate this notion, which has always been a part of our lives, with real diplomatic activity? I think our participation in the war in Spain was a very clear display of internationalism. I was a seaman then. We carried arms to the anti-fascists. Not all those operations ended successfully. The crew of the motor ship Komsomol for instance, was detained and had to spend a whole year in a Francoist prison. That was really a bright chapter in our history. That was a time of our internationalism in action under nascent fascism. Nobody denounced Soviet diplomacy then. On the contrary, its actions in defence of the Popular Front in Spain received wide approval in the world.

Chalyan. But perhaps there is no proletarian internationalism today. I stress: proletarian and not just internationalism.

Slipchenko. But the working class does exist.

Chalyan. It does. But in the United States, for instance, it makes up less than 30 per cent of the 110 million employed people. And there is little proletarian in it.

Yerofeyev. In the past our foreign policy was too ideologised. This is confirmed by the fundamental work entitled *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union* which was published in 1985. This is one of the latest thorough studies of the subject. Soviet foreign policy, it says, "is an active, and effective, factor of the class struggle in the international arena".

It is pointed out in the book that in the Decree on Peace, which is the programme document of our foreign policy, there is a provision on goodneighbour relations and cooperation between states with different social systems. It also expresses confidence that the peoples, above all the advanced and politically aware proletarians of Britain, France and Germany, will help to bring the cause of peace and along with it the cause of emancipation of the working people from exploitation to its successful consummation. Thus, from the very start of our foreign policy activity, both state and class interests were included in it. A combination of the principles of peaceful coexistence and proletarian, as well as socialist, internationalism was the motive power of Soviet foreign policy. In practice an ideologised approach to interstate relations often prevailed in that combination, which had a negative effect on the observance of the

principle of peaceful coexistence, making our foreign policy contradictory to a certain extent.

This defect was, in my view, due to the fact that the leadership of foreign policy and control over it were exercised not by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR but by a small number of persons from the top echelon of the party. Now the political reform is providing a basis for deideologising the relations with other states, strengthening at the same time the socialist development of our country.

Snegirev. We regard peaceful coexistence as the basis for the development of relations between capitalism and socialism. Therefore it cannot be viewed as a specific form of class struggle. Peaceful coexistence is a conception which determined the main principles of relations between the countries having two socio-political systems. Take the Helsinki Final Act, which says that the basis of relations between states is peaceful coexistence, that is, peaceful coexistence between Luxemburg and Belgium as well. During the Moscow visit by Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev suggested that the Joint Statement should include these words: "peaceful coexistence should be made a universal principle of international politics". So, as I see it, we have already departed from peaceful coexistence as it was initially understood.

It seems to me that when we speak about deideologisation, about new thinking, and about the priority of human values, we should always see the extent to which we can go and to which our partners can go. One should not forget that we are hardly in a position to persuade our rivals that they should renounce their class interests. They are not going to renounce them. Here is one example. Margaret Thatcher has said more than once that she has an advantage, for she was the first to establish contacts and cooperation with Mikhail Gorbachev, and how good all this was. Nonetheless, the selfsame Margaret Thatcher undertook such an anti-Soviet act as the recent expulsion of our diplomats. Why did she do that? Because it was necessary again to set off a tide of anti-Sovietism and so to try and get NATO to pass a decision on modernising tactical missiles, behind which London sees broader class interests. And from the position of these interests they approach international problems, and our perestroika, too, clearly aware of the line beyond which they would not go.

We declare that we remain a socialist state and are going to perfect it, to seek a more effective form of developing socialist society. It is not this that the West applauds us for as it greets our perestroika. Such a prospect cannot suit them. They fear, in the final analysis, not war, not that it can break out, but the fact that we and they are on different positions on many questions and will remain in such a situation so long as we are a socialist state and they are capitalist. And since the difference in the approach to solving many problems remains, it is not clear how they will be solved now and in future. Since this is so, it is necessary to preserve their points of view and, if possible, to strengthen our own positions as much as possible. But, unfortunately, in our statements and in our actions this aspect is not always observed. We declare a priority of common human values, thus pushing class interests into the background or even farther, and it appears that they are not observed at all. This also pertains to the assessment of the actions of our Western partners.

Of course, there can be no returning to the time when we used sharp expressions to the point of abuse and would run down whatever the West did. Indeed, we should promote civilised relations. If something is good then we should say it's good, and if it's bad then it's bad. But assessment of our own actions and those of our partners should be made from the point of view of class interests.

Yerofeyev. I believe that the fundamental work on the history of our foreign policy which I have already mentioned here needs improvement. I shall cite just one example to show you why. The authors of the book quote Lenin as saying that our steps towards peace should be accompanied by our intensifying all our military preparedness. These words cannot be applied to our time. One should at least explain what Lenin had in mind, and say that this referred to the specific situation at that time.

And now a few more words about the cold war. Mikhail Gorbachev said at a press conference in Bonn that people throughout the world want changes for the better, that they are tired of the cold war. This means that if they have grown tired of the cold war, it is still there. But the answer to the question concerning a statement by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who had declared that the cold war was over, was this: we have left the period of the cold war, though light frosts and draughts still remain. So it appears that on the one hand we have left that period, and on the other we haven't. I think it was said correctly that we have left that period, but this is not yet clearly expressed in many of our speeches. Incidentally, we said that we had left the cold war already after Helsinki. Evidently further elaboration of assessment within the framework of theory and the history of international relations is required with regard to the cold war as well.

Slipchenko. I do not think we should criticise our science and our theory that much. It seems to me that we have made some considerable breakthroughs in elaborating questions of a political settlement of international conflicts. This is the good effect of new thinking and of what we have done to this end. This is a gain for our policy. But what is the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of our diplomacy, in all this? I have the impression that the main role here is played not so much by our diplomatic departments than by the CPSU Central Committee. Science is just approaching the elaboration of an integral conception on regional conflicts. A good deal here is going on spontaneously: a conflict has erupted, we intervene in it, look for the best solution, and so on. I want to say also that new political thinking is not only a new philosophical view leading towards a new political conception. It is also the way to a realistic policy. And coordination of actions of science and practical actions are most important here.

Chalyun. Vladimir Snegirev's idea that the West is not going to give up its class interests induces us to more deeply analyse how far the West will go in the new thinking policy. It is useful here always to remember the lessons of the past. Here is a book by the head of the British super-secret service during the war, *Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret* published in Britain in 1974. I'll cite just one fact from it: having puzzled out the most secret and undecipherable "Enigma Cipher" of the Germans, the British knew practically everything concerning the cipher communications between Hitler and his commanders of the fronts. Churchill sometimes read the deciphered messages earlier than Hitler did. But during the war nothing was communicated to Moscow, even when the situation was extremely hard for us. Such were, in reality, the allied sentiments of the partners in the anti-Hitler coalition with regard to the Soviet Union and its people. It would be appropriate in this connection to recall Yakov Malik's account of a conversation between himself and Churchill in 1954 at a reception at the Soviet Embassy in London. Churchill stated without any scruple: Well, Mr Ambassador, my goal after the end of the war was to drive a wedge between Russia and the USA, and it seems I achieved what I wanted and what was necessary for Britain.

Farafonov. It is very important to reflect the truth in assessing the attitude in the West to us and to our perestroika, in order not to delude

ourselves and others. In this connection I recall the words of a Soviet diplomat, Fyodor Gusev, who once told an official of the Soviet Embassy in Sweden who had recorded Gusev's talk with the Swedish Foreign Minister in a way which Gusev opposed: remember, talks should be recorded as they are. Time will pass and you will forget that a lie was put down and, wishing somehow to elevate yourself, you will take the lie for the truth and therefore make unfounded proposals. These words should be remembered well not only by ambassadors but also by diplomats of all ranks.

This approach should be used with regard to the positive responses to our perestroika and to its foreign policy aspect. We must clearly distinguish between sincere statements and tactical ploys. Applause addressed to us is very good, but more often than not tactical considerations are behind it.

Further. If in keeping with new political thinking we found it necessary to change our judgements and approaches concerning some questions, this should be done boldly and openly, otherwise the West will continue to guess what we really want and what moves are to be expected from us and will be cautious. As a result, confidence will be diminished. Flirting with the West and vagueness in the relations with it, also with the Americans, will do us no good.

Yerofeyev. The foreign policy mechanism should function so that all our actions, before they enter the outside world, should be analysed by professional diplomats and foreign policy experts. We still feel strongly the effect of what Brezhnev declared at the 25th Congress of the CPSU, when he announced that the USSR agreed that its entire European part be covered by confidence-building and security measures. At the Stockholm Conference (in which I took part) and at the Vienna talks all security-building measures, including inspections and observation were regarded as covering the entire territory from the Atlantic to the Urals, and our concession was not compensated for. It is absolutely clear that our military exercises in regions close to the Urals cannot present any threat to European security. Meanwhile the US territory is not covered by confidence-building measures, though along the eastern coast of the United States there are bases whose weapons can reach Europe as well.

Now there is something else I'd like to say. I was surprised that at the Congress of People's Deputies and at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet there were practically no speeches on foreign policy. In the report by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Nikolai Ryzhkov, "On the Programme of the Forthcoming Activity of the USSR Government", a single paragraph, in fact, was devoted to foreign policy in the section entitled "The New Defence Doctrine and Economic Development".

Practically all delegates concentrated in their speeches on domestic problems, while foreign policy issues, which are so important today, in the conditions of our new political thinking, were ignored. I think there are objective factors behind that. Objective in the sense that domestic problems are most urgent and acute, while foreign policy matters are developing favourably. But there are, perhaps, subjective factors, because the congress delegates seemed to be insufficiently prepared for a profound discussion of foreign policy matters. Perhaps there were no professionals at the congress who would know these matters well, or maybe there were other reasons.

And one more thing. At the talks on military questions (in Stockholm and Vienna) we diplomats were faced with great difficulties in relations with our military. We even have conflicts with them within delegations because they categorically refuse to agree to some measures. In Stockholm, for instance, where I was a member of the Soviet delegation, such measures were the main ones, on which the outcome of the conference

depended. In 1955 we ourselves proposed inspections and verification measures on both sides, and in 1985 we refused to accept that, not to mention aerial photography and so on.

Musatov. In 1962, when I was second secretary of the Ulyanovsk Regional Committee of the Party, my twelve colleagues and myself, who proved efficient in our work, were offered diplomatic service. I was in that service for over 16 years, also in the capacity of ambassador in four African countries, and worked well. So today, the irritated statements about the practice of appointing for diplomatic service party functionaries who had made a fault in their work are insulting to me.

There were different cases, of course, for instance, when in the Khrushchev years Kuzmin, the then Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee, was appointed Ambassador to Switzerland. He was no good. He was annoyed, for instance, by the sound of little bells which Swiss people hung on the necks of their cows. He nearly protested against it. Yes, there have been such facts. Even in recent years a Secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan was posted as an Ambassador. As the former first deputy head of the Personnel Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I believe that diplomats should be sought among persons who have a record of party, economic or trade union activity, especially for diplomatic service in the countries of socialist orientation. We need people well acquainted with economics and party and state development, which is something career diplomats lack.

Ledovsky. I was deputy head of the department dealing with the personnel working abroad at the CPSU Central Committee and bore a direct relation to the question you brought up here. In the past our department proposed at the Central Committee the adoption of a special decision that 10 to 12 persons performing party or other important state functions be sent to the Higher Diplomatic School and be trained for diplomatic service. I think such practice was absolutely correct and it justified itself. There were certain telephone calls to our department, too. Especially when a Party Congress was convened. Then the assistant head of the department would warn: now it will start. And it did start: appointment of dismissed party functionaries, secretaries of regional and city party committees, etc. as ambassadors and for other important diplomatic service. And the chief argument was not always: strengthen our diplomatic personnel.

Yerofeyev. Today, I know, the leadership is against the practice of "exiling" a party functionary as ambassador to some country for blunders he has made in his work. That is true, a large number of people untrained for diplomatic service, people who made a slip in party work, were given diplomatic posts in foreign countries, and some of them made really bad mistakes there. When I was deputy head of the First European Department, one of our ambassadors tried persistently to prove that a revolutionary situation had grown ripe in "his country" and a socialist revolution was just about to take place there. To prove his point he referred to dissatisfaction of the peasants in a region where an aircraft sprayed some toxic liquid over their vineyards and harmed them. Nevertheless ambassador continued to work there without any trouble.

Today this situation has been, on the whole, improved, though we still have "exiled" ambassadors and non-professional diplomats.

It seems to me that the most neglected part in the work of the Ministry and of the foreign policy machinery as a whole was—strange as it may seem—the work with the socialist countries and in the socialist countries. Now we see where this led to. It was a work of secondary impor-

tance. I would hate to offend my colleagues, but it was felt that in a number of cases second-rate diplomats, so to speak, were sent to socialist countries: it was believed that work was easier there, that the main thing in those countries was friendship which would replace diplomatic skill, and tact, and many other things. Most of those who worked there were non-professional diplomats who had been party functionaries or had occupied state posts; they did not know the language of the host country, nor did they know the intricacies of diplomatic work. Besides, the earnings of our diplomatic workers in socialist countries were the lowest. It seems this situation has not changed to this day. I think this was among the causes of the defects in the relations with the socialist countries and the situation, which is still observed in some of these countries.

Chistyakov. Of course, a diplomat requires professionalism, a general cultural level and political culture, and broad education, including economic training. For instance, when I worked in Switzerland, my economic knowledge proved very helpful in establishing contacts and in obtaining useful information. I had good contacts, for instance, with the president of the Swiss Bank who was an outstanding figure in the political and economic quarters of Switzerland and other countries as well.

I think persons who have failed to prove efficient in other service should not be given high diplomatic posts. I happened to meet one such ambassador in Mauritania (before that he was Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of a Central Asian republic). When he had a talk with one or another leader he always took his interpreter along. Back at the embassy, he once told him: write down that during the talk with me the Foreign Minister hinted that he would like to visit Moscow. The interpreter was bewildered: "But he said nothing of the kind." "You understand nothing," the ambassador retorted. "But I see what he was driving at." Well, that happened, too. Therefore my opinion is that people who have not received adequate professional training should not be given important diplomatic jobs, because a diplomat is a person with a special frame of mind. And a high- or top-ranking diplomat should have qualities which by far not all have. He should be well educated, be able to listen to others, be patient, and know at least one foreign language.

It is my feeling and this may sound unusual, that an ambassador should be attractive, should have charisma, so that people know that a conversation with him will be interesting, that he knows well his own country, the host country, and the neighbouring ones. But, of course, professionalism is most important. It was namely the absence of this that left a deep negative imprint on our diplomacy, especially in the years of stagnation, when the number of people given diplomatic posts without special training was larger than ever. The situation must be improved. Any job should be done by a man knowing his work well. It is important that old mistakes never be repeated.

Sudarikov. At the beginning of our conversation I said that, when analysing one's life and past work, one asks himself, how would he act now. I would like to answer this question once again: perhaps we should have acted differently. Though, on the whole, each of us is satisfied to know that we had and have the honour to belong to the cohort of Soviet diplomats, members of Soviet diplomatic service. Perhaps International Affairs will again show interest in the intellectual wealth the veterans of Soviet diplomatic service possess.

LETTER TO THE EDITORS

THE SOVIET-JAPANESE NEUTRALITY PACT OF 1941 AND THE "KANTOKUEN" PLAN

IN DECEMBER 1981, I testified as an expert at the trial of Professor Saburo Ienaga vs. the Ministry of Education of Japan. The case was heard in a Tokyo court of the highest instance, which examined the Ministry's demand for numerous corrections and changes to a textbook on the modern history of Japan written by the professor.

Some of the proposed corrections in question concerned the history of Soviet-Japanese relations in the years of World War II. First, officials of the Ministry took exception to a passage saying that Japan's aim in signing a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union had been to effect expansion southward. Objecting to this interpretation of Japanese policy, Saburo Ienaga's opponents affirmed that the pact had been signed on the initiative of the Soviet Union, which had sought to use it in its own interests. Second, the officials raised objections to the professor's conclusion that Japan had been preparing to attack the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, the preparations being carried on in Manchuria under the pretence of "special manoeuvres of the Kwantung Army" ("Kantokuen" plan). The Ministry officials claimed that the manoeuvres had been a routine buildup of strength without any intention of going to war and that therefore it was wrong to mention the "Kantokuen" plan in the textbook. Lastly, they insisted on deleting a sentence saying that in August 1945 the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan in conformity with the decisions of the Yalta Conference. They wanted it to be replaced by a sentence accusing the Soviet Union of violating the neutrality pact.

Speaking in court, I confirmed the authenticity of the evidence cited by Professor Ienaga. I pointed out that the Ministry's allegations about the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact and the "Kantokuen" plan ran counter to the facts of history. Documents at the disposal of scholars indicated that while proposing a neutrality pact to the Soviet Union, Japan had been intent on taking advantage of German victories in Europe to carry forward its armed expansion in Southeast Asia. As for the "special manoeuvres of the Kwantung Army", they had unquestionably been aimed at preparing for war in order to attack the Soviet Union should the situation on the Soviet-German front take a turn unfavourable to the Soviet Union. It followed that even at that stage the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact had become null and void.

Conservative Japanese politicians and the Ministry of Education persist in attempts to disprove the aggressive character of Japan's involvement in the last war by falsifying history. Education Minister Fujio and former Education Minister Okuno took an outspoken stand in 1986 and 1988, respectively, against defining Japan's wartime policy as aggressive. Thereby they created diplomatic problems. In February 1989, Prime Minister Takeshita * expressed "doubts" about whether Japan and Germany

* Noboru Takeshita remained Prime Minister of Japan till the end of May 1989. *PL*

should be accused of aggression during World War II. He said that it was for historians of the next generation to pass a final judgement.

Furthermore, Japanese politicians and government officials, while ignoring facts of the country's preparations for attack on the Soviet Union, continue accusing the latter of violating the neutrality pact. This is also the stance of reactionary Japanese historians and media right-wingers. By distorting history, they are sowing distrust for the Soviet Union, an actively seriously handicapping efforts to establish relations of peace and friendship between our two countries.

Authentic documents of Japan's armed forces, primarily those of Imperial General Headquarters and the Kwantung Army, help reveal the substance of Japanese operational and strategic plans for war against the Soviet Union, to be started immediately after the fall of Moscow.

Contrary to Japan's expectations, the German offensive against Moscow fell through, and the hour of a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union never came. But the very existence of the "Kantokuen" plan, the massing of Japanese troops in Manchuria and their readiness to strike represented treacherous violations of the neutrality pact. There is also the fact that all this prevented the Soviet Union at the most critical stage in the war from transferring troops from the east to the west, where it needed them so badly for use on the Soviet-German front.

Regrettably, Japanese-Soviet relations in the past can hardly be called friendly, for there were many sad chapters in them. Still, it is necessary to know the facts of history, for drawing proper lessons from the past helps find the right path to the future. Our two countries are close neighbours. Attaining that highly important goal, peace on earth, will largely depend on how their relations shape up. I would therefore like to express earnest hope for the early establishment of lasting peace and goodneighbour relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.

Professor Fujiwara AKIRA
Hitotsubashi University
Tokyo

AROUND THE NON-AGGRESSION PACT

(Continued from page 116)

1. From 11 a.m. of September 3 Britain is in a state of war with Germany.
2. Britain and France shall in every way avoid bombing civilian population, and destruction of historic monuments, and that they shall observe the 1936 Protocol on Submarine War, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting gas war, while in the aerial war against merchant ships they will apply the rules regulating use of a belligerent's rights by its warships, provided, of course, that Germany's conduct is similar.
3. In view of the war with Germany, and in accordance with Art. 24 of British-Soviet Sea Treaty of 1937, the King considers himself free of all obligations under the said treaty (arms limitations and exchanges of information).
4. Locations of minefields in the established areas (reported to you by plain wire).

Ambassador

Devising a Foreign Policy Mechanism

I AM SURE the reader's interest will be aroused by the items in this issue of *International Affairs* dealing with new approaches to Soviet foreign policy and with the process of devising a mechanism for it.

In this issue we are publishing a record of a session of fundamental significance at which the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs discussed the main lines and forms of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's participation in the fulfilment of the tasks facing the Committee. The event was unparalleled.

It was unparalleled for the impotence of the former legislative authority prevented it from cooperating in a businesslike manner and on a permanent basis with the executive authority in the form of government agencies. The event was unparalleled because the Foreign Ministry was the first ministry to establish a unit responsible for contacts with the Supreme Soviet and to draw up an initial programme for partnership with the Committee.

People's deputies have yet to decide how the Committee should function with due regard to the overriding need to ensure that the involvement of the Supreme Soviet in the foreign policy process precludes undemocratic decision-making behind closed doors on issues of vital importance to the country.

What requires consideration is both the main aspects of the matter and numerous details. Should the Committee look into, say, all the agreements signed by the country (their number topped 400 last year)? Should it discuss the candidacies of all ambassadors (the Soviet Union now has 122 posts representing it abroad)? There are many other questions of a similar nature. Be that as it may, the Foreign Ministry is prepared to state its position, make recommendations and join, if necessary, in work on specific problems.

Anders Björck's article is bound to set the reader thinking about what is a new line in Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy, for it is aimed at establishing contacts and ultimately entering into cooperation with European organisations. This is largely unexplored ground for us. We tend to mistake the Council of Europe for the European Council, and our knowledge of the European Communities is superficial. Yet these organisations and their leaders, Anders Björck and President of the Commission of the European Communities, Jacques Delors, are backed by the enormous power of a united Western Europe. The foreign policy mechanism in the making must by all means have a component that will help us build a bridge linking our country with this new world reality.

As for the substance of Soviet foreign policy, an interesting article by A. Kozyrev comments on the ascent of socialist countries engaged in restructuring to a civilised democratic system and on areas in which the interests of countries with different social systems coincide. The writer is a highly experienced analyst endowed with an incisive mind. One of his earlier articles carried by *International Affairs* gave rise to a controversy in Washington between the Soviet Ambassador and the US Secretary of State.

Another article giving food for thought—by A. Yanov—is focussed on showing that the meaning of perestroika lies in our "finding our identity as part of mankind" (Pyotr Chaadayevev), in joining the civilised world at long last.

A DIALOGUE ON COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY

Vladimir PETROVSKY

THREE YEARS AGO, the Soviet Union proposed in common with other socialist countries a dialogue on comprehensive international security. Looking back, we have every reason to affirm that qualitative changes are coming about in the development of this initiative and the tenor of the world community's discussion of it.

This is largely due to the impact of processes of renewal unfolding in every area of international relations. Confrontation between the two social and economic systems, competition in confrontational controversy, is giving way to appreciation of the need to work together on evolving approaches to common problems. *Cooperation as a sporadic phenomenon is rising to the qualitatively higher level of co-creation and co-development. This objectively meets the exigencies of the peaceful period now opening in international relations and marked by a positive rather than a negative interconnection.*

These developments largely stimulate a lasting interest in the idea of comprehensive international security. Nor is this surprising since the dialogue on all-embracing security is essentially a frank exchange of views on how to put the ideas of new political thinking into practice, how to build international intercourse on the principle of giving priority to universal values, how to search in collaboration with other members of the international community for an overall strategy of guaranteed survival. The task of preserving and advancing civilisation connotes establishing a durable security system and organising international relations on just, reasonable and rational principles, on the basis of a balance of the interests of all countries.

All this also presupposes a critical reappraisal of past experience and the provision of conditions precluding a recurrence of mistakes made earlier.

The parties to the ongoing dialogue combine a political philosophy with realistic politics, building confidence and gaining experience in international cooperation.

THE IDEA of comprehensive security is a logical result of the objective course of world development. In the early 1980s, international relations reached a turning point. On one hand, trends towards an objectively integral world, towards closer interconnections and intertwinings in it, towards an intercrossing of economic, environmental and socio-humanitarian interests, won obvious dominance. On the other hand, a confrontational differentiation along ideological, political and other subjective lines persisted. The arms race entered a critical phase, threatening to take on new dimensions, in particular by spreading to space. Without overcoming this contradiction, the world risked finding itself on the brink

Vladimir Petrovsky, D. Sc. (Hist.), is Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

of a deep and explosive crisis. Determined action was needed to remove the dangers threatening the globe.

The search for safe paths for the advancement of civilisation has been going on ever since humanity began to cognise itself. But the nuclear and space era lent it a special meaning. Vivid, uncommon ideas were advanced by many progressive politicians, scientists and public figures in various countries. At the turn of this century, Vladimir Vernadsky, the Russian scientist, warned not only against conflict between countries but against war between humanity and nature as he put forward his theory of the noosphere. Major contributions to the formation of the ideas of new political thinking were made by Frédéric Joliot-Curie, Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein. The Russell-Einstein manifesto appealed to humanity to realise that having mastered the energy of the atom, man must reshape his thinking if he wanted to spare civilisation irreparable disaster. The concept of global development advanced by the Club of Rome and the activity and recommendations of the Palme, Brandt and Brundtland commissions and many other entities made an important contribution to these quests.

It was with the advent of perestroika in the Soviet Union that new political thinking moved as a harmonious system of views from the sphere of theoretical research to that of government policy. The conceptualisation of the idea of a comprehensive international security system by the 27th CPSU Congress amounted to an about-turn by a world power towards the community of nations, to its discarding outdated notions and patterns and the habit of using only black or white in painting the world. The proposal made by the congress was aimed at deciding on a starting point for a sustained international dialogue on a bilateral and multilateral basis, at seeking durable security not through rivalry in strength but through talks, through simultaneous, parallel efforts on all lines: military political, economic, ecological, humanitarian. This approach is in keeping with the tasks flowing from the need to harmonise international relations, strengthen the solidarity of parties to international intercourse and ensure steady world progress. The latter does not rule out social or other changes based on diversity in paths of development and freedom of choice in a new period of history when these concepts are becoming imperative and when the alternation of spells of confrontation and thaw must give way to a lasting trend towards cooperation in every sphere of mutual relations.

We feel certain that by abandoning the philosophy of enmity and confrontation, the world will become more balanced and gain in maturity and wisdom. There is no more countenancing any manifestations of national egocentrism, imperial politics, obsession in any form. What meets everyone's interests today is ideas and projects intended to consolidate the international community and conducive to its survival and progress.

In 1986, the Budapest meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Countries' Political Consultative Committee approved a concept of comprehensive security. It synthesised advanced ideas and proposals, all the new that had emerged in socio-political thought since the onset of the nuclear and space era, and translated it into practical policy.

The evolution of the concept of comprehensive security entered an important stage when, on September 17, 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev published his article "Reality and Guarantees for a Secure World". The article reflected the Soviet Union's approach to major problems and its estimation of the development and potentialities of multilateral cooperation mechanisms, primarily those of the UN. In December 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev concretised and carried forward in his UN address the concept and views set out in his article. His speech showed that coupling

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a new political philosophy with a programme of action offers unique opportunities not only to lay a theoretic basis for processes of renewal but to generate them and bring about real changes.

IT WAS ONLY NATURAL that the UN became the first forum in which the democratic dialogue on comprehensive international security unfolded. An organisation founded by countries that had gone through the horrors of war and aspired to provide conditions for steady and secure development precluding the very possibility of any use of force, the UN embodies the triumph of reason and demonstrates the feasibility of mutually beneficial cooperation. Its Charter as the end result of an arduous process of international co-creation reflects—occasionally in compromise formulations—concepts of universal values, of the mechanisms of regulating the diverse interests in which the world abounds while keeping their plurality intact, of the historical experience gained by humanity at high cost.

However, atomic diplomacy as an outgrowth of the cold war plus an increasing ideologisation of state-to-state relations, both of which became political instruments of former allies, prevented the UN from getting down to real business. They gave its activity a declarative slant, often making it pass resolutions divorced from reality, and substituted vote-hunting for efforts to achieve consensus. The organisation was reduced for many long years to an arena of propaganda and exercises in political intolerance contrary to its essence and predestination.

This is not to say that there were no achievements to give the UN credit for. The organisation greatly accelerated the decolonisation process. It accomplished a major task by codifying international law. And it was under UN auspices that a series of important multilateral treaties were drafted to curb the arms race and cut off some of its channels. Significantly, the Organisation was particularly active in the brief periods of political thaw. But the overall record of the cold war years was markedly negative. Instead of operating as a centre coordinating international efforts according to its Charter, the UN became rather a sort of podium for the prosecution in a system of states assigning law merely an auxiliary, technical role in comparison with policies pursued from positions of strength. Small wonder that UN members came to suffer from a syndrome of automatic rejection of any idea advanced by the other side or its allies, a syndrome whose impact was brought to bear by voting procedure. This explains why the peacemaking potential of the UN found itself blocked and why reasonable decisions were only made on a bilateral or regional basis and in virtual isolation from the UN. As a consequence, a period set in when the organisation's prestige declined, its numerous attempts to act bearing little fruit. This also accounted for the widespread criticism levelled at the UN in recent years over its allegedly congenital, incurable fallacies.

Successes in international relations, especially on the Soviet-US axis, helped create an atmosphere of cooperation which made it possible to *"revive" the UN and restore its original predestination*. The UN is going through processes of renewal that cover practically all its activities and structures and are a product of the organisation's very history.

It is safe enough to say that for the first time since 1945, or since the adoption of the UN Charter, the organisation is again operating in external conditions comparable to those that its founding members proceeded from. Under these conditions, the trend towards dialogue and a negotiated solution of problems, that is, a multilateral approach plus law and order must win the upper hand over an approach based on military

power and reliance on unilateral action. Having joined vigorously in world-wide processes of renewal, the UN is becoming a powerful catalyst of them.

IT IS IMPORTANT to note how the proposal for comprehensive security was modified from one General Assembly session to another. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries upholding the proposal did not resort to the confrontational model as so often in the past but showed flexibility. We can say that we ourselves learnt as we went, revising our own approaches. The dialogue on comprehensive security became a real school of co-creation and confidence.

We understandably encountered difficulties. This was largely because of our initiatives being treated according to old concepts. Diplomacy in the period of stagnation made the other side grow used to the circumstance that high-sounding slogans and initiatives soon forgotten even by those who had put them forward were a cover for reluctance to seek real results. A case in point was our initiative concerning "Historical Responsibility of States for the Preservation of Nature for Present and Future Generations". This was welcomed at the UN but forgotten in our country. Those were initiatives calculated in the main to set off propaganda fireworks and arouse definite political sentiments. With this approach to initiatives, we could expect no fruitful dialogue likely to produce real foreign political results.

As regards the present proposal for a comprehensive approach to security, it differs fundamentally from earlier ones. A result of new political thinking, it is aimed at ending confrontation and initiating a common search and common action.

It was not easy to get the dialogue on a comprehensive international security system off the ground. After all, the new initiative was also new in quality while many other countries responded in the old way, for the habit of automatically rejecting what came from the other side was still there. Our partners did not realise immediately that this time our initiative served no propaganda purpose but was intended to scrap the confrontation model of discussing security issues and encourage a serious, constructive effort to reach mutual understanding. What played a notable part was also the fact that originally we submitted the idea of comprehensive international security to the UN in virtually the same terms as it was advanced at the 27th CPSU Congress. Yet far from all our partners on the international scene—in the West and among developing countries—are willing to support at the UN resolutions reproducing the wording of our party documents.

A new kind of discussion is on. The 42nd Session of the UN General Assembly voted for a resolution reflecting the main aspects of the idea of comprehensive security brought out by then as the result of an intense exchange of opinion between countries. In analysing now the debate on the matter at the session, we have reason to say that the co-authors anticipated in a sense a development to come, for the idea of security did not yet dominate the political thinking of UN members to an adequate degree. The vote was not unanimous but, even so, the resolution constituted a necessary stage in the international community's collective reappraisal of contemporary realities and lent the dialogue a substantive character. The important thing was that in spite of differing views and approaches, nations were plainly at one in seeking to strengthen the UN and raise its efficiency, as the UN Secretary-General stressed afterwards in a report.¹

The arguments given by those who did not immediately accept the idea

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of a comprehensive approach to security included the allegation that in emphasising the connection between the military and non-military aspects of security, the socialist countries implied that progress in any sphere should be conditional on the state of affairs in other spheres. This claim is wrong. A comprehensive approach has nothing to do with a rigid package on the principle of "all or nothing". To point out the interrelation of security factors does not mean linking them to each other but putting it on record that the greater the changes occurring in a particular sector of building security, the greater the prospects opening up in other sectors and hence the possibility of advancing in all areas, concentrating on those in which the world community finds this necessary on the basis of consensus.

At the 43rd Session of the UN General Assembly the co-authors, considering that the dialogue on comprehensive security should be directed towards searching for consensual solutions and taking an open-minded approach to the ideas and suggestions of all those concerned, altered some sections of their draft resolution. Specifically, they changed the phrase "comprehensive security system", which drew objections from many countries, to a "comprehensive approach to strengthening international peace and security in accordance with the UN Charter". The draft stressed that the task was to search for "universally acceptable ways and means of coordinating practical measures to strengthen on a comprehensive basis the security system defined in the UN Charter". The flexibility and receptiveness shown by the co-authors in regard to ideas coming from other groups of countries met with wide approval.

The resolution, which gave expression to the idea of the interdependence of international peace and security, won the votes of the overwhelming majority of developing countries and many Western countries, including some members of the European Community. The only votes against were cast by the United States, Japan and Israel. The main reason given by the United States for its stance was the definition "comprehensive" although that country was the first to put forward the concept of the interdependence of the various components of security. Actually the US delegate must have been prompted by that persistent general stereotype, reflex rejection of anything coming from the other side. But even the countries which voted against the resolution expressed their readiness to discuss in UN agencies having a relevant mandate specific proposals made within the framework of the socialist countries' joint initiative. And while it is only fair to add that quite a few countries abstained on this issue at the session, the trend towards ending negativism is patent nonetheless.

The idea of a comprehensive approach to international security is not a strictly limited set of formulas. It goes without saying that no country can or should "reserve all rights" or insist on definite formulations. After all, given the plurality of socio-political development, any attempt to make an absolute of a universal pattern is seen as a bid for messianism. The Soviet Union is not trying to prevail on the UN to evolve, let alone approve, a universal concept of security "on Soviet terms".

The task is to promote a painstaking search for common ground, expand areas of agreement and build up cooperation in solving common problems. The idea of comprehensive international security is an invitation to such a search.

This casts a different light on the role of resolution on comprehensive security, which has been debated in the UN for three years now. *Passing this resolution is not an end in itself, and the attitude to it must therefore not be identified with readiness for real cooperation. The purpose is to help carry the dialogue deeper, concretise cooperation and*

encourage concerted efforts. The need for such a resolution may disappear altogether at some stage in the evolution of the dialogue.

The question may be asked whether it is really necessary to work so hard on evolving something of a *foreign policy methodology* and then of streamlining it with due regard to the many different views existing in the world or emerging continuously. Wouldn't it be preferable to take action at once as recommended by foreign advocates of "creeping pragmatism"? Experience has shown that fairly often the lack of conceptual mutual understanding and the existence of a contrast between even speculative evaluation of a given phenomenon result, due to a spontaneous, occasionally emotional response, in moves escalating international tensions. Descartes said that one should desist from searching for any truth rather than doing so without any method.

HAVING BECOME a source of new ideas, *the dialogue on comprehensive security* has in three years gone beyond the socialist community countries' wide-ranging initiative to *become a cause of the whole international community*. Its usefulness is unquestionable.

First of all, the initiative conveyed the substance and meaning of new political thinking, of the socialist countries' new approach to the UN. Its progress demonstrated the potentialities of new thinking, its inherent dynamism, flexibility and receptiveness to a changing world.

Second, a new kind of dialogue struck root at the UN, a collective and constructive dialogue in search of solutions. The atmosphere of confrontation and mutual recriminations is becoming a thing of the past. These concomitants of the old are being superseded by greater flexibility, by a willingness to listen to the other side and take its arguments into account in specifying one's position. Hence the fact that the 43rd Session of the General Assembly had to do with more resolutions comprising several drafts prepared by different authors. In other words, the very handling of international affairs is acquiring a new quality.

Third, nations have come to appreciate the need for a truly comprehensive approach to international security. Security, while closely linked with the situation in the military-political sphere, is increasingly influenced by non-military factors, such as the creation of a healthy environment, economic stability, guaranteed human rights, freedom of information. The intimate connection between national and international security is coming out more and more clearly, showing that a country's security can be reliably safeguarded only as part of global security, in a situation where less security for any country is contrary to the interests of other countries, for it results in destabilising the overall situation. It is becoming obvious that given the interdependence of the world, progress in any society cut off from the world process by artificial barriers, such as ideological fences, is in fact impossible.

Fourth, the UN set out for the first time ever to discuss security problems as a complex, which is particularly necessary in an interdependent and integral world. It is indicative that an exchange of views on ways of ensuring the security of the world as a whole has been going on in precisely the First Committee of the General Assembly as a body empowered to examine every aspect of the problem of security. This exchange offers a unique opportunity to make a general and constructive appraisal of the situation in the area of global security, gain a deeper understanding of each other's concepts and preoccupations, respond adequately to them and chart common routes for advance in every field and at every level of international cooperation: global, regional and bilateral. The First Committee also drafts proposals for directly reinforcing

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ing the main and auxiliary agencies of the UN. Besides, it helps bring out specific themes to other UN agencies that can be passed on for further discussion in practical terms.

Fifth, the international community specified the main lines of its efforts within the UN towards building comprehensive security in the period ahead. We now have, in effect, a common awareness of the need to concentrate on definite sectors in intensifying multilateral cooperation.

This implies primarily increasing the efficiency of the UN and enhancing its prestige and influence in world affairs; ensuring the primacy of international law in relations between states; making greater use of the institution of military observers of the UN and the organisation's peace-keeping forces. At the 43rd Session the Soviet Union specified its position on these matters by submitting proposals set out in its delegation's memorandum addressed to the UN Secretary-General.² The proposals are aimed at encouraging a collective search for ways and means of heightening the efficiency of the organisation through full, non-selective application of the provisions of its Charter, by actively using its mechanisms and procedures and building up its capacity for effective steps to avert international crises and conflicts. Furthermore, the UN now has real prospects also for concentrating on preventive diplomacy to keep differences from degenerating into conflicts.

All members of the UN ought probably to draw on this experience in participating in the subsequent effort of the organisation in general and the First Committee of its General Assembly in particular.

THE DIALOGUE is now continuing along two interconnected lines, as it were. One of these is efforts to deepen the ideas of comprehensive security equal for all at the conceptual level. The other line, which is becoming decisive, is a direct collective search for solutions to concrete, palpable problems in all sectors and at every level of international cooperation.

The Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles was a real breakthrough in the military political sphere. Its significance for 20th- and 21st-century diplomacy lies in its being the first agreement to confirm the indivisibility of world security by providing for the abolition of two classes of nuclear weapons.

A new security model can and should be built by destroying and not building up armaments. A big step in this direction would be taken by signing an agreement on a 50 per cent cut in Soviet and American strategic offensive weapons on mutually agreed terms. Reducing military capabilities to the level of reasonable sufficiency would lend a new quality to the issue of parity and the role of nuclear deterrence in guaranteeing strategic stability. Parity may be said to have become a starting point for advancing to a gradual elimination of nuclear weapons. By contrast, attempts to raise parity to a higher level are becoming increasingly dangerous and are plainly fraught with the threat of the arms race getting out of hand. The process of real nuclear disarmament tends undeniably to erode the conceptual basis of nuclear deterrence. What it is now necessary to think about is not how to deter a possible enemy by means of nuclear arms but how to curb nuclear arms themselves.

The economic line of security is emerging as highly important along with the military political one. There is a growing awareness that the influence and place of a country in the community of nations will be determined more and more by the country's economic and technological level, the extent of its involvement in the world economy and its ability

to use the advantages of a developed system of international division of labour. It is these factors and not military power that will be decisive at the turn of the 21st century. Every country has a stake in managing its affairs in a way precluding a strain on international economic ties, to say nothing of their rupture, and ensuring their expansion.

The task of preventing a war by man against nature, is comparable in importance to the need to stave off war between humans. Featured prominently in the sphere of ecology are the increasing interdependence of countries as well as the close interconnection of all spheres of international relations. The problem of environmental pollution is going from bad to worse due to an overburdening of natural systems by scientific and technological revolution and often by mindless, wasteful use of anything but unlimited resources of the planet. The continuing arms race is one of the most dangerous causes of the deteriorating natural balance. It is universally recognised that a nuclear conflict would fatally result in a total environmental disaster. Coming out more and more is the urgency of nature conservation measures at planetary level to prevent humanity from suffering irreplaceable material and moral losses and help it avoid new destabilising factors in the evolution of the international situation.

Nations are awakening to the need to rid the area of humanitarian cooperation and human rights of confrontation to begin with. The democratic community has common goals in this respect, those stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenants on Human Rights. Raising internal practices to the level of recognised international standards is a task facing all countries. Efforts are gaining strength in such a delicate sphere as information.

The dialogue on a comprehensive approach to international security fits in with the existing pattern of UN activity. Components of this idea are discussed by agencies concerned with specific problems. Disarmament problems, for instance, are discussed in the First Committee, economic subjects in the Second, social and humanitarian ones in the Third, legal problems in the Sixth and other key committees of the General Assembly.

THE DIALOGUE has brought our certain connecting links of a comprehensive approach to security. They consist in demilitarising the thinking and behaviour of countries, democratising and humanising international relations and deideologising relations between states.

To move to the standpoint of political approach, of using negotiating mechanisms and recognising the primacy of law, it is necessary to renounce militarist recipes and demilitarise thinking generally.

Whereas politics in the last century were compared to the theatre by using such terms as "stage", "curtain", and so on, 20th-century politics are characterised by the use of terms borrowed from the military vocabulary, such as "offensive", "front", or "breakthrough". At present, however, there is a pressing need made very clear by perestroika for new concepts reflecting trends towards interconnection and interdependence, co-creation and co-development, universal creative values.

To democratise international relations is to abolish exclusive clubs and hence the nuclear club and enable every country to join in decision-making. This task is closely connected with that of humanising international relations since the human dimension is acquiring special significance as a goal and a means of bringing about a secure world. A nuclear-free, nonviolent world is also a just world. New thinking maintains that man deserves a better lot than to be held hostage by nuclear arms. The direction in which international relations evolve and the manner in which

problems arising in the process are solved will depend more and more on man's attitude to life and political stance.

There is another important point, one related to this. It is the increased value of the moral and ethical factor in political decision-making. "All that is a moral evil is also an evil in politics." This idea, expressed by Jean Jacques Rousseau over 200 years ago, is particularly relevant now that the very existence of human civilisation hangs in the balance. One of the political functions of the human factor is to reinforce the moral principle, to introduce into the international sphere common sense, whose shortage is sometimes so acute in state-to-state relations.

Clearing ideological roadblocks is a prerequisite for cooperation on new principles. The primacy of law, respect for the dignity of the individual and progress throughout society are unthinkable without deideologising state-to-state relations, without every country renouncing any claim to knowing the "absolute truth". This certainly does not mean renouncing one's views and convictions. The fundamental right of nations to choose their path of development is beyond dispute. Equally inalienable are man's rights and freedoms written into universally recognised international documents, such as freedom of religion and opinion. The point is that conflicting ideological views must not be allowed to become an international battlefield.

Nor does deideologisation of state-to-state relations imply that world politics should be reduced to primitive pragmatism. Humanity has attained a degree of maturity making it possible and necessary to base these relations on universal moral and ethical principles. Applying the latter should not, however, consist in lecturing other nations on how they should live or in giving oneself the role of supreme judge but in setting an example by experience of one's home and foreign policy.

Deideologisation in the case of multilateral cooperation is not identical to convergence nor implies evolving a universal ideology. It means renouncing an ideologised approach to cooperation mechanisms, proceeding in line with the UN Charter, using international organisations in strict accordance with their competence and promoting cooperation based on equality. Such cooperation demands consigning permissiveness to the archives, rising above ideological differences, tolerating dissent, opting firmly for integration and internationalisation. The latter should be not only an intensifying process of cooperation but a mentality and growing involvement in all that goes on in the world.

THE EXPERIENCE of international relations in recent years has shown that no comprehensive approach to security can be evolved without the UN as a regulator and balance beam of diverse interests. The UN, in turn, needs a concept of comprehensive approach to security providing guidelines for the organisation to adapt to the big changes taking place in world politics. Discussion has confirmed that currently countries associate the formation of a comprehensive approach primarily with a stronger UN, with an increase in its role and efficiency, with emphasis on multilateral approaches.

Of course, putting the accent on multilateral cooperation between countries does not mean underestimating bilateral cooperation. A multilateral mechanism and bilateral contacts should harmoniously combine to contribute to each other.

A very promising prospect is that of extending the traditional agenda of the Soviet-US dialogue by placing on it global, "transnational" problems and questions relating to the UN. To carry the Soviet-American dialogue deeper is all the more important because without the Soviet

Union or the United States, let alone against them, the UN can hardly be expected to really join in international affairs or function more efficiently. Discussion of these matters by the two major world powers would undoubtedly help bring other countries belonging to various regional groups into a broad democratic debate on key problems.

The recent extensive Soviet-American consultations on these subjects marked a considerable change in the nature of the dialogue on problems of multilateral diplomacy in favour of practical cooperation between the two powers, of filling the "fifth basket" with real deeds. The two sides decided not merely to carry further the exchange of views on these issues but to extend discussions to the problem of raising the efficiency of the UN system in order to optimise its functioning. Currently it is particularly important to take a comprehensive approach to this international organisation on the basis of deideologising its activity and depoliticising its specialised agencies.

In this changing situation the main echelons of the UN, primarily the Security Council, are becoming a panel for an interdependent world regulating the intricate processes taking place in its every sphere. Special importance attaches today to contacts between permanent members of the Security Council, for they offer real opportunities to co-ordinate measures aimed at strengthening the organisation, making judicious and thrifty use of its resources and increasing its peace-making potential. A major contribution in this sense could be made by acting on the proposal for a Security Council meeting at the level of foreign ministers during, say, the 44th or 45th Session of the General Assembly.

The role of the UN Secretary-General is growing. So is the importance of making proper use of his powers as well as of member countries supporting him in their exercise.

There are ample opportunities for the UN General Assembly to increase its contribution. Compromise and a balance of interests find expression in consensual resolutions passed by the assembly. It is important to ensure that consensus at the stage of adopting a resolution is backed by consensus at the stage of implementation. This approach will help make the assembly, now a forum for exchanging views, an authoritative, efficient mechanism of coordinating the will of nations.

The role of the International Court appears in a new light today. Recognition of the primacy of law and the task of establishing a community of law-governed states require respect for and unfailing execution of the decisions of this body and reasonable self-limitation by states according to international legal standards. Mikhail Gorbachev said in his UN address that the jurisdiction of the International Court in regard to interpreting and applying agreements on human rights should be binding on all countries.³

The Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, or the Committee of 34, a UN agency which for a long time was idle, is rousing to action. In 1989, it met for the first time in seven years. China has now joined in its activity, and this is very important. The committee now represents all the permanent members of the Security Council, which in itself will make its work more fruitful.

In the context of raising the efficiency of the UN, the activity of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organisation, which has lately produced substantial results, is of special importance. Joint efforts by the countries on the Committee have made it possible, for instance, to agree so important and complex a document as the Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations which May Threaten International Peace and Security and on the Role of the UN in This

Sphere. The declaration was approved consensually at the 43rd Session of the General Assembly.

THE DIALOGUE on a comprehensive approach to security started at the UN but went beyond the framework of the organisation. Discussion between governments developed into a debate on security problems, into their analysis, study and discussion in parliaments, academic quarters and social circles. Thus the dialogue on comprehensive security became an important part of the search for a universal consensus in advancing to a new world order. The search will not be easy because it is taking place in a complicated world. But it is only by going through the school of confidence, into which the dialogue is bringing all countries and backing policies by concrete actions that humanity can ensure the advent of a peaceful period in the progress of civilisation.

¹ UN Doc. A/43/732, Oct. 20, 1988.

² UN Doc. A/43/629, Sept. 22, 1988.

³ *Pravda*, Dec. 8, 1988.

EUROPE ON THE WAY TO 1992

Jacques DELORS

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY has turned 32. Its establishment in 1957 under the Treaty of Rome was caused to a great extent by the economic upswing at the initial stage of postwar development in Europe. In 1951 economic rehabilitation led to the formation of the first of three associations existing today in the Western part of the continent—the European Coal and Steel Community. The ambitious goals set then—to lay the foundations for an ever closer alliance of European nations—were dictated by history, by the common striving of people to give up wars once and for all.

Despite the economic upheavals Western Europe draws its strength, at present as well, from the same source that inspires it. It knows the limit of what is possible, the limit caused by the split of the Old Continent (how long will it remain split?). Nonetheless, in the conditions of the constantly changing modern world Western Europe has felt the insistent need to develop the integration process.

This integration is far from simple. What is more, it was slowed down and in a sense questioned in general by the unfavourable economic situation which persisted fairly long. But today, inspired by the idea of establishing by 1992 a large economic area comprising twelve states, the European Community is again stirring to action. The dynamism regained by the Community has attracted the attention of those who doubted that it was capable of uniting people and displaying initiative. The keen interest in the European Community shown today by the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe is clear evidence of its viability.

How can one measure the really perceptible increase in the Community's prestige? By figures in the first place. In 1988, the economy of the European Community saw the highest GNP growth rate in the past 12 years and the largest investments in the past 21 years. The Community has ensured the creation of 1,800,000 new jobs. To compare: in 1982 it lost one million jobs. Though the international economic situation has to some extent determined the achievement of these results, this alone cannot explain the phenomenon of the restoration of former confidence in the Community's economic potential. Everything considered, this has been largely facilitated also by those prospects in economic growth and in ensuring employment which are associated with the approaching significant date—1992.

That the European Community countries are going through a phase

Jacques Delors has been President of the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) since January 1985. He was born in Paris in 1925; graduated from Paris University; was the Minister of the Economy, Finance and the Budget from 1981 to 1984. He is a member of the French Socialist Party.

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of a new upswing is evidenced, among other things, by the campaign against the established notion "Europe is a fortress" launched by their main trade partners. But the 1992 time-limit does not in the least mean a return to protectionism. It is easy to prove that the European Community countries, which are among the major trade powers in the world, risk losing everything if they close their markets. At the same time this aggressive campaign has clearly indicated that the Community again enjoys respect and even evokes envy.

Besides, a number of countries have asked to join the Community or for closer cooperation with it. At present, Austria and Turkey wish to join the 12 members of the Community. Mediterranean and Latin American countries also wish to have closer relations with them. And even the Soviet Union, which recently accredited its ambassador at the European Community in Brussels, also seeks to promote cooperation with it.

All this confirms that the European Economic Community has again become a powerful pole of attraction in the international arena, that one can no longer correctly assess historical changes beginning today in East-West relations while ignoring it. To explain the reason for this revival, I think it is necessary to review briefly the path we travelled in the past four years.

As I took up the post of the CEC President on January, 1, 1985, I had to state that the goal of establishing a joint market registered in the Treaty of Rome was not reached and the economic crisis caused by the oil upheavals in the early 1970s was followed by a sharp decline at a part of our industrial enterprises which were confronted with the competition of major industrial states. The level of unemployment in our countries was among the highest in the world. The Community was unable to offer the member countries effective solutions.

In that situation I began to speak with Community members (at that time there were ten of them, since Spain and Portugal had not yet joined it) the language of necessity. It was necessary to establish more effective cooperation among them, in order to jointly offer an appropriate answer to the challenge flung to all countries by the new international economic reality marked primarily by increased interdependence. Besides, it was necessary to put real content into the notion Common Market and to establish a vast economic area free from internal barriers. Although the suggested solutions were of a partial, limited character, they were to set new and mobilising tasks for the Community members.

To attain the set goal I offered the Community to fix a date—1992. By that time the "greater" joint market having no frontiers should become a daily reality for 320 million people living in the Economic Community countries. At the same time this process should facilitate a deep-going restructuring of their crisis-ridden economy.

However, before establishing in practice a single internal market and a united economic area within which all obstacles to trade would be removed, the Community should have revised the functioning of its institutions, in particular the decision-making mechanism which failed to meet the demands of modern progress. Why? Because in 1985 a consensus of the Economic Community was still required in making major decisions, which means that there was a constant threat that all of the Community's activities could become paralysed.

Besides, it was necessary to elaborate a policy helping to establish one market with simultaneous evening out of possible imbalance between some regions and states which find themselves in less favourable conditions or are farther removed from the centre. This is precisely why after the intergovernmental conference in Luxemburg in 1985 the

Community countries spoke in favour of revising the Treaty of Rome on setting up the European Economic Community.

THE NEW TREATY was called the Single European Act. In fact it has united in one text all the European Communities—the EEC, the ECSC and Euratom—that is, the entire process beginning with the economic integration and political cooperation effected by the diplomatic departments of the European Community countries right to the establishment of the European Union which remains our supreme goal.

The Single European Act has played a major part in accelerating the integration processes within the European Community: the decisions began to be made not by a unanimity principle but by a majority vote. This reduced the risk of paralysing the Community as a whole. Another merit of the Act was that the Community again had clear goals and was to work to meet them. Since the limits of its activity were clearly outlined, they became more obligatory for the members.

And finally the last stage came. In February 1988, the Economic Community countries (after Spain and Portugal joined the Community, their number increased to 12) decided to provide the Community with considerable political and financial means for accomplishing the tasks of the Single European Act. The reform of the Community's budget required for the purpose eliminated one of the last barriers in the way to directly effecting objective of 1992.

Apart from chronology, I should also mention the methods and principles used for attaining this objective, which for their part help one better understand the type of integration we have chosen.

First, the method. Above all one is to realise that the European Economic Community is a rule-of-law community and all its regulations are strictly defined (no one can assert that one is not familiar with them), and its institutions operate in openness. There are four such institutions: the Parliament elected on the basis of universal voting and taking part in the legislative process by introducing amendments in the texts offered to it; the Council of Ministers taking decisions; the Court of Justice imposing sanctions if our common rules are violated; and, finally, the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) which I head and which fulfils three tasks: it has a monopoly on legislative initiative (which it displayed when objective 1992 was being elaborated), it controls together with the Court of Justice the observance of treaties and also the implementation of the decisions passed by the Council of Ministers. The CEC also represents the Community in third countries.

In a word, the European Community cannot be compared with such intergovernmental organisations as, for instance, OECD, the Council of Europe or the CMEA. It has the right to take independent decisions, and its executive body—the Commission of the European Communities is really independent of the governments of the member countries. This institutional framework should be constantly borne in mind if one wants to understand the originality and complexity of the mechanism of the European Economic Community, which we owe to the “fathers” of the Treaty of Rome.

Now about the principles of activity. They may be reduced to four simple rules of consistent establishment of a common economic area.

The Community can ensure economic growth only if it concentrates on the need for competition between enterprises. Objective 1992 serves primarily the development of competitiveness. However, one will not find a single instance in market economy where rivalry is not be

accomplished by cooperation. It is cooperation between individual enterprises, between trade unions and associations of entrepreneurs, and, finally, between states. As we see it, economic integration is sometimes based on a hardly achieved balance between competition and cooperation. Such is our *first principle*.

The *second principle*. In 1992 it is supposed to remove the obstacles in various kinds of exchange, that is, lift the barriers hindering the free movement of goods, people, services and capital among the European Community countries. Only then shall we have a really common economic area. But the removal of obstacles (be it various kinds of direct control on the borders or indirect limitations associated with national norms) does not mean that we entirely give up regulation.

No, we are to formulate for the enterprises of the Community countries the rules of fair competition, making it possible to combat excessive concentration of production and the efforts to monopolise the markets. This is necessary for the normal functioning of a single market.

It is far harder to achieve the observance of the *third principle*. But it is no less important than the first and the second ones. It is a principle of dividing functions, which means the following: what can be done effectively on the level of the enterprise should not be done on the regional level. What can be done better on the regional level should not be done on the national level. And what can be done better on the level of individual states, should not be done on the level of the Community.

And, finally, the *fourth principle*. The specifics of each state should be taken into account in our activity. It is inconceivable that one and the same model—for instance, the one concerning the role of the workers at enterprises—be imposed on all member states having different traditions in labour legislation. This refers also to agricultural policy. The Community should take into account the differences between the member states where various production models are in use. The community does not dictate one model to everyone. It is rich precisely in its diversity and in order to exist it should always respect pluralism.

All the Community's activities are guided by these four principles. The rise in the growth rate and the increase of employment which we expect from the establishment of a single economic area are inseparable from their daily implementation.

HOWEVER, project 1992 is not confined to establishing a single internal market. I have already mentioned that the establishment of a single internal market should be accompanied by the elaboration of a policy in adjacent areas, which will allow us to combat inevitable regional and national imbalances. So, the Single European Act binds the 1992 prospects with the attainment of *six* precise objectives which are impossible to dissociate.

The central objective, of course, remains the Great Market without frontiers. Utmost efforts are concentrated on this objective. Our studies have shown us that it will provide the Community with 5 million new jobs by 1992 and an annual economic growth of 3 per cent. At present the Community has already adopted more than a half decisions on attaining this objective, some of them most important. Thus, it is expected to introduce free movement of capital among the European Community countries by July 1, 1990. An understanding has been reached also on mutual recognition of diplomas.

What other decisions is the Community to make? What should it concentrate on? Essentially, on opening public markets, that is, markets which the state used to provide only for national enterprises. It is necessary also to bring the taxation systems of states closer together (including indirect taxes, as, for instance, taxes on consumption and those on savings profit).

And, last but not least, it is necessary to eliminate frontiers: it is extremely important that the citizens of the Community, if they really want to feel they are members of the European Community, could move freely within the boundaries of the 12 member states and not be subjected to customs examination. Renunciation of frontiers presupposes the signing of agreements between the police services of states for effectively combating the smuggling of drugs and terrorism on the external borders of the European Community. This is a complex task and it will take quite a long time to accomplish.

At the same time the establishment of a single market will be effective only if this is associated with the five other priority areas of activity pointed out in the treaty and designed for a harmonious functioning of the Community. What are these areas?

In the first place, this is a *policy of regional development*. Owing to the implementation of the programmes and plans of development partially financed by the Community, this policy is expected to ensure equal opportunities for each region of Europe, and especially for those which are remote from the major decision-making centres. If we assume that the average level of national wealth per head of population in the Community is 100, then the figure for Spain and Portugal will be 55, while that for Denmark and Luxemburg will be about 140. The gap between some other regions is still greater. With the help of its member states the Community will seek to eliminate these imbalances, in particular, by means of structural funds.

Another area is *cooperation in the area of research and technology*. This is really a vital need for the European Community countries. Their national policy in this sphere is obviously insufficient. From now on it would be necessary to use the advantages of establishing a single market. Here is one of the numerous examples showing how technology and the problem of preserving regional and national culture are associated—sharpness of the TV image. If it were not for our cooperation in elaborating unique norms of the European Community, the European market of TV sets would have been fully overtaken by Japan. This is a much promising result and other achievements should follow.

Cooperation in the economic and monetary sphere is yet another objective formulated in the treaty. Indeed, it is actually impossible to establish a single market without improving cooperation in the area of economic and monetary policy capable of offering the economy of our countries greater room for manoeuvre. We have done a great deal already with the help of the European Monetary System, which marked its 10th anniversary recently. The EMS allowed to create an islet of relative stability in our world shaken by the fluctuations of the dollar rate of exchange and profiteering on currency exchange. The European Monetary System is also an instrument stimulating the combating of inflation.

However, today we must go even farther. The European Council in Madrid recently confirmed that *the member states have decided to start building a real economic and monetary union which in future should lead to the formation of a European system of central banks and unique currency*.

We should also work in the *social context* of a single market. This term, which has been approved by the overwhelming majority of the

Community countries, covers many major aspects suiting, we believe, the European model of society we have inherited. This is above all a social dialogue. It presupposes coordination of actions by social partners, in particular, on two questions: education and professional training and also the prospects of the European labour market and, apart from that, harmonisation of the efforts to improve sanitary conditions and health protection and ensure labour safety. This is where the European Community countries can learn from each other.

There are two major initiatives on the agenda of the European Community: *the drawing up of a European charter of the main social rights and the setting up of a European law society which would pay great attention to various ways of participation and representation of hired labour at the enterprise.* We do not want such an economic area which at the same time would not be a social area. We must remain faithful to this demand associated with the social and historical development of our countries.

And the last area: *environmental protection.* In this sphere of activity we must learn to combine European and international standards, since environmental problems exceed the state frontiers. Besides, industrial and environmental aspects should be better harmonised. And, finally, we should learn to assess the extent of risk. Soon the Community will have a European Agency for Environmental Protection which would expertly assess loss and danger risks. In this way the agency will help elaborate environmental legislation.

We do not separate our environmental policy from the Community's policy in other areas—industrial and agricultural. Today it is one of the main elements of our efforts further to develop European integration in every way.

So this is what we have in mind when we speak about establishing a single market by 1992. It is quite obvious that the aim is not to turn the Community into a simple zone of free trade with definite financial mechanisms added to it. Our goal is wider and more harmonious. We entirely reject the attitude limiting European development only to its economic activity.

Other priorities come into focus in connection with the 1992 prospect. I have already mentioned the formation of an economic and monetary union conceived as a response to the growing interdependence of the economies of various countries of the world, which is expected to result in expanding cooperation among the Economic Community members. But I should like to stress also that the Community, the way we want to see it, cannot be a domain of industrial managers. It should be faced to a greater extent to the man-in-the-street. Therefore we are going to produce joint programmes in education and concentrate on culture. This is the only way the Community will enrich itself culturally and become a truly common area in the eyes of the 320-million population of the European Community countries.

SO, IN 1992 the image of Western Europe will change. But this historical phase is no more than the next stage along the path of integration, for the European Community does not set itself an ultimate goal. Though the objective is defined in clear terms and our efforts should result in the establishment of a European union, today it is too early to say what such a union will be.

Nonetheless it is clear that the aim of the integration of Western Europe is not oriented on some model, it has no precedent. The notions of federation or confederation used in regard to the European Com-

munity do not entirely reflect the whole matter. It seems to me that it is important to preserve this originality, for it shows that history does not follow trodden paths and remains open for many kinds of choice. I should like to quote here Jean Monnet, one of the main inspirers of creating united Europe: "To predict today what ultimate form the European Community will take would mean to come in contradiction with our understanding of it as a process of change. Anticipation of the result paralyses the spirit of invention. As we proceed, new horizons will open up before us."

It is still more useless to try to predict the final shape of the Economic Community now that Europe is undergoing profound changes which can in future alter the atmosphere on our continent which once emerged after Yalta. The Soviet Union itself has started reforms on an unprecedented scale. So the Community is faced with this question: how to combine advancement on the path of integration among 12 countries, which is a priority goal of project 1992, with a policy of openness with regard to other "Europes" that are close to us.

The European Economic Community does not have monopoly on Europe and cannot be alone to represent it. Other organisations in Western Europe, such as, for instance, the Council of Europe, comprise larger number of states. Other "Europes" have taken shape: the countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with which the Community has common goals and needs. Besides, there are European countries that are not members of any organisation, countries like Cyprus, Malta or Yugoslavia. The East European countries that have normalised their relations with the Community can also be counted here. Among them is the Soviet Union which seeks ways of coming closer to the Community and expresses preparedness to negotiate with it the signing of an important treaty on trade and cooperation.

So this is what the system of cooperation with other countries looks like today, and we wish to expand and strengthen it.

However, the Community is aware that in order to fully fulfil its mission it must go beyond the limits of economy and trade. It should move along the path of elaborating a common foreign policy. The Single European Act, which stimulated the integration of the Community countries, has formalised their political cooperation. In particular, it should be expressed in coordinating opinions on major issues arising before the Community in the area of foreign relations, including those between the East and the West.

Political cooperation is still more necessary today because these relations are growing rapidly at a time of common striving for greater openness, broader contacts and a revision in future of the defence policy, which is evidenced in Europe by the reduction of the conventional weapons of the USSR and the USA. The Community must not stay away from this evolution which directly concerns its security.

This explains why the need to continue to restore the balance between the economic might of the Community and its political status is associated for us with the 1992 objectives. In this way the Community will become an active creator of history and will be able to choose freely ways of its development.

President Mikhail Gorbachev wants Europe to become really a common home. In my speech in the Europarlament on January 17, 1989, I suggested that the "Europes" which have been mentioned here get an opportunity to coexist in one settlement in which one house would be occupied by the Community.

These houses should be friendly among themselves. But the building of such an edifice cannot be planned today. The Community cannot

depart from the set goals. It gives priority to the objectives it set itself in economy and politics.

We are glad that the cold "civil" war which divided us in the past is over now. We are also satisfied to know that the perestroika movement historically coincides with 1992 and that in the context of this policy it has been proposed to remove the obstacles to productive exchange between the partners living on one continent. But at the same time we should observe the commitments made under our agreements and proceed persistently along the path of integration, right to setting up an effective alliance of European Community member states.

And then the European Community can contribute still more to transforming the entire European continent into a vast area of peace and cooperation, where respect for rights and values would finally prevail over the use of threat of force. The CSCE process will only benefit from this. Because a stronger Community will make it so that within the European process there would be further mutual enrichment by all economic, political and cultural values accumulated in the course of history but very often wasted in war conflicts or in the name of out-dated ideologies.

In the context of what has been said it is obvious that the experience acquired by the European Community and its member states over the past 40 years and their effective combining of economic efficiency and political democracy within the European Community will help us jointly to cope with internal and external difficulties confronting Europe today, while the originality of each country will be preserved.

WE ARE ALL CITIZENS

Rudolf YANOVSKY

THE FAR-REACHING qualitative changes taking place on the planet in this century extended to every sphere. They predetermine the future, tending to aggravate the problem of conserving life on Earth. In what has become an interdependent world a process of discarding the misconceived notion of "ideologically pure" revolutionary theory, of replacing archaic, pre-nuclear, pre-STR thinking and international relations is taking place.

At the same time, the phenomena of social and intellectual stagnation which manifested themselves in our country in the 1970s and early 1980s, reducing society to a pre-crisis state, and the deformations of socialism which came out necessitate a new approach to reality. Old thinking with its stereotypes, values and guidelines and its obsolete institutions has reached a dead end. It prevents an adequate assessment of the present and a proper vision of the future. Hence the imperative need for new thinking, for renunciation of certain traditional concepts of the world, the global evolution of humanity and the development of society, including socialist society. The Soviet Union's current policy of new thinking and glasnost, of peace and cooperation, helps nations draw closer together. It is conducive to friendly relations between the most diverse population groups and makes it possible to seriously discuss problems of the future.

Of course, human society will never become completely homogeneous, nor will its level ever even out. Like a family, it will inevitably be characterised by differences and contradictions. This is exemplified by the evolution of relations in the socialist world, by the latest events in Poland, Hungary, the Soviet Union and some other countries. Diversity in approach, however, requires a measure of agreement guaranteeing a reasonable degree of mutual confidence.

Until recently, ideological opposition was considered to express itself in an uncompromising attitude towards anything associated with the bourgeois world. Emphasis was laid on the irreversibility of the antagonistic contradiction between the capitalist system representing the bourgeoisie as the chief class and the socialist system representing the working class of the world. Class contradictions were therefore put at the basis of state to-state relations. This was said to imply that peaceful coexistence was a "distinctive form of the class struggle". Class and universal interests were thus treated as opposites. Hence the myth of the "Soviet military threat" which gained currency in the West. The above propositions were expressive of an open readiness to defend the

Rudolf Yanovsky, member of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission and Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, is Rector of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU CC.

interests of the working class anywhere and any time, often without regard to the interests of humanity as a whole and, indeed, of life on earth.

International relations today comprise numerous interconnected elements adding up to a vast and most exacting sphere of human activity. The process of internationalising production and public life has drawn not only politicians but scientists, cultural figures, academics, millions of the most diverse specialists, members of every population group, into the orbit of international relations. However, state-to-state relations do not now fully cover the wide range of ties between nations. The absence of any alternative to a peaceful competition of ideas and to cooperation in pursuing universal objectives makes for growing international cooperation at non-governmental level. The role of world public opinion is increasing and may therefore be described as a key factor in political decision-making.

The unity of the world is strengthened at the level of individuals and groups, of civil society. Civic activities are a highly important connecting link between political thinking and the individual. The axis of this interconnection is an integral world—the state—classes—nations—citizens. Removing or underestimating any one of these components detracts from the substance and dynamism of new political thinking. Nobody should ignore either the civic or the universal aspect of culture. Global social consciousness and cultural values, if isolated from civic, patriotic consciousness, risk becoming a meaningless abstraction. In new political thinking, the high degree of civic commitment is a synthesis of national, state and universal principles. This approach certainly has nothing to do with would-be models of “citizen of the world” from which country, state and class are arbitrarily and artificially excluded as allegedly unnecessary intermediaries between people. Civic unity is the living unity of patriots unfailingly respecting the rights of other peoples and states.

Citizen. This word, which expresses pride, came into being in Paris 200 years ago, during the French Revolution. Its majestic entry into the modern vocabulary gave rise to so wide a range of ideas and concepts that the past two centuries turned out to be insufficient for a proper assessment of their meaning, as is evidenced by the experience of our country. As for the word *citizen* itself, it sounds highly relevant now, serving occasionally as a logical key to present-day concepts: civil society, civil peace, democracy, law-governed state, new political thinking, a common and interdependent civilisation.

Indeed, the words *civil* and *civilisation* have a common root in many languages. It is only natural to assume that the problem of establishing civilised international relations cannot be really solved until direct international bonds linking the lives of citizens of all countries fill all the voids created in the years of cold war and “detente as a form of the class struggle”. More importantly, this goal will be attained when universal values properly grasped and spelled out to the people become a guiding idea in the home policy of all countries, including ours, of course.

THIS IS SO IMPORTANT that I would like to digress a little. Time was when our authors wrote so copiously about the “inseparable interconnection” between home and foreign policy that the phrase became almost commonplace, something of a vignette. Yet an analysis of this interconnection and its realisation, a most serious one, is impe-

rative, all the more so because the conclusions to be drawn tentatively are practically self-evident.

First of all, we must not forget that the familiar phrase "home and foreign policy" is not only a combination and differentiation of two concepts but a designation of two parts of a *single whole, which is realisation of the interest of society as the totality of the interests of all its members*. It would therefore be wrong to see the obvious and most impressive achievements of our foreign policy as an end in itself, for they may become meaningless or fail to go any further unless home policy keeps pace. And then, fear of renewal at home is a drag on the most daring and promising foreign policy moves.

It is true that the Soviet Union is no longer regarded abroad as an *enfant terrible* begotten when the world democratic movement was suffering from the infantile disorder of leftism. But one should realise that the ice of the cold war began melting primarily under the impact of our "April warming".

To return to the theme of civic affairs. We must remember that the Helsinki Final Act and the results of the 1989 Vienna Meeting have yet to be fully "naturalised" in our country. Without this we can hardly speak about forming a civil society on our soil.

Second, very many of our conservatives find it extremely difficult to combine universal values with communist ideology. Others even espay a collision here. How real is this?

It was said long ago that you cannot enter one and the same stream twice. Still less should anyone try to do so today, when it is far more important to ride the rapids of the river of time. The CPSU is a party of the working class but only to the extent that it must objectively be a party of the peasantry, the intelligentsia and other social groups. This is the only condition on which the party can play its unique role as integrator of Soviet society and ideologue of its renewal. Some may find it paradoxical that the most natural, historically inevitable task facing the party today is to champion, promote and guarantee universal principles in our society, which means that the CPSU must focus its activity on man with his interests and expectations.

The point is that only breaking down bureaucratic structures and barriers, by overcoming the feverish bid for a revision of republican and other internal boundaries of our country and by turning to everlasting human values such as the aspiration for freedom, success and prosperity, for intellectual, social, political and, above all, economic self-realisation, can a social organisation put itself on a durable creative basis. This is the meaning of the words "man is the measure of all things", not social favours done to lumpen proletarians, who lack both property and civic consciousness.

Can this allegiance to universal principles be construed as renunciation of our ideology? No, provided that the latter is understood to mean the totality of aims and values and not a set of means of achieving them—means hallowed by the classics—or "historical" priorities of a tactical nature. In exalting the individual and giving life to that truly great idea, "the free development of each is the condition of the free development of all", the party is historically destined to do what no one else can: it must operate as the integrating and harmonising force of our society. *By putting the individual and the rights of every citizen first, our party can restore to its internal policy what makes its foreign policy strong, namely, dynamism and leadership*. The vanguard of society must have the lead in the general democratic process, must call on people to follow it, must lead them and not shout them down nor pull them up short.

Third, when speaking of home and foreign policy, we must remem-

ber that our country is a huge power, which is home to hundreds of peoples differing in culture, history and religion. In shaping our policy towards the world, we must realise that our country itself is a vast integral and contradictory world. This implies that the standards of mutual relations we would like the world community to adopt must become established primarily in our own country. Otherwise our concept of international relations will be nothing but a euphoric abstraction. After all, the interdependence of the contemporary world also expresses itself in the need to see to it, as we model a new system of international relations and life in our country, that these two models are in mutual harmony.

The foregoing can and must be translated into political practice. We know that the type and pattern of a nation's economy must accord with its historical traditions and a way of life, with all its peculiarities. And yet we used to proceed in a manner suggesting that the laws governing development did not apply to us. (It is clear why we did so but need we persist in error?) At present it is particularly obvious that many problems could have been avoided had, say, the Baltic republics or Uzbekistan been allowed to develop in the economic sphere according to their traditions instead of taking orders from government agencies which saw nothing but a physical map of the country instead of the country itself.

We also know how widely the UN and other international organisations apply the principle of consensus. It appears that this is the only principle on which the primacy of the universal interest can be established in international relations. This also goes for the interest of the Soviet Union as a whole.

LISTENING TO BITTER controversies between our philosophers, lawyers, economists, journalists and writers or to their insinuating arguments, I realise that we have learnt the lessons of the French Revolution rather poorly in many respects. This may be the reason for both the horrors of the 1930s and the theoretical incoherence of today.

Let us reread the first two articles of the historic Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. Article I says: "Men are free by birth and equal in *rights* (my italics.—R. Y.)." Article II: "The goal of any political association is safeguarding natural and inalienable human rights. These rights are freedom, property, security and resistance to exploiters." These theses answer many burning questions.

Indeed, freedom, equal rights (and not equality in income), property and security are inseparable. It is only the totality of these rights that makes one a citizen. But where political power is used as a means of reducing citizens and their property to one and the same level, of placing them in an identical situation ideologically and in terms of property, they become lumpen proletarians and state power degenerates into a dictatorship, or a system killing all freedom.

We are now more keenly aware than ever how much we have missed because "we did not study dialectics according to Hegel". Had we done so, it would be much easier for us to reconcile ourselves to the idea that equality is inequality (an idea frightening only outwardly because it reminds us of Orwell's "newspeak"). Equal rights objectively lead to inequality in property. Non-acceptance of this truth by the man in the street, the "small cog", is one reason why our economy is still not economic, let alone economical.

Civil rights in the political sphere, including security, are a different matter. The problem of security, be it military or environmental,

concerns everybody, and therefore the concept of people's diplomacy is neither a political game nor a flirtation with public opinion. It is actual exercise of man's basic right to life and civic being. It may be described as the highest manifestation of civic activity, for the ideal of people's diplomacy is to make governments respect the laws of universal morality, which are just and safe for the world.

Yet this is an ideal interpretation of the concept. For us, it is more important to answer the question: What is *our* people's diplomacy? What makes it different from or similar to people's diplomacy in, say, America?

I believe the similarity lies in our having to do in both instances with the civic sphere of public life. This diplomacy is an excellent answer to metaphysically-minded analysts who habitually look at international relations from the standpoint of a global class struggle on the principle of "either—or". Actually class and universal phenomena do not exclude but complement each other. "The question arises, what should political education consist in? Can it be confined to the propaganda of working-class hostility to the autocracy?" Lenin put this question in *What Is To Be Done?* and answered it as follows: "Of course not... Oppression affects the most diverse classes of society, inasmuch as it manifests itself in the most varied spheres of life and activity—vocational, civic, personal, family, religious, scientific, etc., etc."

The above propositions of Lenin's imply that the civic sphere appears to be a sphere of activities of all social classes, population groups, in all manifestations of intellectual, moral and political life of these classes. Accordingly, the civic cements the whole structure of civil society by uniting all forms of social consciousness and all value guidelines.

It is particularly important to take account of the latter circumstance so as to see clear in both the phenomenon of people's diplomacy and the evolution of contemporary Western society, which is characterised by, among other things, a process of democratisation of property and social structures. Indeed, it is impossible to reconcile universal and civic principles, which lie at the very basis of contemporary developed society, with the habitual interpretation of the bourgeois state as a machine for the domination of one class by another. Perhaps the essence of Western civilisation today consists not only or not so much in domination, exploitation and suppression but primarily in ensuring nationwide civic consensus.

So, what differences are there between the two concepts of people's diplomacy? It is an open secret, at least for anybody who has joined in various goodwill actions along with, say, Americans, that we differ with the West on the meaning of people's diplomacy. Accordingly, we also act differently and expect dissimilar things from many joint initiatives.

Americans see people's diplomacy as an opportunity to break free from bureaucratic structures and establish direct contacts with people, with individuals, with independent non-governmental organisations. And while we have only just begun talking about the "human factor", Americans believe traditionally and firmly in the might of human individuality.

Our situation is somewhat different. What helped us answer any tricky question on the subject in the past was the formula: "Everybody in our country stands for peace". In this way we tried to settle the issue of the dissimilarity of our concepts of people's diplomacy, and it was a sort of propagandistic discovery from this point of view. But everybody in our country does stand for peace. And feeling certain that the peace policy of our party and state is well considered, we place

our "civic diplomacy" in their service, now as before. We still see our aim in telling the truth about our country and its foreign policy, about perestroika. Do we need to dissociate from official structures and seek autonomy and an alternative course? Many find this a strange thing to ask.

Yet there is no overlooking the complete integration of what is by definition a civic peace movement into official entities. Besides, our people's diplomacy is manifestly dependent on these administratively, materially and financially. This is the reverse side, if you will, of the coin known as political and ideological unity between social organisations and the state.

Thus we are faced with the question whether our people's diplomacy is *representation or participation*. Is it loyal defence of official positions or independent participation on an equal footing in the framing and implementation of foreign policy, aid in harmonising the interests of our society abroad?

I feel like saying yes in a dialectical sense, meaning that civic diplomacy in our country has a twofold aspect, being both sincere support for the state and participation in the shaping of its policy. I feel like this also because in the area of big politics the call for co-creation is daily becoming more emphatic. But the administrative system has its own logic with which it cannot part easily.

All indications are that the classics were right when they noted: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living."² This must be why we find it so difficult to get rid of pervasive omnipresent monopolism (including its "foreign" aspect), to unfetter consciousness and initiative. The fact is that we have inherited a society which sociologists call a "special-purpose organisation", for this society and hence its every member were expected to pursue the one aim of building a new society (by definition), which actually implied executing any order of the Leader or the Directive Body. Hence the theory of "small cogs", the phrase "soldier of the party", and many other things.

Total special-purpose organisation of society has some advantages but they do not last long historically. Outliving their usefulness, they breed problems whose roots lie in the system itself. For instance, the level of private, personal or even collective initiative drops sharply. (The latter was simply dangerous: until recently, a collective complaint sent "up" was interpreted almost automatically as an attempt to form an anti-Soviet organisation). This became virtually inevitable because socially permissible objectives and activities even in fulfilment of tasks set "from above" were restricted. Social activity began to require constant realisation and guidance. Fallacious decisions made by the centre in the absence of mechanisms for their automatic revision became extremely costly for society, affecting the destinies of millions.

Obviously, the problem was that in this case as in many others, the materialist conception of history had given way to a kind of "Bolshevik idealism". Some concepts had been replaced by others, it being held that since an organisation is an artificial formation brought into being by man's will, society is, according to Marxism, primarily a "natural historical process" directed by people and constituting an aggregate product of their efforts. Yet social phenomena are a result of human activity but not of human intentions, as the Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson rightly pointed out.

It follows that the answer must be: people's diplomacy in our

country is representation and defence of government positions. On making it impossible for "those below" to take the initiative, the state apparatus saw its task in reacting adequately to any unexpected situation both at home and abroad. By perceiving home and foreign policy problems uncritically, without regard to outside opinion, and furthermore, by complicating the fulfilment of every task by various allowances for bureaucratic and ideological interests, the state deprives itself of the ability to respond adequately to changes in the world and in the country and becomes its own captive, as it were.

Our diplomatic history of the period of stagnation and even of the early perestroika years may be regarded as a most typical case in point. Assuming that it is right to compare foreign policy to a big ship, we must admit that our ship was unwieldy and bound by inertia. It gave the impression of sailing in an anti-submarine zigzag, thereby increasing the distance to its destination dozens of times over. After a decision had been made, the ship's furnaces would be amply stoked so as to steer a definite course, publicising it. But the decision would prove ill-advised, and the ship would sail back at enormous cost after reaching its miscalculated destination. Thereupon a new extreme would come, a "deviation" in the opposite direction, and so on, *ad infinitum*. This explains why we arrive at the right decisions much later than necessary and at the price of rerouting the ship, an operation which takes years. We have a vivid recollection of one of those difficult changes of course. It led from SS-20 missiles and the NATO "zero option" to Reykjavik and the signing of the INF Treaty in Washington.

We could probably have reached that destination sooner. But society silently watched the evolution of an only decision allowing for no alternatives, leaving no room for proposals, ideas or initiatives from our "people's diplomats". They may have been there except that the general public knows nothing about them. But it remembers how noted public figures versed in diplomacy took it in turns to uphold two mutually exclusive operations, first by arguing that the well-known package could not be "untied" and then insisting that "untying" it was the only sensible solution. This happened, as I see it, because in that situation the state and social organisations turned out to be bound by one chain as usual. And it emerged that this galley tandem benefited neither of the sides and was harmful to both.

Inevitably, the question arises: Who is or should be the subject of people's diplomacy in our country? As of now, it is divided into social organisations and "non-formals". The division is most instructive if curious.

The fact that the word "non-formal" found its way into our vocabulary so easily is evidence of our society's unanimously negative attitude to formalised "social" organisations. After all, these were generally founded "from above" (as in the case of the Society for Sobriety), in the absence of an elementary social base with a developed ideology and system of membership relations. First an apparatus vested with certain powers was set up, then came a search for rank and file members to be led by it, and lastly activities were invented for the organisation to engage in. It would be hard to deny the existence in our country of a "public opinion" speaking for none but its apparatus, an opinion which has never solved and could never have solved one of democracy's most challenging problems, that of representing interests.

This is why pseudo-public opinion was succeeded by a real public opinion in the form of a spontaneous movement. Of course, this movement is not positive throughout. But it is high time we realised that

genuine public opinion is not made up of people organised and directed according to familiar rules but comprises people having an identity and expressing their own views. It is now asserting itself in our society, which stands to gain if it proves equal to bringing in the new groups and movements and allows them to hold their own, for without this there is no harmonising the interests of society nor the achieving of consensus on any problem. It is also very important to draw on foreign experience, which implies setting up a whole system of sensitive mechanisms in order to make civic initiatives indispensable factors for political practice. We need a kind of "legal corridor of guarantees" for the development of self-regulating processes meeting the ideals of socialism and benefiting it. A socialist state can be strong only if backed by a civil society of well-informed, politicised citizens managing their affairs by themselves.

The ideology and logic of organising socialist society are based entirely on civic initiative and action, on citizens' free and independent self-expression. Political structures and social movements cannot be hostile to each other; on the contrary, the former grows out of the latter. One should not give in to weakminded astonishment at the sight of one's epoch, to paraphrase Pushkin. Still less should one be afraid of the "natural historical process", that is, the formation of the civil society which we long for and which Marx called the basis for any modern society.

DEMOCRATISATION OF SOCIAL organisations will enable society to rise to the demands made upon it by the very semantics—a most complex one—of the concept of people's diplomacy. The situation is anything but simple.

Risking an overstatement, I would say that people's diplomacy is above all a highly professional official diplomacy. Where professionalism attains a high standard and the people's and nation's interest is therefore properly represented and defended there is every reason to consider "official" activity an adequate expression of people's diplomacy. But this necessitates permanent democratic control over government agencies, sustained effort by clubs of "people's diplomats" joining together diverse civic initiatives. In other words, there seems to be a case for speaking of so very important a line of people's diplomacy as work *inside* the country, with *its foreign policy service*. One of the methods suggesting itself is parliamentary activity, action through representatives. Another obvious method is to use the media, which should adequately convey the opinions of fellow citizens to society and its leading echelons. This will probably require a good deal of rethinking.

Be that as it may, the media have practically attained consensus on nearly all foreign policy problems. This is hardly normal in a democratic society; indeed, it is unnatural. Not all sections of the population or social groups can react identically to processes going on in foreign policy and international relations. The present state of affairs shows that natural distinctions are simply not allowed to manifest themselves. Sad as it may be, we must put it on record as we look at the situation from the democratic and universal point of view that many groups are still denied a say in foreign policy matters.

Society incurs losses due to this "disfranchisement", and so does the pragmatic interest of the state, whose foreign policy is thus denied the benefit of amendment. It seems to follow that an anti-submarine zigzagging course may again become reality some day.

Eduard Shevardnadze is of the opinion that the press "should help diplomacy". But this help will be really tangible, scientific and intellectually valuable only if the Foreign Ministry is compelled to demonstrate in public debate the soundness of the line chosen by it instead of justifying it on the grounds that it has been okayed by the Directive Body.

I BELIEVE THIS IS ALSO the road to solving the difficult problem of the relationship between politics and morals. Currently we have no reason to declare that our policy based on new political thinking fully meets the exigencies of universal morality. Attempts are made to affirm that it does but they are not really successful. What is certain is that insisting too categorically on wedding politics and its methods to morals is equally harmful to both.

The new period, that of perestroika, has already given rise to clichés and stereotypes identifying the foreign policy activity of the state, which has declared that it renounces old dogmas, with morality. It is true that new political thinking is based on indisputable moral imperatives and that we want this thinking to underlie both our policy on the world scene and international relations generally. Nevertheless, it would be a bad mistake to regard our foreign policy, let alone its concrete moves, as invariably above criticism from the moral point of view. This is not because anyone shows illwill or because we are deficient in morality. It is simply that politics cannot be a hundred per cent moral for purely objective reasons, by definition, being the art of the possible, a synonym of compromise if you will.

Such is reality, and we should not hesitate to recognise it. What politicians call a compromise may be described from the standpoint of universal values and an uncompromising morality as a deal, occasionally as a deal with one's conscience. But this certainly does not imply that society is doomed to merely follow the evolution of the state's policy line without ever being able to express in any way its opinion of this or that political problem from the moral point of view.

I do not think public opinion must be held hostage to the political interests of the state. The main thing is to draw a line both at home and abroad between an official position and views and assessments expressed by various social groups or individual citizens. Can the whole of public opinion ignore violations of human rights in a friendly country? Why should it be prevented from commenting on a given move made by our government *vis-à-vis* a leader (our ally) who is by no means a democrat at home? Why should pragmatic interests considered indisputable by the state take the place of the moral attitude of public opinion?

These questions may be dismissed as rhetorical, for they concern what in many developed countries has long been a *habitual* relationship between state power and the vastly varied social forces making up society. We can restore this relationship to normal by secularising part of the media (separating it from the state) and forming autonomous people's diplomatic organisations.

People's diplomacy has first-class professionals at its service. It can consult natural scientists, humanitarians, politologists, experienced journalists, veterans. It is an autonomous, self-valued force which can and should operate in, say, completely independent politological centres and institutions functioning on the principles of *khozraschet*. A situation where the right to intellectual quests in politology is reserved for scholars enlisted by the state cannot be considered right even if these scholars represent academic institutions. Obviously, the idea of co-crea-

tion advanced by the Soviet Union should be put into practice in the "workshop" of Soviet foreign policy before becoming reality in world politics.

It has long been clear to everybody that opinion can be imposed not only by a government agency but by a research centre as well. This leads society back to the vicious circle of lack of option. By contrast, publishing in the press a dozen options properly spelled out to public opinion and discussed in parliament would place our politological community in a qualitatively different situation, relieving it at long last of the duty to comment on, publicise and improve an only volitional decision made "in the course of routine work". Indeed, there is no reason for us to deny ourselves a procedure that is natural in all developed countries.

One of the obstacles to carrying forward the concept of people's diplomacy is that some time in the past another concept, international relations, was classed as something "foreign". Yet relations between nations are not lacking even inside our country. They are extremely complicated, and some of them are burdened by years-long conflicts and suspicion or even by bloodshed. Surely they are even more important now than whatever goes on abroad. This calls for a most thoughtful approach and for work in appropriate research centres. In other words, we are badly in need of scientific culture. This is one of the problems whose solution requires full-fledged, competent people's diplomacy, possibly the most important of all diplomacies today as far as we are concerned.

IN SHORT, we must answer a great many questions. They seem to arise as soon as we take a new and sober look at habitual concepts tending to become routine slogans, or so it appears. But a frank question is better than a "correct" answer known beforehand.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1961, pp. 400-401.

² Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. One, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 398.

IS THE COLD WAR OVER?

Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI

A CENTRAL QUESTION resonates today both in Europe and in America: is the Cold War over? This question is being asked over and over again by journalists, by students, by statesmen. It is posed with earnestness and with hope. And the fact of its being asked is in itself also an important indicator of historical change.

This question is actually not easy to answer. What is more, the debate over the Cold War has itself paradoxically become a part of the Cold War. The louder some in the West affirm the continued existence of the Cold War, the easier it is for Mr. Gorbachev wistfully to affirm his desire to end the conflict and to stigmatize as mindless proponents of the Cold War those who dispute his view.

Complicating matters even further is the reality that any answer not only risks oversimplifying a complex historical process, but also may serve as a screen for hidden ideological preferences. On the one hand, those who hastily proclaim the Cold War's end tend to be—though with some striking exceptions—those who have traditionally placed the highest value on accommodation with, rather than on firm opposition to; who have in the past advocated concessions in the face of such unilateral acts of Soviet assertiveness as the deployment of the SS-20s or the invasion of Afghanistan; who have viewed Cold War not as a profound philosophical collision but as a conundrum of reciprocal misunderstandings. Last but not least, some among them are eagerly seeking to make a quick buck in the East.

On the other hand, those who firmly reject—maybe even with a touch of anxious nostalgia—the notion of the Cold War's end tend to be those who have viewed the Cold War largely as an ideological crusade; who have more often than not exaggerated Soviet power and who have been overly preoccupied with the prospects of a Soviet invasion; who almost automatically have labeled any agreement with the Soviet Union as appeasement; and who particularly fear that popular acceptance of the notion of the end of the Cold War will mean the unilateral disarmament of the fallible West.

Obviously, I am overstating the contrasts, but not for the purpose of propounding the all-too-easy conclusion that the right answer lies somewhere in the middle. Rather, my purpose is to set the stage for the advocacy of a policy derived from an analysis of what has been lately happening in East-West relations.

I am also aware of the fact that the Bush administration is currently engaged in a comprehensive review of East-West policy. Such a review

Zbigniew Brzezinski is a leading researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington. Born in 1928 in Warsaw, he received an education at McGill University (Canada) and Harvard University. In the 1950-1970s he worked at Harvard and Columbia Universities. In 1973-1976 he was Director of the Trilateral Commission; from 1977 to 1981 — National Security Adviser to the US President. He authored a number of books and articles. This article was contributed to **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**.

has been long overdue. During the last two years of the Reagan administration, the U. S.-Soviet accommodation acquired a momentum of its own. But in its latter phases it was propelled more by Mr. Gorbachev's calculated amiability and Mr. Reagan's fascinated responsiveness than by a deliberate Western strategic design.

Thus the review in progress is needed. But a review cannot be a substitute for policy. I am sure the President and his top foreign policy advisors—probably the best U.S. team since the early 1950s—realize the danger that if the review takes too long or produces the lowest common denominator of interagency consensus, American policy would then lack the requisite historical vision and the desired strategic thrust.

In fact, circumstances call for a Western policy that is historically ambitious and conceptually innovative.

Fortunately for all of humanity, the ideological age is waning—rapidly disappearing. The most hopeful sign is "glasnost" and its rejection of dogmas and claims to infallibility. One can only wish its current leaders—and especially Mr. Gorbachev—well in the historically ambitious and difficult task of breaking with the past and of profoundly redefining Soviet foreign policy and relations with its neighbours. That facilitates discussion of issues that previously were contested largely by force. And certainly the nature of global change is one of such issues, and it has enormous implications for those who live in Washington, and in Moscow.

In my view, four major global geopolitical changes are of special relevance to the future of Europe.

1. The first involves the growing, but already worldwide, recognition that political and social pluralism is not only morally superior to totalitarianism but actually works better as a system. In any case, the evidence for the superior socio-economic performance of pluralistic systems is overwhelming—in terms of standards of living, of intellectual creativity, and of the attraction of its way of life.

2. The second is related to the reemergence of Europe as an economic and political force in the world. The gap created by Europe's political suicide, executed in the course of two destructive European civil wars, is being filled. It means nothing less than the appearance of a major new player on the world scene that for the last four decades has been dominated exclusively by the United States and the Soviet Union. But that player, like America, will be politically and economically pluralistic, democratic, and it will certainly exercise a powerful attraction—economic, political, and cultural—on that region which is in the process of again becoming Central Europe.

3. The third major change involves the shift of the globe's economic center of gravity to the Pacific. That is the area of the greatest economic momentum today. This has obviously great significance for the US. It involves a major reorientation of the American perspective. Global partnership with Japan is beginning to overshadow in importance the traditional special relationship with the UK. The inevitable consequence will be less focus on Europe. America will not be detaching itself from Europe, but the reorientation to the Pacific, and the appearance of a more united Europe, means that the Atlantic relationship will undergo some change. One consequence is likely to be the reduction in the number of American forces in Europe, and thereby also a greater role by the inevitably less dependent Europe in the shaping the East-West relationship, particularly as it pertains to Central Europe.

4. With Europe reappearing, with Asia of growing importance to America, and with Communism fading as a dynamic and appealing ideology, the Cold War between America and Russia is losing its centrality in world affairs. I have no doubts regarding the sincerity of the current

Soviet leadership's desire to improve American-Soviet relations. I see that desire, however, as rooted much in the protracted political-social crisis that is likely to dominate the Soviet domestic situation for many years to come.

The internal Soviet systemic crisis will preoccupy the Soviet leadership. I have elsewhere defined the essence of the Soviet multinational empire's internal dilemma as involving a basic contradiction between the requirements of economic progress and the imperatives of political stability: desired economic progress can only be purchased at high cost to political stability and political stability can only be sustained at the price of economic progress.

The insoluble tension between these irreconcilable objectives has already constrained the external Soviet freedom of action. Indeed, to remedy its internal malaise, the Soviet Union needs a major accommodation and even economic help from the West. It needs a breathing spell—a "peredyshka"—in order to pursue its "perestroika".

As a result, in a move reminiscent of Lenin in Brest Litovsk in 1918, Gorbachev has asked for an armistice in the Cold War. That was the real message of his address in December 1988 to the U.N. General Assembly.

What is the Soviet Union's longer-range future? In my view, neither a restoration of the past nor violent fragmentation are really desirable as such. The consequence of either would be a period of intense instability, probably violence, and the rise of intensely xenophobic Great Russian nationalism. It would destroy the hopes of any genuine longer-term democratization.

As the internal crisis percolates, Soviet control over East Europe will inevitably further decline. The term "East Europe" is a political concept, connected with the Cold War, and East Europe, simply put, wants again to be Central Europe. In other words, it wants to be itself. Some Soviet spokesmen are already beginning to signal that the Kremlin might not even be adverse to a neutral status for some of the East European states. This has been explicitly mentioned recently in regard to Hungary. Such thinking could augur a substantial redefinition of the Soviet concept of its geopolitical interest in East Europe—an issue certainly worth pursuing. Even the Soviet slogan of "a common European home" could be exploited to further such change.

The patterns of change in East Europe will likely be highly differentiated and, indeed, in some cases potentially quite violent. Although Hungary and Poland are leading the way toward some form of political pluralism—and thus toward a major break not only with the Stalinist but also with the Leninist tradition—no Communist-ruled state has yet crossed the elusive dividing line between a state-controlled and a genuinely free-market economy, and between one-party monopoly of power and a genuinely open multiparty political system.

Today, the Soviet Union is only a one-dimensional global power—it is very strong militarily. That enormous Soviet military might must be taken into account in any comprehensive western policy response to the dramatic crisis of the Soviet world. The Kremlin continues to assign very high priority to the maintenance of that power—especially as the political importance to the Kremlin of its military might has risen in recent years precisely because the Soviet Union has come to be viewed worldwide as an economic and ideological loser.

In that complex setting, the West must fashion a policy which simultaneously advances the positive aspects of economic and political change in the East and enhances wider European regional security. In brief, this requires a policy designed to translate the breathing spell—the

"peredyshka" that the Soviet leadership needs—into a genuine "perestroika" of East-West relations that we all want.

Such a wider response—to be politically appealing and historically relevant—should meet the following requirements:

First, it must entail the definition and articulation of the Western concept of the Cold War's termination—a definition that is truly symbolically compelling and politically substantive. A simple and attractive definition of what the end of the Cold War actually should mean to all of us—in the West and in the East—is a political necessity.

The key point here is very simple: if we want more than a mere armistice in the Cold War, we have to define the actual meaning of its end. And we have to express our message in terms that are capable of mobilizing public support.

Second, our policy must respond to the political-economic crisis of the Soviet world in a manner that constructively encourages and consolidates genuinely irreversible change. That sets a higher standard for policy than either passivity based on wishful thinking, or a headlong rush to pour capital into the East, thereby making it easier for those communist elites that merely want to repair the status quo to have their cake and eat it too.

But a critical and discerning approach to historic changes in the East should not be an excuse for Western indifference. Without substantial western aid, the process of change, notably in Hungary and Poland and soon also in Czechoslovakia, could simply provoke breakdowns, even revolutionary outbreaks. That would have terminal consequences for any genuine democratization. Therefore, the West must unambiguously convey that it holds the view that violent change in East Europe would be counterproductive from everyone's point of view and that arbitrary impediments to peaceful change are likely to provide the most powerful impulses for such revolutionary violence.

Third, our policy must address the security dimensions of the changing East-West relationship in Europe. This is especially the case because the progressive fragmentation of the Soviet empire must be breeding fears in the Kremlin that NATO may soon be aiming to extend its sphere of influence to the Bug river and perhaps even attempt to foster instability within the Soviet Union itself. That fear would become particularly strong if the West, in seeking to promote peaceful change, appeared also to be seeking to reopen the German geopolitical question.

We must, therefore, find a policy formula that enhances East-West stability even as it facilitates the desirable and perhaps even inevitable political and economic change within the Soviet sphere.

The quest for a security formula that is congenial to political change, yet reinforces the state of stability, also has to take into account the strategic level. The enhancement of security in Europe must go hand in hand with the reinforcement both of American and Soviet strategic security. Obviously, it can hardly be either the American or the Soviet objective to make Europe more secure for the Europeans while the American and the Soviet peoples remain, or even become more, strategically vulnerable.

We are dealing, in brief, with a complex web of issues—some symbolic, some political, some economic, some military and even strategic. Our response needs to be equally comprehensive. It should be presented as a broad framework for terminating the Cold War, and not just dribbled out in bits and pieces. A historically ambitious design would stand a better chance of winning public support and even of mobilizing popular support in the East for a substantive, and not just symbolic East-West accord.

Thus, let me submit the following general recommendations, all of

which obviously need to be more thoroughly reviewed and fleshed out:

In explicitly defining the meaning of an end of the Cold War, the West should not be shy in focusing on the symbolic and the philosophical. The fundamental issue has been, and still is, freedom of choice versus coercive ideological orthodoxy. Let us not forget that human rights have been the central stake in the Cold War, and the West's identification with human rights has been our greatest moral strength. The Cold War will thus have a terminal date when the Berlin Wall is firmly scheduled for dismantling—even if that action is not taken instantly—and when some—even if not immediately all—of the East European states firmly schedule free elections.

Peoples on both sides of East-West divide would understand such a definition of the Cold War's end. It is a historically and politically more relevant definition. Such a definition would also facilitate the eventual progressive departure of major portions of American and Soviet forces from Central Europe, whose prolonged presence there has been a major manifestation of the Cold War. The West should therefore not be shy in proclaiming the important connection between the philosophical and the military symptoms of the Cold War. And it should also reaffirm clearly that, indeed, the West's central goal is to end the Cold War.

In fostering political and economic conditions actually congenial to ending the Cold War, the West—in which at this point one should also include Japan as an interested party—should undertake a comprehensive program of staged economic and technological assistance to foster peaceful change within the communist world. If peaceful changes continue, some Communist states will soon need help in technical expertise, in resources, and in financing. Even on such a specific matter as parliamentary procedures and operations, the prospectively more influential legislators in some communist-governed countries lack the essentials of experience and techniques. Special training and exchange programs in this area, and in many others, will be needed, should be developed, and should be offered—both to the East European states and to some of the Soviet republics.

A particularly constructive role in this regard can be played by western non-governmental actors. Trade unions, press associations, environmental groups and others have now a greater opportunity than ever before to forge links with their incipient counterparts in the East—and some have already been doing that, thereby fostering the social and political pluralism that is so fundamentally incompatible with totalitarianism.

More important still is the need in the East for large-scale and long-term credits, as well as for an easement of existing debts along the lines of the Brady Plan for Latin America. A major trilateral effort in this area is urgently needed, and special trilateral planning machinery to that end should be created.

Finally, our proclaimed goal for European security ought to be the transformation of the Warsaw Pact from an ideological to a purely geopolitical alliance, designed to maintain the territorial status quo in Europe. Neither Europe's security, nor East-West accommodation, would be served by attempts to dismantle the Warsaw Pact alone or to disband both of the alliances. The first would be strenuously, and probably effectively resisted by Moscow, while the second could only yield a neutral and vulnerable Europe.

What is needed is an overarching framework of security based on the two alliances, within which peaceful political and economic change can be accommodated. In such a context, the progressive dismantling of the largely artificial communist systems in East Europe and their transformation into forms more palatable to their peoples' traditions and aspira-

tions would not automatically represent a danger to Moscow. A Social Democratic Hungary or a Christian Democratic Poland, which would remain members of the Warsaw Pact, would not tip the balance of power in Europe to the West's advantage.

It therefore follows that the West, beyond seeking equitable conventional force reductions in the Vienna negotiations, should also seek formal assurances from Moscow that the Brezhnev Doctrine has been invalidated—while at the same time reassuring Moscow that the West's political goal is not the defection of member-states from the Warsaw Pact. Perhaps at some point, the Brezhnev doctrine could yield to a joint East-West statement, formally affirming both the role of the two alliances in the maintenance of European stability and explicitly excluding the use of either alliance for the imposition of any particular ideological orthodoxy on its members.

As mentioned earlier, progress along these several lines of East-West relations will have to be matched by progress on the bilateral strategic level in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. My hope is that the START process will soon begin moving forward again. But the precondition for progress is the long overdue and badly needed U.S. decision on ICBM modernization. Let me merely reiterate the point that ending the Cold War will also require on the strategic level the effective elimination of the threat of a strategic first strike—by either side against the other—and that must be the central goal of the START process.

FOREIGN AND HOME POLICY. PARADOXES OF INTERCONNECTION

Elgiz POZDNYAKOV

WHO IS NOT FAMILIAR with the all but classic formula that domestic policy determines foreign policy? It seems that few doubt its correctness; what is more, it is considered one of the fundamental scientific tenets in understanding the essence of foreign policy.

However, I venture to point out, for all its seeming obviousness and popularity, I believe that there are few tenets in political science which are just as far from the truth as this one is. To corroborate this seemingly "heretical" thought we shall try to ascertain for starters:

IS THE DIVISION OF POLICY INTO DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CORRECT?

This question may seem frivolous, but let us not be too hasty with our conclusions. Let us examine first the meaning of claims to the effect that domestic policy determines foreign policy. Their general meaning is the same, namely, that the former functions as an external necessity with regard to the latter. And this can mean only that the laws of "foreign" policy should be subordinated to the laws of "domestic" policy and that if they conflict the former are forced to give way to the latter. This unequivocal dependence is the first thing that evokes an objection of principle in an analysis of the correlation between domestic and foreign policies.

Let me illustrate this thought with a vivid example. In the 1960s and 1970s we became actively involved in the arms race and in the pursuit of strategic parity with the USA. If the logic of subordinating foreign policy to domestic is followed, this entire race, which did not give us any benefits in terms of security and which did us obvious political damage and wore us out economically, was dictated by nothing other than our domestic policy and was its continuation, so to speak.

One cannot but be struck by the absurdity of this conclusion. The opposite is more likely the case. If this instance, like, incidentally, many others, is viewed from the standpoint of the correlation between domestic and foreign policy, something else will have to be recognised, namely that foreign policy proved to be the priority here. The status of superpower (which, moreover, is not always comprehended by us) which our state occupies in the world has forced us to pursue, with utter disregard for our possibilities, maintenance of the appropriate trappings, which include above all power politics with the entire set of means to ensure it. Since this "set" because of our economic weakness was ultimately reduced primarily to military means, this fact led to a situation where power politics gave rise to a huge military-industrial complex which itself has already come to exert the definitive influence on domestic and

Elgiz Pozdnyakov, D. Sc. (Hist.), is a head researcher of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

foreign policies. As one of the consequences of this state of affairs, excessive attention was paid to the military spheres of production, the army and armaments to the detriment of civilian production and to the detriment of the nation's social, cultural and other development programmes. This circumstance has been noted by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. "Foreign policy was as if by itself", he noted, and what remained of it and military expenditures was channelled into the civilian economy according to the "residual principle".¹

I could conceivably adduce many other examples that would call into question the notion of the one-sided dependence of foreign policy on domestic policy. It is a well-known fact, for example, that in foreign policy we energetically supported different liberation movements and human rights champions and signed Helsinki agreements, while simultaneously persecuting dissidents in our own country and suppressing any manifestation of openness and democracy in this country.

Thus, in our very first approach to the tenet on the determining role played by domestic policy or on foreign policy being the continuation of domestic policy, we encounter its patent incongruity with practice.² One can descry a close interconnection in the practical correlation of both, and all this is so. The only thing that does not exist in it is a one-sided dependence and subordination. This conclusion is borne out not only by practice but by theory as well. Start if only from the fact that the subject of both domestic and foreign policy is the same—the state. When, however, some self-sufficing importance is attached to both policies, and the determining importance to one of them—domestic policy—it turns out that one part of the policy of the subject unequivocally determines the other part of the policy of the same subject as if aside from the subject itself and the circumstances in which it lives and functions. It is in this point that an obvious incongruity is contained.

The tenet on the determining role of domestic policy directly runs counter to a well-known provision of Lenin's as well. He said: "It is fundamentally wrong, un-Marxist and unscientific to single out 'foreign policy' from policy in general, let alone counterpose foreign policy to home policy".³

There does not seem to be a single person in this country engaged in the issue of the correlation between domestic and foreign policy, who has not turned to these words of Lenin's. What is most astonishing is that they are frequently used to corroborate the tenet that domestic policy determines foreign policy. From where in the adduced words of Lenin's, one would like to know, can this idea be drawn? no matter what angle one examines them from, they do not even contain a hint to the effect. Everything is quite the contrary. Lenin here rejects out of hand counterposing domestic and foreign policies. However, it is when we contend that domestic policy determines foreign policy that we counterpose them, dividing them into two unequal coordinated parts.

Nor will any light be shed on the situation by the attempt by some scholars to regard domestic and foreign policies as some dialectical unity (the salvific formula: on the one hand—on the other! How many times it has extricated us from seemingly hopeless theoretical situations, how many times all our theoretical and practical miscalculations have been written off to the dialectic!) The whole problem here is that recognition of domestic and foreign policies as a dialectical pair in reality means simultaneous recognition of them as two mutually exclusive opposites. In this case we again run counter to the Leninist tenet and simply to the logic of things, for that matter.

How then can these obvious contradictions and incongruities be eliminated? There is evidently one way: find their cause and remove it. The cause, no matter how improbable this may seem to some, lies in

the very fact of the division of policy into domestic and foreign and in regarding them as two not only relatively independent but also unequal parts.

The seemingly simplest and most effective solution is to do away with all division of policy into parts. But this is where the hitch lies. The simultaneous existence of a state's domestic and foreign policies is a fact which no one calls into question. By denying it do we not place ourselves not only into a somewhat absurd situation but also one more difficult than the one we are trying to extricate ourselves from? And what good does this do us at all for that matter?

One could, after all, not touch anything altogether and live as we are accustomed to. Come to think of it, what difference does it make whether foreign policy determines domestic policy or vice-versa? From the layman's standpoint, it makes no difference whether the Earth revolves around the Sun or the Sun around the Earth. But for science there is a difference and it is an enormous one.

Let us return, however, to the correlation between domestic and foreign policies. I will draw an analogy to clarify my thought. It is believed that analogies in science are dangerous. Although I agree with this in principle, I will note that in a number of instances although they are not proof they often serve as an important buttress for elucidating complicated situation. Ours is precisely this.

Thus, let us imagine some individual. Any individual living in society, as has long been noted by perspicacious psychologists, behaves differently at home and outside it, i. e., at work, on the street, in public places, in company, etc. The difference in his behaviour is often striking. The person may be a tyrant at home and obedient or even servile on the job (or just the opposite); he can be gloomy and unsociable in the family and outgoing at work and be the life of the party. Anyone can adduce a host of examples of the difference of a person's behaviour at home and outside it.

Can we maintain in each of these instances that a person's behaviour at home (his "domestic policy", if you will) determines his behaviour outside it (his "foreign policy")? Many might find this posing of the issue improper. However, it does not seem such if a state's domestic and foreign policies are juxtaposed.

Without delving into a multitude of various secondary reasons behind the difference in a person's behaviour inside and outside the home, I will single out what I feel to be the two most important: a) the difference in principle between the environments in which a person realises himself and b) the person's character.

The domestic environment provides greater opportunities and scope for free expression of the individual's nature; in it there are fewer constraining elements and less impact of public opinion. Domestic life is shielded from outside scrutiny and is less sensitive to the universally recognised rules and norms of behaviour. External life is another matter: here a person, irrespective of his nature and intentions, is forced to conform in one way or another with the environment, rules of behaviour, public opinion, and the law. He is also impelled to do so by his vital interests and needs (ensuring security and satisfying his economic, social and cultural needs). They prompt him to behave in the manner customary in the given society so as not to become an outcast and not to ultimately find himself outside society.

I will note another major element which influences a person's behaviour in society—his economic standing. A person seeks to improve his material situation through various means. Depending on his own nature and the specifics of the environment, these means can vary from legal to illegal, from decent to improper.

Lastly, let us point to one more important element, a subjective element, namely, the motivation of a individual's behaviour by the individual himself. The justification of behaviour as a rule differs greatly from the behaviour itself and is usually of an apologetic nature.

In summation, it can be said that the external behaviour of any individual is conditioned, generally speaking, by three elements:

the nature of the external environment in which he lives and works, in which he realises himself as a social being;

the economic, social and cultural needs of the person and his family;

his own nature (character, temperament, upbringing, etc.).

As is readily evident from the above, the link between the domestic behaviour of the individual and his external behaviour is not of a determined nature. These are two different and relatively different types of behaviour of the same subject, each of which is determined by some totality of their even relatively independent factors. This claim not only does not rule out it, on the contrary, assumes a complex interconnection and mutual influence of one type of behaviour on the other, but this is quite another problem.

When the shift is made from the individual to the state, there is, to my mind, reason to contend by analogy that the external behaviour of a state is also defined by three elements, namely:

the nature of the external environment in which the state exists and in which it pursues its policy. This external environment is represented by, the system of inter-state relations in the entire complexity of the laws governing its functioning and development;

the political, economic, social and other needs of the state;

the political, economic and social nature of the state.

To illustrate the correlation between a state's external and domestic behaviour let us also designate the elements by which its domestic behaviour is determined on the whole. Three main elements are seen here, too:

the nature of the internal environment. This can include the social and class composition of the population, the nature of the relations between the classes, the degree of the socio-political differentiation of the political forces in the country, the nature of interethnic relations, etc.;

the needs of the political, economic and social development of the state and society;

the socio-economic nature of the state and the nature and essence of state power.

All this gives ground for maintaining that a state's external behaviour is largely determined by various factors. Given a socio-economic nature of the state that is constant for both instances, the main factor determining the basic difference in its behaviour domestically and in the world arena is the fundamental difference in the environments and conditions in which both are effected.

In fact, if we examine both environments (external and domestic) even superficially, it is obvious that they are entirely different, each having its own social nature and specific laws governing its functioning and development. The state's attitude to them is different in principle as well. The state, say, possesses a monopoly on political power only within the confines of its own national boundaries. Outside them it not only does not possess this power; it is one of many basically equal states which are politically independent of one another and the relations among which are based not on subordination but on cooperation or rivalry, compromise or contradictions, the search for mutually acceptable solutions or confrontation.

These circumstances alone cannot but make for differences in the domestic and external political behaviour of states, which is manifest in

the different goals and tasks facing them inside and outside it and in the different means for ensuring them.

Nor can one fail to take into account the circumstance that a state's domestic political activity reflects its true socio-economic essence and that of the regime of political power more revealingly than does its external political activity. The latter has to reckon much more with world public opinion, the conditions of the external environment, and matters of military and economic security which depend to a great extent not on an individual state but on external circumstances beyond its control. That is why the state is often compelled to shroud its external activity in more respectable, democratic and progressive garb which in principle may not be intrinsic to it and which it can easily shed in its domestic policies.

In the light of the above the inanity and, I would say, political naivete of the view of the correlation between domestic and foreign policies according to which the latter is the continuation of the former is obvious. To contend this means not to see the difference between the domestic and external environments of the state's activity and to render them identical.

Let us stop here for a moment, however. The reader may be getting a sneaking suspicion that during his exposition the author has supplanted notions which has confused the situation even more. Indeed, I began with an analysis of the correlation between domestic and foreign policies and later, seemingly unnoticeably, proceeded to the correlation between the domestic and external behaviour of a state without clarifying the matter. If such a suspicion has arisen it is quite justified, and it is not that I intend to go over to this issue, since it would be difficult to continue without explaining the differences between these notions and without elucidating their interconnection. As the first step it is necessary to explain how they are correlated.

POLICY AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY

AS THE READER REMEMBERS, I maintained above that in order to eliminate contradictions and confusion in the correlation under review it is necessary above all not to divide policies into domestic and foreign. However, how is this to be done and what can be offered in exchange?

To answer this question we will have to return to the aforementioned tenet of Lenin's. Aside from a categorical objection to counterpoising external policy to domestic policy, it also contains an objection to singling out foreign policy from "policy in general". I would like to focus on this point in particular. I will also note that although in this specific instance Lenin does not speak of the inadmissibility of singling out domestic policy from "policy in general" either, this is assumed by the entire sense of what has been said.

The main question here is the following: Why is it inadmissible to single out domestic and foreign policies from "policy in general"? I believe that this very word combination gives reason for unequivocally defining policy in its general Marxist understanding, as a prime part of the politico-juridical superstructure. As such, politics reflects the socio-economic essence of the society in question or, in other words, is a capitalisation of the deep-going economic interests of the ruling class.

All of the above applies chiefly to the state and its policies. It is they that most fully and generally embody this "policy in general". As such, they are integral and indivisible, no matter what sphere of relations they are aimed at. Their division into different parts is artificial and ultimately incorrect.

The conclusion to be drawn is the following. The policies of a state

(since we are dealing precisely with them) are indeed integral and indivisible, this being a socio-economic fact, so to speak. Then again its political activity, in which "policy in general" finds its practical embodiment, is multifaceted. The political activity of a state is carried out in different spheres of public relations with which it interacts in one way or another and which, generally speaking, can be reduced to two large aggregated spheres: the system of internal political, economic and social relations and the system of inter-state relations. Pursuing its interests, and thereby its policies, in practice in the province of domestic relations, the state thus implements its internal political activity; by pursuing its interests in the sphere of external relations it executes its external political activity.

The notions of domestic and external political activity of the state thus reflect the reality which is defined, albeit not quite adequately, in the political lexicon as "domestic" and "foreign" policy. The former outlines more precisely the phenomenon of interest to us. If only to start with the fact that they obviate altogether the need to divide policy into parts. These notions adequately reflect the nature of the state as a political organisation with its inherent political activity that is multifarious in form and content. The distinction between both types of activity is natural and inevitable and does not require special stipulations or theoretical point-stretching every time, as is the case in analyses of the correlation between domestic and foreign policies. Relations of one-sided coordination or the immanent primacy of one over the other do not exist between these two types of the state's political activity: they are relatively independent even though they do exert an influence upon each other. At the same time, depending on domestic and external circumstances, the state can give preference to one type of its political activity or the other and redistribute resources accordingly.

Let us touch upon another important aspect of the problem. The political activity (domestic and external) of states is not something purely utilitarian. All social activity is purposeful; therefore, is presupposes not only practical actions of the subject but also the totality of political views pertaining to it which reflect in the form of conceptions, doctrines, etc., the desired content and orientation of political activity. Marx pointed to this dualism in his time. "In the *executive power* we always have *two things*," he wrote, "the actual conduct of affairs and the political considerations behind it, as a second actual consciousness".⁴

This tenet is very important, as the entire record of history, ours in particular, bespeaks the fact that both these elements—activity and its political justification—correspond to each other very rarely. A correlation between them is encountered in life no more frequently than between what is desired and what is real. At the same time, political justification also performs specific functions: it often serves as a cover for the real goals of practical political activity as well as the rationalisation of it. This applies equally to the domestic and external political activity of the state.

No matter how true the tenet that states, like people, are judged not by their words but by their actions may be, the state's motivation of its political activity in practice frequently conceals the essence of the latter and acts as all but the sole criterion for assessing its foreign or domestic policies. What is more, it is the political motivation that is at times taken for policy itself. It is important to note here that any manipulating with the term "policy" is admissible at the level of motivation. Here the legitimacy of dividing policy into parts is demonstrable just as easily as that of the contention that foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy and that the latter determines the former, as well as vice-versa.

When, however, the justification is based on ideological dogmas to boot, it can exert a destructive influence on political activity itself, dis-

torting it. In this case an incongruity arises not only between motivation and reality but also between practical political activity and the same reality. This state of affairs can lead to a credibility crisis with regard to the policies of the state in question. Our own experience can provide many sad examples in this sense.

At the level of political and ideological justification we have always proceeded from the full harmony between our domestic and foreign policies which are called upon in both instances to serve the interests of the people, although in fact quite the opposite often took place. At the level of justification it used to be believed that war is alien to the nature of socialism altogether, so the aspiration to foster world peace was declared as our only concern on the international arena, although in practice we were active in arms race in nuclear, chemical and other types of weaponry beyond the bounds of reasonable sufficiency and thus prepared, together with our foes, the material underpinning of war, undermining our own economy in the process. When, however, the justification and political activity ran counter to reality and triggered off crisis phenomena within and without we put the blame not on them but on the intrigues of all sorts of hostile and destructive forces ("enemies of the people" inside the country and the reactionary imperialist forces outside it) that were hampering the implementation of wonderful ideals and policies.

This state of affairs inflicted a great deal of damage on the domestic and external political activity of the USSR. Hamstrung on the one hand by ideological considerations and orientations that were divorced from reality and, on the other, by the need to reckon with and somehow react to the demands that were constantly being advanced by the very course of life, domestic and foreign-policy activity became a hostage of both; it was sidetracked and lost its sense of perspective; it became reflex, increasingly ceasing to meet the fundamental interests and needs of society and the state.

In this sense the new political thinking can be regarded as a revolutionary attempt to change the essence of political motivation and bring domestic and foreign-policy moves in line with this change and both together in line with present-day realities.

Strictly speaking, we could end on this note our discourse on the correlation between domestic and foreign policies (and, to be more exact, on the correlation between the domestic and foreign-policy activity) of the state.

I would like to add only one point: let the reader not think that I am suggesting that the terms "domestic" and "foreign" policy be immediately replaced by "domestic-" and "foreign-policy" activity. They have solidly entered the political vocabulary and there is no need to change them. The attendant contradictions and incongruities arise solely during their theoretical analysis. They are no hindrance in their practical application; it should only be kept in mind that they are in fact a semantic expression of such complex phenomena as the domestic- and foreign-policy activity of a state in their indissoluble link with political justification. It is in this sense that these notions are used in this article.

For all the importance of elucidating this matter, the main problem appears to lie elsewhere. Often concealed behind all discourses on the correlation between domestic and foreign policies is perhaps a not always clearly defined desire to identify and scientifically explain them.

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS IN THE FORMATION OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES

THIS IS A PROBLEM that is of true scientific and practical interest. It has become especially significant of late in connection with the changes

taking place in the world and with the restructuring campaign under way in the USSR and its influence on the outside world and, conversely, that of the outside world on perestroika.

While we were a society closed off from the outside world and were cut off from the development of intercourse (political, economic, social, etc.), everything was much simpler. It used to be believed that by the very fact of our existence we exerted a positive influence on the outside world, altering it in the direction required. We rejected out of hand the idea of the interdependability of the world as an ill-intentioned invention of bourgeois science that concealed the idea of a convergence of socialism and capitalism.

Of late, under the pressure of objective processes, especially those linked with the needs of the internationalisation of production and with the danger of nuclear and ecological catastrophes, seemingly eternal "iron" and other curtains that divided the world into bellicose states and their groupings have begun to crumble. The traditional distinction between the internal world and the external world has eroded as well. The development of transport and communications has made easily penetrable formerly unshakeable frontiers of states—the foundation of strict sovereignty over their territory and population. This has been furthered by the ever growing need for broad international economic, scientific and technological, and cultural exchange.

As a consequence of these developments the foremost problems of national life—economic, power-generation, ecological, food and many others have taken on external as well as internal aspects and dimensions. What is more, it has become obvious that they cannot be satisfactorily solved within a narrow national framework.

Hence the concept of interdependability. From the standpoint of the question under review, it means recognition of the close connection and interaction between the internal and external factors of the state's development. The impact of these on the formation of both its domestic and foreign policies and their degree depends in each individual instance not on the a priori recognised priority of one group of factors over the other, but on concrete historical circumstances. Priority can be enjoyed by either group of factors depending on them.

Perestroika and the attending political, economic and social changes in the country are exerting an influence not only on the formation of Soviet foreign policy but on the entire international situation as well. Conversely, the restructuring drive and the domestic and foreign policies corresponding to it are largely conditioned by modern world processes, i.e., external factors.

Interdependability is a universal phenomenon. It cannot be confined to some corner of the world or a group of states. It does not depend on whether it is recognised or not; it is of a general systematic nature and is the main characteristic of any systematic relations no matter what their nature may be. By implication, a knowledge and understanding of the laws of policy is based on a knowledge and understanding of the laws of interdependability. A politician who fails to understand them is not the master of his actions; he is a victim of and slave to circumstances. He becomes a "guinea pig" in the hands of external forces whose essence he does not comprehend and which he is powerless to control.

If we take the sphere of external political relations, the first and elementary conclusion to be drawn from the law of interdependability is that there are no, and cannot be, external (and today internal, too) actions by a state that are isolated and do not affect the outside world, however limited they may seem. Any miscalculation in foreign policy, any mistake, haste or presumption in actions can have the most fateful consequences and lead to irreparable losses and, today to a nuclear cataclysm. In this

connection it is appropriate to recall the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 as an example of ignoring, or misunderstanding, the laws of interdependence. However, the classic example of a complete lack of understanding of the laws of interdependence, the classic example of complete political incompetence was the decision to commit our troops in Afghanistan.

I would like to single out another important facet of the interdependence of internal and external factors. Today we often talk and write about the establishment in international relations of the priority of universal interests over class, party and other ones. However, it should be clearly realised that there cannot be such a priority in international relations until it exists within societies, until societies themselves are built on the priority of universal interests. Let me note the following point in this connection. We often explain the priority of universal interests and values by the fact that the threat of total destruction hangs over humanity. However, I believe that this argument is flawed either by its political naivete or by a desire to sidestep the real reasons why these values have been forgotten. Start with the fact that the threat of total destruction hardly "hangs" over the world in and of itself. If we are going to use this verb, it *was hung* over it by the USA, ourselves and other states actively involved in the nuclear arms race. The arms race has its own reasons. Since the world is divided into hostile groupings and blocs, and since confrontation continues in it and intolerance and hostility among states, peoples, ideologies and religions which are constantly whipping up this arms race is preserved, the threat of universal destruction is also hardly capable of stopping forces from unleashing war, including nuclear war, just as the threat of capital punishment is hardly able to prevent murders. But since all this is preserved, what priority of universal interests is there to speak of?

It is hardly correct to render the priority of universal interests dependent on the threat of total annihilation. They are of value in and of themselves and should be worked for irrespective of whether the threat of universal destruction hangs over humanity or not. I feel there is only one way to struggle for their establishment: by removing the split in the world, confrontation, intolerance and everything else that is dividing peoples, nations and states today.

Nowadays we are talking about the need to democratise and humanise international relations, but neither can exist until relations within society are democratised and humanised. The same applies to freedom of choice in international relations; this principle is impracticable externally until it is realised domestically, until freedom of convictions, freedom of conscience, and freedom of political, economic and social choices are guaranteed to the individual within society. Until there is this correlation between the domestic and external aspects of the state's activity, there will always arise a suspicion of insincerity and hypocrisy of proclaimed intentions and goals. However, the time is past when an unseemly domestic policy could be veiled behind a respectable foreign policy.

It follows from the fact of the interrelation and interdependence of internal and external factors that not only is our successful internal development indissoluble from the outside world; without the creation of a system of the broadest possible ties with it, it will simply reach a deadlock. This, among other things, is why further pursuing military rivalry with the West would mean not merely political and ideological narrowmindedness but also complete disregard for the interests of the nation.

The fact that the prospects for our foreign policy today depend to a large extent on the success or failure of our restructuring drive is taken for granted nowadays. Whether we take the idea of a common European home or the prospects for relations with the USA, Japan or any other

country, they cannot be distanced from progress in the country's internal development and from changes in our conceptual views of ourselves, the outside world, and the interconnection of the two. And vice-versa.

The common European home concept seems to immanently contain the idea of an all-round link between and interdependence of the internal and external development of states. It serves to define the general economic, social, legal and democratic level of states without which, for one thing, the existence of a truly modern, archaism-free society is inconceivable and which, for another, can only ensure the unification of these societies into something whole and integrated which can conventionally be called a common European home.

Today the notion of interdependability is indivisible from the world economy. It is increasingly becoming an integral organism, and no state can develop normally outside it. Without establishing a wide range of ties and without integrating into it we are doomed to vegetation. For its part, integration requires the broadest possible development of what can be called convergent processes, i. e., the development of common forms of cooperation and mutual enrichment. These processes have in fact already begun. However, it is important that they develop orderly, carefully, without a fear of violating "ideological purity", and become an intelligent purposeful policy that knows what it wants and what it is aspiring for.

Here it is imperative to rid ourselves of our former illusions, myths and dogmatic schemes. It is difficult even to imagine involvement in the building of a common European home on the basis of the slogan "Workers of the world, unite!" This is not merely a slogan—behind it stand ideological confrontation, the concept of class struggle in international relations and the rivalry between socialism and capitalism in the world arena, and rigid unequivocal notions of socialism and capitalism and their incompatibility that drew their beginnings in the 19th century.

This is not the place to provide a detailed criticism of all these notions and concepts (this has already been done in part in a number of articles by Soviet authors). All I will note is that major changes are taking place in their assessment today. The concept of class struggle in international relations has in effect been rejected, and the concept of the struggle of the two opposing systems is being reviewed; at least it has been admitted that it is not the determinant of the modern epoch. However, for all the definitive importance of the latter conclusion, one cannot confine oneself to palliatives here. It is my own deep conviction that we need to surmount this entire scheme, one elaborated by Stalin, of the rivalry between the two systems as being, at the present time, erroneous theoretically and harmful in practical terms.

This concept runs counter to present-day realities and the idea of the interdependence of the world; therefore, as long as it exists it will be a heavy burden to the new political thinking, hampering all our aspirations for universal cooperation. As long as it exists, we will be talking with the West in different languages, and any attempts to build a joint home will definitely develop into a modern version of the Tower of Babel. The search for and finding of a common language for its part presupposes a tearing down of all the obstacles and fences which divide the two worlds, a development of all-round ties and intercourse, and gradual integration into the world economy and into the common flow of history.

Broad vistas for Soviet foreign policy, too, are opening up along this path. Progress on this path will give it the scope, initiatives and creative impetuses it needs and rid it of the fettering binds of ideological rigidity and petty reflexiveness; this progress will make it possible to elaborate the central conceptual direction which, embodied in concrete plans for disarmament, economic development and cooperation in other fields, will

impart to it the deep meaning and concrete goal without which disarmament, economic cooperation and interaction with the outside world in other spheres will hardly be able to extend beyond the framework of the structures and practice of inter-state relations that took shape during the Cold War years.

However, a change in these structures is impossible without fundamental transformations in our political, economic and social system, without the formation of a truly parliamentary democracy with its system of checks and balances, without an effective system of control over executive power and, last but not least, it is impossible without the full triumph of law in the entire life of the state and society, and without the elimination of the monopoly of ideology and its oppressive influence on the economy, politics and other spheres of society.

All these facets of domestic policy are transformed externally through foreign-policy activity or other means; they are embodied in international relations and return to us in the form of the appropriate positive or negative reaction by the outside world. These are some of the specifics of the action of the law of interdependability. It sometimes gives us not very pleasant surprises; the less we understand the laws of interdependability and the less we take them into account the more unpleasant and unexpected these surprises are. That is why it is so important to base our domestic and foreign policies on it and to correlate our goals and the means of attaining them with it. If we observe these conditions we will have more reason to count on success in achieving both individual and more common goals and a balance of interests in relations between states on the creation of fundamentally new inter-state relations and their democratic and humane development, as well as on the more successful elaboration and implementation of the strategy of domestic political development.

¹ See *Arguments and Facts*, No. 18, 1989, p. 2 (in Russian).

² In his article "The Stereotypes We Abandon" V. Stupishin focuses on the dubiousness of the tenet that foreign policy is the continuation of domestic policy. See *International Affairs*, 1989, No. 7, pp. 28-29.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964, p. 43.

⁴ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 120.

THE FINNISH CENTRE PARTY, A UNIQUE PARTY

Paavo VÄYRYNEN

THE SPECTRUM OF FINNISH political parties is similar to that of many West European countries. Operating in the country are a large social democratic party, the Finnish Social Democratic Party (FSDP), and a large right-wing, conservative party, the National Coalition Party (NCP). The positions of the Communist Party have weakened, particularly since the 1960s, but even today this party is stronger than its opposite numbers in many other West European countries. Political life in Finland is characterised by the existence of a strong peasant party, the Finnish Centre Party, which plays an important role.

Political parties like the Finnish Centre only exist in Nordic countries. The centrist parties of Sweden and Norway are relatively weak, compared with their Finnish analogue. In Denmark it is the Venstre that holds centrist positions. The Progressive Party of Iceland is more like the Finnish Centre than any other Nordic sister party. There are no such parties in any other country as far as their social background and essence are concerned.

The reason why centrist parties sprang up in precisely the Nordic countries was distinctive political conditions. Although the feudal system extended partly to Northern Europe, agriculture in the region was based mostly on family farms. And while rich landowners united afterwards to defend their interests and exercise their will by joining conservative parties founded by the urban bourgeoisie, landless people joined socialist alignments formed by the industrial proletariat. Rural inhabitants realised that the parties formed in the cities and functioning primarily among city dwellers would never appreciate objectives important to the peasantry and so would not fight for them.

Thus peasant centrist parties came into being in all Nordic countries. In Finland it was the Agrarian Union (1906), founded where independent peasants made up a relative majority among the population, that is, in Karelia and Pohjanmaa. Where big landowners were fairly numerous, the party's positions were weak at first. Centrist ideas did not win support there until after World War II—a result of the settlement of evacuated families. In recent years the Finnish Centre has also gained noticeable support in those areas although these are still dominated by right-wing and left-wing parties.

The Agrarian Union was based on the strong positions held by the peasantry. Nevertheless, this party has been open to all from the outset. It tried—as its name suggests—to group all rural inhabitants irrespective of profession or social class. Ever since it was founded, it has included blue and white collar workers and small entrepreneurs. Santeri Alkio, known as an ideologue of the party, was a trader by profession. The range of the party's supporters widened steadily.

Paavo Väyrynen (b. 1946) is Chairman of the Finnish Centre Party (Keskustapuolue). A member of parliament since 1970, he served repeatedly as a cabinet minister. He was Foreign Minister from 1977 to 1982 and from 1983 to 1987. He contributed this article to International Affairs.

Although the party changed its name—first to Centre Party and then to Finnish Centre—and although it worked to extend the range of its supporters, the peasants' confidence in it grew. The party now has the backing of roughly two-thirds of the peasantry. But as structural changes have led to a decrease in the proportion of peasants, their share among those who vote for the party now stands at about 30 per cent. Some two-thirds of the party's supporters are working people and the rest, employers.

After the 1987 general election, the Finnish Centre found itself outside the government in spite of its electoral victory. Since then it has improved its standing as an opposition. During the latest general election, it won 17.6 per cent of the vote but now it is plainly supported by more than 20 per cent of the electorate. The presidential and communal elections held in 1988 as well as numerous opinion polls show that the Finnish Centre goes on contending with the FSDP and NCP for the role of Finland's largest political party. To be sure, this depends primarily on the actual policy of various parties but it also reflects changes in people's thinking.

IN TERMS OF SOCIAL BACKGROUND, the Finnish Centre is a unique national party. And I must add that its ideas and programme, too, are distinctive, for they set it apart from both right-wing and left-wing forces.

The FC is at once non-socialist and non-capitalist. It considers that the country's economic life should be based on private property and private business. But it is also agreeable—with certain reservations—to business activity by the state and communes. Thus we want a system based on a mixed economy. The economy should not be completely free. Society should set limits to business activity. The FC takes a most negative view of economic centralisation. Concentration of jobs and people in big cities should be regulated primarily by a policy aimed at developing the countryside and supporting its vital forces. To prevent concentration of capital and power in the economic sphere, it is necessary to steadfastly support small private proprietors and small employers. The activity of cooperatives is prominent in the FCP's economic programmes. The economic structure of the country should be decentralised. The party also favours decentralisation in government and may therefore be said to aspire to a society which may be called a decentralised social system.

The FCP's concept of social development is based on the humanist idea embraced by the party. Accentuating humanism, the party refuses to support narrowly materialist ideas. It stresses the importance of man's spiritual well-being as well as of sound human relations.

At a certain juncture, it seemed that people were beginning to repudiate humanist ideas. They have been drawn to materialist values. All over the world, an effort is being made to raise living standards, to increase consumption. New technology makes it possible to offer more and more new tempting commodities which prompt people to consume more.

If consumption could grow continuously there would be no more hope for humanism. While many are aware of the voids created by consumer goods culture and of its anti-human character, they find it hard to control their requirements.

Now what does man really require? According to democratic principles, everyone determines his requirements by himself. This seems to imply that a society ruled by the people should be able to meet all requirements. But reality is not as simple as that. Even the best social

system is not based on people's rule, especially where authority is centralised. There is no better solution than democracy, however, and the task is to at least seek perfection within its framework, using decentralisation—radical decentralisation—as the chief means.

"Fortunately", nature cannot sustain the steadily increasing consumption by the planet's fast-growing population. The environment around us has already been damaged to a considerable degree. New technology has helped and will go on helping save natural resources and protect the environment. But it alone cannot solve all of humanity's urgent problems. The development trend of human society must be altered if our children and future generations are to be able to meet their material requirements.

There is a need for a revolution in values and goals. We need to end the omnipotence of materialist consumer culture and to strive for a society appreciating spiritual factors, a society in which human relations would grow spiritually and achieve harmony. In countries where material well-being is inadequate, its growth is a twofold task, being a prerequisite for spiritual well-being.

Humanity must necessarily face up to the problem of changes enhancing humanist ideas and reducing material values. In the era of industrialisation, it was the need for material efficiency that led to a centralised society. But the situation is changing. Information society does not require major production facilities or organisations, does not need to mass workers in large centres. The more production is decentralised, the better for information society. Environmental and sociological factors likewise confirm the need for decentralisation.

These are, in brief, the ideological reasons which I think explain increased support for the Finnish Centre over the recent period. A party which many had expected to disappear as a consequence of structural changes has proved to be a growing force of information society.

IN THE FOREIGN POLICY SPHERE, the party's roots lie in the peaceful way of life of the peasantry and other rural inhabitants. As a national party, the FCP has never felt strong sympathy for or antipathy against other countries or the parties in power there. A friendly attitude to all is a tradition of the Finnish Centre. It is the FCP that has always sought neutrality.

The first foreign political crisis experienced by Finland was the civil war in the initial period of its independent development. It was primarily an internecine war between Reds and Whites. Its foreign political aspect consisted in the presence of Russian forces whose members backed the Reds and which the Whites wanted to be withdrawn. The civil war in Finland may be described as internal strife between the Left and the Right in areas where large-scale ownership of land predominated and there were no independent peasants nor Centrists at all. The war involved major forces of a peasant centrist orientation siding with the Whites. It aggravated the split into right and left. The Agrarian Union saw its principal aim in easing this contradiction and consolidating the nation.

The foreign political situation had its effect on the formation of Finnish statehood. The Right wanted a monarchy headed by a member of the German Keiser's family. Its plan was so close to realisation that a king was chosen. It miscarried due to the defeat of Germany in World War I. The plan had a manifest foreign political bias, being designed to make Finland a German ally. The situation was truly abnormal at the time. All left-wing MPs with the exception of one Social Democrat were

absent, most of them being in prison since the end of the civil war. The king was chosen on the basis of an unlawful interpretation of the Constitution. The Agrarian Union was the only parliamentary party to vote unanimously for a republic throughout. In terms of foreign policy, this meant supporting a policy of neutrality and resisting a policy in favour of alliances.

After World War II, the Finnish Centre's foreign policy principles benefited the framing of Finnish foreign policy. The Agrarian Union played a decisive role along with the Communists in the formation and implementation of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line. This line grew step by step into a policy of neutrality. The FCP and above all Urho Kekkonen, our most renowned politician of all times, made a decisive contribution to this process.

The Paasikivi-Kekkonen line passed through several stages. From the period immediately following the war to the mid-1950s, it was known as the Paasikivi line. Urho Kekkonen's name was first associated with it in 1955. But the name of Finland's foreign policy line in its present, complete form became established only gradually.

The fact that Urho Kekkonen's name was added to the designation of the foreign policy pursued by Finland in postwar years meant taking account of two circumstances. First, during the war, he and Juho Paasikivi were among those firmly shaping and implementing this line. It was particularly important to point out that the new trend in Finnish policy was a line upheld namely by Paasikivi and Kekkonen. Second, the new and extended name was aimed at emphasising continuity. In this way an effort was made to convince the Soviet Union and other countries still more that a change in the leadership of the Finnish state would not result in a change of foreign policy line.

While Finnish policy came to be renamed the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line as an indication of continuity, there were certain distinctions between the two presidents as to foreign policy. However, they were unrelated to the main issue of our foreign policy, namely, our attitude to the Soviet Union. Under Juho Paasikivi, Finnish foreign policy gave priority to independent statehood and national security. Finland made its principal choice in the security sphere, and it was on the basis of this choice that the country worked to strengthen its international standing.

To safeguard its independence, Finland adopted a security policy decision of principle by refusing to join any military political alignment. This was preferable as a means of keeping the country out of any future crisis or war. Hence Finland's aspiration to neutrality.

Finland also had to solve the problem of safeguarding its security in the eastern sector, for that was where the Finns had often found themselves involved in hostilities. The problem was solved by signing a Finno-Soviet Pact of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. Although similar in name to other treaties signed by the Soviet Union with other countries, this pact is unique in content. It does not contradict Finland's desire for neutrality. This is seen in the articles of the pact as well as in its preamble, which explicitly takes into consideration Finland's aspiration to stay out of contradictions between the great powers. The pact serves its purpose well. It guarantees the security of the north-western frontier of the Soviet Union, thereby providing a basis for mutual confidence. Furthermore, it has put an end to speculation about Finland's international standing. We owe it to this pact that the two neighbours are cooperating on a large scale.

The groundwork for Finnish-Soviet relations was laid during President Paasikivi's term in office. They benefited greatly from the transfer in 1955 of the territory leased by the Soviet Union on the Porkkala peninsula, a transfer effected ahead of the stipulated term. The event

ended the emergency resulting from the war and restored to Finland all external attributes of an independent state.

Finland pursued a consistent security policy on the basis of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line both under Urho Kekkonen and afterwards, when Mauno Koivisto became President. This line keeps the country out of blocs, now as in the past. Finland, which is building up a completely independent defence system of its own, has the prerequisites for defending its territorial integrity. Its every move is intended to strengthen confidence that in a crisis situation it is going to proceed according to the Pact of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. Cooperation based on the pact is active and is expanding in various fields.

The chief foreign policy issue of Finland under Paasikivi was the attitude to the Soviet Union. Other foreign policy sectors were passive in this context and were approached very cautiously. However, the emphasis on caution was partly due to Paasikivi's character. At the end of his presidency, it became clear that Kekkonen was already seeking a bolder and more active line of action.

It was not until the end of the Paasikivi period and the beginning of the Kekkonen presidency that it became necessary and possible to extend and step up Finnish foreign policy. A solid basis had been laid for steady progress in Finnish-Soviet relations. It was under the new President that Finland became a member of the UN and the Nordic Council. Its cooperation at international level intensified in other sectors as well. Finland was invited to take a stand on various international issues and to participate in diverse forms of international cooperation.

In extending the area of its foreign political activity, Finland had to decide on the principles of taking a position on and participating in international affairs. Being non-aligned, it naturally developed a relevant policy accordingly, with due regard to its national interests. In line with this approach, it seeks to stay out of contradictions between the great powers and to promote good relations with all countries. Its foreign policy is not passive. Finland contributes actively to peace and international cooperation. Its policy of neutrality is primarily an instrument of achieving foreign policy objectives.

The extension and intensification of Finnish foreign policy made the Soviet Union suspect that Finland's neutrality was aimed at depreciating or even at renouncing the 1948 Pact. One reason for these suspicions must have been that the principles and essence of our policy of neutrality had not been stated explicitly enough.

To appreciate the substance of this policy, it may be useful to examine it from two standpoints. I have already noted that in seeking independence, Finland keeps out of blocs and that it would like to stay out of any possible crisis or war. Its aspiration to neutrality does not contradict the 1948 Pact provided that it is interpreted as "seeking complete security". After all, throughout these years, Finland has reaffirmed its loyalty to the obligations assumed by it in signing the pact. I think the two sides are at one on this interpretation. The Soviet Union recognises that Finland is outside blocs and seeks to stay out of international conflicts. The important thing, however, is that the Pact of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance be respected by both countries.

The other, "general" aspect of Finnish neutrality has no bearing on Finnish or Soviet security or on bilateral relations between our two countries. In taking a stand on international disputes and joining in international cooperation, Finland does its best to stay out of contradictions between the interests of the great powers and to maintain good relations with all countries. Thereby it strengthens its international positions and provides more favourable conditions for activity in the interest of peace.

and development. This is in keeping with the interests of other countries as well as with the spirit of international cooperation.

Finland's policy of neutrality, if understood and implemented correctly, does not run counter to the 1948 Pact or good Finnish-Soviet relations generally. It exists alongside the pact as a notable part of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line. At the same time, thanks to its neutrality and its policy of non-alignment, Finland has done much for the international community in the matter of strengthening peace and furthering cooperation, especially in Europe.

When, in the mid-fifties, Finnish foreign policy began to expand it concentrated on nearby regions at first and later, on the policy of achieving security. In that period, President Kekkonen put forward two famous proposals: for creating a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe and for demilitarising the Finnish-Norwegian border. These initiatives are still relevant. The proposal for a nuclear-free zone was spelled out on numerous occasions and was the object of vigorous discussion. Currently all Nordic countries support in principle the idea of establishing such a zone but, even so, its creation is a matter for the future. Work in this direction goes on.

Ever since the late 1960s, Finnish foreign policy activity has covered the whole of Europe. Finland was entrusted with a responsible task in connection with the convening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. As a neutral state, it took charge of the holding of the first and third phases of the conference. Operating within the framework of this process in common with other neutral states as well as with non-aligned countries, it helped advance the European process.

The 1970s saw Finland sign trade and economic treaties with the Soviet Union and other CMEA countries, on the one hand, and with the EEC, on the other. This was done with due regard to the need to ensure loyalty to the principles of Finland's security policy. Accordingly, it was only a treaty on free trade that Finland signed with the EEC.

Ever since the late 1970s, Finland has also been active beyond Europe. An important part of this activity is aid for developing countries, which Finland is going to render at the rate of 0.7 per cent of its GNP as recommended by the UN. Our country has been expanding cooperation with many other countries also for reasons of trade policy, in view of the existence of fast-growing markets outside Europe. There are political reasons as well, for it is important for Finland to have first-hand information on the situation in various parts of the globe and to publicise its role and its foreign policy. The extension of foreign policy areas for Finland did not imply that the level attained at the initial stage should be lowered afterwards. The area encompassed by foreign policy activity was widened in response to real requirements and with due regard to new material possibilities.

Finnish foreign policy draws a clear cut line between priorities. The main thing for the country is to preserve its independence and security. Now as before, relations with the Soviet Union are of paramount importance to us. Relations with neighbours have always been central to our foreign policy. Finland will continue doing all in its power to contribute to security in the North of Europe and throughout the continent. There also exist other problems, of course, but they are of secondary importance in comparison with those listed above. It is a tradition of the foreign policy initiated by Kekkonen to try to anticipate future challenges and to act accordingly.

The FCP actively supports the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line to help the country meet in the future challenges that will be of still greater global significance and will affect the whole of humanity.

The Finnish Centre has understandably been very active on issues

concerning international cooperation in environmental protection. Its supporters include not only peasants but many other people who directly depend on nature for a living or live "close to nature". They realise that the ecosystem is unprotected. Their lives, like those of their children, depend on whether or not renewable natural resources will be conserved. The Brundtland Commission set up by the UN had advanced the idea of sustainable development. The people in question appreciate the idea, for it concerns their traditional environment.

The Finnish Centre advocates raising international cooperation in environmental protection from the level of officials to that of governments, for it wants the problem to be dealt with as a key international issue. It has proposed that the UN adopt a recommendation that industrial nations, while continuing their aid to developing countries, use, say, 0.5 per cent of their GNP for environmental needs at international level. Finland's national interests prompt it to be particularly active in environmental protection. It lives and will go on living off its forests, so to speak, as well as off other renewable natural resources.

Finland's activity should cover the whole of Europe also in the future. Important environmental protection treaties have already been signed but they only mark the beginning of the widespread cooperation to come. The peoples of Europe are shocked because the environment is becoming inhabitable. The continent is our common home in respect of precisely the environment, as President Mikhail Gorbachev has put it. Pollution and changes in nature cut across borders—common home has no walls. A deteriorating environment makes countries cooperate more extensively, adopt new restrictive standards and search for funds to spend them on environmental protection.

I feel certain that environmental problems promote cooperation in other fields as well, above all in the economy, technology, transport and energy. To solve environmental problems, we all must look into the entire "development process", into all human activities impinging on natural resources and the environment. In Europe as elsewhere, we must move on to a course of development that does not damage nature. This calls for all-European cooperation. In accordance with the philosophy of the European process cultivated in Finland, it is right to affirm that growing cooperation of this kind contributes to peace and paves the way for progress in disarmament. The destruction threatening the environment in all European nations may well help or, indeed, make them start vigorous and wide-ranging cooperation regardless of ideological or political boundaries.

The challenges facing all of humanity are still greater. The need to meet them is giving rise to a new sphere of activity in the form of universal, supranational politics. Cooperation at this level is prompted by common interests but developing along with it is a universal culture, a sense of union and common responsibility. States are the main but not the only exponents of universal politics.

It is safe to say that universal politics came into existence with the founding of the UN. From the very beginning, the organisation's chief mission has been to safeguard peace, protect human rights and contribute to economic, social and cultural progress. This work did not assume an active character until the 1960s. Subsequently the UN grappled with other tasks, with environmental protection as one of the most important. Activity in this area did not begin until the 1970s.

Humanity is faced with serious challenges in all the above spheres of UN activity. Although Europe has enjoyed peace for a long time now, wars on other continents are part of everyday life. Notwithstanding some progress in disarmament, the arms race persists on a clearly abnormal scale. It follows that we all will have our hands full fighting for peace

and disarmament. I think problems of development and environmental protection are rising steadily to the level of the above problems.

Today's world is home to roughly five billion people. In the next decade, the population of the globe is expected to increase to 10 or even about 15 billion unless demographic policy becomes more effective before long.

Food production for a population growing so fast will be a serious problem. Agricultural production can be increased in many regions but is affected by many negative factors. Communities and roads "eat up" some of the finest arables, soil erosion hits many important agricultural areas, deserts are expanding fast, and artificial irrigation areas are losing in effectiveness. People everywhere want to raise their "living standards", which implies growing goods consumption and hence a rapid decrease in non-renewable natural resources and the deterioration of living conditions. Great damage is caused to the environment by steadily increasing power generation capacities. They pollute the environment and are responsible for the greenhouse effect with its disastrous concomitants.

I trust humanity will continue developing techniques making it possible to save natural resources and effectively protect the environment. Still, the vector of development must be changed. It is essential to moderate population growth, save non-renewable natural resources, conserve nature and ensure the restoration of renewable natural resources. Aid for developing countries should be based on the principles of reasonable development.

Man's economy must be adapted to nature's. We must change over to a course of development causing no damage to nature. Man's aspiration to go farther and higher must be transformed from goods consumption to the creation of a humane society. Reorientation to nature-conserving development calls for efforts at both national and international level. International cooperation is particularly important, for nations will accept changes only if others do likewise. This makes it a key task to intensify and expand international cooperation in environmental protection. Once they realise the need to conserve nature, nations and the whole of humanity will learn step by step to think and act according to the laws of nature.

THE FINNISH CENTRE, along with contributing its share to the development and realisation of the country's foreign policy, has always participated in international affairs by using its ties with parties of various countries. This cooperation is as unique as the party itself.

I have already mentioned the main sister parties operating in Scandinavian countries. They are the centre parties in Sweden and Norway, the Venstre in Denmark and the Progressive Party in Iceland. The FCP has long-standing close ties with the peasant parties of Bulgaria, the GDR and Poland.

Formal relations between the FCP and the CPSU were established 15 years ago. These relations have their tradition, for informal contacts developed as far back as the years when Urho Kekkonen was still active on the political scene.

A few years ago, the Finnish Centre established formal contacts with the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. Ties with other socialist countries are also developing.

In the 1980s, the FCP has been participating in the activity of the Liberal International. It began as an observer but has been a full-fledged member since the fall of 1988.

The latest development in ties between parties is bilateral contacts with the Democratic Party of the United States and the Communist Party of China. We are also establishing ties with the Indian National Congress.

The FCP's international effort is characterised above all by active participation in "mini-CSCE". There have been three conferences to date, called to discuss problems within the framework of the CSCE. They were attended by centrist, liberal and agrarian parties. Soviet representatives took part in all of them. These conferences are interesting forums, for they bring together parties representing diverse social ideologies. Their level is rising. The next conference is likely to be held in the winter of 1990/1991.

MY ARTICLE is entitled "The Finnish Centre, a Unique Party". Any party may be called unique in a sense. But it seems to me that this description is particularly suitable for the FCP.

The Finnish Centre is always ready to learn from other parties and has always told them frankly about what it stands for so as to enable them to use this information as they see fit. It certainly does not try to impose its doctrine on other parties. It is unique precisely as a Finnish party.

WHAT IS HAPPENING TO THE EARTH?

**Vladimir ZUYEV,
Kirill KONDRATYEV,
Victor AKOVETSKY,
Vladimir DZHANIBEKOV,
Victor SAVINYKH**

WE ALL KNOW that truly urgent measures need to be taken to rectify the critical environmental situation on the planet. But do we know at all the object of the global rescue operations the need for which the entire world is talking about today?

This is not an idle question. Our efforts to preserve the environment are being hampered by the present deliberately anti-ecological concept of production when the country's economy is preoccupied with the question of what should be produced, and how much, and quite forgets the other question, which has been invisibly present all along, but now become explicitly prominent: how this should be done? We want to name two more reasons for today's completely unsatisfactory management of nature:

First, imperfect theoretical notions of the formation and re-formation of the natural landscape both under the impact of natural forces and with a technogenic transformation of individual components and the landscape in general. Present-day theoretical conceptions do not take into account the existence of the main forces which determine the chief laws governing the development of the landscape, namely, the systems of the physical fields of the Earth and circumterrestrial space.

Second, the unrepresentativeness of traditional information on the components of natural and technogenic landscapes which is based on a "cluster" distribution of workloads in exploring and developing natural resources.

Obviously, accomplishment of the new task of gaining a global vision of the processes taking place in the biosphere also requires fresh methods, above all systems-aerospace ones. Comprehensive organisation of systems-aerospace and traditional types of work ensures the obtaining of systematised information on natural resources that is equally truthful and representative for the whole territory under study. The specifics of the remote-control methods based on technological advances in aviation and aerospace engineering are making it possible to perform this work with much less expenditure of time and resources.

If we analyse the present ecological situation, the interaction of the technical civilisation with the environment and the scientific problems emerging here we can understand why an ever increasing number of experts in the world are beginning to study processes by which the state of the environment is determined. An urgent task is being placed on the agenda, namely, identifying and coordinating links between in-

Vladimir Zuyev and Kirill Kondratyev are full members of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Prof. Victor Akovetsky is D. Sc. (Tech.); Vladimir Drzhanibekov is Pilot-Cosmonaut of the USSR, twice Hero of the Soviet Union; Victor Savinykh, Cand. Sc. (Tech.) is Pilot-Cosmonaut of the USSR, twice Hero of the Soviet Union.

dividual national and international research programmes being conducted within the framework of individual natural sciences. We think that it is clear to any unbiased observer that this is not a benevolent wish, not even a desire to save and rationalise the efforts of researchers but an objective requirement which obtains from the intransigent fact that our environment functions as a united and integral system.

By implication, an information system of monitoring the planet's health should be only this—united, integral and global. And this will definitely require that in the 90s we merge all the national ecological information systems that are in existence and that are to be elaborated into a single integral, flexible and efficient structure. The conditions for its creation is close international cooperation in the exploration of outer space, interaction in the development of technical means for ecologically monitoring the state of the environment and processing information, and free exchange of statistics and scientific ideas.

AN OBVIOUS QUESTION IS: Do there exist now the prerequisites for creating a unified ecological information system or, in other words, for creating global ecological observation and control? Yes, these objective prerequisites do exist, and precisely at the global level.

For example, there is a host of information systems of different levels called geo-informational systems (GIS) outside the USSR. Optimally, geographical and ecological information systems represent automated complexes which include:

- banks of territorially organised scientific and departmental information about national conditions and resources and different types of nature management and environmental protection;

- banks of aerospace information;

- mathematical models of physical and geographical phenomena and processes as well as mathematical ecological models of natural and socio-economic phenomena and processes, expert systems and knowledge bases;

- computer and reception/transfer means for the collection, processing, storage and circulation of information within the framework of regional and global computer systems (a special role in GIS is played by systems for the reception and reprocessing of aerospace information and block-system of automated cartography);

- systems of land and sea-based standard and support measuring of environmental parameters (sometimes GIS interface with systems of permanent measurements of environmental parameters);

- a system of display terminals for all GIS users (from bodies of state power to local economic management bodies, major enterprises and scientific and educational organisations);

- engineering and research personnel for servicing programme systems and conducting ecological and economic tests, and for carrying out prognoses for variants of socio-economic development.

Very important changes are taking place with regard to the ecological problem in the USSR, too. In January 1988 the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution "On a Fundamental Restructuring of Environmental Protection in the Country", in accordance with which the State Committee of the USSR for Environmental Protection was formed. It was instructed to pursue an integral scientific and technological policy in the sphere of environmental protection and efficient management of natural resources. One of the new committee's important tasks is the creation of an information system on the state of the environment that would ensure the

formation of analytical information for elaborating and conducting environmental protection measures in the country.

The concept of an integral ecological control information system (IECIS) being elaborated in the USSR provides for:

- collection and systematisation of statistics on the state of the environment and nature management;

- centralisation of access to information contained in a number of departmental (national) monitoring systems;

- organisation of a coordinated flow of information about the environment for conducting an integral environmental policy and adopting environmental protection decisions on the national and international levels;

- organisation of an integral system of collecting, storing, processing and forming information for elaborating and taking environmental protection measures on the nationwide and republican levels;

- creation of an analytical base for assessing and forecasting the state of important components of the environment and natural resources, modelling natural systems and elements of the biosphere, and elaborating scenarios of anthropogenic influences on the planet's climate;

- extradepartmental running control (land- and aerospace-based) over the state and management of natural resources;

- links with international ecological information systems (in particular, GRID and INFOTERRA) for effectively utilising scientific and technological breakthroughs in geoecological information.

It is important to note that the Soviet ecological information system already incorporates conceptually the global aspect as one of its own national and also of its future international activity. There are two major subsystems within the IECIS structure—the geoecological information system (GEIS) and the global space system of ecological control (GSSEC). Each of them can be only conventionally regarded as a separate system, since the satellite information from specialised transducers (meteorological, oceanographic, natural resource satellites, manned orbital stations, etc.) cannot be used effectively without closely-related non-satellite information received by contact (direct) measurements.

As to the establishment of a global ecological information network, we should dwell in detail on the tasks of precisely the national system of ecological information if only because the point at issue here is control over the state of one-sixth of the globe's land surface. The GEIS is called upon to tackle the following tasks:

- collection, systematisation, storage and processing of information and the results of economic activity and environmental protection measures;

- keeping cadastres on natural resources;

- speedy provision of users with truthful information on the parameters determining the actual state of the environment in the country's most important and critical regions;

- provision of information to the legislative and executive bodies of state administration for drafting legislative and normative provisions regulating the principles for efficient management of nature and for monitoring compliance with the decisions taken;

- prediction of ecological situations in a number of the country's regions;

- determination of the degree of economic influence on nature users (importance of standards, payment for use of natural resources, fines, etc.);

- regular analysis of the effectiveness of economic methods of managing nature;

retrospective analysis of statistic information with the aim of pinpointing negative trends in nature management long before irreversible processes appear;

generalisation and systematisation of the results of expert tests on projects for the construction or reconstruction of enterprises and other facilities influencing the ecological situation;

provision of users with the required multipurpose cartographical information on different regions;

keeping of ecological certificates of enterprises and industrial branches;

monitoring of compliance with environmental protection measures defined by the resolutions of central directive bodies and by orders of ministries and departments;

formation of expert appraisals of different influences on the environment;

keeping of a Red Book;

provision of information to bodies of state power and to all interested departments for elaborating a stand in international cooperation to solve global environmental protection problems;

contact with international organisations and data banks in the sphere of environmental protection.

On the whole, the GEIS system will consist of: long-use data centres; depositories of data obtained in sub-satellite experiments and control measurements (evidently of temporary storage); bases for copying data required for conducting research by users, and an information network linking the components of the system with the flight control centre and with data bases of the two systems, including international ones.

We believe that there are grounds to consider the Soviet national ecological information system being elaborated today one of the elements of future global ecological observation and control. This is also evidenced by the sufficient extensiveness of the observations of the territory and air basin of the USSR that are being planned. These measurements will be carried out simultaneously on seven levels:

1. Survey from an altitude of 500-1,000 km by a Meteor—Priroda-type satellite at a scale of 1:2,000,000-1:12,000,000.

2. Survey from an altitude of 250-350 km from a Soyuz, Mir or Salyut spaceship at a scale of 1:200,000-1:2,000,000.

3. Visual and instrumental observations from spaceships.

4. Survey from an altitude of 15-20 km at a scale of 1:50,000-1:200,000 from an airplane or balloon.

5. Survey from an altitude of 2-5 km at a scale of 1:200-1:25,000 from an airplane or helicopter.

6. Visual observation from an airplane, helicopter, dirigible, balloon, hang glider, etc.

7. Ground- and water-based, underwater and under-ice observations at control points selected according to aerospace visual observation materials.

Accordingly, the technical means being used within the framework of the state ecological information programme can also become the building blocks of would-be technical structures of global ecological observation and control. The point at issue is highly sensitive means grouped at ground-based automated stations (GAS) and ground- or sea-based data gathering platforms (DGP). Their difference consists in their work modes.

GAS are automated "observatory-type" stations with sophisticated measuring devices (spectrometers, laser gas analysers, ion-beam control laboratories, etc.) which are serviced by technical personnel;

the findings of their tests are automatically relayed by radio channel to satellites. It is most probable that a majority of GAS will be emplaced in modules on stations for background monitoring of biospheric reserves, where tests are already being conducted under the global environmental monitoring system (GEMS). Over the longer term it is planned to mount GAS in all reserves and national parks in the USSR and other protected territories for gathering information on the background parameters of the present-day state of the biosphere and on the level of the regional set of pollutants in the environment.

DGP are specialised stationary platforms for the gathering and relay by automatic control transducers of meteorological parameters and also of pollutants in the atmosphere, soil, water, etc. These platforms do not require servicing by technical personnel and are being emplaced everywhere, including places difficult to access and in polar and mountainous areas. Thus, the data received from control-measurement stations will characterise the state of the environment and the global, regional and local pollution levels.

The chief means of the global space system of ecological control (GSSEC), aside from the generally known complexes, are represented by synergically grouped complexes of on-board transducers which are being emplaced on polar orbital platforms and a manned orbital station (video-spectrometer, lidar, multizonal scanners, microwave radiometers, etc.). Aside from regional and territorial national data reception and processing points whose capacity should be several times greater than existing analogues, it is planned to set up a Regional Centre to be part of the international GRID system and linked with INFOTERRA.

A system of gathering operational control data on the pollution level in critical points and emergency notification of ecological disasters, whose ground-based transducers are emplaced on nuclear power stations, hydropower stations, plants producing harmful substances, etc. is to become a new element of GSSEC. The experience of developing the COSPAS-SARSAT international system, together with the French ARGOS system shows the realistic possibility for carrying out prompt telemetric monitoring of the state of the environment on hundreds of thousands of points on the Earth.

Such is the existing practice. But no less important is real political will which should not be disregarded when the prerequisites for global ecological cooperation are enumerated. Addressing the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly, Mikhail Gorbachev said: "International ecological security is inconceivable outside its connection not only with disarmament but also with the *definition of the global ecological threat*. The ecological situation in a number of regions is simply horrifying. The Soviet Union is prepared to cooperate in the establishment of an international space laboratory or a manned orbital station that would engage exclusively in monitoring the state of the environment." We believe that numerous international scientific and technical and organisation measures could be carried out in this direction, the results of which would be adequate to the scope of the problems on the threshold of the 21st century. Hence the Soviet proposals.

We think that it is necessary, as a first step towards the creation of a global space system of ecological control, to set about the practical utilisation of the COSPAS-SARSAT system for early warning of disasters at nuclear power stations, hydropower stations and plants producing dangerous substances, and also of such natural disasters as eruptions of volcanoes, tidal waves, mud torrents, floods, earthquakes, etc.

It is imperative right now to use the flights of the Mir manned space research complex for environmental protection and rational nature management with the aim of developing and assessing the on-board transducers of GSSEC and also for obtaining data for subsequent interpretation.

The Resurs-01, Okean-01 and Resurs-F natural resource exploration satellites, the Planeta meteorological system and geostationary communications satellites that are in operation or are being commissioned should be used for carrying out uninterrupted observations of the ecological situation on the planet.

Lastly, the most important point. All the aforementioned is practicable unilaterally, but the very task of establishing world ecological observation and monitoring can be accomplished only through the international efforts of non-governmental as well as state organisations. All the more so since there is a host of sub-tasks here. One of them, to put it figuratively, is the language problem. What is meant by this?

A global geo-information network implies definitely free, instantaneous and automatically effected exchange of information. Consequently, the question arises of the compatibility of information flows, including the conjoining of national systems according to algorithms, programmes and "language". Also important is a certain standardisation of the structure, format and type of sources of information and systems for gathering, receiving, processing and storing it. In short, the point at issue is ecological "gear"—computers of the same type with an integral operational system, interactive systems, plotters, special processors, etc. Their comprehensive organisation is a natural condition for creating a world complex of ecological information structures in the immediate future and also for effectively applying, and minimising the cost of, the information networks in use at present.

We believe that this problem can be solved by setting up international joint ventures, laboratories and ecological instrument-making centres. There probably are other options here, too. They are what we would like to discuss with our Soviet and foreign colleagues, with individuals and governmental and non-governmental organisations—with everyone who wants a global ecological monitoring system to become a reality as soon as possible. Time is of the essence.

Representing Perestroika in the USA

Yuri DUBININ

AMERICANS are manifestly aware of our perestroika.

Soviet diplomats in the United States see one of their most important tasks in working as "co-developers"—to use Eduard Shevardnadze's word—of the foreign policy line of new political thinking, of innovative diplomatic thought. For the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, this means not only joining efforts for an in-depth perception of the ideological assets of perestroika but appraising from this angle all the big and small, bilateral and other international realities constituting the substance of the intercrossing interests of the Soviet Union and the United States, of the contradictions and cooperation between the two countries. In other words, the staff as a whole and each of its members in particular must evolve new professional thinking and new working methods. There is also the task of reorganising the work of the Embassy and other Soviet missions in the United States, which must go hand in hand with growing initiative and capacity for independent action on the part of all diplomats.

For over two years now, the Embassy has had a fairly active Scientific Council which enlists the assistance of visiting scientists. However, I cannot but agree with what Councillor Sorokin said at the recent theoretical and practical conference on the Role and Place of the Soviet Embassy in the United States in the Shaping and Implementation of Soviet Foreign Policy in the American Sector. He pointed out that even allowing for the presence in the Embassy of mostly competent specialists, we hardly had reason to affirm that we had reorganised our work fully or at least in the main.

What we have now is a process of steadily improving the work of the Embassy in every respect to ensure that it ultimately helps raise the overall efficiency of the country's foreign policy mechanism.

The theme of perestroika is central to our contacts with official America on all levels: with the State Department, the apparatus of the White House and, in exceptional cases, the President of the United States. Discussing major political events in Soviet politics—the work of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, plenary meetings of the CPSU CC—and major foreign policy initiatives with Secretary of State James Baker and his deputies as well as with the President's assistants is a normal practice today. It is not merely that we offer information or spell out our position, for some of our meetings give rise to new components of the Soviet-American dialogue.

Yuri Dubinin is Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR in the USA and a member of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission.

THE USSR EMBASSY building on Washington's 16th Street is an architectural monument, as the brass plaque on its façade indicates. It is interesting in itself as a building and attracts tourists. But the main thing which brings numerous groups of Americans to the Embassy and has, in effect, transformed it into an open house is Soviet glasnost. Americans differing in age and standing show interest in the rooms where Mikhail Gorbachev has met with Ronald Reagan and George Bush. They ask us many questions about our country, and any diplomat on duty is ready to answer the guests after inviting them to the Embassy's Golden Hall. I must note, however, that the street outside the Embassy has been used for anything but friendly demonstrations and that the tiny area to the right of the building was named "Sakharov Plaza" in the past, nobody imagining that the time would come when the academician's name was associated in the Soviet Union with innovative perestroika ideas.

Perestroika is a living, fast-moving process that places innumerable problems on the agenda. In the United States, a well-wishing interest and favourable comments intertwine with unfriendly interpretations of new developments in our society. This necessitates energetic work by Soviet diplomats among the American public. The number of enthusiasts for this work is growing in the Embassy, and they use more and more varied forms of contact with Americans.

In 1988, the Embassy held 23 press conferences against 10 in 1987. This added fresh chores to the Embassy press-group: the Press Attaché Bulai and his assistant Malakhov have to be on the constant alert, and more enterprising and swift in their daily routine. This year is still more eventful. I have met with American journalists at a tea party, given a talk at a meeting of the Association of Foreign Journalists, addressed a national seminar of newspaper editors, offered informal remarks to members of the Press Club. There are many indications of the Americans' close interest in our country, such as the arrival of a group of Soviet schoolchildren in the United States at the invitation of the children's American Association of Young Ambassadors or the sincere response to the Armenian tragedy.

We have much work to do. The Embassy's lectures now cover many areas and institutions of the country, including research centres, Stanford, Harvard and other universities, councils for foreign policy studies, military colleges, seminars sponsored by leading business organisations. Here is an example. For a number of years, Beaver Creek, a small community in the faraway Rocky Mountains, has been the venue of the World Forum led by former US President Gerald Ford. The Forum brings together former Western heads of state or government, other statesmen and politicians as well as leading businessmen, who for several days exchange views on world development trends and the political and economic problems facing humanity. This year it was attended by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Lord Callaghan, Helmut Schmidt and several members of the US administration. The presence of this writer as Soviet Ambassador was a novel circumstance. Besides addressing full meetings, I read an introductory paper (which attracted the greatest attention) in a section formed to discuss our perestroika. Helmut Schmidt presented a supplementary paper. The debate was most lively. Some skeptics alleged that the Soviet Union was taking no real steps towards disarmament and that the arms race was continuing. Opinions about perestroika varied considerably although the conclusion that perestroika had a salutary effect on the international situation prevailed in the end, as did the opinion that new political thinking offered a unique opportunity to ease military tension.

In short, the ideas of perestroika are on the march. Meeting the

exigencies of the day is a permanent concern of the Embassy staff. This has bred a multitude of problems, such as those of professional training, inventiveness, prompt processing of and response to information, the acquisition of new qualities, and so forth. I therefore think the Foreign Ministry meeting which is to discuss the role and place of embassies in Soviet foreign policy activity today will be useful.

The Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan were withdrawn on February 15. The event was a significant milestone in Soviet-American relations as well. The following day, Embassy Councillor Oleg Derkovsky and I called at the State Department to see to some current business (contacts between the two offices are almost a daily occurrence). The American diplomat who saw us to the door at the end of the visit found relations good enough to tell us that the day before a group of State Department officials had drunk champaign on the occasion of the Soviet pull-out from Afghanistan. We asked him why they hadn't invited Soviet Embassy officials to join them. Our American colleague looked surprised. True, he replied after a pause that it would really have been a good idea to celebrate the event together because it was important to both America and Russia. I added that Soviet people were glad our boys were back and that the Soviet Union was willing to cooperate with all countries, the United States included, so as to help restore peace on Afghan soil as speedily as possible.

The content of our conversations with Americans on the subject has changed even though the situation in Afghanistan is still complicated. We devote much attention to the problem of bringing back home Soviet POWs. When, some time ago, one of them called at the Embassy we did our best to help him. We provided him with lodgings in the Embassy house and made arrangements with the Americans for him to fly to Moscow. The young man's story of what he had gone through in captivity and of his subsequent ordeal was appalling.

This is no easy task, for there are also forces standing in our way. The recent decision on "Afghans" in trouble adopted by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet laid a new basis for the continuation of this important effort by Soviet diplomats both in the United States and elsewhere.

The political thaw allowed scope for cultural relations between the two countries. All earlier levels were soon surpassed. As regards the appearance of people's diplomacy in the American sector, it is in the nature of a veritable explosion. People's diplomacy adds immensely to the opportunities for informal contacts between Soviet people and Americans greatly differing in age, opinion and social station. Sympathetic attention to each other over troubles occurring in the two countries is becoming an element of normal intercourse between the Soviet and the American public. This was illustrated by the benefit concert sponsored by the Embassy in connection with the Armenian tragedy. The concert was given in Carnegie Hall, New York's most renowned auditorium, and drew a unique group of performers. It took place under the patronage of Raisa Gorbacheva and Barbara Bush as an outstanding event in American cultural and social life.

Another initiative of the Embassy staff is a charity fund called Children in Crisis. Its purpose is to help Soviet and American children who are victims of natural calamities. These activities, which evolved in the recent period, require new qualities of diplomats and often also of their wives who help them. I mean above all inventiveness and a spirit of enterprise.

Soviet-American contacts in the military sphere are becoming a new area of growing mutual confidence. I regularly meet now with the US Defense Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Diplo-

matic activity extends to the steel decks of Soviet and American warships, as it did not long ago at Norfolk, one of America's largest naval bases. Admiral William Crowe said that he had never imagined he would set foot some day on a Soviet warship (he did so during his recent visit to the Soviet Union). I also remember the request of a Soviet admiral that he be photographed aboard the *Theodore Roosevelt*, America's largest aircraft carrier, so that he could prove to his close friends that he had really visited it. A noted US admiral remarked at Norfolk that he would like relations with Soviet partners to always be as good as they were during the visit of Soviet ships. Tens of thousands of Americans applauded our sailors who performed at the city's open-air theatre as members of a song and dance company.

Americans recall Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev's conversation with one of their soldiers during his tour of a military facility.

"Why do you think I'm here?" the marshal asked the soldier.

"I don't know," the soldier replied, "but I'm sure your presence in the States is a damned important thing."

Contacts like these are important indeed, both for the Soviet Union and the USA, and the world.

By the end of the term of the previous administration, Soviet-American dialogue had spread to security problems, regional conflicts, humanitarian issues and bilateral relations. Lately it has gone further to include environmental protection, efforts to combat terrorism and grave diseases, and other transnational problems.

OUR ELECTIONS, the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the formation of the Soviet government made a tremendous impression in the United States. American opinion and the US Congress see them as signs of dynamic progress in perestroika. Congressmen are showing an unprecedented interest in more contacts with members of the new Soviet parliament. The share of effort to help promote these contacts is growing in the activity of Soviet diplomats in Washington. Our own contacts with US legislators are expanding for their part. Over the past couple of months alone, we have had meetings on new aspects of Soviet foreign policy, our country's humanitarian policy, our approach to regional conflicts, including the situation around Afghanistan, to increased Soviet-American trade, and so on. There was no such thing until very recently.

Growing ties between Congress and the new Supreme Soviet undoubtedly hold a big promise for Soviet-American cooperation. An obvious indication of this was the visit which a delegation of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee paid to our country at the invitation of the Supreme Soviet.

The past six months have seen the Embassy prepare and send to Moscow about twenty-five summaries of US political and legal experience. They take up roughly 400 pages of analytical materials plus thousands of pages of annexes. Most of the summaries are equal in standard to research done in specialised centres and could be used as subject matter for theses. The only difference is probably the fact that the information supplied by us is markedly practical and that occasionally the time limit allowed for preparing it is just a few days. We have had a whole number of assignments from the Supreme Soviet but much of this work is done on the Embassy's own initiative. The material we provide deals primarily with questions raised by perestroika processes. An interesting theme of our research is the US

administration's approach to problems facing many countries of the world, including ours, such as disaster relief, protecting the environment, combating AIDS, sea pollution, and so on.

It is interesting to note that while the structure of America's Federal executive authorities is on the whole very stable, a new department in charge of veterans' affairs was established this year. This must be a reflection of a notable socio-political trend. The All-Union Organisation of War and Labour Veterans has asked us to inform it how the new American department is functioning in case our country can benefit by its experience.

I think careful and impartial study of US experience in fields of interest to us is a necessary, long-term line of work for the Embassy that can be a supplement to the work of the relevant echelons of the Foreign Ministry and research institutions. This calls for extensive participation by all diplomats irrespective of rank, for creative dynamism, a constant search, high efficiency, ability to assimilate things new and original. It is gratifying that the staff shows a growing taste for this kind of work. Embassy Councillor Georgi Markosov was right when at the theoretico-practical conference mentioned earlier he pointed to the need to send to Moscow more material prepared on the Embassy's own initiative. Of course, we will be assigned fewer tasks in this sphere if we show greater initiative. The Embassy is thoroughly reorganising its information work with due regard to the requirements of today. This implies, among other things, that we must reinforce the staff by bringing in competent specialists with a sound theoretical background and adequate experience.

Our relations with Moscow occasionally come up against organisational problems. Sometimes we receive within one month identical tasks although they differ in wording, and what is more, some of them come from one and the same department and deal with subjects already analysed by the Embassy staff. This suggests that part of the information sent by us fails to receive proper attention or is not used effectively enough. In any case, there is plainly no centralised registration. We probably need a centre in Moscow to which Soviet embassies could send copies of all or most of their surveys. This function could be entrusted to the Foreign Ministry's Scientific Coordination Centre. Some of the surveys could be of interest to the library or research centre of the Supreme Soviet. In short, I believe this is a matter worth considering.

NEW POLITICAL THINKING leads naturally to new economic thinking both inside the Soviet Union and in its external relations.

The United States as a member of the community of countries active on the world economic scene is a special partner for us. The American economy is still the most advanced, efficient, dynamic and flexible economy in the West. The United States as a business partner is emerging in a new quality primarily as a result of changes in our own economy. The appearance of numerous Soviet trading partners on the foreign market in an independent capacity is substantially altering the pattern of Soviet-American economic relations, offering them vast opportunities.

This process understandably demands active involvement by the Embassy. We see our task in helping to the best of our ability solve our economic problems in the spirit of perestroika. To this end we supply information on how they are viewed by Congress, the administ-

ration, research centres and the media, which calls for close contacts with all of them.

One day in mid-July, we touched on this subject in an unofficial conversation with the US President's assistants. It was evident that the subject gave rise to many questions on both sides. The exchange of views shifted increasingly to practical matters. It was suggested that discussion be given an organised form, in particular through meetings between Soviet and American experts. We agreed to think it over, which means that the Soviet-US dialogue may come to include a further line.

Mention should be made of the idea of exploration by experts of the two countries of possibilities for making the Soviet economy more compatible with the world economy. The American team is led by George Soros, a noted financier. The group recently met with Nikolai Ryzhkov.

Conversations in the Embassy resulted in starting the implementation of the concept of a Soviet Foreign Economic Consortium (SFEC) and an American Trade Consortium (ATC), which will make it possible to remove at one stroke several hurdles to extending business cooperation between our countries. These hurdles include the particularly acute problem of the shortage of convertible currency in the Soviet Union. The trade imbalance in favour of the United States has exceeded 22 billion dollars in the past 28 years.

The project has already made notable progress. Both consortiums are there and are preparing in line with a General Trade Agreement signed between them last spring to set up scores of joint ventures. The formula that has been chosen will make it possible to have a pool of convertible currency. The latter is to come first from the earnings of the SFEC-ATC as a joint project leading off oil production for export (in cooperation with the Chevron Corporation) and then, in step with the formation of other ventures, from their export earnings.

US business has come to appreciate the idea. Preparations for starting cooperation between the American Medical Consortium and its Soviet partner are at an advanced stage now, and talks are underway on founding petrochemical consortiums. Firms of other countries, too, show interest in this form of cooperation.

More and more the Embassy concerns itself with ensuring in principle that specific projects for cooperation between American companies and their Soviet partners are considered and put into practice and that our products find access to the American market. We are doing this in close collaboration with our Trade Mission in Washington, Amtorg and the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council (ASTEC), which are operating within the framework of the Embassy's Economic Council.

Good results are achieved by joint efforts. Not long ago, the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry was presented with the "Silver Anvil", the highest award of the American Public Relations Society, which enjoys exceptional prestige in the country's advertising, for the first commercial exhibition of Soviet exports (New York, December 1988). It is now important to use the opportunities provided by the exhibition, to build on our commercial success.

Frequent meetings with American businessmen lead us to the conclusion that they have a growing stake in developing economic ties with the Soviet Union. Opinions about the forms, terms and structure of specific projects or even about their trend may vary, of course, but these are all matters which can be settled and are of secondary importance, the main issue being whether or not we should trade with each other, whether or not we should cooperate. The range of countries interested in contacts with Soviet organisations and enterprises is widening. American family companies (they are among the largest)

are more willing than others to participate in joint projects on a long-term basis. The fact is that their approach to the time limits of paying profit in convertible currency is more flexible than that of the traditional corporations, for the latter's directors are obliged to regularly render account to the shareholders on profits. This circumstance may prove of considerable value to us.

I recently visited Rochester, N. Y., where the Eastman Kodak company is based. We were shown articles which the company expects to start manufacturing in the Soviet Union. Imagine an instrument slightly larger than a typewriter which in a matter of seconds carries out a blood test for many indications and is comparable in performance to a whole laboratory. The instrument proved its worth in the tragic days of the Armenian earthquake.

I hardly need to mention such widely known products of the firm as cameras, film or photographic paper. Devices for the automatic development of film and printing of photographs could solve one of our everyday problems which at present causes much loss of time and frustration. Worthy of note are high-standard disquettes for personal computers, videotape and other products of Kodak.

One of the more significant projects offered by U.S. West, a major company, is joint construction of the missing link of the world network of highly efficient optical fibre communications, that is, a line crossing Soviet territory. It gives high promise of benefits for us and the rest of the world. The problem of recoupment in hard currency can be solved but there remain some problems which have not been created by us.

Or take so sensitive a sphere of our economy as rail transport. It is fair to say that American railroads have been given a new lease on life. They have found their place in an intricate economic structure going through continuous modernisation. Burlington Northern, one of the biggest companies, is known for highly efficient organisation of freight haulage using road—river—sea transshipment hubs. The network owned by it covers 25 states of the US and two Canadian provinces and is automated and computerised to a high degree. Right now the company is developing a system of satellite control of rail traffic. Labour productivity on the company's railroads has risen considerably in recent years. Videotape shows how well the company has organised operations, how efficiently it keeps up and coordinates the smooth functioning of all components of the production and transportation cycle. It has suggested exploring the possibilities of cooperation between our countries.

Besides railroads, Burlington Northern is engaged in mining, another field in which it calls for joint ventures. One of its offers is to set up an enterprise that would carry foreign freight along the Transsiberian Line, from the Pacific to the Atlantic, and to cooperate generally with the Soviet Ministry of Railroads in raising the efficiency of our rail transport. For all I can say, this could also help us develop the economic area along the Baikal-Amur Mainline and in intensifying traffic on this railroad. The question can only be answered as a result of substantive talks.

A short time ago, the Embassy formally announced the founding of a new association, the American Food Council. The purpose of the Council, which comprises dozens of firms, is to encourage Soviet-American cooperation in the early provision of facilities for the storage and processing of farm produce and in building an up-to-date food industry. The announcement came on the same day as the CPSU CC held a meeting on a similar theme. Strictly speaking, this was no mere

coincidence. It indicated that the Embassy is well aware of the people's economic problems and is working steadfastly to help solve them.

The companies mentioned above could become our new partners. As for our old partners, they are expanding cooperation with the Soviet Union in traditional areas and, moreover, make new, often unexpected offers. We are setting out to export Soviet ships on the initiative of PepsiCo. The Embassy has joined in maintaining permanent contacts with Armand Hammer.

Interest in cooperation with the Soviet Union, especially with the more advanced sectors of Soviet science and technology, is growing as Americans acquaint themselves with our achievements. Richard Mahoney, who heads Monsanto, a recognised international leader in biotechnology, admires the potentialities of the Shemyakin Institute of Microbiology of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the high standard of its research. Scientific and technological cooperation could prove beneficial to both sides.

I could go on listing joint projects now being worked out. Their potential value runs into billions of dollars. Still, the trend is far from satisfactory. What is emerging is, at best, fairly promising prerequisites and possibilities for a future breakthrough in Soviet-American business cooperation. Why is this? The main reason is that some discriminatory US legislation is still in force. True, there are signs of a change for the better, such as the current preparations for suspending the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. This work may be interpreted in different ways but it is obvious that without such a step, which would be symbolic rather than real, normalisation of the US approach to the Soviet Union in terms of trade policy cannot get off to a start. Besides, we must remember that, for certain reasons and for some time to come, Soviet-American economic cooperation will be developing under the threat of recurrences of old thinking. But the benefits to be derived from cooperation are great and dictate exploratory effort and increasingly serious discussion of these problems at political level. The Embassy should do its best to contribute to progress in the dialogue.

I must add, however, that the organisation of our economic life often raises obstacles which foreign companies find hard to overcome. The reasons for this (personal or departmental ambitions, unsatisfactory procedure, low efficiency, the absence of the style of doing business universally accepted in international relations, inadequate familiarity with relevant legislation, and so on) do not matter after all but this state of affairs is by no means helpful.

Take, for example, the problem of using economic ties with the United States to increase milk production in the Soviet Union. The American Holstein is one of the world's finest breeds of dairy cattle. Many countries have lately raised highly productive cattle on the basis of this breed. Hungary, Turkey, Egypt, Israel and other countries have attained notable results.

I therefore welcome the persistence shown by Nikolai Pervov, Agricultural Attaché of the Embassy, in pointing out the need to raise with American aid a Soviet Holstein population annually yielding not less than 7,000 kg of milk. We have sent to Moscow proposals for the purchase, shipment and utilisation of American Holsteins in our country. Many of our experts believe that it is important to act on these proposals in order to help solve the country's food problem and advance our livestock farming as a whole. Some of them see Holsteins as the future of our dairy farming. In short, this is a matter of great social importance.

The Embassy's proposals got strong backing in Moscow. But notwithstanding efforts begun more than two years ago, we have not yet

bought a single US Holstein. The only Holstein bull recently delivered to the Soviet Union came as a gift from the Americans, not as an animal bought by us.

Who stands in the way is hard to tell. Still harder is it to say why we annually spend large amounts of foreign exchange on purchasing grain and food but seem unable to allocate a hundred million dollars or so for the future of the country's entire dairy farming. The Embassy is told (privately) that we are not prepared yet, have yet to solve the problem of fodder, know too little about Holsteins, and so on. But we do not really find any of this convincing. Meanwhile time is running out. The problem *must* be solved.

Generally speaking, the tactic of noncommittal answers and procrastination is something incomprehensible to Americans, who adhere to the high standard of efficiency accepted in the West. Of course, some of their offers may not be competitive enough or may fail to meet our interests. But more often than not, the Embassy is hard put to reassure businessmen who complain of the extreme difficulty of reaching in Moscow people who make decisions. This is one reason why many members of the American business community arriving in Moscow insist on seeing either Mikhail Gorbachev or Nikolai Ryzhkov.

I might as well note in passing that some of them, realising that there will be no progress in business despite the courteous and seemingly promising reception accorded them in various departments in the capital, now go to Union Republics, for they have found out that there the problems they are interested in can be solved faster than in the capital.

A serious problem still facing us is to organise really wide-ranging work to spell out our new foreign economic policy, the relevant legislation enacted by the recent session of the Supreme Soviet and present-day realities. The new system of doing business with foreign partners necessitates persevering and imaginative advertising. What is being done today is plainly insufficient. Among other things, we ought to keep asking ourselves just what could attract foreign capital, whether we have areas in which that capital could be invested, that is, whether we can offer what others lack. The answers to these questions should be conveyed to the business community by every available means.

The Embassy is perfectly aware of its share of responsibility for today's shortcomings and realises the need to join actively in removing them both on its own initiative and according to guidelines provided by Moscow. Incidentally, we now receive requests not only from Moscow but from Union Republics and even from individual enterprises. We welcome this. The Embassy and Soviet economic missions in the United States see the purpose of their work in ensuring that the system of foreign economic relations begins functioning "at full capacity" as early as possible, helping solve internal problems of our economy and lend it a new quality. It is very important for us today to ascertain how to coordinate the work of Soviet agencies and enterprises linked with the American market without overregulating it by bureaucratic methods.

INITIATIVES OF RECENT date have extended the Soviet-American exchange of opinion to the activity of information services bearing on Soviet and American interests. The conversations which Alexander Yakovlev had with USIA Director Charles Wick and the contact established by Vadim Medvedev with the new head of USIA, Bruce Gelb, were most noteworthy in this respect. Under the impact of big politics,

the situation is changing in this sphere as well. Indeed, the Voice of America now has to do with glasnost, not with jamming of VOA broadcasts. The two phenomena are poles apart. The station's commentators, at least those who refer to the opinion of the US administration, now have every reason to expect that if they sin too much on the side of partiality (as they occasionally do, I am sorry to say) a staff member of the Soviet Embassy may want to interview a USIA official. Things like this may also come up for discussion during what is now routine meetings between Soviet and American experts. After all, this is a very delicate sphere in which stereotypes of the past and outbursts of old thinking are particularly hard to overcome.

The new pace of international intercourse and the technological revolution in the media and communications imperatively demand up-to-date means of communication between Moscow and Soviet embassies. Of course, diplomatic mail carried by couriers—a centuries-old practice—retains its significance. Nor can anything supersede coded telegrams. But invading everyday diplomatic activity at the same time are direct lines, special telecommunications and facsimile apparatus. The State Department now keeps in touch with US embassies by means of computers. It extensively uses videot techniques for information purposes as well as for further professional training. For instance, it circulates to its missions abroad video records of speeches by officials of the administration, including the State Department. Embassies across the world, are using computers on a mounting scale.

As for the Soviet Embassy in Washington, a computer line to Congress enables us to familiarise ourselves in a very short time with many non-classified records of this legislative body. A facsimile communication line has speeded contact with Moscow. But the problem of improving communications and technologically modernising other aspects of the activity of Soviet embassies requires constant attention.

SOVIET-US relations have improved as a result of tremendous efforts by the leaders of the two countries. The summit meetings in Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, Moscow and New York were milestones on the way forward. They marked advances towards building up the positive content of the Soviet-American dialogue, towards lending it constructive continuity and generating new ideas.

The numerous meetings between the Soviet Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State (forty since 1985) have become the main instrument of preparing for summits. Besides, they play an important role in promoting exchanges of opinion and settling problems that crop up in between meetings of the two countries' leaders. Eduard Shevardnadze has just met with James Baker in the United States.

The beneficial impact of improved Soviet-US relations on the international political situation as a whole is beyond doubt. New developments in cooperation between the two countries have become part of the universal effort to make the political situation on the planet healthier. Within the framework of this process, the prospect of a new Soviet-US summit is being discussed more and more actively by public opinion in the United States and other countries. The decision on this score has been announced recently. Political trends suggest that this prospect should become a guideline for among others, the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

Interethnic Relations in the USSR

IN LENIN'S DAYS, the concept of international relations was applied not only to relations between countries separated by state frontiers but the relations between the republics founded on the territory of what had been the Russian Empire. In a letter addressed to the workers and peasants of the Ukraine on the occasion of victory over General Denikin, Lenin wrote about the international unity and brotherhood of proletarians.

Subsequently the concept was modified to indicate that international relations meant relations with foreign countries while relations between nations of the Soviet Union should be treated as interethnic.

The difference was not terminological but substantive. The substance lay in visualising the panorama of the dynamic formation of a new historical community, the Soviet people.

Assuming that there was only one people, that is, the Soviet people, the term "people" could not very well be applied to the population of every republic. These populations came therefore to be seen as merely nations making up the Soviet people.

This could have been acceptable had there been one nation in every republic yet there was no such thing anywhere. While the republics were home to many nations, their ethnic components were parts of other republics, so to speak, and not one people forming part of the Soviet people.

It was all scholasticism pure and simple, something based on notions conceived by armchair politicians and divorced from life. These notions—some of them borrowed—were included in guideline speeches expected to be accepted as unquestionably as catechism. Somewhat later, these directives were underpinned by would-be arguments suggesting that the new historical community had long been a reality in our country and that all we had to do thenceforward was to perfect it.

According to a myth created simultaneously, there could be a certain division of labour. The central leadership personifying the Soviet people see to all that might be described as interests of the whole Union, including nearly all its international ties.

As for the republics, they would have to concentrate on local interests, joining in foreign policy activity strictly on orders from on high.

In these circumstances the division of concepts into "international" and "interethnic" helped generate at the level of the subconscious a perception of the outside world on the favourite pattern of all bureaucratic systems: to each his little square or line as the case might be, any step to the left or right, up or down being out of the question.

Meanwhile life went on at a different pace and along a different path. People were dissatisfied with the answers to the numerous questions agitating them, and the two threatened to fuse sooner or later, forming an explosive charge.

They actually did as soon as the fetish of the "most developed socialist society" disappeared. Had this fetish lasted beyond 1982, let alone

1985, the explosive charge would have reached such proportions as to blow up everything everywhere and not just here and there.

The wave of interethnic conflicts that swept from east to west, from the banks of the Lena and the mountains in the South to the Baltic Sea altered many established concepts. This made it imperative to draw serious conclusions, renounce many dogmas and patterns and provide conditions for adopting independent decisions, developing the productive forces and raising the standard of living.

The situation is not normal yet. Thought has given way to emotions, arguments have been supplanted by slogans, and a thirst for revenge has suppressed justice. Interethnic relations, once seen as idyllic, are now fraught with explosion.

With passions running high, calls ring out for various sections of our peoples' common home, the Soviet Federation, to be "sawed off". There are attempts to exploit developments of half a century ago, treaties concluded on the eve of World War II.

Thus an important foreign policy aspect of interethnic complications has emerged. It is certainly a matter for the Soviet peoples themselves to shape their mutual relations as they see fit. Neither the most rabid extremists active inside the country nor instigators from without can abolish the principle of non-interference in our internal affairs irrespective of whether they disguise their aims by sermonising or by offering advice.

The solidity of the various components of the common Soviet home is determined by, among other things, legal standards. These comprise the constitutional principles of the republics and the Union as a whole plus bilateral and multilateral international legal acts, including the UN Charter and the Helsinki accords, which guarantee stability in Europe and the world. To encroach on these values of the world community is a hopeless and, moreover, a risky business.

SOCIETY BENEFITED from awakening to the danger threatening not only its stability but its very existence although we regretfully admit that interethnic friction has already made itself felt in critical situations.

Both at home and abroad, the decision to discuss the problem with all its controversial aspects at a Plenary Meeting of the CPSU CC was rightly assessed as an important mobilising step. It was a difficult step, nor was it exempt from a certain risk.

What made it difficult was that it marked a transition from a complimentary to a critical approach, from self-deception to the bitterness of harsh realities.

And it involved a certain risk because persisting in social consciousness, above all in the minds of those who considered themselves responsible for moulding it, was a desire to keep up illusions and ignore those realities.

The experienced critic will arrive, when he looks back, at the correct conclusion that far from everything suits everyone in today's solutions. Indeed, all questions cannot be answered simultaneously. The main thing is that we have finally taken a realistic approach to the situation in our multinational home.

Opinions vary from "everything is wrong" to "everything is all right". Nor is this surprising. Ours is a vastly varied country where there was no written language in some regions until recently while elsewhere we have universities founded centuries ago, and where humility and obedi-

ence are considered a moral asset in some regions against independence and honour elsewhere.

This is what has made the ongoing debate so sharp. It is safe to say that decisions will have to be carried out amid clashing positions, for to uphold something, it is necessary to reject something else. A search will be needed for a multiple consensus between the Federation and the republics and simultaneously between the republics themselves, between autonomous and Union republics, between ethnic groups within autonomous republics and regions, and so on.

Seeing that the issue is to seek harmonious interethnic relations on a new basis as one of the highest goals of the party's policy towards nationalities—the CPSU platform calls for precisely this—all that makes for disharmony within the Soviet Federation is certain to put up resistance.

There are still many things that will have to take up their proper places, and as for social consciousness, it will have to embrace concepts and categories some of which have always been there but have not always been perceived realistically. These include a "discovery" in the form of the people of the republic as a multinational component of the community of Soviet people still in the making.

Inside the country there understandably exist international along with interethnic relations; nor will the former become simpler as the sovereignty of republics acquires real powers. *For the sake of clarity a new term "people-to-people" relations may be offered to describe these relations.* They will necessitate harmonisation within the system of all-Union relations, including relations between republics.

This structure will be made even more complex and intricate by the republics' participation in world economic ties and foreign political relations.

It follows that harmonisation of interethnic relations will ultimately take place as a complex process of creating great symphony of colour and music durably combining the whole palette of colours and hues and the whole gamut of orchestra and choral sounds. This will require much effort and talent. But then it is a worthwhile sphere of application of society's energy, a goal far more desirable than the levelling absence of personal responsibility which the administrative system of the past relied on or the atomising multitude of homogeneous formations sought by "non-formal" advocates of breaking away or setting themselves apart.

The results of improving the mechanism of interethnic relations inside the Soviet Union will find reflection in the country's international relations. They will contribute to our activity on the world scene and add new means by which to solve our political and economic problems.

At the same time, they will make things more difficult for many government departments, for our embassies and other missions by posing new problems, for the sphere of state-to-state intercourse will inevitably attract new forces concerned with defending the interests and using the potentialities of their republics.

A great many complexities unknown before will arise. Some people will uphold their rights, others will refuse to relinquish rights that are not theirs; some will be overburdened with work while others may find themselves doing nothing in particular. There will be joy but the possibility of an occasional frustration cannot be ruled out. At this stage as before, it will be important to study the experience of other countries far and near, to draw conclusions from their positive and negative experience.

The outside world was never indifferent even in the past to interethnic relations in the Soviet Union. There were many reasons for this, the most important of them being the country's global leverage. It

is not accidental that the Soviet Union, like the United States, is still called a "superpower" in journalese.

There is also the unique fact that our country borders overland alone on twelve countries whose population totals one third of humanity.

A further reason is the vast number of immigrants from Soviet republics. Twenty million of them maintain ties with compatriots, and many more (one in four or five inhabitants in the case of the United States alone) consider themselves linked by spiritual bonds with our country, the land of their fathers and grandfathers.

The coming restructuring of interethnic relations in the Soviet Union will enhance their significance in the eyes of the world community.

Why? For reasons relating to the whole Union as well as to its various republics and nationalities.

With regard to the Union as a whole there is primarily no ignoring the circumstance that ending internal tensions in any country makes it a more attractive partner. It wins the central authority greater support in solving problems of the state as a whole. All this fits in with the wide-ranging integrational trend that is gathering momentum throughout the world.

There are also particular circumstances. Prior to current developments there emerged some common problems concerning which we have a self-evident stake in exchanging views, knowledge and generalisations with other multinational states (Yugoslavia, Canada, India). Now is the time to proceed to this exchange.

Union republics represent the other level. An inseparable aspect of their sovereignty is the right to maintain relations with foreign countries and international organisations. With the Soviet Union establishing a general order and coordinating the activity of Union republics, these can look forward to extensive activity abroad. Going over to self-financing and republican *khozraschet* involves greater effort by the republics to join in the international division of labour, cooperate in production and promote cultural ties with due regard to the interests of their population.

There will also be new opportunities for the cooperation of local government bodies and social organisations with their foreign counterparts on the basis of ethnic community or ethnic ties. The past period has seen many instances of such cooperation. Cases in point include durable contacts between the Ukraine and Canadians, Americans and Australians of Ukrainian origin and active participation by Armenians living abroad in the rehabilitation of the areas of Armenia devastated by the earthquake.

Perestroika is adding many new elements to what was there before. Worthy of special note is the attention being devoted to Soviet ethnic groups lacking their own territorial formations and to ethnic minorities. It has not been long since we included these categories in our political vocabulary, and they will yet give rise to controversy.

There are plans for setting up ethnic cultural centres and forming fellow countrymen's organisations to be represented in local government. Ethnic minorities are expected to promote contacts with compatriots in other countries through ethnic cultural centres and social organisations.

All these provisions, like many others, take account of international legal standards. They are consonant with the documents adopted at Helsinki in 1975 and at Vienna early this year.

Policy towards nationalities interacts directly with foreign policy. Every step towards harmonising interethnic relations will help solve big and small problems of the world. And progress towards lasting peace will lead to a life without massacres and refugees, to concord and cooperation among nations and in our own home.

It would be naive, however, to imagine that there will be no road-

blocks to harmonious interethnic relations. Hence the need to learn to clear them without detriment to our state as a whole.

In grappling with the complicated ethnic problems that have piled up over the decades and in discarding armchair patterns in favour of progress towards an interethnic consensus, it is essential to bear in mind accepted international standards. Harmonising relations in our multinational family, promoting a multiple consensus in relations among the peoples of the USSR are the most important condition for the survival of perestroika and a notable factor for greater mutual confidence and stability both in our country and on the world scene.

As regards the foreign policy aspect, we cannot expect our approach to problems to be welcomed by all. This is one of the areas in which the attitude to the Soviet Union varies greatly.

We enjoy support among many well-wishers the world over, who realise the difficulty of the problem tackled by our country and express their opinion of how to solve it best.

We are aware of the reaction of those abroad who say we will get nowhere or those others who declare provocatively: "The worse for them, the better for us."

An angry response on our part would hardly be wise. The important thing is that nobody can prevent us from implementing sound plans unless we bungle the job.

Soviet Economy Could Benefit from Japanese Thrift

Tadao MORIMOTO

FOR SOME TIME PAST, Japanese business has been taking a keen interest in the Soviet Union, closely following its economic development. Needless to say, this is not due to idle curiosity. Many Japanese businessmen consider that relations between our two countries have great potentialities for growing cooperation in various fields, including the economy.

Our Institute has attempted an analysis of the economic situation in the Soviet Union, and I would like to tell the journal's readers about the results of the research done to date. To begin with, the analysis indicates that the Soviet economy is characterised by an enormous waste of resources and output. In 1986, for example, as much as 160 million tons of metal went into producing a mere 110 million tons of products. The 50 million tons of wasted metal equalled annual output in a country like China.

Power consumption in metallurgy is just as wasteful. The Soviet Union uses 62 per cent more power per ton of steel than Japan. If Soviet metallurgy were to adopt the power-saving technology in use in our country it would economise 442 trillion kilocalories, or the equivalent of nearly one-eighth of the power generated in the Soviet Union. Going further in our analysis, we came to the conclusion that by saving on metallurgy alone, the Soviet Union could dispense altogether with atomic power, which gives rise to so many complaints.

Ending waste in metallurgy and introducing a power-saving technology would make it possible not only to cut production costs but to substantially increase Soviet fuel exports for convertible currency since at present 46 million tons of fuel is used for generating the 442 trillion kcal now wasted. This is worth around four billion dollars at current world market prices.

IT IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE that Japan, being faced with an energy crisis, set out to develop a technology differing qualitatively from the one used previously and based on saving power and using electronics in industrial production. As for the Soviet Union, it persevered in increasing extraction of raw materials, or oil to be specific, taking its time over accomplishing a technological revolution. In other words, it tended to force its industry into structures typical of backward countries and to squander enormous resources. This was the gravest contradiction affecting Soviet industrial policy in the second half of the 1970s, with a disruption of the country's entire energy complex in the end.

Tadao Morimoto is President of the Torei Research Institute, Japan. The article is written specially for INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

At the same time, the exigencies of oil exports and mounting difficulties over extraction prompted the Soviet Union to cast about for ways to maintain its energy balance by resorting to atomic power instead of introducing a power-saving technology. It is safe to say that the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986 was due to an overhasty policy of increasing atomic power generation. And it is well known that undue haste does not always go hand in hand with the quality and application of new technologies. Due to the irony of fate, *an energy superpower tried to end its "energy shortage" in that way.*

The volume of power generation in the Soviet Union equals 60 per cent of that in the United States and is more than twice as large as in Japan. Hydraulic power engineering has given way to atomic power plants. Soviet specialists are undoubtedly aware of the difficulties involved in the construction and operation of such plants. Nor should anyone dismiss the fact that atomic power generation is now under criticism everywhere for obvious reasons. As of January 1, 1987, the Soviet Union had 43 atomic power units in operation, with an aggregate capacity of 303 billion kilowatts (15 plants) and Japan, 32 units generating a total of 245.2 billion kilowatts. Over half of the Soviet units were built after 1980—an indication of the importance attached to atomic power in the country.

Atomic power production costs were considered the lowest for some reason. Yet it is only now that here in Japan these costs have drawn level with those of power generated at plants using coal. It is hard to explain what made the Soviet Union, a country having much cheaper coal, oil and natural gas than Japan, hang on to increasing nuclear power generation, especially in view of the expenditures entailed in building atomic plants and disposing of nuclear waste.

Even before Chernobyl, we got word that there was a group of specialists in the Soviet Union who opposed the policy of relying on atomic power and took a critical view of the economic policy of the Brezhnev period. These specialists based their arguments on the fact that prior to the second oil crisis, people in the Soviet Union really considered its power resources inexhaustible, with the result that policy-makers did not find it necessary to save power. The situation today is seriously affected by mistakes of that time.

The Soviet Union is following a rather strange pricing policy which explains why hydrocarbon fuel is unjustifiably cheap. Under such a system, it is more profitable (contrary to economic logic) to sink new oil and gas wells than to develop power-saving equipment and technology. Not surprisingly, industries have no stake in saving power. At the same time, the Soviet Union exports to Japan excellent power-saving plant for the steel industry but uses no such plant in its own industry, a fact having likewise to do with what is supposed to be a pricing policy.

I have noted that oil and gas in the Soviet Union hold a focal place in fuel and power production. But as oil production faces growing problems, the Soviet Union has to question the possibility of increasing output any further. In other words, the days of inexhaustible oil resources in the Soviet Union are gone.

The current oil boom started with the discovery of large fields in West Siberia in the 1960s. One well in the area yielded as much oil as whole oil-fields and eight times as much as a comparable American well. But subsequently no such fields were struck.

Natural gas is seen as a more promising source of power than oil. At this stage, the Urengoi, Yamburg and other well-known gas-fields can fully compensate for the decrease in oil production, and gas is therefore going to outdo oil in power generation. But there are problems here too, for 80 per cent of hydrocarbon fuel is consumed in the European part of

the country whereas most fields lie in the north and east. Large investments are needed for the construction of a communications network. Besides, gas piping itself swallows a huge amount of power and holds third place in this respect next to power engineering and metallurgy. Yet most Soviet exports go to Western countries, and gas has to cover a long distance to reach the consumer.

THE SOVIET STRATEGY of saving power is ineffective for the time being. Although the recent past witnessed numerous exhortations and decisions aimed at saving power, nothing is really being done about it. Speaking of particularly power-intensive sectors such as steel, non-ferrous metals or chemical products, we do not at the moment know of any plans or measures to develop a power-saving technology.

Japan today concentrates on systems in which thermal power is used chiefly for activating mechanisms and generating power while its low-temperature part is used as a source of heat. The Soviet Union's huge thermal power stations, which were the pivot of power engineering policy in the past, cannot be classed as such systems. And if it is true that Soviet atomic power plants are to be used as thermal stations to be built for safety reasons in areas far removed from those of consumption, this will move them even further away from a "co-generation" system, that is, a system supplying heat and electricity on the spot. This technology of saving power exists in Japan but is not being developed in the Soviet Union.

In the area of research into highly efficient sources used for heating urban buildings—an area in which competition in development is unfolding between the United States and Japan—the Soviet Union's contribution is quite insignificant. It follows that if Japan and the Soviet Union were to start exchanges of technology, Japan's flexible power-saving technology could usefully complement basic Soviet technology and subsequently this could provide a promising sphere for cooperation.

FERROUS METALLURGY in industrial countries has the lead as to power intensity, and power-saving measures in this sector strongly influence the country's energy balance. In Japan, for one, power consumption in ferrous metallurgy in late years has varied from 13 to 14 per cent of total domestic demand, which means that the industry holds a prominent place among extractive and manufacturing industries as a consumer.

Over the past ten years, nominal power intensity in Japanese ferrous metallurgy has been 4,894,000 kcal. According to our presumably conservative estimate, the share of power intensity in the Soviet Union is 61 per cent greater than in Japan. If Soviet ferrous metallurgy had used the kind of power-saving technology in use in Japan, it could have saved in, say, 1982, at least 442 trillion kcal in producing ferrous metals. This is the minimum if the possibility of simultaneous saving at the stage of rolling steel is borne in mind.

In short, effective power-saving measures in Soviet ferrous metallurgy such as are current in Japan would have made it possible to renounce atomic power plant construction altogether or at least to avoid the Chernobyl tragedy.

It is only fair to add that the foregoing does not imply that Soviet ferrous metallurgy so far has been consuming power mindlessly, without trying to save. To make effective use of blast furnace gas, for example, the Soviet Union has developed the world's most sophisticated techno-

logy, one that other industrial countries, primarily Japan, have adopted. This is undeniable. But it is equally undeniable that there is an obvious imbalance in the Soviet Union between original fundamental research and the actual utilisation and dissemination of its results.

Steel smelting is the most power-intensive process. But it is in the Soviet steel industry that a particularly large amount of power is consumed. This is because much of the steel is made by using the open-hearth process, which involves a high degree of power consumption. If the Soviet Union were to make by the converter process, say, 70 per cent of the steel smelted in open-hearth furnaces it could save about 50 trillion kcal. In other words, one reason for the enormous waste of power is the current lag in introducing continuous casting. In 1984, the Soviet Union produced a mere 12.3 per cent of its steel by this process, while the corresponding Japanese index was 89 per cent. By adding to this a switch to the converter process mentioned above, the Soviet Union could have saved 10 per cent of the total amount of power consumed in its steel industry.

THE STEEL INDUSTRY is both a major consumer of thermal power and a gigantic source of heat supply. But a vast amount of heat is still released into the environment. Soviet metallurgy is vigorously developing a technology of utilising this "by-power". The Soviet Union and France have developed a technology of using a power turbine activated by high-pressure gases accumulating in the upper section of the funnel. In Japan this technology is being used by the Kawasaki Seitetsu company, which has bought it in the Soviet Union.

Operating in Japan in 1985 were 35 generators of this type (four of them of Soviet make). These generators produced over 2.6 billion kwh of power that year. The Soviet Union is also behind other countries in using original technologies developed by itself. The Japanese Sinnitetsu company is using a Soviet coke producing technology.

The Soviet steel industry is leading in the development of technologies, but is far behind Japan in their introduction as well as in the development of power-saving technologies. I would describe this as neglect on the part of one of the world's major oil-producing countries.

Japan, which has obtained from the Soviet Union power-saving technologies developed there, could help the Soviet Union introduce them into industrial production. The fact that a great power ranking first in the world in natural resources fails to show proper thrift in using these finite resources and power is unfortunate not only for the Soviet Union itself but for the whole of humanity. The aid in saving power which I have mentioned would therefore benefit Japan itself and contribute to the harmonious growth of world power engineering.

In carrying on its economic perestroika, the Soviet Union ought to keep in mind the following:

— The natural resources at the country's disposal should be regarded as a universal asset. It is very important for humanity that they be used thriftily.

— More competitive Soviet output would have a beneficial impact on the world market. The emphasis should be put on exporting equipment, whose share in Soviet exports is only 14 per cent now. Incidentally, this indicator in the case of Japan is 76 per cent.

— Advances in the disarmament process would be of tremendous economic value. Current military spending in the world stands at 630 billion dollars, and the money released as a result of disarmament could be invested in infrastructures and used for social purposes, the development of natural resources, and so on.

This analysis concerns Soviet metallurgy but the situation in the chemical industry, mechanical engineering and other sectors is similar. *Perestroika should begin by ending waste rather than by generating more and more power that virtually goes into making up for waste.*

THE SOVIET ECONOMY must be given credit for very impressive achievements. In addition to what I have mentioned earlier, there is high-standard research going on in the sphere of metallurgy, specifically into titanium and its alloys and into the monocrystallisation of molybdenum and tungsten. The Soviet Union is at least three years ahead of the United States and Japan in creating artificial diamonds but its experience still finds no uses. Regrettably, Soviet scientists do not couple their research with the task of putting out the necessary products. This is why their achievements in, say, obtaining chemically pure crystalline tungsten are of little value because this tungsten does not become a commodity.

I would suggest starting an active search for ways to combine Soviet fundamental research with Japanese applied science, which would make it possible to organise production of the most sophisticated items. This could be done within the framework of joint ventures. Right now this is no more than an idea, for we in Japan know very little about Soviet fundamental research, and as for Soviet researchers, they often do not know how their work compares with world standards.

In practical terms, the idea of setting up joint ventures, apart from legal difficulties, faces the stiff problem of the non-convertibility of the rouble. I have heard that the Soviet Union uses multiple exchange rates of the rouble. But no economy can function normally in such a situation. Some economists consider that to end this state of affairs, it would be necessary to put the rouble on a gold base. But I do not think this would produce the necessary result.

A rouble backed by gold is an anachronism. First of all, the value of gold is declining on the world market. Second, even taking into account the amount of gold mined in the Soviet Union, it must be recognised that there is a limit. Orientation to gold cannot guarantee the stability of the currency in an economy as vast as the Soviet Union's. It was not accidental that the last gold-backed currency disappeared from the world market as long ago as 1972.

Now for two more points in case we set up joint ventures. I am referring to the need to introduce a well-considered system of prices for land and to evolve a system of remunerating the employees of joint ventures. The rise of problems of this kind is perfectly natural. In China, for example, where the first joint ventures sprang up ten years earlier than in the Soviet Union and where up to 10,000 of them are operating today, some problems are still unsolved. It seems to me, however, that joint ventures in the Soviet Union can be brought into being more smoothly. But the country should be prepared for the prospect of an economic restructuring in favour of internationalisation that would cause over a period a chain reaction of problems requiring prompt solution.

Joint ventures should be set up first in industries capable of ensuring an inflow of hard currency at an early date. A beginning could be made by building in cooperation with foreign companies hotels and other facilities for foreign tourists.

Japanese businessmen are concerned that it takes the Soviet Union an average of eight years to build a plant against 18 months to two years in the case of Japan. Thus Soviet plants become obsolete even before going into operation, and foreign businessmen are therefore wary of investing in them. Besides, building major industrial plants jointly

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REGIONAL CONFLICTS

ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION

"International Affairs" Journal (USSR)/Institute for East-West Security Studies (USA)

The Panel: Congressman Lee Hamilton, Chairman, House of Representatives Subcommittee on Europe and Middle East; Robert S. McNamara, former President of World Bank, former Secretary of Defense of the USA; Boris Piadyshev, Editor-in-Chief, *International Affairs*; John Mroz, Director, Institute for East-West Security Studies; Lincoln Bloomfield, Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

RISK CENTRE SHIFTING TOWARDS THE THIRD WORLD

B. Piadyshev. Why regional conflicts?

Though Europe retains its key importance for the US and Soviet political and strategic concerns, the Third World has become, in fact, the exclusive scene of wars and acute crises. Over the postwar decades Europe knew no armed conflicts although events there took dramatic turns at times. Whereas crises in Asia, Africa and Latin America continue unabated and do not lose their bitterness.

I refer to 1988 report of the Institute of World Priorities of Washington which stated that there were 25 wars in the world at the time, more than ever. About three million lives, mostly civilians, were lost in those wars. All in all about 17 million people perished in military conflicts after the Second World War. All in the Third World whereto the centre of risk is shifting.

International Affairs repeatedly pointed in its articles that during the recent decades, the East and West have worked out a mechanism of interaction which greatly diminished the probability of a direct military confrontation or a runaway crisis. There are many restraining factors in this field: balance of armaments, a smoothly functioning system of alliances for maintaining security, a diversified network of negotiations on disarmament, political consultations, etc. Forecasting events in the Third World is a problem with many unknown factors.

R. McNamara. I believe the US and Soviet Union face the greatest opportunity in forty years to shift the basis for the formulation of their foreign and defense policy from "Cold War" thinking to a new vision of superpower relations. The opportunity is a function of the "New

Institute for East-West Security Studies of New York is an authoritative research centre in the USA. The Soviet-American discussion on regional conflicts was undertaken by *INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS* journal and the Institute within a broad international conference held in Washington last summer to review pressing issues of consolidating universal stability in a multipolar world.

Thinking" introduced by Gorbachev. It features at least three concepts strongly at odds with traditional Marxist-Leninist and Soviet views:

- A nation's security interests should be pursued through diplomacy not military threats or the use of force.
- One nation's security cannot be guaranteed at the expense of the security of others. Security cannot be pursued unilaterally; it must be strengthened in cooperation with other states.
- International organisations and bilateral efforts can serve to solve regional and global problems.

How might the "New Thinking" be applied to the world of the future? We cannot assume it would be a world without conflict. There will be conflict between disparate groups within nations and conflict extending across national borders. Racial and ethnic differences will remain. Political revolutions will erupt as societies advance. Historical disputes over political boundaries will continue. Economic differentials among nations, as the technological revolution of the 21st century spreads unevenly across the globe, will increase.

L. Hamilton. US-Soviet accommodation and the requirements of economic restructuring in the Soviet Union have led to a reduction of superpower tensions and a retrenchment in Soviet foreign policy.

The Soviets have shown greater restraint in their support for regional clients; they have also been less ready to exploit unstable regional situations for their own advantage:

- Together with the recent growth in the influence and prestige of the United Nations, these trends in US-Soviet relations have had positive consequences for regional conflict situations.
- During the past two years, longstanding regional conflicts have been mostly resolved in South Africa and Afghanistan.
- Other regional conflicts are moving toward negotiation and some resolution in the Iran-Iraq war, hostilities in Indochina and Central America.

L. Bloomfield. It never was true that, as Ronald Reagan asserted in 1980, "If there was no Soviet Union, there would be not hot spots around the world". Local conflicts still arise at a steady clip, and the inherent instabilities and local quarrels will be little affected by great-power arms control and disarmament agreements. Four major types of conflict have characterised the second half of the 20th century: colonial, inter-state, primarily internal, and internal with significant external involvement.

B. Piadyshev. The elaboration of new Soviet approaches to international issues, including the issue of coping with regional conflicts in a multipolar world, is dovetailed with the current deep-going processes of perestroika in Soviet society. We are convinced that the democratisation process and public decision-making in foreign policy will develop further. Our partners should know that Soviet diplomacy is growing and operating in a new domestic environment, under a new democratic and legal regime. The Soviet leadership has taken a definite stand for de-ideologising interstate relations.

Changes for the better due to new political thinking have occurred in recent years in the world at large and in individual regions. There is no direct threat of nuclear war. Europeans have started to scale down nuclear confrontation—the most dangerous in the world. We are prepared to work together with the United States on a predictable and stable basis and to move ahead by combining continuity with fresh ideas. The Soviet Union has withdrawn its forces from Afghanistan and started withdrawing them from the lands of our allies.

We shall not waver from the Vladivostok policy in the Asian-Pacific

region. We have already identified the agenda and tone of our relations with many countries—this is good will, constructiveness and mutual respect.

J. Mroz. While Europe was enjoying its longest period of continuous peace in contemporary history, the East-West competition was being played out on the battlefields of the Developing World. Rhetoric notwithstanding, both sides have been more interested in the balance sheet of "victories or defeats" vis-a-vis each other than they have been in working to resolve root causes of conflicts, reduce the level of violence and promote social justice. Leaders proudly boasted of "rollbacks", "achievements" and changing correlation of forces. The Third World was a scorecard of the competition between the two major powers and their respective ideologies. The Swahili saying "when two elephants fight, the grass suffers" was a fair description of many conflicts in the Middle East, Central America, Africa and Asia over the past forty-five years. Whereas most of these conflicts were indigenous in origin, the great powers were able to exploit and obtain short-term benefits from aiding one side or another. There were cases (e.g. Somalia/Ethiopia) where the great powers switched local clients. In other cases, they were able to foster coup d'etats. While the literature is now rich in case studies, the people of the Developing World are worse off. The important questions we need to ask ourselves are what we in the East and West have learned from our experience and what we intend to do to change our policies and commitments. Whereas both countries can point to some limited or temporary successes in openly pursuing their rivalry through backing one side or another in Third World conflicts, the overall results have been counterproductive for both the United States and the Soviet Union in the long run. Increasingly the superpowers found themselves unable to influence, let alone control events in regional conflicts. The costs both sides have paid for such involvement, particularly the costs paid by the USSR for its policies before the introduction of New Thinking in its foreign policy, have far exceeded the political and strategic gains.

L. Bloomfield. Most dramatic of all was the reversal of long-standing Soviet policy, detailed in Gorbachev's extraordinary statements to the UN in 1987 and 1988. The rhetoric of his "new thinking" embraced not only support for UN peacekeeping, but across-the-board revival of the UN system to deal authoritatively with nuclear, economic and environmental interdependence.

B. Piadyshev. That was good news. Yet bad news is there, too. It would seem that the degree of mutual distrust in today's world is lower than it was at the apex of the Cold War. Still, arsenals of destruction at present greatly exceed the amount of weapons from that period. Regrettably not everyone has yet abandoned the claims to be judge and arbiter. Apparently some believe that calling one's own country "a model of democracy" gives them the right to cavalierly assert their monopoly on making or enforcing recommendations on how other countries should conduct their domestic affairs and which pattern of political, social and economic development they should choose.

R. McNamara. In the post-war years the US had the power—and to a considerable degree we exercised it—to shape the world as we chose. It is clear that in the 21st century regardless of actions by the Soviet Union and the US, relations among nations will differ dramatically from those of the post-war decades. Conflicts within and between nations will not disappear. But how different that world would be if the Superpowers agreed on two points:

1. Neither would seek to take advantage of such disputes to incre-

ase or extend their political or military power beyond their borders;

2. Their bilateral relations would be conducted according to rules of conduct which precluded the use of force.

In the next century, whether or not the Cold War ends, we will live in a multi-polar world, and our foreign policy and defense programs must be adjusted to that reality.

We have already seen the rise of Japan. We must expect it to play a larger and larger role on the world scene—exercising greater political power and assuming greater political and economic responsibility. The same can be said of Western Europe, which will take a giant step toward economic integration in 1992. From that is bound to follow greater political unity which will strengthen Europe's power in world politics.

And by the middle of the next century several of the countries, of what we now think as the Third World, will have so increased in size and economic power as to be major participants in decisions affecting relations among nations. India will have a population of 1.6 billion, Nigeria 400 million, and Brazil 300 million. If China achieves its economic goals for the year 2000, and if it then moves forward during the next fifty years at satisfactory but not spectacular growth rates, the income per capita of its 1.7 billion people in 2050 will be equal to that of the British in 1965. Its total gross national product may well approximate that of the US, Western Europe, or Japan, and very likely will exceed that of the USSR.

These figures are, of course, highly speculative. I point to them simply to emphasize the magnitude of the changes which lie ahead and the need to begin now to adjust our goals, our policies, and our institutions to take account of them.

In such a multi-polar world, neither the US nor the USSR would be able to so completely dominate their respective spheres as at present. Nor would the advantages outweigh the costs, even if it were possible. With or without changes in relations between East and West, both the US and USSR must prepare to reposition themselves politically, for new roles in a new world.

J. Mroz. Today, we are witnessing for the first time in many years, a great deal of new realism in the way both the USSR and the United States approach regional conflicts and interaction with the Developing World. At best we can call the current time a period of transition from confrontation to cooperation. We should not fool ourselves into thinking that this transition has been or will be an easy one for either country. The residue of more than four decades of competition will not easily disappear from the maps of the Developing World nor from the memories of many in East, West and the Developing World. Even more difficult for both sides will be the adjustment of traditional policies and the change of instinctual behaviour which leaders of both countries have had in reacting to events which take place throughout the Third World. The United States and the Soviet Union will find the transition of their behaviour in regional conflicts to be much more difficult in practice than in words. Earlier this year, President George Bush announced the end of the American policy of containment which has largely governed U. S. actions and views toward dealing with Third World conflicts for more than four decades. Mr. Bush has called the new era "Beyond Containment". It is not clear, however, what this new era of Beyond Containment means in policy terms. Senior Administration officials and advisors privately admit that they are cautious about a reversal of American policies in Third World areas. Whereas they genuinely welcome the radical domestic and foreign policy reforms

being undertaken in the Soviet Union, they are concerned about reversibility. They feel uncomfortable making decisions which reflect dramatic shifts in the way the United States has defended its traditional interests in the Third World. They are particularly chary of such changes when they are not convinced that the ideological-military struggle in regional conflicts is truly over. These same officials have demonstrated a propensity to seek dialogue and a more cooperative relationship with the USSR, but not to the extent that one can call the current period a time of cooperation in dealing with regional conflicts.

THE TRADITIONAL AND NEW CAUSES OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS

B. Piadyshev. As this discussion went on we already got involved in looking at the roots of regional conflicts, and of the crises present and future. The traditional cause of conflicts and wars have been adequately researched. The problems of economic development, including social conditions in the Third World characterised by hunger, the increasing gap between the developing and the developed world, structural, financial and other issues pose no less, and if anything a greater danger to general stability and the future of mankind than the military-political processes do.

However, the experience of successful and rapid development in a whole number of countries of Asia, Latin America and even Africa, including tremendous progress in resolving food problems in such densely populated countries as India and China, invalidate the apocalyptic predictions many have made. The situation, however, is complicated, to say the least.

L. Hamilton. Natural resources would also cause future regional conflicts. Resource shortages—of fossil fuels, of scarce strategic minerals, of water in the Middle East, of timber in South America and Southeast Asia—could provoke new conflicts. And as technological development makes it feasible to exploit other resources, such as minerals in the seabed, countries could become involved in disputes over access and control.

Refugees and large population transfers can also cause conflict. Massive flows of people—as a consequence of political persecution, war or economic distress—have been destabilizing in Southeast Asia, southern Africa, and the Horn of Africa. The sources of these mass migration are likely to persist.

L. Bloomfield. Conflict is inherent in the dynamics of economic, social and political change. Warning signals applicable elsewhere can be read in Iran's tempestuous efforts to reverse the processes of modernisation, westernisation, and industrialisation. And finally, Danton's apothegm that "revolution devours its children" has proved no less true of a number of countries than of Robespierre, with future victims not hard to discern.

B. Piadyshev. The state of affairs in the sphere of ecology in developing countries will exert and does exert great influence on the global community.

The Third World is beginning to show concern over the state of the environment but often lacks the necessary skills as well as resources for implementing environmental measures. This situation often causes these countries, where tropical forests are destroyed or "dirty" technologies are propagated, to adopt a politically accusatory and categorical approach to environmental issues.

Ecology is a relatively new sphere of international cooperation which suffers little from the burden of confrontational attitudes. This may be

helpful. Environmental control must be a global concern and, in spite of its complexity, constructive and business-like cooperation can set an example for all groups of states. It is important to prevent it from becoming an arena of ideological and political speculations.

L. Hamilton. Man-made environmental problems now regularly spill over national boundaries. Given the heightened awareness of the dangers of environmental degradation, certain environmental problems now have the potential to provoke bilateral or regional conflicts.

The acid rain problem in North America has been handled with considerable sensitivity by the US and Canada, but it is conceivable that a similar pollution dispute between less friendly nations could become more confrontational.

Industrial accidents like that in Bhopal, India, could lead to bilateral tensions in cases in which the countries involved in a foreign investment are neighbours.

Nuclear reactor accidents like the one at Chernobyl, but in nations smaller than the Soviet Union, could spew deadly fallout across national borders, provoking an angry response.

B. Piadyshev. Today, the Third World is the main source of yet another plague of our times—terrorism. The only correct and practical solution that the world community can offer to prevent terrorist acts from becoming a daily nightmare is to develop an "immediate policy of intolerance" towards terrorism especially towards state policies favouring it. Silence or patently mild reactions to its manifestations and moreover, to open calls to resort to it at the state level, cannot but be interpreted by those who practice terrorism and those who suffer from it, as encouragement of the policy recognising terrorism as legitimate.

Human rights, political democracy represent one of the most difficult problems of the Third World. Without internal democratic control over the government, without such indispensable freedoms as freedom of information and freedom of expression, without elections that are conducted under procedures which nobody has any grounds to question, it is hardly possible to achieve a reliable solution to regional conflicts, cessation of the regional arms race and the establishment of a minimal level of confidence between states.

Many Third World countries avoid detailed discussions of these aspects, saying that it is either interference into internal affairs or espionage. Naturally, their societies cannot be made democratic or open by force and it would be extremely dangerous to attempt to do it. Nonetheless, our political and moral position on that score should be unequivocal and consistent. Democracy and openness are not an unavoidable concession but a foundation of development and security both regional and in the entire world.

L. Hamilton. The transnational appeal of certain religious ideologies, such as Islamic fundamentalism, could also continue to be a source of concern for status quo governments. How government cope with transnational issues will affect regional conflicts.

B. Piadyshev. One can hardly fail to agree. The rise of Muslim Fundamentalism, the outbursts of militant nationalism in different corners of the Third World show that these are not isolated incidents, but an extreme manifestation of a rather widely spread phenomenon i. e., an opposition to European and North American values on questions of good and evil. Even with its notable economic development, the Westernisation of a country does not at all exclude the rise of oriental, medieval emotions based upon the cultural traditions of the society.

J. Mroz. Some leaders and analysts of the Developing World as well as several European commentators in Europe have expressed fears of the creation of a "new condominium" between the two largest military

powers in regional areas. It's said that "when two elephants make love, the grass also suffers". Our colleagues in the Developing World need not lose sleep over such possibilities. The geo-strategic, economic and political interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are sufficiently different and the lack of trust remains sufficiently high to warrant any such talk of a "new Yalta". Beyond that, the growing complexity and multipolarity of the international system no longer allows for such condominium. Sales of sophisticated arms are now a South-South problem (China, India, Brazil, Israel, South Africa) as well as an East-West and North-South problem.

L. Bloomfield. Local conflicts may become peripheral to global peace and security, but that trend could be reversed if a warring local party resorts to nuclear weapons. Of the current adversaries, only India, Israel and South Africa are believed to possess that capability today. Tomorrow the list could include Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Iran, Brazil and Korea (and one day conceivably Germany, with unforeseeable effects on European security.)

Determined leaders, with little experience of modern warfare or limited knowledge of the effects of nuclear war, may not only come into possession of crudely deliverable nuclear weapons but also have a willingness to use them. Local conflicts will be worsened by the introduction of surface-to-surface missiles, short to intermediate range, found notably in the Middle East and South Asia.

L. Hamilton. A final and highly alarming, potential source of regional instability is the proliferation of lethal new weapons. The chief concerns here are ballistic missiles and the nuclear, chemical and biological arms which they can carry. Particularly in the Middle East, where proliferation has been widespread, these weapons are increasingly possessed by countries with longstanding grievances or long-running disputes with their neighbours.

The mere possession of these weapons is itself destabilising. As we have seen in the Middle East during recent years, countries usually seek to match the forces of their regional adversaries, initiating unstable arms races. In addition, the proliferation of these new weapons and the declining reluctance to use them, adds a potentially catastrophic new ingredient to conflicts with various origins.

The use of missiles and chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war, and by Iraq against the Kurds, suggests that regional antagonists may not exercise the kind of strategic caution and self-restraint which has characterised the US-Soviet nuclear stand-off.

R. McNamara. The US Foreign Aid program—totalling approximately \$13 billion per year—is today largely a program of military assistance and defense support. Less than 25 per cent of the total is supplied to the poorer nations of the world in the form of development assistance. The Soviet aid program is similarly oriented. In the future, under the proposed Code of Conduct, both the US and USSR would stop delivery of offensive arms to Third World nations and would sharply cut back the flow of other forms of military assistance.

J. Mroz. U.S.-Soviet relations have vastly improved since 1985, arms sales and transfers to the Developing World from both countries have not decreased. There is a good argument to be made that conventional force reductions in Europe will apply even greater pressure on the defense industries in East and West to export more weapons in order to keep per unit production and development costs in line. A debate has recently emerged in the USSR over the ability of Soviet arms manufacturing enterprises to directly sell arms abroad to bolster hard-currency earnings. Recent published figures in the United States show

that Western sales of arms abroad have increased from a year ago. *B. Piadyshev*. It is unfortunate that, according to the recent report of the Congress Research Center¹, sales of US arms to Third World countries went on a sharp increase last year. US deliveries grew 66 per cent in one year (Soviet ones dropped 47 per cent). The United States sold 9.2 billion dollars worth of weaponry in one year.

L. Bloomfield. The forces that generate local conflicts show no sign of diminishing. It is instructive to try to glimpse at the future agenda even with the caveat that nothing is inevitable until it actually takes place.

A new category of conflict cases is likely to arise from technology-driven phenomena, in particular environmental degradation, but also including disputed uses of newly-exploited "global commons" such as the seabed and outer space.

...Traditional assumptions about national security make a poor fit with emerging environmental problems. Soviet President Gorbachev has called for new attention to "ecological security".

However, whatever the source of the conflict, the conflict itself will doubtless still be between recognisable entities such as states. It will probably take such familiar shapes as soldiers wearing different color uniforms shooting at each other.

L. Hamilton. In addition to these long-standing sources of conflict, new international developments have created conditions for potential clashes.

Emerging "regional superpowers" have begun or are preparing to exercise power in their own neighbourhoods. Regional powers typically seek to preserve international stability, but they often act unilaterally and sometimes violate the sovereignty of others:

- India has intervened forcefully in the affairs of nations of South Asia; it has also recently successfully tested a long-range ballistic missile;
- Pakistan and China, countries which share India's wider Asian ambitions, have built powerful modern armed forces;
- South Africa has mounted attacks deep inside neighbouring states with near impunity;
- Brazil has developed a successful arms industry and has surpassed its neighbours in military power;
- Israel remains a dominant military force in the Middle East;
- Iran and Iraq each seek to dominate the Persian Gulf and each other;
- Vietnam's ability to dominate Indochina militarily has alarmed non-communist states in Southeast Asia.

L. Bloomfield. The Middle East is the *locus classicus* for recurrent warfare until both Israelis and Palestinians come to terms with the other's essential legitimacy. Since 1948, the conflict has exploded into violence every eight years on the average; the next time may feature nuclear weaponry. It will continue until the underlying dispute is settled—a recognised homeland for Palestinians and unequivocal acceptance of Israel by its Arab neighbours. Rivalries for leadership in the Arab world continue between monarchies and radical movements, between Sunni and Shiite Moslems, and between Iraq and Syrian Ba'athist movements.

R. McNamara. The ultimate solution of the Middle East problem requires acceptance by the world, including Israel and the PLO, both of Israel's right to live in peace and the rights of the Palestinians to a home on, and some form of self-government in, the West Bank. It is very likely that the start of negotiations to work toward such a solu-

tion would be facilitated by the convocation of an international conference backed by the US and USSR.

The political unrest in Latin America, and particularly in Central America,—e. g. in Nicaragua and El Salvador—has not been the result, in the first instance, of action by the Soviet Union or their proxy Cuba. Instead, it has been a function of the failure of the political elites in each nation to address the basic needs of the mass of their people. That failure has often led to political disorder. After disorder developed, the Soviets, in accordance with Cold War behaviour, intervened with military assistance—the US often did the same. In the future, under the terms of the Code of Conduct, neither Superpower would intervene. No longer would the Soviet Union, directly or indirectly, support efforts to subvert established governments in the hemisphere, and never again would the US introduce military forces unilaterally. How then will political conflicts be resolved? They will continue to fester, as they have in Panama, unless the Latin-American nations themselves, through the OAS—or through ad hoc arrangements such as the Contadora or Arias Plans—seek to bring peace to the area.

L. Bloomfield. Internal conflicts are likely to continue with causes ranging from ethnic quarrels and socio-economic injustices to ideological competition and simple power grabs. The watch list includes Ulster, Lebanon, Sudan, Burundi, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Spain, Yugoslavia, perhaps one day Belgium and Germany. In South Africa, the continued domination of a majority black population by a white minority has created a growing commitment to violence by Africans inside and outside these areas.

R. McNamara. Apartheid in South Africa. For all too long, the US failed to denounce apartheid as strongly as our national traditions called for. We held back because we feared such action would weaken the Afrikaaner government, and that in turn would react to the advantage of the Soviets. Ultimately, we unilaterally imposed economic sanctions which have proven quite ineffective. In the future, in accordance with the Code of Conduct, we would seek to develop a consensus in the UN to deal effectively with the problem on a multilateral basis.

THE PERSIAN GULF. There may again be disruption of petroleum traffic through the Persian Gulf. Should that occur, instead of unilaterally introducing armed forces, as the US did in 1987, it should support the establishment of a UN force to assure safe passage of oil cargoes.

L. Bloomfield. In the interstate category, the watch list includes such past and potential adversary pairings as Greece vs. Turkey, Vietnam vs. China, Thailand vs. Laos, Burkina Faso vs. Mali, Bahrain vs. Qatar, Kampuchea vs. Vietnam, USSR vs. China, Afghanistan vs. Pakistan and Panama vs. the US. India and Pakistan rub along suspiciously, nagged by the likelihood of a Pakistani nuclear catch-up, and by the long-unresolved Kashmir dispute which has generated three wars and remains unsettled more than forty years after the UN called for a plebiscite. Afghanistan, free of Soviet invaders, may write a new fundamentalist Islamic chapter in the "Great Game" that has long generated casualties and great power rivalry. Turkish and Greek Cypriots show little sign of settling their ancient quarrel.

The absence of clearly-demarcated boundaries remains a prime source of potential conflict between Algeria and Morocco, Morocco and Mauritania, Ethiopia and Somalia. There are border disputes in the Arab world between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Yemen and South Yemen, Iraq and Kuwait. India has yet to solve border differences with China in the Himalayan foothills that have already undergone one violent phase, and the millennial dispute between China and Vietnam may erupt again over the potentially oil-rich Spratley Islands. Else-

where in Indochina, tensions persist between Vietnamese and Cambodians, and between Chinese and Malay populations.

J. Mroz. The United States and the Soviet Union will not find it easy to adapt to the reality that we are now living in a transitional period in world politics and in our own relationship. During such a period, both sides must learn to have greater confidence in the other. This means that both sides will have the right to demand additional evidence from the other power that rhetoric and professed hopes of a new relationship are being matched by deeds. The behaviour in regional conflicts of the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as their key allies such as France, the United Kingdom, and the German Democratic Republic is as important as any indicator of the true changes that are taking place in the fundamental relationship between East and West.

POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF SOVIET-US INTERACTION

L. Hamilton. Trends in U.S.-Soviet relations suggest that the prospects are good for a continuation of reduced superpower involvement in regional conflicts during the next decade. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union appears inclined to provide sustained high levels of financial or military support for clients, proxies, or established governments not now among their allies. What the Soviets have provided to Cuba they will not provide to Nicaragua and what the US has done for Egypt is not possible today with new friends in Africa or Asia.

Although the frequency in superpower involvement will probably therefore decrease, many of the historical, geographical and economic factors which caused previous conflicts will persist. In addition, other recent developments could fuel new conflicts or heighten the dangers of conflicts that are still simmering.

Basic loyalties of ethnic and racial nationalism are presently at the root of power struggles or separatist movements in several areas. Subnational loyalties often suppressed for generations can come back to demand respect and expression. Many of these national minded groups could escalate their demands overnight and draw in other states.

L. Bloomfield. Adoption of a new strategy, and a far more seriously-meant commitment are called for. The commitment is to preventive action aimed at better anticipation of incipient conflicts, instead of the ingrained custom of paying attention only when things have gotten out of hand. The strategy aims at insulation and isolation from outside meddling in local confrontations from which wider wars can develop.

Rather than new machinery, what is needed is a broader concept of national security that comprehends the linkage between multilateral "peace-monitoring" and the quest for regional stability and peaceful change, based on recalculating the painful costs and dubious benefits of some recent unilateral intervention in conflict-prone regions of marginal interest. A policy responsive to that insight, which I have called "Spheres of Abstention", would substitute for traditional "Spheres of Influence" and intervention.

The "conflict resolution system" has focussed obsessively on violence once it is imminent or has actually broken out. What is needed is to apply far more political and diplomatic muscle to conflict anticipation—early warning and prevention—before disputes turn into conflict and wars.

In two recent wars—the Falklands/Malvinas and Iran-Iraq—the international community took a lethargic approach to preventive diplo-

macy. There was no major effort to reinforce agreements already reached, or to find formulas to inhibit or deter open warfare between the parties. International activity in the Falklands only became serious when Argentina invaded and Britain decided to fight. In the tradition of paralysis when an Arab or even Third World State is the offending party, Iraq's 1980 attack on Iran was scandalously ignored for years by the Security Council, even as hundreds of thousands of people were slaughtered.

R. McNamara. There, clearly, is the need for developing a new relationship between "the North" and the Third World.

At a minimum, such a relationship should:

1. Guarantee the military neutrality of the Third World.
2. Commit the Superpowers to sharp reductions in, and ultimately termination of, military support of conflicts between Third World nations and conflicts between opposition political parties within those nations.
3. Assure support for a system of collective security for the nations of the South, and a mechanism for resolution of Regional Conflicts without Superpower involvement.
4. Increase the flow of both technical and financial assistance to the developing countries to help them accelerate their rates of social and economic advance.

Agreement by East and West to support such a program would not only represent adjustment to the reality of economic and political change in the Third World, but would be consistent with moves to dampen down and ultimately terminate the Cold War. It would be a return to Roosevelt's and Churchill's conception of the post-war world, a conception, which, when first formulated in the Atlantic Charter in 1941 and later expanded into a proposal for establishment of the UN, was uncontaminated by the ideology of the Cold War.

Roosevelt's hopes for a strong, united organisation that would defend a single interpretation of the post-war order were, of course, not to be fulfilled. By the time the UN was organised, East-West rivalry rendered it impotent.

L. Bloomfield. The future will surely surprise us. Along with new forms of terrorism and nuclear proliferation, it may feature internal conflicts and ecological disasters creating such societal chaos as to require the rethinking of UN Charter Article 2 paragraph 7, which forbids intervention in the internal affairs of states. Responsible officials are increasingly aware of these contingencies. Action will require that we transcend the traditional mindset that Harlan Cleveland² calls "Hardening of the Categories". International cooperation is not necessarily habit-forming. What is most needed is hard-headed realisation that to achieve everyone's national security objectives, there is no escape from a limited pooling of sovereign power, probably without calling it that.

But even then, the present weak system of multilateral cooperation should not be asked to carry more than the traffic will bear. To apply a new order of national and international conflict-prevention efforts *before* a menacing conflict actually turns into a war, would be a major breakthrough. To invest serious political energy in reversing the earlier "Dispute Phase" would be a triumph of reason over habit. It is steps such as these that belong far higher on policy makers' agenda as expressions of enlightened national interest.

J. Mroz. Central to much of this debate is the question of the role of ideology in foreign policy. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has boldly articulated the new thinking ideas of President Mikhail Gorbachev. His

speeches to his Ministry staff the last two summers have been carefully read in the West as very significant demonstrations of both the difficulties of implementing new policies and procedures based on new thinking as well as the commitment of the leadership of the USSR to implement changes in its policies and actions as well as words. Placing global interests and values—the values of human survival—ahead of the class struggle reflects not only an awareness of the changes which have taken place in capitalist societies during the past seventy years but the new realities of the world we live in. Our ability to deal successfully with these challenges will depend on our ability to eliminate the ideological-military competition that has characterised U.S.-Soviet relations for all of my lifetime. I do not believe that this is an impossibility nor that it must take decades to be achieved. It will, however, require patience, mutual assistance by both sides in not causing new problems for the other, and a genuine political will to act differently in regional conflicts. In the balance lies many lives and many more aspirations for a better future by the majority of our globe's population. It will also help determine whether the Cold War and the East-West struggle can finally be relegated to the ash bin of history.

B. Piadyshev. Clear distinction between internal and external causes of conflict situations makes it possible to approach their settlement in a far more realistic way. Recently, the idea of national reconciliation as a means of removing or neutralising the internal sources of regional conflict was for the first time tested in practice. Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Kampuchea have embarked upon the way towards national reconciliation. There are few or possibly no historical analogies to ending a civil war through national reconciliation followed by the establishment of a coalition structure to govern the country. Precisely for this reason, a number of politicians regard this line of policy as ineffective or altogether hopeless. Yet, the following arguments can be made in favour of the policy of national reconciliation as a way to neutralise internal sources of regional conflict.

It has been a long time since a "pure" civil war was fought anywhere in the world and today, it is no longer possible at all. The dialectics here is that whenever the foreign element is removed from an internal conflict, which means that the external negative influence becomes neutralised, conditions evolve which are obviously conducive to a national reconciliation between the internal parties.

National reconciliation seems to be the only acceptable way which enables the neighbouring countries as well to participate in joint actions to stop regional conflicts. This was vividly manifested in Central America: the goal of internal reconciliation in Nicaragua became the uniting idea which made it possible for Latin American nations to step up their efforts and come up with a program for settling the regional conflict.

R. McNamara. But is it not time to return to a conception of a world in which order would be maintained through international cooperation and support for a set of multilateral institutions—the United Nations and Regional organisations? To move toward realisation of that vision, should not East and West agree on a Code of Conduct to cover relations between themselves and between them and other nations?

An earlier attempt at establishing a US-Soviet Code of Conduct, the 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev Basic Principles Agreement, was unsuccessful. Its failure was due, in part, to increased Soviet activism in the Third World in the mid-to-late 1970s. The 1972 Basic Principles Agreement was simply contradictory to the interests of at least one of its signatories, and no one realistically expected its terms to be obeyed.

Now, however, circumstances have changed, and a mutually be-

neficial Code of Conduct can perhaps be negotiated. Alexander L. George³ has written extensively on the advantages to be gained from—as well as the limits on—explicit rules of superpower behaviour. He has argued that “the two superpowers should seek to develop, through timely, intensive discussions, a series of individual ad hoc understandings on how they would limit their competition and involvement in a particular country or region”. George believes that even if the effort to devise the rules proves abortive or only partially successful, the interaction inherent in the effort itself can help clarify motivations, goals, and perceptions.

Perhaps more importantly, both the Soviets and the US are retracting some of their Third World commitments—the commitments that doomed the 1972 Agreement to failure—and Gorbachev himself has suggested that “new rules of coexistence” might be drafted.

Such “new rules” could provide that:

1. Each Bloc's political interests will be pursued through diplomacy, not military threats or the use of force.
2. Consistent with 1, each Bloc's military forces will be restructured to defensive postures and reduced to a balance at substantially lower levels.
3. The Superpowers will not become involved in Regional Conflicts.
4. The nations of East and West, and in particular the Superpowers, will utilise international organisations to solve regional and global problems, including conflicts within and between Third World nations.

B. Piadyshev. Whatever name they are given, in my view, the most promising are efforts to work out adequate limitations, in kind or degree, on outside interference in regional conflicts. As promising are joint efforts to settle disputes and local crises in the Third World zone. There are certain situations of confrontational nature there; it is both sides' concern that these are kept under control not to let them evolve into dangerous. Prospects are thus present for some interaction in regional crises.

Feasibility of this line was in evidence during the last phase of the Reagan administration. After 1985 a mechanism of “quiet diplomacy” at different levels began to emerge. Main regional problems were energetically discussed and considered at the five summits, some forty meetings of the USSR and US foreign ministers, and at numerous expert consultations of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and US State Department, with the aim of reducing tensions and arriving at ways of settlement which would be worthy of each side. This work continued with the administration of George Bush. The September meeting of Eduard Shevardnadze and James Baker was quite productive. One may say that the Soviet and American diplomacies have gained positive experience in their contacts on problems of Africa's South, Middle East, Cambodia, Afghan settlement, and Central America's issues, though in the latter the US administration has taken a rigid stand.

L. Hamilton. The U.S. and the Soviet Union appear increasingly to have a common interest in preserving international stability. The two superpowers have already begun to discuss ways to cooperate in resolving existing regional conflicts and ways to prevent their being drawn into new conflicts in the future. However, in addition to discussing specific cases and strategies for conflict avoidance, future bilateral discussions should address longstanding and more recent sources of regional conflict. US-Soviet discussions would be an appropriate arena in which to pursue cooperative approaches to some of these sources of conflict mentioned above.

(Continued on page 135)

RUSSIA AND SOUTH AFRICA

Boris ASOYAN

ON A FEBRUARY EVENING in 1905, a carriage stopped at a small house in a quiet Lisbon street. A man in a black cloak, his hat pulled over his eyes, came out and rang the doorbell. It opened immediately.

The guest was shown into a room where two gentlemen were waiting for him—Alexander Koyander, head of the Russian Imperial Mission in Lisbon, and Alexander Zelyony, Secretary of the Mission. The latter owned the apartment.

The visitor, about 45 years of age, a man of fine appearance, comported himself with great dignity. He silently handed a batch of papers over to the head of the Russian Mission who set to reading them right away.

The secret police of any European royal court would have paid a good price to look over the shoulder of the Russian Envoy. Alexander Koyander was reading:

"...Hatred and extreme enmity towards Russia expressed by the British in regard to your war against Japan gave me reason to think that it would become necessary for Your Government to create possible difficulties for Britain... My present purpose is to see an official Representative of Russia and ask him whether his Government would wish to help inspire an uprising of the Kaffirs, an uprising so serious that it would rivet Britain's particular attention for two or three years..."

A few days before that meeting, the keeper of those papers had paid a visit to the Russian Mission. He identified himself as Joubert-Pinaar, and said that he fought in a rank of general against the British in the war of 1889-1902, that he hated them irrepressibly and wanted to take vengeance on them for the sufferings of the Boers, for over 26,000 Boer women and children who had starved to death in Lord Kitchener's concentration camps. He said also that a plan had been devised for undermining the British influence in South Africa and that he reckoned on Russian help. In his homeland, the general added, resentment at the British invaders was mounting not only among the Boers, but also among the natives.

Koyander sent a telegram to St. Petersburg, marking it "top secret".

It was read by the Emperor.

The answer arrived the next day. The proposals made by General Pinaar, wrote Count Lamsdorf, Minister of Foreign Affairs, were worthy of attention. It was necessary to find out the details of his plan.

"My attention was concentrated, of course, on the three Kaffir tribes living in the Cape colony or along its borders," read Koyander. "I mean the Basutos, the Zulus and Swazis. I know their morals and customs well and even understand their language.. I also know their Chiefs..."

Boris Asoyan, Cand. Sc. (Hist.), is Deputy Chief of the African Department, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. First of two articles.

During the Anglo-Boer war, the British, wishing to set the Kaffirs against us, made advances to them and so let them get out of hand. On making peace they changed abruptly their treatment of them. This circumstance, and the invitation of Chinese workers to the Rand, which deprived the Blacks of big earnings, caused among the latter extreme dissatisfaction against the British and so they are now bent on rising against their oppressors. Most agitated is the Swazi tribe, which, being among the smallest, is most energetic and capable. The Blacks are held back from an uprising by the apprehension that the Boers, whom they are used to fear greatly, may join the British in suppressing the uprising. My chief role will be to calm the Kaffirs in this regard and convince them that in the event of a clash with the British we will remain entirely neutral."

However, the matter concerned not only South Africa—the general suggested nothing less than launching a war against Britain almost in all her African colonies!

"...I have travelled for the purpose almost over the whole of Africa and have seen the Chiefs of the tribes that are hostile to Britain... I had a meeting with one of the Chiefs of the Negroes living on the Gold Coast and he promised me his support... At the present moment, an insurrection of Blacks is raging in the German and Portuguese colonies. During my stop-over in Mosamedes I shall see my emissary who, I am sure, will have no difficulty in preparing an uprising against the British as well."

Pinaar assured that the "Kaffirs" would send not less than half a million troops against the British. The weapons for them would be provided by "German, American and even British smugglers". He himself asked merely for 3,000 rifles with ten cartridges for each as presents for the "main Chiefs of each of the above-mentioned tribes", 80,000 pounds sterling and a ship for delivering the weapons. He believed that as soon as the uprising would start it would be joined by the Australian and Canadian workers of the South African goldmines who were "very angry with the Government for bringing the Chinese workers to South Africa". The war would last not less than two years, he said, and "Britain would have to bend every effort to wage it". And in two years, "we Boers will intervene and with God's help will drive the British from our country in one more year".

After the victory, he said, the Boers would ask Russia to establish Russia's protectorate over South Africa. Russia, the general stressed, should in future be the Suzerain and protector of South Africa".

It all smacked of madness, but still was tempting for St. Petersburg.

One could hardly hope in earnest for a mass uprising of black South Africans or the tribes in the Gold Coast or in any other colony. There was neither objective nor subjective causes for it. Besides, it was naive to reckon on the white goldminers' support. The racial barrier was already too high to speak of any possible solidarity of the Whites with the Blacks. But even with a perfect combination of factors, what could Pinaar achieve with one steamer? It would have been stopped by the first British coastal post.

And still, for all the weak points of the plan, Russia showed interest in it. The temptation was too strong: Russia, too, was humiliated by Britain, and, of course, itched to pay it in kind. But that had to be done so that Russia would be above suspicion. As for General Pinaar's true intentions, the Russian Councillor had no doubts that he was sincere.

"He expressed full confidence in me without any hesitation; and on his part he did not make the slightest attempt to induce me to do something that could compromise me. I may be mistaken, but it seems to me that, should we decide to cooperate, the only danger for us would be that

if his plans fail, our participation in them could be made known to the British in order to set Russia and Britain entirely at loggerheads."

Pinaar asked to be invited to St. Petersburg, so that the imperial government would make sure that his intentions were honest.

But in St. Petersburg such a visit was considered dangerous, and it was suggested that Paris was a better place for a meeting with the general.

On March 14, 1905, Count Nelidov, the Russian Ambassador in Paris, received a secret message:

"The Secretary of our mission, who has a secret assignment for you, is leaving Lisbon today. The proposal he will communicate to you can in principle be accepted. However, considering that this is a very delicate matter, one must be extremely cautious. Kindly report your personal impressions and your considerations about a future course of action."

It is known that Alexander Zelyony fulfilled the assignment and had a meeting with Ambassador Nelidov, and informed St. Petersburg about that. But it looks like the undertaking stopped at that.

Perhaps something prevented Pinaar from arriving in Paris, or maybe he felt he could hardly count on the over-cautious Russians who already had enough troubles. Anyway, the name of general Pinaar was no longer mentioned in the correspondence.

PARTNERS

THERE ALWAYS were many vague, incomprehensible or misunderstood things in the relations between Russia and South Africa. There were secrets, and some situations resembled detective stories.

However, even what seemed absolutely obvious, say, in the 1920s or the 1940s was soon overgrown with bureaucratic secrecy and passed into the area of vague rumours and then became plain myths. "Listen, they say we seem to have had diplomatic relations with South Africa some time in the past. Heard anything about that?" a young journalist expert in African affairs asked me in the early 1970s. He had heard that from an embassy probationer but did not believe him. Many of those who allegedly dealt with African studies had a vague idea of Russian support of the Boers in their war against the British in 1899-1902, and they used to think that the song "Transvaal, Transvaal, my land, you are on fire," which was a hit in Russia at the time, had come to us from Britain.

There is a Soviet TV programme called "It All Happened to Us, It Did". Scenes from old films and old songs satisfy the nostalgia of the older generation of viewers. This name would suit a programme about the past of our foreign policy and political science. This is necessary, first, to rectify our memory weakened after frequent social upheavals and, secondly, to remind ourselves once in a while that it is far from always that we were as progressive as we are today.

One such broadcast could be devoted to the history of our relations with South Africa. We could recall, say, the brief period of our New Economic Policy (NEP). The economy of Soviet Russia, which was gaining strength then, boldly emerged on the world markets, and we considered South Africa a potential trade partner. Or we could review World War II, where South Africa and the Soviet Union were allies, and Soviet consulates were opened in two South African cities—Pretoria and Cape Town.

Or to ponder our protracted "stagnation" which drowned our knowledge of the past, while propaganda clichés and slogans replaced real life.

...In the mid-1920s, South African businessmen and politicians visited Moscow quite frequently. J. Smith, a trade representative of South Afri-

ca in Europe, arrived in 1925 with an official assignment of his government to explore possibilities of cooperation with the Bolsheviks. He felt satisfaction with all he had seen and upon his return to Pretoria he recommended emphatically that Russia should be traded with. In that he was supported by Oswald Pirow, a parliament member from the Nationalist Party, and Mr. Pinaar, another trade representative of South Africa in Europe. A document of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs noted that both "are known as friends of Germany and as persons showing interest in Soviet Russia".

Georgi Chicherin suggested that serious attention should be paid to promoting relations with South Africa:

"The line of the government ...is the line of far-reaching autonomy and far-reaching separate rights of South Africa, though within definite limits... As a matter of fact, both the government and the party of Afrikaners wish to establish relations with us, above all for trade purposes, and also for political contacts. Having studied the situation in the USSR, and after the talks with our leading economists the South African delegates decided to establish contact ties with us and hope to send a permanent delegate to Moscow for maintaining contact. The delegate will be named Trade Delegate, but he will serve contacts in general between us and South Africa. He will belong to the party of Afrikaners. As regards trade, South Africa is very interested in receiving goods from us and selling us goods directly, without London intermediaries."

One of Chicherin's arguments was: "South Africa buys oil from Standard Oil. There is no doubt that our oil gets to South Africa through Standard Oil. So it is far more profitable for the former and for us that our oil be sold directly..."

Interest in Russia was not caused, naturally, by trade alone. The Nationalist Party of Hertzog tried to use the "Russian card" both in the struggle for influence, including the business quarters, and mostly for gaining greater independence from Britain.

South Africa demanded full independence at the Ninth Imperial Conference held in London in 1926. General Hertzog expressed an idea which lost none of its significance to this day. The cornerstone of the Empire today, he said, is the goodwill of all its component parts. Without this goodwill the Empire is bound to collapse. If the Empire is to flourish and meet the hopes pinned on it, he went on, we should ensure that the will to live as part of the Empire, as in a family of free nations, is strong in each of its components.

In other words: strong colonies mean a strong centre.

In the autumn of 1925 the Soviet-South African Joint Trade Association was set up in Moscow under the guidance of Leonid Krasin. Its South African shareholders were Schlesinger, Cooper and Hill who forwarded a request to the Chief Committee for Concessions in July 1926 for setting up in the USSR a foreign bank with a capital of £500,000 and with a guarantee of attracting foreign credits to a sum exceeding the principal capital ten times over. The term suggested for the concession was 40 years, that is, until 1966.

Leon Trotsky, who headed the Chief Committee for Concessions at that time, approved of that idea. He was backed by Chairman of the Board of the USSR State Bank Sheiman, though he recommended to be not too hasty in decisions. People's Commissar for Finance G. Sokolnikov, too, believed that the development of that kind of relations entirely suited the USSR's new economic policy.

"We have a currency with stable purchasing power and with a stable rate of exchange," he wrote in a letter to the Chief Committee for Concessions in June 1925. "Our currency legislation operates quite satisfactorily. It has put the currency market in order... There is no doubt

that internal commercial ties are being established better and more fully than a short time ago... The changes in the situation are evidently so significant and profound that it is time the former point of view be revised... The operation of a foreign bank, to which our crediting and currency legislation should, of course, be extended, can no longer be regarded as dangerous for our finances, our money circulation and credits..., it can be of use to the Soviet state, strengthening our relations with the international monetary market and widening our opportunities in attracting foreign means."

It is hard to believe today that in the past we had stable convertible currency and felt as equal partners on the international financial market while internal trade ties were in good order.

But we had it, hadn't we!

N. P. Bryukhanov, who succeeded Sokolnikov as the People's Commissar for Finance, agreed in August 1926 with the memorandum of the Chief Committee for Concessions on establishing a foreign bank and recommended that appropriate instructions be given to "our representatives abroad" so that practical negotiations could begin.

Relations with South Africa were developing so well that the Consul General of the USSR in Great Britain proposed that "unofficial talks" be started with South Africans "on establishing our trade mission there". "Considering the present desintegrating tendency," he stressed, "it would hardly be necessary to have special talks on this matter with London because, as regards trade, colonies feel independent enough."

In South Africa the expanding contacts with Soviet Russia were watched closely and with obvious approval. The Johannesburg newspaper *The Star* predicted in April 1926 that the mission of banker Schlesinger had vast opportunities and could become an event of unprecedented importance in the country's economic life. The possibility of selling wool, metals and farm produce in the USSR in exchange for Siberian timber and oil was lively discussed in the business quarters. On his arrival from Russia, Oswald Pirow caused a sensation as he declared that Moscow was ready to purchase goods to the tune of £4 million a year.

The Hertzog government insisted on maintaining the contacts and rejected as unserious assertions that the Bolsheviks were insolvent. The newspaper *Nation*, subsidised by Hertzog's party, wrote in September 1925 that Russia's recent proposal, put forward in August 1925, under the former government of General Jan Smuts on purchasing a large batch of wool (to the tune of £4 million) on conditions of a long-term credit caused mockery in many papers and business quarters. The USSR's solvency was derided and South African merchants were recommended to stay away from that deal. However, the paper went on, the Soviet proposal was worthy of a more serious attitude. In any case, it is difficult to understand, the paper said, why such a vast country as Russia with all its natural wealth should be cut off from trade relations with the rest of the world.

The intentions to sign a treaty with Russia, separately from Britain, were strong in South Africa right until the early 1930s. Moreover, in September 1930 these relations were given a fresh impetus: a resolution of the USSR Council of People's Commissars (Cabinet) recommended the setting up of a mixed joint-stock company for selling oil products to South Africa. The list of goods for mutual trade was growing ever longer.

However, the plans of the 1920s remained unfulfilled. Stalin's "socialism" strangled NEP and dashed all hopes for a normal development of the Soviet economy. The question of trade with South Africa arose ever more seldom until it was finally buried in the archives of the Foreign Ministry and other departments.

The winding down of relations with South Africa was being done by the other side as well. The right-wing groupings in South Africa itself demanded that all contacts with Soviet Russia be broken off: nascent South African totalitarianism saw in it a threat to its interests.

ALLIES

THE ATTACK of Hitler's Germany on the Soviet Union changed the attitude of the South African public to Russia. The Russian aid in the war against the British, the brave volunteers who fought on the side of the Boers and the nurses from St. Petersburg who saved many guerrillas from death were all remembered again.

There were people in South Africa who believed in Russia's victory from the very start of the war and they did not fear to say that in public. Douglas Young, a British Consul in Sevastopol and Archangelsk from 1909 to 1918, wrote in the newspaper *The Cape Argus* four days after the German invasion of the USSR that the Germans hoped to be in Moscow by August. Perhaps they will be there, he said, but they may be driven out of there by March next year, like Napoleon was. But if they stay there, what next? Moscow is not the whole of Russia. The Russians can fight. No other European nation is comparable with the Russians in endurance and resistance. The Russians will amaze the world, he concluded.

Forecasts like that were rare, of course. Viewed from South Africa, the Germans' onslaught looked so powerful that the majority did not doubt that Hitler would soon win.

Piet van der Byl, who was given the important post of Minister for the Natives' Affairs at the start of the war, expressed the opinion of the majority in June 1941. Personally I believe, he said, that the invasion of Russia will not take much time... Germany, he said, is capable of occupying the Ukraine and the Caucasus within six weeks and even sooner, though everybody hopes sincerely that this will not pass... When I speak about a possible defeat of Russia, he went on, I do not assume that the entire country will be occupied by Germans. Germany, no doubt, will seize only the Ukraine and the Caucasus and will establish puppet states there. Stalin, he went on, can lose power, the existing regime may fall, and complete chaos may set in the country.

As it is becoming clear today, the Kremlin, too, was aware of such an outcome. In any case, Stalin tried to propose to Hitler a separate peace already early at the start of the war, to cede Germany the Baltic republics and a part of the Ukraine, and so to save his regime.

At that time committees of "Medical Aid To Russia" society were being set up in the bigger cities of South Africa. During the war they raised over £1 million. The South Africans sent us not only money and medicines. Early in 1944 the Naval Fund dispatched one thousand sheepskin jackets for Soviet seamen and 10,000 articles of clothes and blankets. In November 1943, a ship chartered by Medical Aid and the Jewish Committee delivered to the USSR foodstuffs, clothes and ambulance cars.

Parcels from far-away South Africa were arriving at the Museum of Gifts of Stalin which, as Moscow old-timers remember, was situated on Gorky Street in Moscow (now the Revolution Museum). R. Altman, an activist of the Friends of the Soviet Union Association, drew a portrait of Stalin in a Marshal's uniform. Abram Bor, a businessman from Cape Town, presented Stalin with a massive gold watch. The servicewomen of a garrison in the town of Standerton sent to the Generalissimo a hand-woven pull-over. General Pinaar, the Governor of Transvaal, sent to the Kremlin pipe tobacco produced by his firm.

The Friends of the Soviet Union, apart from money-raising campaigns, held meetings of solidarity with the Soviet people, organised reviews of Soviet films, circulated Soviet newspapers and magazines, and issued pamphlets in English and Afrikaans.

The Soviet films "Stalingrad", "The Battle for Oryol", "The Diary of a Fascist", "Masquerade", and "Leningrad Music Hall" were shown in South Africa.

The Jewish Workers' Club also showed our films "Kutuzov", "Two Soldiers", "There Lived a Girl". So did the big South African newspaper *Guardian*. Russian music concerts were held in many cities: Tchaikovsky, Rimsky-Korsakov, Shostakovich, folk songs. In 1942 Consulate General the USSR in Pretoria and a Soviet consular agency in Cape Town were opened.

The level of knowledge about South Africa those years could not be great in our country (also among diplomats). There did not exist special training for work in African conditions at that time. Diplomats learned on the spot. A good deal looked strange and even inconceivable to them.

In one of its first reports the Consulate General in Pretoria drew up a classification of the population of the Union of South Africa:

- a) Europeans—people of purely European descent.
- b) Natives—pureblood Aborigines (natives) from the Bantu tribe.
- c) Asians—people born in Asia or their descendants...
- d) Coloureds—a group consisting mainly of the coloured people of the Cape Province...

Political education for the Consulate staff was conducted naturally, in a rented house and then in the house of the Consulate, with a film show to crown it. Film attendance was strictly registered: as in our days, this was regarded as not entertainment but an important political and educational undertaking.

The staff would maintain contacts with Russian emigrants many of whom were useful. They would go to the Royal cinema where films were shown by David Podolsky. They would buy goods at reduced prices in one of the biggest shops managed by Victor Rumanov.

The public atmosphere there was conducive for maintaining wide contacts with Soviet representatives. Russia nationals who numbered about 18,000 by the 1940s (besides there were as many Letts and Lithuanians) came to the Soviet representatives, hoping to trade with the USSR, restore their Soviet citizenship, obtain information about their missing relatives, and just to learn how Russia lived.

There turned up Leon Borodov, a tailor. His daughter Dusya was a popular performer of Russian romances and his son was a famous violinist who won 18 gold medals and several diplomas.

"Big South African landlord" Kamenetsky, who had visited the USSR in 1938 and purchased "a lot of all kinds of goods, such as toys, sewing machines, farm implements and so on", used to come and ask to help him to buy "a number of agricultural machines in the USSR". But perhaps it was just as difficult to do then as it is today.

Stamp collector Igor Vasilevsky, who worked as an engineer in a copper mine, wanted to exchange stamps. But for some reason they did not like him at the Consulate and declined his offer. He was directed to a shop in Johannesburg where "a large number of Soviet stamps had been sent over".

Ilya Zagorsky asked to be conscripted into the Red Army.

Stefan Lebedina, a Yugoslav, insistently offered "a song against the capitalist system" he had composed for the Soviet people. But the stern officials at the Consulate told him that "such songs are not published in the Soviet Union", and if he wished his songs to be sung, he might offer them to "local progressive organisations". It is a pity, of course, we are

never to know what was the song written for the Soviet Union by a Yugoslav from South Africa.

Many people there lived hard and unusual lives. Some wandered around the world and their sufferings would be enough for several lives.

Victor Lesun-Krivoruchko, whose father worked on the Chinese Eastern Railway, appealed to the Soviet Consulate General in Tianjing asking to restore his Soviet citizenship. He waited for the answer for a long time, living a miserable life. Finally he lost all hope and took a ship to the Balkans. There he enlisted in the Yugoslav army, was sent to the front in Libya, fell ill with tuberculosis and was taken to Cairo and from there to an army hospital in Johannesburg. The Yugoslav government paid him a salary of 5 pounds and 10 shillings. He asked the Consulate to be repatriated. Alas, no help again...

The government of Jan Smuts (who as we remember, as early as the 1920s was against cooperation with Russia) did not obstruct public activities in favour of the USSR. Moreover, the Prime Minister and the members of his cabinet used every opportunity to stress their support for the Soviet Union.

In 1944, Smuts agreed to patronise the Congress of Friendship with the USSR which was held at the Witwatersrand University and attended by 600 delegates from Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia, Belgian Congo and the Union of South Africa. Among the delegates there were South African blacks, which, as it was noted by the Consulate General of the USSR, "was unusual for the Union of South Africa because, as a rule, natives are not admitted to meetings of Europeans".

During the opening ceremony the congress was addressed by Minister of Finance and Education Hofmeyer. It would be strange in these circumstances, he said, if South Africa did not wish to be friends with Russia. We should think not only about friendship in wartime but also about friendship that will continue in future, he said.

That year an exhibition called "Speed Up the Victory" opened in Johannesburg. It included also a Soviet pavilion which was visited by about 200,000 South Africans.

The South African public was insisting that the government establish full diplomatic relations with the USSR. Smuts is known to have considered such a possibility. Early in 1945, the Johannesburg newspaper *The Rand Daily Mail* reported even that Pretoria had taken a decision "in principle" to open a diplomatic mission in the USSR. The South African flag would be raised in Moscow late in 1945 or early in 1946, the paper predicted.

However, there were quite a few opponents to such cooperation. Right before the war Oswald Pirow re-emerged on the political scene. But now he changed his political views and headed the pro-fascist grouping "New Order". Remaining a "friend of Germany", he became a sworn enemy of the Soviet Union. In 1944 Pirow circulated a letter in which, referring to his talks with Chicherin, he wrote that "the USSR has adopted the Russian imperialism of tsarist Russia". If one takes a look at the map of Russia, he alleged, one will not fail to see that the USSR has seized even those lands which Genghis Khan had rejected.

Eric Low, a member of parliament from Nationalist Party and a firm opponent of relations with the USSR, constantly demanded that the government should break relations with Moscow. Prime Minister Smuts made a curious remark in response to such statements by Low in 1943.

"You have mentioned a wise word, 'Stalin'," the Prime Minister said. "I bow to this word and to the Russian armies which do not spare themselves to save the freedom of the world."

Russia is becoming a great power and one "should not annoy it", said Smuts a year later.

Smuts was a very contradictory person and even South Africans themselves sometimes could not grasp him. Throughout his surprisingly long political career—from the Anglo-Boer war to the founding of the United Nations—he always amazed his countrymen; he made abrupt changes and decisions which some people regarded as betrayal and others as brilliant foresight.

In foreign policy, too, Smuts' actions were marked by diversity. On February 25, 1945, he sent Stalin a telegram of congratulations on the 27th anniversary of the Red Army. "I will not try to extol the achievements of the Red Army: they have been written in flaming and indelible letters on the pages of history," he said. "I can only convey to the Marshal and the Red Army our profound amazement and gratitude for what they have done. They play a splendid role in saving the world from the Nazi threat; by their close cooperation with the other United Nations they will be able to do a still greater service to the cause of peace all over the world and to peaceful progress."

Yet quite soon after that eulogy of Stalin he declared that "Stalinism does not differ from Hitlerism".

The victory over Germany was received in South Africa, too, as the start of a new era of international cooperation without wars and hatred. Selfsame Smuts declared in 1945 that a new order would come and reward mankind for the sufferings and sacrifices of that generation. Furthermore, he associated the coming of a new order with a new role of the Soviet Union in the world.

On May 12, 1945, a service was held in honour of the Victory at the Cape Town Cathedral. Bishop Derbushaer of Cape Province said in the presence of Cabinet ministers, members of the supreme command of the country's armed forces, and the diplomatic corps: "Whether we want it or not, justice in this war was brought in by the Russian army."

Addressing a large meeting on June 23, 1945, Pepis, head of the Cape Town branch of the Medical Aid to Russia association, said: "The Red Army has saved the world from a Nazi invasion. The peoples of the USSR and the Red Army, defending the whole of peace-loving mankind, even though they incurred heavy losses themselves (6 million servicemen and 23 million civilians killed), smashed the German war machine and Hitler's army which had threatened to enslave the whole world." By the way, the assessment of our losses is quite interesting. They differ greatly from those which were put into propaganda circulation later.

Such figures were understandable to South Africans then: almost 350,000 went to the war (of them, 211,000 were whites); 30,500 whites and about 7,000 non-Europeans did not return from the war.

The stronger the Nationalist Party led by Daniel Malan was becoming on the political scene, the more aggressive the enemies of the USSR were. Pirow declared that Moscow was using the Communist Party of South Africa for subversive purposes. Among the Communists, he said, there was a large number of Russian Jews who had been specially trained in the USSR and sent to South Africa for terrorist activities. He was quoted by *The Cape Times* as saying that the government had to close the Soviet Consulate and that South Africa did not wish to have any relations with Soviet Russia.

Jan Smuts, too, contributed to that campaign. He called the USSR a "police state" denying the freedom of speech and thought. Addressing the Transvaal Congress of the United Party in December 1947, he uttered the words which had a boomerang effect for South Africa. Criticising the system of rule in the USSR, Smuts said: "This is the right of the minority to rule over the majority. The rule of the minority over the majority is clearly demonstrated in all countries that are under communist domination."

A few months after the coming of the Nationalists to power (1948) the campaign against the USSR sharply increased. Rumours about a forthcoming closure of the Soviet Consulate were becoming ever more widespread, and the accusations of the Soviet representatives of espionage and subversion were growing more persistent than ever. In an interview to the London *Southern Africa* monthly the new Prime Minister, Daniel Malan, explained the reason for such apprehensions. Our non-European population as we see it, he declared, is a good medium for the spread of Russian communist propaganda.

In July 1948, the Johannesburg *Sunday Express* predicted that the relations with Russia would soon be broken off. On the next day *The Rand Daily Mail* carried a noteworthy refutation: a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official who wished to remain anonymous persistently denied the rumour that South Africa would soon sever diplomatic relations with Russia. The *Mail* had more reliable sources than the *Express* had: seven years passed before Pretoria finally decided to close the Soviet mission in South Africa.

On February 1, 1956, the Foreign Ministry of the Union of South Africa issued a note announcing its decision to close the Soviet Consulate which was accused of maintaining contacts with "subversive elements in South Africa", especially among blacks and Indians, and of spreading "communist propaganda" among the African population.

The closure of the Soviet consular mission in South Africa, the note said, does not mean a break of diplomatic, trade and other relations which would in future be exercised by the Soviet Ambassador in London through the High Commission of the Union of South Africa.

The Soviet representatives were seen off almost warmly. The authorities issued a special order to customs officials not to inspect their luggage. The Consul General of the USSR was invited to the Foreign Ministry where he was wished a "happy journey". The wife of one of our diplomats who had given birth to a baby a few days before was sent a bouquet of roses from the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Still, not all relations were broken off. Trade even showed an upward trend: in 1947 trade between the two countries was nil, whereas in 1954 imports from South Africa exceeded 11 million rubles and reached its record high of 106,800,000 in 1957. The next year, however, it dropped down to 34 million and in 1959 it hardly amounted to 20 million rubles. We imported wool, rolled steel, and hides.

The situation with our exports was worse. Our grain trading organisation *Exportkhleb* was a misnomer even then—it bought spices. In 1945, we sold a small number of gramophone records, Astrakhan fur and carpets to the total sum of £17,000.

In 1946, South Africans asked us to sell them timber, but we refused. Next year they offered us profitable contracts for the deliveries of Soviet timber, gasoline, cement (up to 10,000 tons), asbestos, chemicals, various kinds of paper, furs, canned fish, etc. But they were restrained by the South African government which believed that trade should be conducted not directly but through Europe.

As in the 1920s. South African businessmen insistently demanded regular trade relations with the USSR. In January 1953, they announced the setting up of a company for purchasing from the USSR of large amounts of wheat, phosphates, farm machinery (particularly tractors), and timber. They asked to be sold one million 203-pound bags of wheat, which shows how really big the offer was. The requirements of South Africa in importing these goods were fairly big and in future they would include many other goods, oil products among them, said the directors of the new company in a letter to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade.

(Continued on page 135)

KHRUSHCHEV IN AMERICA

Robert IVANOV

EXACTLY THREE DECADES have elapsed since Nikita Khrushchev's visit to the United States of America (September 15-27, 1959), the first-ever by a Soviet Head of State. It marked a break-through in relations between the two superpowers whose close confrontation predetermined a whole period in international relations, known as the cold war. The visit was a success, even though the hopes it inspired did not materialise.

BACKGROUND

IT WAS NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV who set the ball rolling. He, naturally, took into account not only external circumstances, but the domestic requirements of the USSR as well. Khrushchev's reforms were pragmatic enough to make this country face the rest of the world.

The Soviet leader had first announced his desire to visit the US when he met a group of American governors in Moscow in the summer of 1959. President Dwight Eisenhower reacted positively. He called his Secretary of State, Christian Herter, and said that Khrushchev's offer was, perhaps, an attempt to break the stalemate. On August 5, the President officially announced the Soviet Premier's forthcoming visit to the United States.

Eisenhower, considering Soviet-American relations a matter of his supreme concern, saw top-level meetings as immediately beneficial to the US. Even before the official invitation was sent to Khrushchev, he had declared privately that his idea was to "unfreeze" Soviet defence by means of personal discussions.

The President ignored John Foster Dulles' advice to exude an unsmiling air and a stern expression while in the company of the Russians and avoid meeting them personally. He strove for a closer relationship with the Soviet Union and profoundly, even mystically believed in the value of direct contact between ordinary people in order to pull down what he called the barriers of misunderstanding between nations.

The reason why Eisenhower favoured meeting Khrushchev was not only because it would open up opportunities for broad exchanges between the two nations. What was more important was that the President realised the immense danger of the strategic arms race which was fast gathering momentum. He realised that it could lead to irreversible economic consequences. Eisenhower declared more than once that one could not build up one's national defence while undermining its economic foundation by an untrammelled arms race.

Milton Eisenhower, the President's brother and closest adviser, noted: "My brother was very careful to hold down on military courses and he did all he could to soften the Cold War which had started in the Truman Administration immediately following World War II. It reached terrible proportions, I think, on both sides."¹ In Eisenhower's time, the USSR and the US were already the world's strongest military powers.

Prof. Robert Ivanov, D. Sc. (Hist.), heads a group in the Institute of General History of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

They possessed most of the weapons of mass destruction available on this planet. Having invited Khrushchev to visit the US, the American President expected to find mutually acceptable ways of reducing the stocks of these weapons.

Besides, like many chief executives did as their term of office drew to a close, the President, in the opinion of American observers, felt it was time to think of his place in history.

Christian Herter, who replaced Dulles on his demise, adopted a more cautious approach to foreign affairs. The change of guard at the State Department certainly contributed towards creating a favourable political climate for the first postwar Soviet-American top-level meeting.

THE RUN-UP

KHRUSHCHEV'S VISIT had been preceded by Soviet-American preparatory meetings. First, it was Anastas Mikoyan and Frol Kozlov, First Vice-Chairmen of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, who visited the US. Then the Vice-President of the United States, Richard Nixon, was sent on a mission to the Soviet Union, accompanied by Milton Eisenhower. Nixon's mission was not only to open an American exhibition in Moscow, just as Kozlov had opened a Soviet one in New York shortly before that, but to lay the groundwork for the summit meeting.

In the meantime, relations between the USSR and the USA became strained. A week before Nixon was due to fly to Moscow, President Eisenhower had issued a proclamation instituting a Captive Nations Week in 1959. That was not the best prelude to the Soviet-American meeting. The Soviet reaction was instant and sharp. Khrushchev, speaking in Warsaw, came down hard on the document and expressed his doubt about the expediency of the US Vice-President's visit to the USSR.

In giving his instructions to Nixon before he left, Eisenhower said that in talking with the Soviet leaders he ought, in particular, to insist on the Western rights in Berlin as a component of the overall German problem. Nixon replied that he would also seek to find out Khrushchev's true views and change some of his misjudgements about America.

Nixon, when he yet got to Moscow, reported back to Washington that Khrushchev did not conceal his anger over the President's proclamation. The Soviet leader referred to it at every opportunity both in public and in private to deride the Vice-President, particularly in the opening stage of the visit. Nor did Khrushchev omit the issue during his heated debate with the Vice-President at the opening of the American exhibition in Sokolniki Park. (Dwight Eisenhower, incidentally, highly appreciated that exhibition.) However, the proclamation did not actually cause the negotiations in preparation for the visit to break down.

Nixon and Milton Eisenhower discussed a wide range of issues with Khrushchev and other officials, relating to the agenda and the protocol of the Soviet leader's visit to the USA. The details were all settled during the meeting of the American Secretary of State and the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs on September 16, 1959.

There were quite a few problems involved, such as those of security arrangements for Khrushchev and the definition of his official status. Delicate negotiations on the subject had been conducted for a fairly long time between the Soviet Embassy in Washington and the State Department. Khrushchev was not a head of state, and could not, consequently, expect appropriate honours. The problem of welcoming Khrushchev as a head of government or state was held to be an important one in the White House, considering his personal qualities as well. A confidential document "Khrushchev: The Man and His Outlook", drawn up for the US leadership, said: "Proud of his proletarian origin, he is, neverthe-

less, determined to receive full recognition and honor as the authentic leader of a great world power. While attacking the glorification of Stalin's person, he has permitted a growing degree of adulation of himself."²

In the end, the only possible compromise was arrived at: the Soviet leader would be received in the USA as a head of state.

The prospective hosts were also puzzled by Khrushchev's categorical refusal to put on a dinner-jacket for an official lunch at the White House. He believed a dinner-jacket to be a symbol of capitalism. Eisenhower said the Soviet guest was free to put on anything he liked, but the Americans would stick to protocol.

THE MEETING

AT THEIR MEETING on the opening day of the visit, Khrushchev and Eisenhower once more cleared up the range of issues they were going to discuss. The President offered to hold the talks in his country retreat at Camp David. The Soviet leader accepted the offer with satisfaction, especially after Eisenhower had informed him that it was cooler there than in Washington.

At the very start of the conversation, Khrushchev stressed that his top priority was to make peace as safe as possible and establish mutual confidence based on the recognition of either nation's right to exist. As to the distinctions between the social and political systems of the USSR and the USA, he declared: "Let history judge."

Later on, Eisenhower noted the Soviet leader's quiet and restrained demeanour: "There was nothing in our guest's stated intentions to quarrel with."³ In general, the first meeting of the two world leaders, which had begun at full-delegation level, largely predetermined the course and the tone of the subsequent negotiations. It was substantive, constructive, and with practically nothing to cloud it. Even during that meeting, they touched on a number of rather serious problems of principle.

For example, one item under discussion (which they reverted to several times later on) was the philosophy and practice of communism. Eisenhower frankly stated his misgivings aroused by the policy of Communists, including American Communists. He made no secret of the fact that anti-Communist feeling in the USA sometimes resolved itself into a witch-hunt.

The Soviet guest spoke with confidence and did not stop short of expressing his judgement on matters that could hardly please the hosts. For instance, speaking of the way the American media would cover the visit, Khrushchev wondered which of his pronouncements they would publish, Eisenhower explained that it was entirely within the competence of the media. Khrushchev was not so sure and said: "Of course, the American government gets printed what it wants printed and is able to suppress what it does not want printed."⁴ The President offered to stop "propagandizing ourselves on propaganda", noting that on the following day Khrushchev would have a big meeting with the press. There, he would have an opportunity to see that there was no control over it and no restrictions on the questions asked.

The first meeting of the Soviet and American leaders ended with a one-on-one conversation, with only interpreters present. It was then that the US President said that Khrushchev had a chance to go down in history as an outstanding leader if he used his tremendous power constructively. Eisenhower modestly added that his own chances in this sense were considerably fewer as he had only 16 months left in the White House.

In conclusion, they had their pictures taken and made a half-hour overflight of Washington and its environs in the presidential helicopter.

Khrushchev, who at first felt a little uneasy, then liked the helicopter very much and ordered three machines for himself.

Then the President invited the Soviet guest and the members of his family to a lunch at the White House. In his toast, Khrushchev stressed the special responsibility of the USSR and the USA for the destinies of the world and expressed his conviction that the two powers would never quarrel. Moreover, he said, by their joint efforts, they would make a major contribution to peace. The Soviet leader repeated again that history would judge which system was better. "It is true," Khrushchev said, "that you are richer than we are at present. But then tomorrow we will be as rich as you are, and the day after tomorrow we will be even richer."⁵

Both leaders had positive impressions of the visit at that point. After his meeting with Eisenhower, Khrushchev, full of optimism, declared that he would inform his government of the positive beginning and of his hope that the final results would be better still.

THE TOUR

THE PROGRAMME of the Soviet guest's stay in America was extremely crowded. After further negotiations on the second day and a return lunch in honour of the US President and his family at the Embassy of the USSR, Khrushchev set out on a 10-day tour of the nation in the morning of the third day. It took him to New York, Hyde Park, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Iowa and Pittsburg. On his tour, the Soviet Premier was accompanied by Henry Cabot Lodge, the US Ambassador to the UN; Khrushchev had the members of his family with him.

He showed great interest in everything he saw. He was fascinated by the San Francisco bridge and the design of American highways, and displayed unaffected enthusiasm for Roswell Garst's farm in Iowa. He was immensely impressed by the hospitality, goodwill and unpretentious attitude of ordinary Americans. All observers noted mutual sympathies in that case.

Khrushchev made many speeches. He attached paramount importance to the issues of safeguarding peace and promoting peaceful coexistence as well as to the role of the USSR and the USA in resolving international problems. The official document prepared for the White House on the results of the visit said: "The Soviet Premier's general line is that the USSR and the US are the world's two greatest powers, and that the state of international relations thus depends to a large extent on the state of Soviet-US relations... Most prominent has been the general theme of peace, the need to eliminate the threat of war, reduce tension, establish trust among nations, in short 'to end the cold war'."⁶ He expressed these ideas with particular emphasis in the speech he made before the UN General Assembly on September 18 where he stressed that there were two ways for the world to choose from: either that of peaceful coexistence or that of the most destructive and horrible war in the history of humanity.

Khrushchev paid great attention to military problems. When he saw an aircraft-carrier entering the port of San Francisco, he said that he did not envy her crew because it was a huge target that would be instantly destroyed once a war broke out. In Khrushchev's opinion, it was nuclear-powered submarines that had the future with them at sea. Having dwelt at length on their advantages, he said that the Soviet Union had scrapped several cruisers, 95 per cent completed. The only warships that were still under construction in the USSR, he said, were submarines, destroyers, and patrol ships.

During his tour he made some comments on military aircraft as well.

He said frankly that he was not particularly interested in that kind of aircraft as he found them to be no good as a means of warfare any longer, being totally superseded by missiles.

In his conversations with Henry Cabot Lodge, Khrushchev came round and round to discussing the future. They had an interesting argument on September 18. The Soviet guest said that when his grandchildren had grown up there would be no capitalism any longer and they would all be socialists. Lodge replied: "I don't think the Soviet Union is static. There is a lot of evolution there... What we are going to see is a lessening of central bureaucracy and a growth of wider individual freedom, and my grandchildren's generation and your grandchildren's generation will be very much alike in essentials although the politicians will go on talking a long time in the same old phrases."⁷

Khrushchev disagreed with his host's forecast, and exclaimed: "May God have pity on you." Then he turned to his wife and said: "Isn't it a sad thing to see a nice man all stuffed up with foolish notions? Come to the Soviet Union and we will polish you up."⁸

Khrushchev returned to Washington on September 25. Lodge briefed the President in detail about energetic and unpredictable guest, saying that it had not at all been simple and quiet with him everywhere. In particular, he related an incident which happened in Los Angeles. Khrushchev expressed a desire at the last moment to go and see Disneyland. It was practically impossible to organise effective security arrangements in that ever overcrowded place for a distinguished visitor without proper preliminary preparations. The request had to be refused which displeased Khrushchev. He was quite surprised to learn that the Mayor of Los Angeles, who had also objected to the Soviet leader's trip to Disneyland, did not obey the US President. "Now," the guest remarked, "I begin to understand some of the problems of President Eisenhower".

CAMP DAVID

RIGHT AFTER KHRUSHCHEV'S ARRIVAL in Washington, he and Eisenhower went by helicopter to Camp David to continue the negotiations. The President recalled afterwards that they had not stuck hard to the agenda which had been agreed upon by the foreign policy directors of both countries. Some of the conversations were held eye-to-eye, with Khrushchev's interpreter alone present. Such confidential discussions suited Eisenhower perfectly well as they offered him an opportunity to gauge the Soviet guest's intentions and to make out the peculiarities of his character.

They conferred on a wide range of subjects in an informal atmosphere propitious for heart-to-heart talk. Khrushchev, for instance, told his host much about his participation in the war as a member of the military councils of a number of fronts. He also mentioned Marshal Georgi Zhukov who had been dismissed from his post of Minister of Defence in 1957 on Khrushchev's initiative. He told the President, in particular: "Your old friend Zhukov is all right. Don't worry about him. He's down in the Ukraine fishing—and like all generals he is probably writing his memoirs."⁹ Khrushchev expressed his admiration of Zhukov, if rather reluctantly, noting that he had been sharp, cool, determined and undiplomatic, as a soldier was likely to be.

The questions discussed were of all kinds—from the American political system to the evaluations of the economies of both countries and to such international problems as Germany, Berlin, the Far East, China, and the like. There was a hectic controversy over the rights of the Western Powers in Berlin. Eisenhower took up a rigid stand over it. He interpreted the Soviet standpoint as an ultimatum and declared that un-

less it changed, there would be no sense even in talking about the possibility of a summit meeting between the USA, the USSR, Britain and France, still less so since such meetings were normally useless, in his opinion. Khrushchev, on the contrary, stressed the need for such a meeting to be arranged as soon as possible.

Both Eisenhower and Khrushchev considered that trade was a matter of tremendous importance for mutual understanding between the two nations. Eisenhower noted the serious difficulties in the way. One of the most important problems was the Soviet Lend-Lease arrears. But the President looked ahead optimistically in the belief that the progress in trade was possible even under the existing circumstances.

Khrushchev declared without any diplomatic subtleties that the lifting of discrimination in trade was an indispensable factor. On the Lend-Lease problem his position was clear and simple: he agreed to come back to the issue on the understanding that it had to be settled. The Soviet guest emphatically rejected the rumours that he was inclined to find his way into the coffers of American bankers and made no mention of any desire to receive credits from the USA.

Khrushchev stressed the point that the USSR would be promoting only mutually beneficial trade. "The Soviet Union is not a colony," he said, "but a great industrial power with great industrial capacity, a high level of scientific development which enables us to produce all the industrial and consumer goods needed. So if there is any intention to sell sausages or shoes to the Soviet Union, you would not find a market for those goods in our country. But we are prepared to develop trade with you to buy what we need to buy, and sell to you what you need to buy from us, and that includes both industrial products and consumer goods."¹⁰

The discussion showed that both sides realised perfectly well that it was essential for them to do everything possible to extend contacts in every area—science, art, culture, sport etc. and expressed their readiness to work towards it.

At the end of the visit, Khrushchev invited Eisenhower and his family to come to the Soviet Union in 1960. He stressed that the trip could last as long as the President wanted and that it was up to him to choose the itinerary. He would be offered an opportunity to see everything, just as Khrushchev had in the USA.

IMPRESSIONS

SO THE SOVIET leader's visit to the United States was over. Naturally, it had been followed with immense attention not only by all America but by the whole world as well. The visit had been monitored in every single detail, with attention paid to everything—Khrushchev's manners, his way of speaking and dressing, his habits, tastes, inclinations, polemical tactics etc. The intention behind that interest was to try and understand the system and the nation through an examination of the visitor himself, his strong and weak points. But, above all, of course, it was to discover what he had come with and whether he had brought along any specific proposals and ideas which could be helpful in resolving the most pressing problems of humanity.

Now, for the impression Khrushchev had left of himself in America. Historians in the USA qualified his visit as a tremendous success, noting, in particular, his simplicity and goodwill, his sense of humour and his aspiration for peace. That is why ordinary Americans in their mass had welcomed Khrushchev very warmly, in every way hailing his peace-seeking foreign policy programme.

American officials who had met the Soviet Premier at close quarters

formed a rather full idea about him. It is not without interest to quote some of the comments made about him at the White House.

The background paper "Khrushchev: The Man and his Outlook": "By any standards Khrushchev is an extraordinary person... His faith, his grass roots knowledge of the country and his realism helped him in the necessary effort to close the gap which existed between the Soviet theory of how things ought to be and the realities of the existing Soviet system. His familiar manner, his histrionic proclivities and his semi-comical appearance, together with his knowledge of popular wants and aspirations, helped him gain a greater measure of consent on the part of the population for the regime at the same time that his ruthlessness, boldness and shrewdness were permitting him to eliminate his rivals on the ladder to supreme power.... Khrushchev has collected and passionately espoused simple solutions to complex problems." ¹¹

"The Portrait of Khrushchev": "He is not a clumsy buffoon, but neither is he the totally rational genius, unencumbered by personal quirks or temperament. He is self-confident, dynamic, ambitious, tough and ruthless. Besides his native intelligence, agile mind and grasp of detail, he has a demagogic gift and a shrewd sense of political timing and showmanship. Mingled with these traits, however, are obstinacy, belligerence, vengefulness, an unextinguished sense of inferiority (both national and personal) and a sometimes exaggerated preoccupation with considerations of prestige. His impetuosity stops short of recklessness, however, and he is not afflicted with Hitler's and Stalin's paranoia. He has had the frequent good fortune to be at the right place at the right time and some of his most vital gambles have succeeded only by the slimmest of margins. The fact remains that he has risen to the top of a stratum which has little tolerance of weakness and incompetence. In many ways Khrushchev personifies the USSR today—the accomplishments are many and undeniable, but the rough edges still show." ¹²

Dwight Eisenhower: "There was no question in my mind of Khrushchev's skill as a debater. He was a master at picking up another's proposals and using them—with his own interpretations—to advance his own point of view." ¹³

Milton Eisenhower: "Chairman Khrushchev was a very smart man, he knew what he wanted... He had a quick mind, and is good at polemics, but he had primitive ways." ¹⁴

Henry Cabot Lodge: "Khrushchev was a remarkable, although very difficult man... He wanted peace and co-operation." ¹⁵

Summing up the results of the talks, the President of the United States did not share the hope that Khrushchev's visit would put an end to the cold war. He regarded it as an event of an intermediate character, one he had always looked on with suspicion.

However, the positive shifts in American-Soviet relations were there, and Eisenhower admitted that there was less pessimism among the public in the USA by the end of the visit than there had been when Khrushchev first appeared on American shores.

The President considered the problem of disarmament and peaceful coexistence to be the main issue in relations between the two superpowers. The Memorandum summing up the results of the Eisenhower-Khrushchev talks at Camp David, stressed: "Both the President and the Chairman agreed on the extravagant cost of the armaments race and the dangers inherent in it. They also agreed that arms limitation was the 'most important problem' in contemporary international relations." ¹⁶ Such agreement between the two world leaders by itself made their meeting well worth while. Besides, they concurred in the view that "the maintenance of world peace requires the utmost effort on the part of everyone to settle world problems by method of peaceful negotiation." ¹⁷

Khrushchev was the first at the time to apply the term "peaceful co-existence" to the actual practice of international relations. Later on he often referred to the "Camp David spirit" although Eisenhower never used that formula and never believed it valid. In general, the American President was concerned at the Soviet visitor's energy and push and at his unmistakable knack of capturing the political initiative. In the course of the negotiations, Eisenhower had to look for counter-arguments to try and "corner Khrushchev".

Success demanded to be consolidated and built upon. The start was encouraging. The world waited for it to be followed up. It waited for the US President's return visit to the Soviet Union and for a four-power summit in Paris which was scheduled for June, 1960. There was a feasible opportunity to put an end to the cold war and, turning a new page in international relations, bring the world back to its normal, "working" state.

THE INTRUSION of the American U-2 reconnaissance plane, shot down at Sverdlovsk on May 1, 1960, buried all expectations. Khrushchev withdrew his invitation to Eisenhower and the Paris meeting proved unproductive. Soviet-American relations were "frozen" for a long time. The subsequent events made it clear that it was easy to spoil them, but took years to repair.

Nevertheless, Khrushchev's trip to America was not useless. It did take its place in the relations of the two world powers. The first ever Soviet-American summit demonstrated that it was possible to improve them even at the peak of international tension.

¹ Transcript of a conversation with Milton Eisenhower on November 1, 1975.

² Eisenhower Library (hereinafter: E. L.) International Series, Box 48, File: Khrushchev Visit. Background Paper, Sept., 59 (2), 9.11.59.

³ Eisenhower D., *Waging Peace*, New York, 1965, p. 435.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 437.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 440.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Khrushchev Background Paper, pp. 1, 2.

⁷ E. L. International Series, Box 48; File: Khrushchev Visit, 9/15-27/59 (1), Memorandum, p. 4.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Eisenhower D., *Op. cit.*, pp. 442-443.

¹⁰ E. L. International Series, Box 48, File: Khrushchev Visit. Sept., 59 (1), Press Conference 9/27/59, p. 8.

¹¹ E. L. *Ibid.*, Khrushchev Visit, 9/11/59, pp. 1, 2.

¹² *Ibid.*, Portrait of Khrushchev, p. 2.

¹³ Eisenhower D., *Waging Peace*. N. Y., 1965, p. 437.

¹⁴ Brendon P., *Ike. His Life and Times*, N. Y., p. 379.

¹⁵ *Ibidem.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Memorandum 6/9/88, p. 2.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Briefing Paper for President's Press Conference, Sept. 28, 1959, p. 1.

Ecology and the Highest Authority

THE LATEST GUEST CLUB forum held by *International Affairs* was more like a working meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Ecology and Rational Utilisation of Natural Resources. It was attended by the Committee Chairman, one of the main ecological authorities among people's deputies; leading officials of the ministries and other agencies involved more than others in the protection of the environment and largely in its destruction; diplomats concerned with problems of international environmental security; a spokesman for the "non-formals" (the Greens).

The government officials present used the opportunity of meeting deputies at the journal's headquarters for setting out their programmes, offering explanations and defending themselves. The diplomats argued that a breakthrough in saving the country's natural environment could hardly be expected without coordinating efforts with the world community and adhering to European and world environmental standards. It was an interesting meeting which outlined recommendations that may well prove helpful in producing the requisite decisions.

Following is the list of the guests.

Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences *Anatoly Kuntsevich*, chemist;

Boris Mayorsky, Acting Chief, Directorate of International Scientific and Technological Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR;

Polad Polad-Zade, First Deputy Minister of Land Reclamation and Waterworks of the USSR;

Kakimbek Salykov, People's Deputy of the USSR, Chairman, USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Ecology and Rational Utilisation of Natural Resources;

Yuri Sedunov, First Deputy Chairman, USSR State Committee on Hydrometeorology;

Valentin Sokolovsky, First Deputy Chairman, USSR State Committee on Nature Conservation;

Andrei Vavilov, Deputy Chief, Directorate of International Scientific and Technological Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR;

Alexei Yablokov, People's Deputy of the USSR, Deputy Chairman, USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Ecology and Rational Utilisation of Natural Resources, Corresponding Member, USSR Academy of Sciences, biologist;

Svyatoslav Zabelin, Director, Coordination and Information Centre, Socio-Ecological Union.

DANGER SIGNALS

International Affairs. The Foreign Ministry Collegium recently discussed environmental problems. Speakers said, perhaps too bluntly, that we couldn't consider our country civilised in view of the environmental situation here. The environmental danger we used to mention in a somewhat abstract sense is no longer at our threshold but right inside our country.

Still, we should apparently beware of mistaking the shortsighted, narrowly departmental, technocratic approach to the environment advocated by our ministries and other agencies for the fundamental attitude of our state. The task now is to defeat our domestic bureaucrats by making them proceed in the spirit of the humane nature conservation ideas first advanced by many of our outstanding compatriots, primarily Vladimir Vernadsky, who did so in his concept of the noosphere. It is regrettable that his ideas were put into practice in the West and only later in this country.

Yablokov. I suppose we could argue over which is more terrible or dangerous, whether the threat of military catastrophe or the threat of ecological disaster. But we must not forget the unique character of the environmental danger. Let me explain.

There is a so-called principle of 11 per cent. If one of the headlights of your car is smashed or you have a flat you can keep driving. But the loss of just a small screw raising the proportion of breakages to 11 per cent makes the breakdown of the whole system snowball and brings your car to a stop. This also goes for nature. We have been knocking out one component of it after another, destroying the ecosystem. How far has this gone by now? Is it 5, 10 or 10.99 per cent?

We cannot only speak of an environmental disaster hypothetically. What has befallen the Aral Sea and the surrounding area is a real disaster affecting a vast region. All problems have closed in upon us. For instance, we know of the danger posed by a sharp worldwide decrease in the variety of biological species. But formerly many of us associated the problem with the tropics, coral reefs, and so on. Do we know exactly how many unique species of Baikal endemics have perished or are perishing constantly? They number over 2,000 there, and in some cases we only know one individual.

Salykov. The problems of regions in environmental distress must be solved without delay. This is a major task. Just see what we have. It is true that there are the thinning of the ozone layer, the greenhouse effect and other global problems. Let scientists study them and tell us what we should begin with to improve the situation. Although I think that, generally speaking, there is a way out.

But regional problems are something special. In some places we are on the brink of disaster, and elsewhere the disaster has long been there. If we don't come to our senses now we risk losing everything, ruining the whole environment. There is going to be a relevant law and a programme as well as legislation on land use, on property, on self-government. However, that will take time. But there are problems brooking no delay. We must solve them now or it will be too late.

Yablokov. We keep talking about protecting the environment. But the environment doesn't surround us, for we ourselves are an inseparable part of the global ecosystem. Where the system is affected we are affected too. Seeing that once every three years some vertebrate species disappear in this country, we would probably do well to remember that we are vertebrates, too. Let us also recall that one reason for the Kuzbass strikes was an exceedingly grave environmental situation. In Magnitogorsk, Sverdlovsk, Nizhny Tagil breathing has become something downright harmful and isn't "recommended". As for the whole Soviet Union, the maximum admissible concentration (MAC) allowed for pollutants discharged into the atmosphere is exceeded ten or more times over in 103 cities.

I wish to stress that obsolete production technologies aren't the only reason for this state of affairs. Ecology today is the focus of economic, political, social and, indeed, ideological problems. People who are com-

pelled to breathe unbreathable air and to drink undrinkable water become willy-nilly political economists and politicians.

Zabelin. That's the only explanation for the explosion of social activity, with people forming since 1985 ecological clubs and societies. Our Socio-Ecological Union comprises about a hundred such groups now. They have sprung up where people can no longer breathe and the water has become undrinkable, and where man finds himself among species threatened with extinction. The groups have about 5,000 active members but during mass campaigns they are joined by over a million ecological-minded people.

Sedunov. Let me add to the two elements mentioned here—air and water—a third, the soil. It is deteriorating at as disastrous a rate as the others. Being immobile, it has become a huge accumulator of pollutants of every description. In many big cities the ground in the immediate vicinity of industrial plants is steeped in carcinogens. In the case of industrial giants the harmful effects of their operation are many times stronger. Around Norilsk, for one, plant life has been damaged on an area of 600,000 hectares. But that city beyond the polar circle isn't the only one in our country to have an industrial combine like that, is it?

The point is that the anti-ecological concept of production has caused a global change of climate on the planet. We are burning fast carbon fuel—coal, wood, oil. With emissions of carbon dioxide going on at today's pace, we can expect its concentration in the Earth's atmosphere to go up 20 per cent by the year 2000 and to double towards the middle of the next century. It follows that climatic belts may shift, with the cultivable area receding to Tyumen. Will we be able to adapt to new conditions? Besides, the change will entail grave economic and political consequences.

Yet this is a look into just one of the many aspects of the ecological disaster. They include the thinning of the ozone layer, now a reality. All over the world, industry and households using, say, refrigerators and aerosol sprayers release into the atmosphere about 100 million tons of substances containing compounds of chlorine and bromine. These compounds are harmless on Earth but on reaching the upper layers of the atmosphere, they release chlorine and bromine, which react on ozone and start "devouring" the protective layer. And while people may adapt somehow by using masks, eyeglasses, gloves, and so on, many primitive organisms will be killed by hard ultraviolet radiation. As a consequence, many components will drop out of the world ecosystem. How will those changes affect us humans? We still lack an overall model of the processes likely to set in.

Sokolovsky. While environmental problems are varied, we may break them down into roughly three groups. One of them has to do with natural resources: their depletion and qualitative and quantitative deterioration, the loss of genetic resources, the exhaustion of gas and oil reserves. The second group involves the destabilisation of natural systems. The Aral Sea has already been named here as an instance of ecological disaster. But it isn't the only one. There is also the Sea of Azov, where the removal of roughly 18 cubic kilometres of water for irrigation purposes has upset water circulation between it and the Black Sea. As a result, the Sea of Azov has become more saline and attracts jellyfish. With the onset of winter, the jellyfish perish and decompose, the process consuming oxygen and killing the fish population. (This comes in addition to water pollution by pesticides, which kill all fry).

It has just been said that we have no clear idea of how so comprehensive a deterioration of the environment is going to affect people. But we have at least some tentative estimates. Academician Nikolai Dubinin

cites in one of his publications. US statistics, not just on the incidence of disease among Americans, but on children born with deformities between 1900 and 1980. The proportion of such births went up from 0.4 to 11-odd per cent in that period. Such is the price of dangerous environmental pollution. And I must say that of the 66,000 chemical compounds which man has synthesised and used, the concept of MAC only covers from 1,100 to 1,200 substances. As for the rest, there is still no barrier to them because they have yet to be included in the list. Pollutants discharged into the environment react on each other and are partly neutralised and partly become still more aggressive and toxic.

Zabelin. A word about our almost ritual references to American statistics. Holding forth about problems that allegedly "must not exist" in our country, we invariably referred for decades to "their" experience, doing so even with some ideological satisfaction. Let us forget that immoral practice. After all, we must realise that ecologically America is far cleaner on all counts than this country.

In discussing environmental troubles, we don't have to go very far in search of examples. We have only to look at ourselves to realise the destructive conditions we are living in, to go through a catharsis if you will, to be horrified. Zaporozhye is a symbol of our early five-year plans and is "poetically" described as a city of 20,000 smokestacks. For a long time past, it has been the birthplace of children called "mutants" by the writer Albert Likhanov, Chairman of our Children's Fund. Local scientists and doctors take exception to the term but there is no getting away from the facts.

Many Zaporozhye children are suffering from hydrocephaly. Their heads are three times heavier than their trunks, which means that such children cannot even sit up and are compelled to stay lying down. Other children are afflicted with microcephaly, that is, have practically no brain. Still others are stricken with cerebral paralysis, were born blind or deaf, have fingers or toes grown together or one hand or foot missing. The range of anomalies is so wide that some of them, such as incommensurate feet, have no medical designation yet.

Please note that I've made no special mention of infant mortality although its rate is the highest in the republic—16 to 19 per thousand. As for other infants, they are supposed not to mar the statistical picture because they are living. Yet nearly all of them show chromosomal mutations. They live in the Zaporozhye infants' home called "Solnyshko" (lit., "little sun", a term of affection.—*Tr.*).

However, Zaporozhye is quite a long way from here. Let us return to Moscow's Baumansky District and the offices of *International Affairs*, where we are now exchanging views. Well, this district is the city's foulest, and its environmental situation is characterised by the presence in its soil of every single element of the Mendeleyev Periodic Table, including mercury, thallium, cadmium and a lot of carcinogens. I will go as far as to say that if the problem were approached according to rigid international standards, the whole surface layer of the district's soil would have to be bulldozed (exactly as we did it in Chernobyl) and buried in special dumps.

Meanwhile children here make sand cakes as in the good old days although those days have long been gone.

Kuntsevich. My feeling is that in the middle of this century we unwittingly embarked on a suicidal course. We did so for all that we humans are growing in numbers. In 1987 there were five billion of us but in 2020 we will almost reach the 10 billion mark. Yet humanity is upsetting the global biospheric balance even today. What will happen when the population of the globe doubles? I believe there should be a threshold which mustn't be crossed. World science should establish a

growth limit. We must ascertain even now whether or not we've upset the balanced systems that had existed.

Mention has just been made of inborn deformities. Personally I see the appearance of genetic mutations as a danger signal. What causes them? Unless we discover this and stop the trend, humanity will have as early as 20 to 30 years hence a critical population characterised by genetic mutations. After that a chain reaction will set in, and humanity will simply degenerate.

The question was asked here how far things had gone. I'm afraid we are only at the stage of putting the danger on record. The amount of carbon dioxide is on the rise, the climate is warming, the ozone layer is thinning, we are polluting water sources and felling forests. What next? Are there waste-free technologies we could use? Meanwhile we have nothing but rallies in those 103 cities in ecological distress.

Sedunov. You know, it was Yevgeny Chazov who put that figure, 103, in circulation. We've been repeating it ever since. The State Committee on Hydrometeorology defines somewhat differently the class of particularly endangered cities. How is the problem often seen? Weather conditions, such as the absence of wind; may result in pollutants really accumulating in a city and complicating the environmental situation there. But one or two days later a change comes about in atmospheric processes, and the wind blows away the gas cloud. Incidentally, this is a frequent occurrence in our southern cities. And while MAC may be exceeded in such cases as much as tenfold, this is not to say that conditions there are really intolerable at all times.

We need a comprehensive, integrated approach. We should therefore use a conventional overall indicator, summing up and integrating cases of exceeding MAC not severally, that is, not for benzopyren, sulphurous gas, formaldehyde, ammonia, nitric oxides and so on, but for a city's whole "array" of pollutants. With this approach, the number of particularly unsafe cities turns out to be 68. The list of these cities, as a high priority one, was included in our draft Long-Term State Programme for Environmental Protection and Rational Utilisation of the USSR's Natural Resources for the 13th Five-Year Plan Period and up to 2005.

International Affairs. It looks as if we are minimising the extent of the threat: the Health Minister speaks of 103 cities but a spokesman for another government department is giving us a different figure reducing the number of cities by 30.

Sedunov. No, there is no such thing as minimising the danger. It's just that in one case it is the question of accidental processes and in the other, of regular ones. We are capable of staving off disaster. We should follow the example of countries which have made progress in this respect. Take Japan. Several years ago, Tokyo was the most gas-polluted city, and we wrote that traffic police were compelled to wear gas masks. But now urban traffic in Japan is more or less clean, ecologically. And what is more, with an absolute 14.5 per cent increase in output over the past eight years, the Japanese have cut power consumption by 3.5 per cent. In the United States pollutant emissions into the atmosphere in 1974 added up to 246 million tons. That figure is now down to 136 million, or nearly 50 per cent. Besides, there is the Bush Plan.

International Affairs. You mean the national programme put forward by the President on June 12 last? It's intended to reduce air pollution by the year 2010.

Sedunov. Yes, discharges of carcinogens are to be reduced by three quarters. As we see, the Americans are advancing steadily if selectively to the solution of a concrete problem. Unlike us.

Yablokov. It all comes down to the economy. The economy over there helps conserve nature but in our country it is simply devouring nature.

Indeed, we utter a lot of nice words about a law-governed state and legality, yet the USSR Council of Ministers authorises the construction of immense plants not only without an ecological examination (something we've long been used to) but without plans (what do you say to that?) and occasionally even without a feasibility study. This is how matters stand with a further "project of the century", this time in the perestroika period. I mean the Tyumen petrochemical complex, which is expected to cost as much as several Baikal-Amur railroads. There exists even a peculiar term, "priority funding", which implies a project without the technical documents required by law.

Isn't it hypocrisy to talk about legality at a time when the highest executive authority is the main violator of the law? The Gas Industry Ministry is prospecting for oil on the Yamal Peninsula, as it has done elsewhere, without allotting land. It is flooding indigenous people's lands with oil, thereby driving them off. This, too, has been sanctioned by the Council of Ministers. Nikolai Ryzhkov has described wasteful utilisation of natural resources as a barbarity. Well, he is right, because such a practice is barbarous.

But the departmental approach is something more than land-grabbing and production monopoly. It is also monopoly on information and an obsession with keeping data on the environmental situation secret. I said it at the Congress of People's Deputies and say again that withholding such information should be regarded as an environmental crime.

Sokolovsky. We should note, none the less, that in 1987 Glavlit (State Censorship Office—*Ed.*) lifted restrictions on publications in the local press (in addition to the central press) of information on air pollution in cities over the past week or ten days (the practice varies from place to place). It follows that cases of exceeding MAC are also reported.

The trouble is, however, that we only think of MAC when a monstrous violation occurs. I'm often told that our cleanness standards are lower or more liberal than Western standards. But that's wrong because our medical, that is, health protection standards are more rigid than those of the Americans, Japanese or West Germans.

That they can be ignored with impunity is another matter. Really, this brings to mind Saltykov-Shchedrin, who wrote that the abundance and severity of Russian laws were mitigated by flouting them. Must we keep up this national tradition?

What we have is really terrible: violations of MAC are something routine, a condition of the existence and some sort of functioning of many of our industries. There is, for instance, the so-called oxide emission standard established for our wood chemistry complex. Of all the plants of the complex, it is a mere 15 per cent that keep to this standard. This implies that if we were to start enforcing the law on protecting the atmosphere we would have to shut down 85 per cent of our wood chemistry plants. And then our whole economy would be paralysed.

International Affairs. What is the admissible pollution level? What units are used for measuring it?

Sokolovsky. The content in milligrammes per cubic metre of air. In Moscow, for instance, the amount of sulphur dioxide in the air doesn't exceed the limit. Nitrogen exceeds MAC, violations varying greatly from district to district. The amount of toxic wastes released into the city's air space is 1,200,000 tons a year. As much as 840,000 tons of this comes from motor vehicles, and the rest is of industrial origin. In the south-eastern part of Moscow the air pollution limit is exceeded five- or sixfold. The amount of nitric oxides in the area of the Sadovoye Ring in rush hours exceeds MAC tenfold. In short, motor transport is clearly becoming the main source of pollutants. While industrial pollution is local, nitric oxides cloud formed by motor vehicles blankets the whole city.

But the threat of "car asphyxia" is only part of the environmental problem. A deteriorating environment is both a product of scientific and technological progress and, yes, an incentive for making it humane and human-like. It is now very important for us to realise this if we don't want to make our economic and technological lag even more. Let me give an example. We are all trying hard to earn foreign exchange by selling our cars in the West. But why is it that we can't sell, say, Volgas to Switzerland, much as we would like to, even at a token price? The reason is simple. Few people in Europe today adhere to the environmental standards for toxic emissions from/ internal combustion engines established in the past by the European Economic Commission. (As for us, we still hold to them.) Switzerland, Austria, West Germany and many other developed countries are adopting or have already adopted American environmental standards, which are many times more exacting than their European analogues. These standards bar our Ladas from the American market although we still sell them in Europe.

Vavilov. Cars have become almost a symbol of contemporary civilisation. But they make us stop to think of priorities. One day I chanced to read an interesting American publication. It said that one car releases five tons of carbon dioxide a year. Besides, it appears that one hamburger is worth 55 square feet of tropical forest. What is meant is that you must cut down so many trees to win pasture for cows that will go in the end into making hamburgers. Yet the planet's forests are its lungs.

And so the anything but rhetorical question we must ask is: Is Western civilisation prepared to alter its way of life? After all, there is an obvious need for new ethics, for a new, environmentally clean way of life. In fact, humanity needs a revolution in requirements. Is one to take a bath or a shower? "Ecoman" will choose a shower so as to help save power and reduce the greenhouse effect that way. In other words, it is now essential to keep numerous rules of environmental ethics, which our Green movements could assist in publicising.

International Affairs. Let us repeat an important thing: glasnost is a prerequisite for the solution of environmental problems. Information on the environment must be available to everybody. This will be the purpose of national reports on the environmental situation in the Soviet Union. The first report will be released shortly, if somewhat later than planned. Glasnost today is the biggest problem in our relations with nature conservation agencies and other entities.

Worthy of special attention in the context of glasnost is the idea of an independent international examination of major national projects having far-reaching implications for nature. It might be useful to advance this idea on a high political level.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE AND WHAT SHOULD NOT

Zabelin. It is "environmental glasnost", so to speak, that will have to prove that we are serious enough about both glasnost and ecology. Why is it that we find it so difficult to face up to environmental problems? I would say that it's because the range of those who solve environmental problems is still extremely narrow, is artificially kept narrow. Numerous people who are really concerned about the situation have been alienated from monitoring the environment, probing into the causes of its deterioration and working out alternative projects. Everything is in the hands of government agencies. They have monopolised information and its circulation, that is, have a right to ban publication of any data they consider "harmful" (to themselves), as they did in the case of information on the sick rate in the Chernobyl area.

Social organisations have been conceded a right of doubtful value,

that of protesting when they get word from accidental sources about a disaster or the threat of one. But protests are indicative of the people's organisations being denied their rights, of their having to take or leave accomplished facts. This is why our Socio-Ecological Union sees its paramount task in constructive effort, that is, in working out environmentally safe projects for the socio-economic advancement of territories on the most diverse levels ranging from every village to the country as a whole. To this end we set up independent bodies in charge of environmental monitoring research teams and experimental facilities. Publicity for environmental ethics is part of our job but we need a press of our own to provide it. We are therefore looking forward to the Supreme Soviet granting social organisations at long last the rights they still lack. The sooner it does so, the better, for environmental problems cannot be solved without freedom of information, in the absence of alternative thinking and action.

Kuntsevich. Quite right. We may be able to answer that eternal question, "Who is to blame?", when ecology and truthful, adequate information begin marching together. Meanwhile the harm done by pesticides, herbicides and the rest is supposed to be part of what is called "chemistry".

Now that is something I emphatically protest against. Indeed, a distinction must be made between chemistry as a hard science and the departmental approach, plain ignorance leading to unprofessional practices. Many may find it paradoxical if I say that remedying the environmental situation today depends directly on chemistry and its achievements. To save nature, we need to promote such sciences as water chemistry, air chemistry, soil chemistry. It is chemistry that can produce safe technologies.

Scientists realise this, I'm glad to say. The Academy of Sciences is now setting up a chemical complex of two sections. One of them will concern itself with physical chemistry and unorganic materials and the other with general technical chemistry. Their projects will have a direct relation to solving environmental problems. Generally speaking, we must point out explicitly that unless our state comes in the period immediately ahead to realise the priority role of chemistry in present-day conditions our chemical industry will lag hopelessly behind. Hopelessly! Why, we are 50 years behind the West even today. The West has long been using polymers in sewerage and water supply systems, plumbing, and so on. As for us, we stick to metals. This means not only wasting finite natural resources but putting a burden on our metallurgy, a production branch affecting the environment, as we know very well.

International Affairs. In speaking of ways to solve problems of environmental protection, of the answer to the question "What is to be done?", it would be useful to make up our minds about what should not be done. At an ecological rally in the Gorky Park, someone raised a placard reading: "Martians' Warning: Building Canals is Dangerous for the Planet's Health".

Polad-Zade. Looks like it's my turn now. For years past our Ministry has been acting as a customer in matters of land-reclamation and waterworks construction, but not as a nation-wide planner of these activities. We've also been engaged in regulating water distribution. Today our tasks have changed to construction proper, and digging canals is no longer an end in itself. Our main concerns are the waterworks and ecological problems. Incidentally, it was our Ministry—yes, the Ministry of Waterworks—that concerned itself with combating water pollution before the State Committee on Nature Conservation was set up. We used to protest, being all alone against those guilty of polluting. We wrote letters and imposed fines and sued the culprits, and in exceptional cases we shut

down plants. But we were laughed at, and nothing changed. Public opinion kept silent. But now we have a vocal public opinion and glasnost, and I really envy the Committee on Nature Conservation because it enjoys such tremendous public support.

International Affairs. Still, let us go back to canals. This discussion would be incomplete if we said nothing about those canals that were so ill-fated—or were they? To be specific, what's the situation around the Volga-Chograi project?

Polad-Zade. It can't be put in a nutshell, you know. The point is that in view of the particularly difficult natural and climatic conditions typical of our country, it is hard to guarantee food production on an adequate scale. It's even out of the question in some areas. But I wish to note that the twenty million hectares of irrigated land we now have covers a mere nine per cent of our arables. True, Central Asia's share in this irrigated area is very important for the obvious reason that the region has long been one of extensive land use. And believe me, it's painful for me to admit that we have no other state concept of developing the region. Yet previously we did have alternatives.

Salykov. That is all past history. Let us discuss today's problems.

Polad-Zade. All right, don't let us talk about the past. But still I wish to stress that neither the Ministry of Water-Works nor personally I sought a larger area in Central Asia. Why make us the target of criticism? After all, there were those who actually started the whole thing. I agree that there is no need to look too far back. But the 27th Party Congress decided on irrigating 600,000 hectares of new lands in the region. That wasn't long ago, was it?

Yablokov. But didn't they ask your opinion before making that decision?

Polad-Zade. That is just the point—they did not. You can't find our OK on that decision. We objected categorically. Why, it involved removal of eight cubic kilometres of water from the Aral Sea. Besides, the whole thing took place in our day, not in the period of stagnation. But when none other than I called for a halt to that new irrigation in the region, do you know who took a stand against me? All the republics and the State Planning Committee of the Union. Our opponents agreed with us only because we invented at the time a smooth formula about "desisting in the main from expanding irrigation".

Salykov. Really, that's all past history. We don't need it. Why recall it?

Polad-Zade. I'm sorry but I must interrupt you. Why do you say we don't need it? This is a matter of principle, and since we are criticising, let us be specific.

I will never agree that our Ministry was carrying on an "anti-popular policy" (to quote the phrase used recently) and that the 130 billion rubles we spent was money thrown away or buried. First of all, 130 billion rubles is the cost of the whole project, half of which involved the social infrastructure in the countryside, homes, schools, hospitals, nurseries, roads, cultural facilities, forest shelter belts, and much else. In other words, it was not irrigation. The other half was 60 billion rubles spent over a period of fifteen years, or a mere four per cent of all government investments. How could that four per cent have led the country to an economic crisis? I think there were more serious reasons for the crisis. Of course, our land improvement effort was beset by only too many shortcomings, miscalculations and even strategic mistakes.

As regards the Volga-Chograi Canal, work on building it was started—I wish to stress this—at the insistence of Stavropol and Kalmyk party and government officials, who proposed it. They pressed for it, saying that the situation in their areas was very difficult because the sands were advancing, and so on. A decision was taken and a canal

projected. Subsequently we were told to start preparing work. Well, you know the situation around that project. Afterwards some suggested renouncing the project and stopping construction. The Academy of Sciences was entrusted with presenting this autumn a concept of developing the region. I don't know what the concept will be. In any case, I can tell you that we don't think we can go back in the next five to ten years to building the canal. This is my opinion, and as for the decision that will be made—

International Affairs. How much has been done so far? How many kilometres and how many rubles?

Polad-Zade. How many rubles? Let me see. The money was spent in the main on roads, bases, housing and, well, experimental digging of the canal bed all along its route. It has to be decided what should be done about the work already carried out there in case construction isn't resumed. It is hard to say how much has been dug.

Yablokov. Please answer a simple question simply by saying that you've spent over 50 million rubles and dug about a hundred kilometres. Why not say it since the figures are known now?

Polad-Zade. No, it isn't a hundred but forty kilometres made up of separate sections, and as for the route, you've just reminded me of the figure. It is 60 million rubles spent chiefly on building roads, bases, housing and power lines.

Yablokov. That's a small amount, all right, compared with the amounts withdrawn from circulation at other building sites. We have frozen five atomic power plants by now, which means several billion rubles really thrown away. Your 60 million doesn't amount to much against that.

Polad-Zade. Indeed, it isn't money that matters here.

Kuntsevich. Of course not but money also has its value.

Polad-Zade. Of that 60 million rubles, some 10 million must have been spent on planning and research which cleared up the problem and are necessary in any circumstances. Roughly another 10 million went, as far as I remember, on earth-moving. The rest wasn't wasted, either. It was spent—let me repeat—on roads, housing and building industry bases.

Salykov. I take this occasion to ask you just one question. Shouldn't we show greater determination in enlisting international cooperation to solve our environmental problems? Speaking of the problem of the Aral Sea, we've already contacted American scientists. What is your concept of saving the sea?

Polad-Zade. This is a formidable problem. But if it's only a question of solving the problem of restoring the Aral Sea, nothing could be simpler technically. We would only have to stop farming in the area. But you will realise that this would be a fantastic thing to do and is therefore unthinkable.

What is the concept worked out by us? Its main provision is a complete, total reconstruction of all old systems. This would save us ten to twelve cubic kilometres of water. After that we would build a header to channel mineralised water to the Aral Sea. This would mean normalising water utilisation in the basin. It follows that under this programme, which is both investment- and resource-intensive but very necessary, we would have a minimum of 22 cubic kilometres of run-off per year. I think we should carry out the programme if we are to save the sea. To be sure, it will differ in scale from what it was in the sixties.

Yablokov. Let us assume that we could get 20 to 25 cubic kilometres under the programme. But we need 50. So where are we to get the rest? The Americans will certainly suggest a solution because we are going to consult them. But why can't we use our wits? What about a concept of saving the Aral Sea and the surrounding area?

Polad-Zade. That is what I've been talking about all along. We need a streamlined concept of social and economic advancement of the region. In line with it we could sharply reduce the area to be irrigated. As for the population, we should use it the way they do it in Hongkong, Singapore or South Korea. In other words, we need to develop the region industrially. But nobody is working on such a concept although already there are three relevant assignments from the Political Bureau.

THE SCNC SYNDROME

International Affairs. After four candidates, if I'm not mistaken, failed one after another to fill the post, it came to talk about the SCNC Chairman syndrome. The Committee now has a chairman at last, Nikolai Vorontsov. So what is the State Committee on Nature Conservation to be like?

Mayorsky. I believe it is too early to consider the matter settled, to say whether we now have the "right" nature conservation agency. It's apparently worth returning to the problem of its status. Not surprisingly, the opinion that the Committee should be more powerful, and have greater authority and a bigger say is voiced even abroad. Americans who come to Moscow to look into our environmental situation ask during a conversation at the Foreign Ministry, why the Committee is so weak, why its powers are so small. There seems to be a reason behind these questions. Well known are difficulties the SCNC comes up against with its present status.

Sokolovsky. It is a very demanding job. We are expected not only to provide conditions for the population's normal life and to see to the conservation of all the flora and fauna species but to ensure the effective functioning of our entire economy.

Salykov. The issue is one of political assessment, of psychological perception of the Committee's status. Why, everybody is afraid of something. Nearly every one of those asked to head the Committee said that since we were offering him the job we should subordinate the Committee to the Supreme Soviet and make its chairman deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers because otherwise—I don't think such an approach is right. It may well be that our foreign colleagues among environmentalists are criticising the status of the Committee, and we all agree that the prestige of this agency should be raised and maintained. But not by including it in the Supreme Soviet. The Committee should be left within the structure of the government so that the government itself can be in charge. Why relieve it of responsibility? If we did so we would be excluding the government from an important nation-wide activity.

It may be possible to change the Committee's status but how? We now have a deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Chairman of the Commission on Emergency Situations, Comrade Doguzhiyev. We asked the Supreme Soviet Session to have him assume authority also over the Committee and, indeed, over the State Committee on Hydrometeorology and all other nature conservation agencies. That would have enabled Comrade Doguzhiyev as a member of the executive to take charge of everything.

In short, neither the Supreme Soviet nor our ecological Committee should assume all the responsibilities. We already receive letters from various localities and people want to see us as if we were the only ones who can help. We aren't. Of course, we must help the SCNC, must build up its prestige but, even so, people should know exactly who is doing what, who is responsible for what. Our function is a standard-setting and supervisory one.

Kuntsevich. I, for one, am sure that the Committee should by all

means have an extradepartmental status and deal with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers direct. There is another point I wish to raise. Is the very concept of the Committee all right? Why, it's unchanged! Look what the Committee is expected to do: submitting to the State Planning Committee proposals for the utilisation of resources. Think what this means. Must the Committee concern itself with procuring resources? Its duty should be to dictate terms by saying how much oil you may have and what the strategy of using it in the period ahead is to be. In other words, the Committee must set limits to the utilisation of resources.

There is another problem, however. Right now the Committee is an entity lacking research centres, laboratories, transport and other components of a scientific infrastructure. If everything is left unchanged the Committee will be unable to accomplish anything and hence to win any leverage. Having no research facilities of its own, it will have to look to departmental research institutions for help, and that will be the end of its independence and prestige.

Zabelin. The Committee as an agency of the Council of Ministers will inevitably have to adapt to the interests of producers. Yet its duty is to obey the people's will by working to change the environmental situation in the direction to be specified by the people's authority as an immediate or long-term goal. At the same time, social organisations having their supervisory bodies and experts' teams must represent on all levels the interests of the inhabitants of the areas where producers are at work.

It is up to local government bodies to study the opinions of both sides and make with due regard to their requirements and to national realities concrete decisions on whether they should shut down, say, an old factory or switch it to a different kind of production, whether they should ban a new building project or have its blueprints redone, and so on. I believe a binocular approach will make it possible to find a way out of environmental as well as resultant economic, social and political impasses.

ECOLOGICAL INTERNATIONAL

International Affairs. You will recall that on April 7 last, Mikhail Gorbachev said in London that the Soviet Union would soon join international nature conservation agreements it had not signed yet. The Foreign Ministry is now busy making an inventory of such documents. Of the 140 international nature conservation agreements registered by UNEP as of late 1988, we can apparently accede to roughly 35.

This will require a restructuring of our industrial production. But it is also necessary politically if we don't want to be accused of ignoring treaties. It is therefore particularly important to carry out the decision of the Congress of People's Deputies to complete by 1990 the drawing up of a national environmental programme of both urgent and long-term measures.

Vavilov. UNEP sets the number of such agreements at about 140. In addition to the 55 signed by us, there may be roughly another 36 related to them. Some preclude our joining them because they are mainly regional.

Accession to the Convention of the Council of Europe is a special problem, nor is it simple. It is well that we want to cooperate but, on the other hand, this may entail considerable expenditures because you have to pay for everything. Most conventions have international secretariats which want money. In short, we need circumspection.

But the efforts being made by organisations to which the Foreign Ministry has been drawn traditionally is another matter. An international UN conference on the environment and development is to be held in 1992, with Brazil as the most likely venue. Thus there is a point in

calling the attention of developing countries to, for example, the problem of tropical forests. The opinion now emerging is that the conference will differ completely from all others. We have had enough declarations. Now a vast international programme of action for the 21st century is to be prepared.

Specialists estimate that the programme will comprise about sixteen sections and that relevant decisions for the next century must be prepared in three years. They are to cover such areas as power generation and the environment, agriculture and the environment, education, the flow of financial resources, monitoring, early warning, emergency environmental aid, the problem of waste of toxic chemicals. But how is each of these programmes to be implemented specifically in terms of international cooperation? Solution of the problem of, say, power generation calls logically for participation by all countries represented in the IAEA, and solution of the problem of education (or illiteracy), for participation by UNESCO member countries. Financial problems and problems of developing countries must be tackled by GATT, UNIDO and other organisations which we don't yet belong to but will have to join.

International Affairs. That is highly important as we see it. Couldn't international law help us in the end in defeating our domestic bureaucrats?

This prospect makes it a priority task to join treaties and agreements now in force. But we clearly make a poor showing in this respect. Even though we are a party to UNEP, we refuse to participate in space monitoring of the state of the Earth and have stayed out of the global natural resources data base. True, we recently began exploring the possibility of joining in this programme. If we did we would be able to make long-term forecasts of the economic and environmental situation. The Soviet Union is not a party to either the Convention on the Protection of Migrant Animals or the Convention on Sea Shipments of Nuclear Materials and the Responsibility of Operators of Nuclear Ships. And we have yet to assume financial obligations under the Convention on Trade in Flora and Fauna Species Threatened with Extinction. This is an incomplete list.

Vavilov. This situation must be ended as speedily as possible. We must therefore bring in all our forces, all government departments, all environmental movements—incidentally, these are a topic of much discussion now. "Non-formal" social organisations, Greens all over the world are preparing for both a serious dialogue and responsible action. In January 1990, a representative conference of scientists, parliamentarians and clerics will convene in Moscow to discuss global environmental problems.

Zabelin. What can be done to have all non-governmental organisations attend it? As for us, everything is very complicated.

Vavilov. Yes, but it's a big internal problem. As far as the Foreign Ministry is concerned, it will back you. By the way, Sofia will play host in mid-October to the first ecoforum for Europe within the framework of the European process. The forum is going to discuss problems relating to accidents, chemicals and transboundary lakes and rivers. We plan to ask the host country to invite non-formals and environmentalists from everywhere and to sponsor a parallel public opinion forum there.

Sedunov. Andrei Mikhailovich, I would like to ask just the same how necessary it is for us to join all existing conventions. There are as many as 140 conventions while the world isn't the same everywhere and all countries are different. There are distinctions between regions and seas and littorals. You said here and so did someone else at the Supreme Soviet Session that we are behind the universal trend. Does that mean,

however, that we must participate in absolutely everything? It looks as if you were concerned only because we might have to pay three or four salaries in hard currency to three or four people assigned to a secretariat or even to contribute our share to the maintenance of the secretariat. But surely that is beside the point.

The real cost of a convention lies in something else. What does the convention on the ozone layer imply? It implies that we must retool our industry, that is, spend billions. The convention on transboundary fluxes, under which we would have to cut sulphur oxide emissions by 30 per cent, would cost further billions. But would we stand to gain? Lastly, some statements could make us join a convention on the protection of the North. But that would cover an area of our special interests, the Arctic Ocean. Not all of the Western countries' proposals may be acceptable.

Yablokov. Those interests have long become a thing of the past. And I don't think your concern about billions is warranted. What is 10 billion? Or even 50 billion? We must pay it. The question is not whether we should pay. We must. We ought to have done so long ago. The arithmetic is simple: if we don't spend that money today we'll have to pay twice as much tomorrow. The stingy pay twice.

International Affairs. Indeed, speaking of new ecological thinking, we should begin with ourselves. For us, the only way out of the crisis is to join actively in international cooperation.

It is true that by assuming international obligations, we would in some cases have to reconstruct our plants and hence to spend a lot of money. But the experience of the difficult decision on international cooperation in saving Lake Baikal has shown that cooperation doesn't necessarily entail excessive hard currency spending. This cooperation is profitable to us also from the point of view of obtaining the latest technology. Other examples are our offer to West Germany for joint research into general problems of water ecosystems, meaning the Volga and the Rhine, and for the transformation of the Repetek State Reservation in the Kara Kum Desert into a UNEP base to study the problem of desertification. Specialists believe that it could be very useful to draw up in collaboration with UNEP programmes for improving the environmental situation in the Aral Area and in areas contaminated in the wake of the Chernobyl accident.

Now for objections and bans. Let us admit that our refusal to participate in many joint projects is due to purely departmental considerations. What stands occasionally in the way is a kind of paranoid "secretiveness", fear of supervision that might throw an unfavourable light on the performance of local authorities. An often-used pretext is the existence of "closed zones". Hasn't the Arctic Ocean, where we've done quite a few disgraceful things, been turned into just that kind of "special zone"?

Mayozsky. We would like to move the environmental problem, now a third-rate one, to the fore in UN activity. Our idea of establishing something of an environmental security council has spurred much thinking about it. The French suggest setting up a specialised international institution in charge of the biosphere. The British declare for setting up a committee on ecology of the UN General Assembly and for discussing environmental problems in the Security Council. We aroused interest by submitting for discussion a proposal for eventually setting up an ecological committee under the Security Council by analogy with the Atomic Energy Committee which existed under the Security Council in the forties.

Sokolovsky. What I'm going to say is probably banal but we do need new thinking, a fundamental revision of our entire world outlook. Even

this meeting, which has brought together specialists, shows that the revolution in thinking is still some day off.

We have been complaining of lacking even tentative guidelines for regulating relations between the nature and the state. But haven't we solemnly recognised the primacy of international over domestic law? Why cannot we extend this principle to the environment? We objectively must, are in duty bound to do so by the logic of world development. You may recall that the International Union of Nature Conservation has adopted a universal strategy for environmental protection. There is a report by the Bro Harlem Brundtland World Commission, and its recommendations are now being put into practice. Lastly, the European Economic Commission, which comprises 33 European countries, the United States and Canada, has approved on our initiative a nature conservancy strategy for the period between now and the year 2000. In short, the world community has already evolved an environmental philosophy. We should go on it in practice without forgetting that we must work out a national environmental programme taking our own problems into account.

We must stop marking time and guessing. We still don't really know what is happening to us, to nature. All the negative effects of human activity on Earth keep piling up. They are intensifying one another, and at a certain stage, after reaching the "critical" 11 per cent mark mentioned by Alexei Yablokov at the beginning of this discussion, they are bound to trigger unpredictable, snow-balling processes in our biosphere. We have no time to lose. Tomorrow begins today.

Salykov. I'm satisfied with our discussion. There were interesting points in it, and besides, Polad-Zade and I had a useful exchange of views. Of course, he looks on many things in his own way, historically so to speak. As for us, we want to forget the past and to put things on a new course.

What we need today is action, not arguments. Everybody wants to breathe mountain air. But first we need a painstaking analysis of our environmental situation. It might be worth founding a theoretico-practical daily or weekly to this end, I trust the process of ecologising our thinking will now get off to a brisk start, and it's our duty to make its start successful so as to ensure progress in people's environmental culture. This culture should result in ecologising all government programmes, the whole economy and our every undertaking.

It is important to take a measured, reasonable approach, for we are occasionally urged to shut down a plant or pit right away, to fill up a canal, and so on. But that would be wrong, we wouldn't get far that way. We will certainly build plants we need and shut down plants we don't need, provided that their uselessness has been proved. In short, each case should be dealt with upon careful examination.

Environmental problems are so important that I think they should be put on the agenda of the government, the State Planning Committee, the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies alike. Look how many new and interesting ideas have been produced by today's pluralist opinion. We must put them all to use, mustn't we? When we've placed the problem of ecologising the country on the agenda of our highest authorities we will call on the Academy of Sciences, the government and "non-formal" organisations to join efforts. There is no other way, for environmental protection today is a task which everybody must tackle. Alexei Yablokov put it aptly at the Congress of People's Deputies when he said that we must all "go Green" now. The phrase has become part of our vocabulary.

Yablokov. Incidentally, Nikolai Ryzhkov supported the idea. "Let's 'go Green'," he said.

THE USE OF A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENT

THE PROCESS OF NEGATING the theory and practice of "totalitarian" and "stagnant" socialism seems to be several steps ahead of the ability of socialist society to adjust its social and political thinking to the present international situation. Vladimir Stupishin rightly points out in his article * that "a critical analysis of the past should necessarily be accompanied by a no less critical assessment of the present". Indeed, success in perestroika, including the introduction of new political thinking into international relations, will depend in equal measure on the conclusions we draw from history and on a proper, objective assessment of all that determines our current policy. In this case, public opinion can assume responsibility as a real and sufficiently strong guarantor of the correctness of what the leading apparatus does in home policy and on the international scene.

V. Stupishin writes that "in a democratic rule-of-law state the right to make a mistake is balanced by the right to public analysis and criticism of the actions of the powers that be, which should have powerful limiting factors, a public with its own press being most important of these". But the limiting factors, at society's disposal in the climate of perestroika are still inadequate, for public opinion still lacks a press independent of the leading apparatus. We must renounce here a stereotype whose grip on our notions of the socialist system is particularly strong. I mean the idea that the press is and must be a vehicle and advocate of none but the policy of the administrative apparatus, must encourage the people to fulfil tasks and slogans put forward by members of this apparatus.

I cannot accept V. Stupishin's view that openness in contemplated diplomatic moves and decisions endangers a professional approach to foreign policy activity. Were public opinion to have no real opportunities to block an occasional decision, amend a given attitude towards specific international issue, being expected merely to approve of or criticise decisions already made or diplomatic steps already taken, it would be doomed in practice to using people's diplomacy when it was too late. Professionalism in diplomacy undoubtedly plays a very important role but it should not become a barrier to the interests of society, which is entitled not only to be informed but to insist that its opinion be heeded in making a diplomatic move. Unless this is done, the future is bound to surprise us by bringing to light tragic decisions made by an individual or a small group, as in the case of the decision to move Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

For decades running, we learnt to grow fruits of narcissism in the socialist world, in the soil of a military and economic alliance, as if we had forgotten all about the existence of national and regional interests. To advertise unanimity, we concealed our blunders and the mistakes made by our allies. We kept silent on bitter truths and hid the pain of wounds behind an optimistic smile.

There is an interesting publication showing for its part that stereotypes inculcated for decades live on in society and tend to adapt to new

* Vladimir Stupishin, "The Stereotypes We Abandon", *International Affairs*, No. 7, 1989, p. 26.

conditions. I am referring to *Truth and Misinformation*, a collection published in 1988 by the Sofia Institute of Contemporary Social Theories. In an article headlined "The Information Process Today and the New Dimensions of Prompt Counter-Propaganda" (p. 366), Zdravko Raikov writes: "We must show still greater perseverance and force of conviction in conveying to people the truth of Marxist-Leninist ideas, in presenting the peaceful foreign policy of the socialist community, our inspired effort, whose fruits are evident in every social sphere. Seen against the background of the fundamental evils inevitable under capitalism—exploitation of the individual, unemployment, poverty, terrorism, moral degradation of the individual, and so on—they give us a sense of legitimate pride in the achievements of existing socialism and inspire us with a desire to work still harder for the good of the people." Anyone reading these lines would do well to glance at the calendar to make sure that things have not been put one decade back. Besides, it is not a very good idea to seriously regard the growing "evils of capitalism" as reason for added pride "in the achievements of socialism". It appears that "the new dimensions of prompt counter-propaganda" have not gone off the beaten track.

V. YONEV,
Sofia, Bulgaria

THE SEA WARDENS

OF LATE *International Affairs* has been raising the problem of endangered world ecology, a subject that urges one to conscientiously join the common effort to save man's environment. Regrettably, our generation was much too long to realise the danger. Therefore, to be effective, actions to remove it must be global and involve huge expense.

Pollution of the World Ocean is a major ecological problem. This is of a truly oceanic scale, with pollutants coming in from dry land, sea-going ships, seabeds (as result of malfunctions and accidents, as well as of the operations of offshore oil wells) and air (acid rain). The UNEP reports that every year billions of tons of wastes are dumped into the Ocean, a result being ecological disasters that turn seas into lifeless expanses.

International legal publications comment quite often on the sluggish development of sea protection standards, although some national and international legal acts envisaging measures to prevent marine environment pollution and extermination of living resources of the high seas have already come into force. It should be noted that the responsibility for enforcement of the rules established by the conventions rests either with coastal nations, whose sovereign rights extend to the economic zone with states of ports, or with nations of ship flag. Such control has proved ineffective. Undoubtedly it should be internationalised.

Global problems are such by definition because no nation, however remote from heavily industrialised areas or other pollutant sources, can consider itself free of concern for solution of these problems. First, because global danger is universal, and, secondly, they can only be dealt with through common efforts.

Here I would like to describe an idea which was prompted by a minor episode in Catherine II's court life, described in the memoirs of Fürst von Bismarck. Such minor anecdotes remain in the memory of generations only because, like a biblical parable, they contain certain moral ideas often of many facets. Once on a stroll in the Summer Park, Catherine II saw a snowdrop which came up earlier than usual; she ordered that the flower be watched lest it be picked. To fulfil her wish, a sentry was placed at the flower. The idea of a soldier guarding the flower at the Empress' whim nowadays can be materialised in small naval ships with international crews (similarly to UN Peace-Keeping Force) to safeguard living resources of the high seas and to see that ships of signatory nations observe the rules designed to prevent pollution of the World Ocean.

Let the naval ships given this mission by the UN or UNEP be called sea wardens, and their crews wear blue caps similar to the blue berets of the UN Peace-Keeping Force.

May everyone know that military force can be employed both in national interests and in common human interests.

A. SEMYONOV,
Assistant Professor,
Kharkov Institute of Law

ON THE USEFULNESS OF ADVICE FROM THE OUTSIDE

WHAT THAT WORKER said to CPSU CC General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at the Izhora Works may be attributed to the heat of debate, I suppose.

"*Mikhail Gorbachev.* So you've made up your mind to work for capitalists, comrade, have you?

"*Answer.* I could work even for capitalists if they paid me well."

The reference to capitalism was out of place. The socialist system promises to provide no fewer benefits if its original principles are put into practice. But even so, we stand to gain by drawing on the wisdom of the finest minds of the other society, which shows efficiency, initiative and capacity for organisation.

The new capitalist élite includes people who have an excellent knowledge of the state of affairs in our country and possibly know our economy better than we. The Soviet Union, its potentialities and prospects are under impartial scrutiny. It is a process without ideological overtones, nor is it intended to draw conclusions filling someone's social order. The aim is to see clear in perestroika and find out in what areas the Soviet Union could be a suitable partner and how far it would be willing to go.

I have twice had detailed conversations with Tadao Morimoto, one of the wise men mentioned above. He is President of the Torei Scientific Research Institute (Japan). His main ideas are set out in an article contributed by him to *International Affairs* and printed in the Business and Perestroika section of this issue.

The important thing for Russia, Mr. Morimoto told me, is to cast off its psychological burden. Right now you are disheartened by apocalyptic visions of your situation. The shock caused by the negative information which leaders, economists, journalists are heaping almost gleefully on the country tends to disarm people, to make it impossible for them to soberly discuss and find ways out of the crisis. Why are you Russians forgetting that the Soviet Union is a mighty power? You have everything—no country can match you in natural resources. You had set up a powerful industry in a matter of decades by building innumerable factories and power plants. You should not forget this. You should not derive your economic strategy from an inferiority complex but should base it on Russia's immense potential.

That this potential is largely unused and so is neither feeding the country nor keeping it warm is another matter, Mr. Morimoto went on. This must be due to inefficient management and poor leadership. You need to realise it. You have not lost at all, the situation is not hopeless. The ongoing radical perestroika in the sphere of management and leadership will be based on powerful industries being used poorly, however, and on excellent fundamental research.

To support what he had said, my interlocutor voiced precise, bold, virtually revolutionary ideas about how to really transform our style of work.

I said to myself as I listened to that wise man Mr. Morimoto: Dear me! Here are normal ways to pull oneself out of the abyss of crisis. But

the next moment I wondered how we were to go about doing away with a system of management and leadership that had grown so ossified and cumbersome over the decades and was subsisting by the country and the very idea of socialism.

No man is a prophet in his country. In view of the situation in which we find ourselves, nothing would be wrong with inviting a prophet from without. We could, for instance, form a team of brilliant minds—Japanese, American, West German and other authorities on the problem—and entrust it with drawing up special-purpose economic development programmes for us. This would be helpful, all the more because the economy in leading capitalist countries is undergoing changes in a direction inexplicable to us, acquiring characteristics which we associate with the socialist system. Basic to the American economy, for one, are 40,000 cooperatives of various proportions. Is this an ordinary empire of uncrowned rulers or a new state of society?

As regards those words spoken in the heat of the moment, they were uncalled for. Never in its long history, including the last 70 years, has socialism had a real opportunity to prove its worth.

We now have a new chance and should make sure that we don't miss it.

Boris PIADYSHEV

SOVIET ECONOMY COULD BENEFIT FROM JAPANESE TRIFT

(Continued from page 88)

leads to a considerable delay in the inflow of hard currency earnings for the Soviet side.

Another way to increase such earnings is to establish joint trading companies to sell Soviet products on the markets of third countries. Available data show that Japanese trading companies alone sell to third countries Soviet products worth 600 million dollars a year. If sales were carried on through joint ventures the influx of dollars would increase considerably. By building up a foreign exchange reserve in this way, the Soviet Union could postpone the introduction of a convertible ruble by at least ten years.

These notes of mine contain some criticism and recommendations prompted by thirty years' experience of contacts with the Soviet side. I hope I am not misunderstood, for I sincerely wish to see the Soviet economy attain greater efficiency.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

(Continued from page 96)

The sources of regional conflict can be addressed in bilateral talks, but in many cases can only be fully resolved in multilateral forums.

¹ *International Herald Tribune*, August 2, 1989.

² A well-known American political scientist, held several positions of responsibility in international bodies and US missions. Writes on foreign policy problems.

³ American political scientist, a professor. Authored and co-authored several research works in international relations.

RUSSIA AND SOUTH AFRICA

(Continued from page 106)

All of that remained just on paper. As the worldwide anti-apartheid movement was mounting, the trade was rapidly decreasing and ended altogether after the UN imposed sanctions against South Africa. The situation remains unchanged to this day.

(To be continued)

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THE YEAR 1789 AND 1917

Yuri POLYAKOV

THE YEARS 1789, 1793 and 1917 are probably unsurpassed in world history as the subject of controversy and violent clashes of opinion. Heated debates on the French Revolution have been going on for nearly two centuries and debates on the Russian Revolution, for over seven decades. One would have expected opinions and assessments to differ because it is a question of different periods. But the dividing lines are identical and so are the arguments adduced by the two sides.

Great revolutions take long to come to a head, but they break out unexpectedly.

The way for the storming of the Bastille was paved by the "court of reason", Voltaire's free-thinking, Rousseau's doctrine of people's natural equality, Diderot's *Encyclopédie*, Montesquieu's theory of the separation of powers. The royal throne was shaken by increasingly powerful actions on the part of peasants and townspeople in 1787-1789 and by the activity of the states General, which proclaimed itself a National and then a Constituent Assembly. But even in early July, no one in France could imagine that after July 11, when Louis XVI removed Necker, a progressive statesman, events would snowball and culminate in an armed uprising and the storming of the Bastille.

In Russia, the way for the overthrow of the Romanovs and the victory of the October Revolution was paved by the selfless struggle of members of the Narodnaya Volya (People's Will), Tolstoy's writings, Lenin's activity, the combining of Marxism with the working class movement, the involvement of tens of millions in revolutionary struggle (a mere twelve years saw three revolutions), unsuccessful wars. The pillars of the House of Romanov were sapped even by the Duma and Milyukov's speeches and by Rasputin's semi-mystical life and death, which was rather like the dénouement of a cheap detective story. Many were those who realised that Russia was pregnant with revolution. But no one could imagine that the strike called in a shop of the Putilov Plant would spread to all of Petrograd's plants and that at dawn on February 27, the 2nd Company of the Volynian Life Guards Regiment would disobey its commanders, join the strikers and induce the garrison to go over to the insurgents' side, thereby predetermining victory.

A common characteristic of the French and Russian revolutions was that the revolutionary process was complex and protracted, with the people becoming increasingly radicalised for many reasons. The struggle gradually drew in the mass of the people, characterised as a rule by a particularly strong aspiration for decisive change, the greatest resolve and an intense hatred for the powers that be.

The writer, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, is Chairman of the Academy's Scientific Council on Historical Demography and Historical Geography.

Another reason for growing maximalism was that resistance from the enemies of the revolution was gaining in strength and bitterness. There arose a kind of chain reaction: unqualified repudiation of the old world made for mounting resistance from its exponents; their action was countered by carrying reform deeper; the more drastic revolutionary measures became, the more those affected by them fought back; the greater the bitterness shown by the counter-revolution, the more bitterly the revolution reacted to it. Brutality and violence mounted on both sides. Thus one of the tragedies of revolution—an escalation of brutality and violence—became reality.

In France after July 14, 1789, one dramatic collision came after another. The struggle went on intensifying until the counter-revolutionary coup in July 1794. The stages of the struggle included the Parisians' march on Versailles in October 1789, the crisis in the summer of 1791 over the King's attempt to flee the country, the uprising on August 10, 1792, the abolition of royal power, the proclamation of a Republic, the execution of the King, the establishment of a Jacobinic dictatorship, the transfer of land to the peasants, the elimination of feudal rights and privileges, counter-revolutionary rebellions that extended to two-thirds of the country and were mercilessly put down.

Developments in Russia, too, followed a dramatic course when, after the abdication of Nicholas II, the people's sentiments became more radical from week to week while counter-revolutionary resistance stiffened; when, after the proclamation of Soviet power, a civil war broke out, armed foreign intervention was launched and brutality, leading to more brutality, reached the utmost intensity when the nationalisation of land and industry struck a deadly blow at the landowners and capitalists.

The flywheel of radicalisation in Russia turned faster and faster and, coming into full swing, generated an incredible force of inertia.

With the struggle rising to higher pitch, the leaders of the revolution began to differ. Originally, too, they had dissimilar aims and disagreed over the meaning of what was going on or was likely to come, but these differences did not at the time place them on different sides of the barricades. Liberals and radicals, moderates and maximalists argued among themselves but it never occurred to any one of them that some day they would be cutting each other's throats. They became mortal enemies with the advance of the revolution.

Every revolution causes division in the victors' camp. Old goals give way to new ones but some people remain in the past as it were, others keep up with developments, and still others come too far too fast. Divisions are due to many factors, including primarily counter-revolutionary resistance from within and without and personal ambitions.

That old phrase about revolutions devouring their children, reflects another immense tragedy of great revolutions.

The guillotine killed not only leaders of the aristocracy and constitutionalists but moderate revolutionaries (Girondins), right-wing Jacobins (Danton, Desmoulins), extreme radicals (Hébert), and lastly, leaders of the Jacobinic dictatorship (Robespierre, Saint-Just).

In Russia, the influential Constitutional Democrats, who had criticised the Tsar until shortly before and regarded themselves immediately after the February-March victory as being "on top of the mountain", drifted subsequently farther and farther to the right and ended up as a "party of the people's enemies".

Socialist leaders—Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries—lagged in their turn behind the rapid growth of the revolutionary consciousness of the people; they opposed the October Revolution and then took up arms to fight against it. Serious differences surfaced among the Bolsheviks themselves. Afterwards Stalin, setting out to impose his dictatorship un-

der radical revolutionary slogans, destroyed nearly all active Bolsheviks—heroes of the October Revolution—along with numerous non-party people.

At work during revolutions is a tremendous, mainly destructive force of inertia, and both France and Russia experienced this. This force gathers momentum and goes beyond reasonable bounds. It cannot stop at once, any more than the sea can calm down immediately after the storm has subsided. The very scope and irresistibility of the force of inertia and the inevitability of excesses are one reason why revolutions are dreaded by many.

Revolutions rise against the old. They overthrow it because they negate and hate it. The force of inertia destroys many things unnecessarily, doing so indiscriminately just because it is against the old as such. Revolutions were and are aimed at razing the world of violence to the ground. Here the world of violence encompasses the whole "old world" with its complex and contradictory legacy.

What makes revolutionary leaders really great is perhaps their ability not to fuel the anger of the masses they are leading but to induce them to subdue their emotions in favour of reason and their anger, in favour of meeting the exigencies of legality and to show mercy to the vanquished. Surely he who demands respect for order and calls for tolerance can be a revolutionary leader.

The Russian revolution went much further than the French Revolution in negating the past; it made many fatal mistakes ranging from the substitution of "revolutionary consciousness" for legality to an arrogant attitude toward the legacy of history. Many failed to understand that there is a difference between "old" and "past" that even the old cannot be associated with violence alone. And while radical and sensible Russian revolutionaries insisted on using all that was valuable in humanity's heritage, they were often ignored.

The people's struggle is led by enthusiasts who may include fanatics as well as upright pragmatists, holy men as well as hypocrites. Inevitably, the rising tide of revolutionary activity sweeps to the top many ambitious adventurers, shameless parasites, marauders and swindlers. This froth is unfortunately part of history. There was froth in France and Russia as anywhere else. The phenomenon is neither a tragedy of revolutions nor their reverse side. It is a smear of dirt on a gigantic picture in which the sun, a blue sky and blood appear side by side. It is a plant parasitising a healthy tree. There is no need to pull a grey curtain across the dirty part of the canvas. Regrettably, rubbish washed up by mighty waves prevents many who probe into history from seeing the clear water underneath.

It is equally deplorable, however, that revolutions do not immediately create democratic mechanisms making it possible to remove the froth. The experience of the French and Russian revolutions indicates that insurgent peoples must learn as speedily as possible to use freedom, must begin by developing a mechanism that will make it impossible for anyone to impose personal power unrestricted by law.

Revolutions grow from social contradictions and destroy them more or less completely. We have always known this. But we did not really know that revolutions themselves give rise to a multitude of new contradictions which nobody had foreseen, and when they emerged we did not quite see clear in them in practice. One of them is the contradiction between dictatorship and democracy. A victorious revolution finds itself encircled by enemies. To defend itself, it establishes a revolutionary dictatorship. This is justified by harsh realities. But a dictatorship is a dictatorship, which means that it can hold up the formation of democracy for a long time; it can survive even when the revolution has consolidated itself and is in a

position to exist on a democratic basis. The dictatorship of a revolutionary people may grow into the dictatorship of a victorious general or unscrupulous politician.

And here is another example. The new bureaucracy turns out to be an immoral if legitimate daughter of the revolution. Born as the antithesis of the old bureaucracy, it becomes a self-sufficing force growing year after year and hampering social progress. New contradictions arise in this way, and the historical process goes on, evolution alternating with revolution.

BOTH THE FRENCH and the Russian revolution may be described as a most intricate intertwining or knot of diverse trends, a combination of numerous objective and subjective, positive and negative factors. But there is no appreciating them without a correct idea of Jacobinism and Bolshevism, for these are the core and centrepiece of both revolutions, a concentrated and particularly consistent expression of their essence.

At a definite stage Jacobinic radicalism expressed more firmly than any other trend the interests of the majority of workers and the majority of the revolutionary people.

The Bolsheviks' consistent orientation to socialism, for its part, gave consistent and concentrated expression during the October Revolution and the civil war to the interests and will of the majority of workers and peasants, the majority of the revolutionary people, and subsequently to their aspiration to build a society of social justice.

We now talk and write a great deal about universal values and morality. Their vast importance is beyond question at all times, and to ignore them would mean neglecting the moral health of society. But universal values are no abstract concept; they manifest themselves in concrete historical situations and not in a vacuum. Besides, the historical process has always been determined by class interests. Social revolutions bring class interests to the fore. This applies to both opposing sides. Moral standards are infringed by both defenders of the old and champions of the new. Both groups are prompted primarily by class interests having an objective basis. Everything else is pushed into the background. These are historical realities which we must not forget, as we do by arrogantly censuring our ancestors for flouting universal principles.

Slave-owners punished insurgent slaves with blood-curdling brutality, and feudal lords treated insurgent peasants in a similar way. During social upheavals, the bourgeoisie ignores humaneness, an everlasting universal value. There are innumerable facts attesting this. Both the Jacobins in 1793 and the Bolsheviks in the years of revolution and civil war resorted to violence, showing firmness in defence of the revolution and giving no quarter to its enemies. Both the Jacobins and the Bolsheviks established a dictatorship and used terror, bothering little about mercy.

Jacobinic terror is a theme touched on in most of the articles published on the occasion of the bicentennial. Non-acceptance and criticism of terror runs through all current publications. This is evidence of an ongoing reappraisal of long-standing stereotypes idealising revolutionary violence. Five decades ago, however, the Soviet press wrote that terror had saved revolutionary France.

One certainly cannot admire terror and violence. But one can and must take account of concrete historical conditions and the mentality of the people who have risen against centuries-long oppression. Hence one must also appreciate the psychology and conduct of the leaders of an insurgent people.

The truthful historian needs to know and explain reality no matter how unattractive it may be, not to hold forth abstractly about good and evil.

Just as sincere champions of social justice may include crafty time-servers, so lasting human qualities may include brutality, with class consciousness becoming envy of the rich. But while realising this, one must remember that universal values do not at all contradict the class interests of labour. It is natural and logical that they should combine. Where these values were ignored or flouted, this was due to the bitterness of the struggle imposed by external and internal circumstances. The historian must unfortunately admit that in the course of intense class battles, values are mostly flouted, not preserved. History tells us again and again that the time has come to give up the idea that violence and dictatorship are inevitable in effecting revolutionary changes.

The coordinate system determining and assessing the progress of society changes. So do times and circumstances. Conditions today do not at all dictate giving priority to the class approach although class consciousness and class interests have by no means disappeared. It is to be hoped that class interests can be combined now and in the future with universal values and that the latter can be given priority on many points. But how difficult it is to achieve harmony!

●

I HAVE COME to the main point of differences and controversies: the significance of revolutions in history. Last summer, the long-running controversies mentioned earlier, which have never abated, flared up again; they are still on, especially in France and the Soviet Union. The reason for this in France is the bicentennial of its great revolution and in our country, perestroika, a unique revolution.

People have been arguing. Some historians, philosophers and politologists describe revolutions as locomotives of history. Others see them as deviations of the historical process due to diverse causes. Some write about the greatness of the people's goals and enthusiasm while others point to the price they exact, to the horrors and tragedies they bring on.

The point is that revolutions are neither actions programmed in advance nor accidents depending on the activity of this or that group, let alone great individuals. They are inseparable from the historical process and are repeated in various countries and various periods, each of them being remarkable for its distinctive character. The stupidity of kings and emperors, the venality of grand viziers and petty satraps, the incompetence of ministers can be a spur, stimulus or accelerator furthering popular movements that draw tens of millions into their orbit but they cannot underlie these movements.

Whether we like it or not, revolutions are a historical reality. Big and small, deep-going and less deep-going revolutions alike are a natural historical development. Every revolution is a departure from standard in the sense that it upsets the ordinary, habitual, measured course of life.

Each revolution, viewed broadly, is a manifestation of natural, inevitable trends in the progressive development of society, an expression of natural and inevitable contradictions.

Contradictions and antagonistic groups arise in society time and again. Surprisingly, we give in at times to a rather unaccountable euphoria and invent idylls pleasing to the heart and mind, forgetting all about simple truths and indisputable facts.

It would be wonderful to have social antagonists walk arm-in-arm and present orchids to each other, with people having power and money and enjoying privileges offering all that with a smile to anyone who asked for

it. But this is impossible. In innumerable cases, life has brutally rejected idealism and destroyed sweet dreams and naive hopes. In appraising history, we must proceed from realities and not from abstract concepts of good and evil, not from our wishes. Society will have to develop sooner or later a completely humane and democratic mechanism for overcoming contradictions. There is no such mechanism as yet, nor has history recorded one. Anyhow, social explosions were inevitable in both France in the late 18th and Russia in the first quarter of the 20th century. They were sparked by violence and injustice. No wonder they bred both.

One can criticise the behaviour of revolutionaries. But it would be ridiculous to criticise a revolution. To do so would be tantamount to criticising a storm. One may like or dislike a storm. It may cause terrible devastation. But it is bound to break once it has gathered head. As for revolutionaries, they are worth the name only if their élan is as strong as the fury of the storm. Of course, one can dream of measuring out wind in doses and of rationalising precipitations. Some techniques of dissipating clouds, bringing about a rainfall and regulating snowslides have already been devised.

One can plan a coup or revolt but cannot plan a popular revolution. One can forecast the latter and help bring it nearer but nobody has yet been able to plan a revolution involving millions.

Historians have done much to evaluate the French and Russian revolutions, depicting them in glowing colours. They have taken great pains to describe the complexities and difficulties attending revolutions and the horrors of terroristic rule, of amorality and fratricidal strife, of hunger and death. Definitions range from "the greatest event" or "the greatest heroism and enthusiasm of the people" to "a massacre".

I am convinced that for all the excesses involved, revolutions owe their significance to the fact that they resolve contradictions which build up in the course of history regardless of people's will. They have done so by the "plebeian" method of a Jacobinic dictatorship and the worker-peasant method of a proletarian dictatorship. They paved the way for the new by destroying the foundations of the old.

The French Revolution advanced an admirably simple slogan: "Liberty, equality, fraternity."

The past 200 years have seen no country in the world win liberty, equality or fraternity, nor do I think this can be done in the near future.

The October Revolution proclaimed an end to the exploitation of man by man, the construction of a society of social justice, national self-determination, peace among nations and the formation of a new democratic system. These goals turned out to be harder to achieve than they seemed originally. The paths charted for their attainment were largely ignored, and development went astray. Many of the revolutionaries who found themselves at the head of the movement showed incompetence, illwill and selfishness and changed for the worst on finding themselves in power.

We failed to use the immense opportunities provided by the revolution. But the reduction of the country to a society of missed opportunities cannot be blamed on the revolution; it was due to subsequent mistakes and deformations, to an inability to grasp the meaning of new phenomena. It is now that our country has a chance to make up for lost time by reviving in the course of perestroika the impetus of the October Revolution. History will not forgive us if we miss this chance.

I am certain that the winning of stronger positions by the working people and the adoption of progressive social measures (social insurance, unemployment relief, a new system of health service and education, a democratised society, and so on) are all an indirect reaction to the Octo-

ber Revolution and have been encouraged by it, with distinctions attributable to the peculiarities of each particular country.

There is no denying that the irresistible aspiration of peoples for self-determination, the collapse of colonial empires and the rise of new sovereign states are reflections of the Russian Revolution and the emergence of the federation of Soviet republics. New thinking in international relations, which is gaining ground everywhere, is unquestionably based on the ideas of the October Revolution and is the top of the tree which sprouted 72 years ago. October 1917 did not lead off a world revolution, as we had hoped it would but, like 1789, it contributed to the evolution of the world.

The ideas of the French and Russian revolutions proved so strong and had such an effect on people's hearts and minds because they were brought into a wide-open world by millions. They were conceived by thinkers, by dreamers and scholars, by poets and philosophers. But words written by the greatest realists, brilliant logicians and sincere Utopians differ from words written in blood and sweat by millions who died at the barricades or on the battlefield, defending those ideas and building a new society in their name. What lends everlasting significance to the French and Russian revolutions in that they roused "the very lowest strata to making history" to quote Lenin's apt expression.

The words about cooks who were offered an opportunity to learn to govern the state have been derided more than enough by saying that cooks never learnt to govern but then forgot how to cook. It is true, however, that we lowered the requisite standard of competence by trying to teach them to govern the country. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the ploughing and weeding done by the two revolutions in the late 18th and first half of the 20th century enabled "the very lowest strata" to prove their worth on a scale they could never have dreamed of.

People find it very difficult to grasp the meaning of their own experience. We are arguing and will go on arguing, alternately extolling and decrying the performance of our fathers and forefathers.

Be that as it may, humanity has undeniably entered a qualitatively new stage in its history. It is faced with new, amazingly complex and difficult problems. Real opportunities have opened up for the transformation and renewal of world civilisation. It is only by changing man's very world and mentality that humanity can learn to think in a new way, can become strong enough to stave off nuclear annihilation and ecological disaster and put an end to discord and enmity. They have changed and continue changing, and one reason for this is that in France and Russia people set out to build a new edifice, shedding their blood and going through untold suffering.

The transition coming about in our country is ultimately following the same road as the whole planet. The years 1789 and 1917 will always stand out on this road as great milestones resisting all strokes of time.

TO OVERCOME THE INTOLERANCE

Richard OVINNIKOV

REGULATION OF RELATIONS among states in the major areas of world politics is of key importance in the search for practical ways to shape a secure world which is now under the impact of new political thinking. These are relations between the states of the two different socio-political systems—the capitalist and the socialist.

The most attention here is concentrated on the importance of turning back the arms race. This is only understandable. The enormous stockpiles of deadly weaponry amassed over the past four and a half decades, above all along the East-West divide, can crash down on humanity like an avalanche. This would not only lead to incalculable calamities but also bury world civilisation under it. What is more, the dismantling of the pyramids of apocalyptic weapons that has today become a vital necessity is palpably being slowed down by the instinct of states, an instinct developed over millennia and buttressed by the stern realities of the 20th century, to accumulate arms as the decisive trump card of foreign policy.

What is this, a vicious circle? No, it is a dual problem. It is not fortuitous that the 27th CPSU Congress posed, alongside disarmament (destruction of the material basis of waging wars), the task of establishing proper, civilised relations among states, and of non-use of force. Incidentally, this task was called a fundamental one.

All the same, where does one begin? What is primary—the arms build-up that undermines friendship among states, or their enmity, which fuels the amassing of weaponry? They say it is not worthwhile to argue what came first—the egg or the hen, distrust among states or their power rivalry. In this instance, however, what is being decided is not a scholastic dispute but the fortunes of humanity. And it is the politicians' responsibility to find the decisive link capable of ensuring a practical approach to peaceful development.

It is our belief that weapons are, after all, secondary. In a world where power is a benchmark states regarded their stockpiling hardly as an end in itself but as a means of ensuring the protection or advance of their own interests in a system of hostile states.

In the final analysis, it is political tension that grows into military confrontation among states. Ronald Reagan repeatedly made this point in the last years of his presidency. He reiterated it twice during his stay in Moscow in May-June of 1988—in an address at Moscow University and at his final press conference. The US President expressed it as follows: countries do not trust one another not because they are armed; on the contrary, they arm because they do not trust one another.¹ Mr. Reagan was referring not to countries in general but precisely to the capita-

¹ Richard Ovinnikov, D. Sc. (Hist.), is the Rector of the Moscow State Institute for International Relations of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

list and socialist states, and the most powerful of them, the USA and the USSR, first and foremost.

In former times we would easily reject such a statement as the West's justification of the arms race, and not an explanation for its cause. Now, when we understand that security can only be mutual and universal and that each state has legitimate interests, such a frivolous course is inadmissible. On the contrary, we have a vested interest in looking much deeper than the brief superficial formula proposed by the American president.

So let us try to answer the two key questions of the problem at hand. First, why don't the USSR and the USA, and the East and West as a whole trust each other? If this distrust is irreversible altogether, there exists the probability both of a resumption and even growth of confrontation, and, sooner or later, the inevitability of its outcome—a fateful break. Light is visible at the end of the tunnel for mankind only if it is possible to change or at least substantially decrease this distrust, this mutual suspicion which feverishly whips up relations. But in this case there arises the second question: How can a breakthrough from distrust to trust between two sectors of one civilisation be reached?

The answer to both questions should be begun with a realisation of the stark problems of the relations between capitalism and socialism in our tempestuous 20th century. A brief excursus into relatively recent history is required not for pursuing propaganda dividends and levelling one-sided accusations but for analysing objective realities in the search for an exit from the deadend of confrontation.

FROM INTOLERANCE TO COOPERATION

A NEW ERA in world history began in 1917, when a previously united civilisation split into two opposing systems—capitalism and socialism. From the outset both sides espoused stands of full mutual rejection, of a repudiation of the link of the times, so to speak. Each considered itself absolute good, and the other side, absolute evil which had no right to exist. Each side in effect declared, albeit to different degrees and for different reasons, that it would not be able to exist safely until its unbearable neighbour perished.

Frankly, such moods were widespread in fledgling Soviet Russia. The fact is that the new social system was a response to and a protest against three main evils of the capitalism of the early 20th century—imperialism: 1) exploitation, the low living standard of the working people in the capitalist countries; 2) the colonial oppression of an enormous mass of enslaved peoples by a handful of powers; 3) the unleashing of the first world war in history. In these conditions Nikolai Bukharin, a prominent representative of the leftist Communists, considered it possible, for example, to frankly think in terms of export of revolution. In an article published in 1919 he wrote: "It is obvious that a momentous world revolution will include both defensive and offensive wars on the part of the victorious proletariat: defensive *to repulse* the advancing imperialists, and offensive, to *knock off* the retreating bourgeoisie in order to arouse to insurrection the still oppressed peoples, to liberate and free the colonies, and to formalise the gains of the proletariat."²

It is highly important, however, to make the reservation that such bellicose statements were chiefly rhetoric that did not become state policy. Furthermore, even the architects of such an approach, as is evident, thought above all in terms of a retaliatory counter-offensive alone.

To counter this the governments of the capitalist powers took the initiative to unleash hostilities. Crudely interfering in the internal affairs of a young state, they organised a collective armed intervention against

it. At that time the West, simply put, could not have claims against any shortcomings of socialism itself, as the system was only in the formative stage. There was one justification for the attempt to export counter-revolution, namely, that, as Winston Churchill put it, just because socialism is grounded on a different foundation than capitalism it should be strangled in the cradle.

When a hungry and bare Soviet Russia managed to uphold its independence with arms in hand, the most reactionary quarters in the West swore not to admit this mistake of history. Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby grounded in 1920 the policy of non-recognition of the Soviet state as follows: "The existing regime in Russia is based upon the negation of every principle of honor and good faith, and every usage and convention, underlying the whole structure of international law; the negation, in short, of every principle upon which it is possible to base harmonious and trustful relations, whether of nations or of individuals".³ This messianic non-acceptance of socialism solidly demarcated the two socio-economic systems.

The period of development between the first and second world wars led to deeper mutual suspicions and claims.

How did we see the West then? First of all, due to the unprecedented world economic crisis of 1929-1933, the deprivations of the working people in the capitalist world were broadening and deepening. Secondly, the colonial oppression of the peoples continued unabated. Thirdly, the internal economic laws of capitalism generated a new outburst of aggressiveness and the Second World War. Thus, the previous evils of capitalism were confirmed. What is more, still another extremely negative phenomenon, fascism, appeared in the West. It was perceived at the time as an inevitable product of bourgeois democracy. Furthermore, stubborn efforts were being made to channel the strike force of fascism from the West to the East, against socialism, with the aid of the Munich policy.

How, for its part, did the West perceive socialism in those years? Sad as it may have been, it at first received weighty counter-arguments. First of all, the establishment in the USSR of Stalinism with its regime of mass terror was evident. This in effect was a distortion of socialism just as fascism was a distortion of bourgeois democracy. However, bourgeois ideologists, demonstrating the same aberration of a vision of realities as the Stalinist ideologists, preferred for their part to declare Stalinism a natural product of socialism. Further, the non-aggression pact with Germany which the Soviet Union concluded in 1939 could not be effectively criticised by the Western powers, as they themselves had torpedoed the establishment of a united front against fascism. However, the subsequent conclusion by the USSR of a treaty of friendship with Nazi Germany unquestionably tainted the prestige of the world's first socialist state. It was against this background that the well-known pronouncement by Senator Harry Truman at the time—let fascism and socialism destroy each other—became possible.

It took a crisis of universal scope—the resolve of fascism to uproot both bourgeois democracy in the West and socialism in the East in the name of establishing its "thousand-year Reich"—for the rigid ideological blinkers to fall from people's eyes in the face of this mortal danger of all of world civilisation being rolled back. It turned out that in that fateful situation the common interests of the two systems, which remained different, all the same greatly outweighed their differences. Former enemies became allies in the anti-Hitler and anti-militarist coalition. The question of whether fascism could have been destroyed without the participation of socialism is far from an idle one in this context, too. After all, two-thirds of the Nazi armies were routed on the eastern front.

The main result, however, consisted in the following. During the anti-fascist struggle its participants drafted coordinated democratic principles for postwar relations among states. They were embodied in the Charter of the international organisation that had been formed then—the United Nations Organisation—and provided for the maintenance of a lasting peace on Earth through joint efforts. On behalf of the peoples of the United Nations the governments stated in this historic document their resolve “to display tolerance and live together, in peace with one another as good neighbours”. This was a great insight.

We will revert back to this theme. But for now it can be said that over their first three unsteady decades, East-West relations thus seemed to have received a mutually acceptable foundation for real normalisation.

DETENTE AND ITS IRREVERSIBILITY

THE ELIMINATION of the threat common to the members of the anti-fascist coalition, however, led to the rapid disintegration of the unity of the forces of the two systems and to a repudiation of the jointly created potential for the development of world civilisation. The latent contradictions proved stronger.

Winston Churchill's Fulton speech was made just half a year after the end of the Second World War—the West was oriented to a resumption and intensification of power rivalry with socialism. Nuclear weaponry, this unprecedented instrument of mass destruction, became the monopoly of one of the sides and was viewed as its best “big stick” in the historical dispute. For four long decades the cold war reigned with its different variants, from the “containment” to the “rolling back” of socialism. But its most characteristic and dangerous feature was the unprecedented arms race which was doggedly escalating.

This is not the place to determine the measure of the blame of the East and West for this course of events. Our goal is more constructive, but also more difficult—to explore points of contact. From this standpoint it can be noted that even on the road of the arms race, which became a thoroughfare, there nonetheless were partial accords which made it possible to avoid sliding into the abyss. But nothing more. The first real opportunity to halt the unbridled alternating of cycles and counter-cycles of weaponry appeared only after a long quarter of a century of cold war, in the early 1970s.

What created this possibility? How was it realised?

The Soviet Union had managed by that time to attain military-strategic parity. Of course, this was also a one-sided power solution, and it was attained at the highest possible level of military rivalry. Nuclear weapons had by then become thermonuclear and missile weaponry, i. e., not only highly destructive in terms of yield, but almost instantaneous in delivery time. “Assured mutual destruction” was how the stalemate was dubbed.

The already obvious suicidal essence and political powerlessness of what seemed to be the absolute weapon also had the most sweeping consequences. Detente became inevitable. The parity in strategic arms between the USSR and the USA was confided in the SALT-1 and the ABM treaties and then in the SALT-2 Treaty (although the latter was never ratified).

Two political agreements of those years were, in our opinion, potentially even more important. One of them was the bilateral Soviet-American accord “The Foundation of Relations Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America”. This document was signed at the summit level in 1972. The first cardinal principle which the sides pledged to be guided by read: “They shall proceed from the

common conviction that in the nuclear age there exists no other basis for maintaining relations between them than peaceful coexistence". The second is: "Differences in the ideology and the social systems of the USSR and the USA are not a hindrance to the development of normal relations between them based on principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual benefit".⁴ This was the second (after the creation of the UN mechanism) coordinated orientation in history for deideologising international relations on the basis of recognition of the right of socialism and capitalism to exist. The second, now multilateral, international agreement of this type, which regulated East-West relations on the whole, was the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which was signed in August 1975.

Alongside the SALT and AMB military-strategic agreements, these two foremost political documents should have, and could have, become the cornerstones of new, peaceful relations between East and West, and the underpinning of a stable international peace. Instead, however, history recorded detente solely as a transient phenomenon, one typical only of the first half of the 1970s.

Why did everything turn out as it did? What was the Achilles heel of detente? Without an answer to this question, without ascertaining the reasons for the costly backfire—the instability and the reversibility of detente that proved possible—it is difficult to take on blind faith the success of any new joint efforts in this area so vital for the future of civilisation.

To the authors' mind, the main factor behind the failure of detente and the subsequent mutual disillusionments was the poorly considered and, frankly, chiefly time-serving approach of both sides to it at the time.

As far as the United States is concerned, its short-sighted attitude to detente is convincingly reconstructed from the memoirs of one of its architects, Henry Kissinger. As he admits, the interest of the American side in detente consisted of three elements of different degrees of importance. In the first place he puts "tactical" considerations linked with attempts to outmanoeuvre the Soviet Union. In the second, a striving to influence the "domestic" political situation in the USA to ease the pressure from the American peace supporters. He calls the aspiration of the administration to avert a nuclear catastrophe only a "residue". Kissinger evolved the tactical aspect, which proved the main one for the USA, as follows. According to him, since Congress did not allocate sufficient resources for new Pentagon strategic programmes due to the expenditures for the war in Vietnam, it was the USA's task not to let the USSR shoot forward in this situation, i. e., to "arrest the Soviet offensive buildup". It was this that made for the American administration's readiness to agree to mutual strategic arms limitations with the USSR. However, the USA deliberately veered from concluding "permanent agreements" of this type in a bid to preserve "the greatest possible freedom for modernising" its own forces.⁵

Generally speaking, however, the USA took a cynical attitude to political accords with the Soviet Union regarding mutual norms, or a code, of behaviour as an integral part of detente. Kissinger frankly admits, in particular: "Our policy to reduce and where possible to eliminate Soviet influence in the Middle East was in fact making progress under the cover of detente."⁶ This was a far cry from integrity of intentions and actions according with agreements.

However, the behaviour of the Soviet side with regard to mutual commitments was far from flawless. This needs to be realised if we want to draw the proper conclusions from history.

Yes, it was to the Soviet Union's credit that it set about military detente at a time when it had not only attained parity but could have been tempted by the chimera of military superiority. In this sense its self-limitation, not forced self-limitation as in the case with the USA, at-

tested to the enormous historical responsibility of socialism and the principled nature of its course for scaling down the arms race that had gotten out of control. However, the stagnation that had already begun in the country and the mentality of "quantity" had corroded the Soviet Union's practical policy in this area. Juridically, of course, the USSR had every right to choose its own quotas of strategic armaments coordinated with the USA, up to and including the permitted ceiling. But there was no point in doing this in the military-strategic sense, for it did not enhance our security. This line was burdensome economically, greatly increasing as it did the country's expenditures without reason. It proved downright counter-productive politically as overzealousness in the matter of armaments, since it could not help evoking questions abroad.

Still greater short-sightedness was displayed by the Soviet side in the development of relations of trust between states. The tenet on the change of the correlation of forces in the international arena in favour of socialism and peace was smugly interpreted as the start of decisive (and not only political) offensive on the positions of capitalism in the Third World. From this angle detente took on the unnatural shade not of normalisation of East-West relations but a settling of accounts, or, to put it differently, "offensive detente".⁷ Support for Angola and Ethiopia in defending their independence, support which was legitimate from the standpoint of international law, looked distorted. The chief miscalculation of course was the advance of the Soviet Armed forces into Afghanistan. On the whole, instead of doing everything possible indeed to formalise, deepen and broaden detente and make it truly irreversible, which accorded with the fundamental interests of socialism and the whole of humanity, the short-sighted pursuit of ideological dividends undermined the efforts to attain the cardinal goal.

All this played into the hands of the forces in the West for which detente in general was merely an irritating sitting-out before another round in power rivalry. This also disoriented the segments of the population, especially in Europe, where detente had made deep inroads from the outset.

The Reagan administration came to power in the USA in 1981 on a wave of social revanchism and maximal ideologisation of foreign policy. Having pushed aside the already complicated prospects for establishing world law and order, it set colossal new military programmes in motion. There followed statements about "predominance" over the Soviet Union, a "crusade" against socialism, and accusations against the USSR's being an "evil empire". If, contrary to all these confrontational impulses, the situation in the world arena began to change drastically in the mid-1980s, the reason for this was the surfacing of deep-going factors that were much more powerful.

NEW THINKING—FOR EVERYONE

FOR ALL THEIR COMPLEX, multifaceted origins, the healthy changes that have taken place in East-West relations over the past few years have one common denominator—a realisation of the extraordinary danger of on-going confrontation.

Paradoxical as it may seem, it was to this state of affairs that the triumph of the champions of irreconcilability in the USA in the first half of the 1980s had led. Such obsessed ideologues were around before, too. Almost 30 years ago, right after the crisis in the Caribbean Sea, which the USSR and the USA emerged from with difficulty, barely having avoided a nuclear war, William Buckley, an ultra-right publicist, who is still alive, stated with regret: "If it is right that a single man is prepared

to die for a just cause, it can be argued that an entire civilization be prepared to die for a just cause."⁸

It was not so bad when such orientations were proclaimed at an irresponsible, purely speculative, level. However, when at the start of the current decade American irreconcilables (above all in the person of neo-conservatives) filled the highest echelons of power in Washington, and the practical formation of such a policy began, a real danger was posed. Incidentally, a reverse process—an exodus of foreign policy ideologists from the second Reagan administration in 1986-1987—attested, on the one hand, to its insight regarding the unprecedented level of the risk into which the hawks were pushing the country, and, on the other, to the creation of objective conditions for enhancing realism in American policy on the international scene.

The excessive ideologisation of foreign policy, which inevitably made for confrontation, proved, approximately at this time, or even somewhat earlier—in the late 1970-early 1980s—discredited for its sad results in the Soviet Union as well. A curious synchronisation of internal developments, is it not? Interestingly enough, some American researchers described a sort of feedback between the irreconcilables in the East and West. According to data gathered by them, the spiritual fathers of the ultra-rightist ideologists in America were disillusioned ultra-leftists, or rather, former American Trotskyites who switched like political werewolves from the theory of permanent revolution to that of permanent counter-revolution.⁹ That extremes come together is not a new idea. However, the simultaneous bankruptcy of Messianism in East and West is creating objective prerequisites for the triumph of reason and for a search for an exit from the dead-end road of confrontation.

In this context new political thinking which the Soviet Union has embraced and which it has proposed to the entire world is the intellectual leadership which socialism has assumed in the effort to find a practical path of world development that is qualitatively different from the one based on might. Coercion can no longer be the midwife of history that it was in the past. Today it is threatening to be its grave-digger.

We know that people in the West are increasingly, and sincerely, querying whether USSR's new thinking is a truly innovative philosophy or just a transient phenomenon caused by Moscow's numerous difficulties that have amassed. Some people there say cynically that in the 1970s the USA agreed to detente to get through the shocking consequences of the defeat in Vietnam more easily, and now, in the 1980s, "it is the Soviets who wish to use a new phase of detente to arrest the resurgence of Western strength".¹⁰ Others, on the contrary, admit that the Soviet Union is oriented not to temporary tranquility in the international arena but to a "formal structure that codifies that tranquility" on a stable basis.¹¹

For the Soviet Union itself new political thinking is above all a realistic perception of the world the way it is, and a readiness to adapt its practical policy to this.

How do we view the West today? All three fundamental negative features endemic to the capitalism of the first half of the 20th century have definitely undergone substantial changes over the period following the Second World War.

First of all, the full, albeit involuntary, collapse of classical colonialism as a system of the direct political domination of a handful of powers—mother countries—over many dozens of conquered peoples is a fact. Unjust economic relations, of course, are still peculiar to the world capitalist economy, but all this is another level of the contradictions.

Further, the material situation of rather broad strata of the population in the industrialised capitalist countries has debunked the spe-

culative projections of absolute impoverishment, and the situation has, on the whole, improved palpably over the past few decades. Capitalism has managed for the purpose to draw rather effectively on the results of the scientific and technological revolution and the instruments for heightening the social protection of the above segments, which, incidentally, were borrowed from socialism.

Lastly, the economic contradictions among the capitalist states, which played the vile role of the trigger mechanism of world wars twice in the 20th century, have for decades now been regulated by purely peaceful means. True, in parallel with this a military machine has ballooned unprecedentedly over the same period in the West, and it is spearheaded outwards—against the other social systems. However, possibilities are appearing—at the negotiating table—for untying this knot, too.

Generally speaking, with such capitalism, which, adapting to modern-day realities, is ridding itself of a number of its faults that used to be considered organic, socialism as a socio-economic system, although built on different principles, can, should and is prepared to cooperate twice as extensively on the basis of peaceful competition. This would be a level of their relations that is entirely different from what it was in the past.

How should the West for its part view the revitalising socialism today? What with perestroika, glasnost and democracy in the Soviet Union, one can no longer honestly speak of socialism as an autocratic, repressive and closed society. It will be recalled in this connection that the changes in the West linked with the transition of number of countries from dictatorial regimes to democratic forms of government were joyously received there.

In the context of the Soviet economic reforms and the USSR's stake on technological advance, utilisation of the market's possibilities and the encouragement of creative initiative, it is unrealistic to count on socialism's economic stagnation continuing. Similar processes in the West, when Japan and the FRG overcame unfavourable economic conditions to advance to the forefront of science and technology, cannot be unique, even though they were called a "miracle".

Another point. Socialism is not offering its own unilateral formulas for normalising East-West relations. It is advancing generally accepted norms of international law as the foundation by proclaiming the primacy of law in its foreign policy. Such an approach should have evoked a favourable response in the West.

Frankly, it is not to please people abroad that we are doing all this. No, it is for ourselves, for revitalising socialism and giving it a second lease on life. The whole world has been told that if perestroika is a success the entire world community will be dealing with a new socialist state—a new but precisely a socialist one.

By and large, however, the objective consequences of subjective aspirations are still more important for the long-term horizon of humanity. Above all from whether efforts dovetail or diverge in the different sectors of world civilizations. We believe that a fundamentally important conclusion can be made from this standpoint. *By virtue of the changes that are taking place both in capitalism and socialism, the gap between the standards of the two worlds is realistically narrowing for the first time in the 20th century.*

It is our conviction that the incipient convergence can hardly be the point at issue in this connection, although such a viewpoint does exist. Each of the systems preserves above all its own specific features, features which are the most essential to it. However, the aforementioned process of making the two systems more compatible *is creating a favourable objective basis* for advancing the deideologisation of East-West relations, enhancing tolerance for each other, and exploring reasonable compro-

mises. Without this it is hardly possible to proceed to a peaceful future and to normal international relations.

One further remark. We are correct in stressing that there is no reasonable alternative to a revamping of international relations on the principles of non-violence and law. However, at times we place excessive emphasis on negative impetuses, on "scare" arguments. It is correct to say, of course, that otherwise, the world is threatened by the armed race developing into the annihilation of humanity in a thermonuclear self-conflagration. To justifiably warn against the danger of irretrievably crossing the threshold of an ecological catastrophe. It is also correct to point to the need to urgently defuse economic and other time bombs in the Third World.

However, aren't we going too far in our glib apocalyptic predictions? After all, no one has sent anybody to paradise through fear. An alternative, non-violent, more just world in and of itself contains a host of positive incentives, and they should be propagandised first and foremost. Development, social progress, the liberation of the forces of humanity—all these lie in coordinated efforts, in cooperation among states, in joint tackling of problems, in the stimulating influence of peaceful competition and rivalry between sovereignly chosen models.

Competition? Doesn't competition in and of itself undermine trust? This train of thought, however, merely prompts established canons of thought. In reality, rivalry and competition are a method, one reliably tested by history, of the peaceful development and ascent of human society, and in virtually any dimension. Competition in sport, in the economy, in ideology and politics (unless the latter develops into armed conflicts) are all positive, not negative, factors which stimulate progress. It is in this context that the competition between the two systems, the two ways of life, should be perceived as an entirely natural phenomenon that prompts both sides to perfect themselves.

On the other side of the coin, competitors, of course, are not of the same mould; they do not fully trust one another. At times they do not trust one another at all. This happens chiefly because each of them considers his goals, his value system and his interests superior to his competitor's respective standards. But this mutual mistrust can be overcome where there is a readiness for honest competition, for observance of the "rules of the game". This is how, say, some American researchers approach the problem of competition and trust with regard to Soviet-American relations. "The 'credibility gap'", they write, "exists on both sides of the Iron Curtain: the Soviets mistrust our intentions and actions almost as much as we mistrust theirs." However, they continue, "doing business under conditions of mistrust is far from impossible; indeed, it is the dominant mode of conducting affairs in the world". Lastly, "the reality is that most transactions in the world, especially business transactions, are based not on trust but on what might be called 'institutionalized mistrust'—institutions that permit transactions to proceed... We make the point that if the political will is present, ways can be found around the problem of mistrust."¹² Further on the authors propose a number of specific measures which they feel could help regulate and lessen the present mistrust in Soviet-American relations and East-West relations as a whole. All one needs is the desire.

The competition between socialism and capitalism is a normal phenomenon from the standpoint of assessment, too. According to the laws of dialectics, development, including social development, the most complex form, proceeds not along surface or linear coordinates or by way of mutual destruction of opposites or even the removal of one of them from history. It proceeds along an ascending spiral, through the inclusion of the most positive elements of each of the opposites into an ultimate

synthesis. The latter is the quintessence of development based on past experience and the continuity of the times. It is in this that the great motive force of competition lies.

But if the objective conditions for switching East-West relations over from confrontation to competition are there, to what extent are the sides prepared and mature for international change?

THE TORTUOUS ROAD TO THE GOAL

IT IS, OF COURSE, unrealistic to expect that the relations of deep mutual mistrust that have taken shape over the years between socialism and capitalism will suddenly give way to trust and proper behaviour by themselves. If we are going to be realistic, we can only proceed to this goal gradually, by stages.

In the final analysis, we believe that both sides will have to arrive at an unequivocal *recognition of the legality of the existence of both social systems as two sectors of one civilisation on the basis of a free social choice of the peoples*. Only such an accord and its unswerving implementation through non-export of counter-revolution as well as revolution will help establish truly complete trust once and for all. This will, of course, require a great deal of time, especially, judging by today's realities, for the West.

An immediate and more accomplishable task could be for the East and West to adopt *mandatory and identical norms of behavior* in the very near future. This would greatly lessen the suspicion in their relations. But thus far, this task, as the record has shown, is proving quite impracticable.

The Soviet Union proposed a concrete action in this direction at the Soviet-American summit in Moscow in late May 1988. Mikhail Gorbachev proposed to President Reagan to take a major step forward to shape civilised international relations, specifically, to sign a platform of intentions and political actions that would include the following major principles:

disputes should not be resolved militarily, but only by political means; peaceful coexistence should be regarded as a universal principle of international relations;

equality of all states, non-interference in domestic affairs, and freedom of a socio-political choice should be recognised as being inalienable and mandatory norms for all.

Although the president's initial reaction was that he liked the proposal, he later changed his stance. The American side first advanced what seemed to be clarifications and new versions of this formula, but then levelled outright objections to it. As a result, an accord was not reached on the issue.¹³

As far as the USA itself is concerned, the Bush administration that followed Mr Reagan's is in no hurry to tether itself to clear-cut political commitments to respect the legitimate interests of socialism—on a mutual basis, of course. A certain one-sidedness also came through in the stand of representatives of the well-known Trilateral Commission, which unites prominent politicians and business people of the USA, Western Europe and Japan, as it was set forth to the Soviet leadership in Moscow this past January. During this meeting the Soviet side reaffirmed its new vision of the world, which differs from the one which the West has been used to dealing with for decades. At the same time, the Trilateral Commission representatives for their part were silent on how the West would be changing, which fact was brought to their attention. But this is also an important part of the key issue of the day.¹⁴

Reciprocity on the part of the West in the political sphere is often lacking today, too. At times ulterior motives seep through. People in the

West, for example, talk about overcoming the split of Europe, but by elbowing out socialism. Or they picture a Europe in which there is a place for the USA but not for the Soviet Union. Can trust between East and West be built on such a foundation? Any galvanisation of a time-serving approach to normal East-West relations would hamper the laying of a truly solid foundation for this normalisation.

There is still another delicate aspect of the protracted hesitation of the Western powers in an issue which, strictly speaking, is an elementary one. The Soviet proposal to the USA in June 1988 on mandatory mutual norms of behaviour is in effect the same thing that is enshrined in the aims and principles of the UN Charter—a document that has been signed by virtually every country. The UN Charter, in particular, contains a postulate on the need for a peaceful settlement of international disputes and a commitment to refrain from the use or threat of force. It also formalises the pledge of states to display tolerance towards one another, respect the equality and self-determination of peoples, and disallow interference in one another's internal affairs.

If the USA and the West as a whole are prepared for real normalisation of international relations, they can naturally demonstrate that the above principles will be respected and observed not only abstractly but also concretely in the relations between capitalism and socialism. This is the obvious minimum without which it is hard to foster trust between East and West. It could launch the building of a new era in world history, the era of civilised relations among states.

It is tolerance of different modes of thinking and different ways of life that is becoming one of the foremost prerequisites for progress and the formation of a new and diverse civilisation.

A famous Russian saying, one which Ronald Reagan came to love so much in the final years of his presidency and which he often cited, goes: "Trust but verify". By and large, the USSR and the USA, the East and the West, have already learned to verify compliance with a number of specific accords they have reached. However, the logical sequence offered by the saying with its age-old wisdom is somewhat different: first general mutual trust, and then, on this basis, of course, verification.

Indeed, it is trust for one another that is the foundation of normal relations in human society, on the basis of which the saying came into being. The saying is called upon merely to reaffirm that respect for the rights of one's counterpart and mutual integrity of intentions are still the underpinnings of relations. That is why it is important that the elementary norms of human morality are made the basis of East-West relations.

¹ *The Soviet-American Summit, Moscow, May 29-June 2, 1988*, Moscow, Politizdat Publishers, 1988, pp. 108, 164 (in Russian).

² N. I. Bukharin, *Selected Works*, Moscow, Politizdat Publishers, 1988, p. 9 (in Russian).

³ *Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy*, edited by S. Bialer and M. Mandelbaum, Boulder, Colorado, 1988, p. 307.

⁴ *The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament. Collected Documents*, Moscow, Politizdat Publishers, 1977, p. 121 (in Russian).

⁵ Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, Boston, 1979, pp. 198, 543, 1255; idem, *Years of Upheaval*, Boston, 1982, pp. 1009, 1019.

⁶ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 594.

⁷ *International Security*, Winter 1987/88, pp. 94, 106.

⁸ *Political Affairs*, April 1986, p. 26.

⁹ *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1987-88, p. 167; S. Blumenthal, *The Rise of Counter-Establishment*, New York, 1986, pp. 14-15.

¹⁰ *SAIS Review*, Summer-Fall 1988, pp. 86-87.

¹¹ *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1988, p. 131.

¹² D. Yankelovich and S. Harman, *Starting with the People*, Boston, 1988, pp. 142-144.

¹³ *The Soviet-American Summit, Moscow, May 29-June 2, 1988*, pp. 140-142, 174.

¹⁴ *Pravda*, Jan. 19, 1989.

UNIDO's Concerns

Domingo L. SIAZON

UPON BECOMING a specialised agency, the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) received a new mandate and took on a role that extended far beyond the original concept of an agency delivering technical assistance. This change is fully reflected in the new Constitution of UNIDO which goes beyond 'the promotion and acceleration of the development of the developing countries' manufacturing sector to encompass the 'promotion of industrial development and co-operation on global, regional and national as well as sectoral levels.'

As a result, since 1986 UNIDO has been playing a more vigorous catalytic role. It has been mobilising the flow of technical, managerial and financial resources from enterprises in the developed countries to those in the developing countries, as well as among enterprises in the developing countries.

This new role, particularly the promotion of enterprise-to-enterprise industrial cooperation, is welcomed by all concerned. In fact, support for the programme is such that the cooperating parties are prepared to provide UNIDO with the funds to exercise this intermediary role; either through third-party trust-fund financing or through self-financing by public and private enterprises.

By virtue of the parties involved, industrial cooperation can be seen to involve a much broader form of cooperation than the customary scope of technical cooperation. This latter activity is normally carried out by UNIDO with financing from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the industrial development fund (IDF) of UNIDO. The sources of finance can be described as grants for technical cooperation projects, with the primary focus on the needs of ministries, government departments and institutions. Furthermore, industrial cooperation as conceived by UNIDO covers the entire project cycle: from the original conception of the project idea to the final completion of the manufacturing plant and its operation as a viable industrial entity. It also covers all aspects of the plant's existence and "welfare". It is not merely related to the technical or technological aspects, but it enters into matters of financing, management and business development.

Industrial cooperation also takes on myriad forms. These may include joint ventures, profit-sharing arrangements, joint research and development activities, natural resource development, as well as the transfer of technology and industrial know-how. They may also include build-operate-transfer (BOT) arrangements, which are normally beyond the scope of the more traditional technical cooperation projects of UNIDO. One es-

Domingo L. Siazon was elected Director-General of the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) in August 1985. He was born in 1939 in Cagayan, Philippines. In 1959, he graduated from Manila University, also took course in Tokyo University of Education and Harvard University. Has been in diplomatic service since 1964, occupied high-rank posts in Tokyo, Bern, Vienna.

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sentia element, however, is common to all these activities: UNIDO must have a clearly defined role to play in these cooperation mechanisms through projects that it executes under trust-fund arrangements.

This is all part of a long-term strategy for UNIDO. The basic aim is to ensure the operational flexibility of the Organisation and to display a higher degree of developmental initiative that can accommodate the realities of modern pluralist society. UNIDO is extending its role as a technical assistance agency to become an active catalyst for industrial cooperation in the broadest sense of the term.

The services it can render range from macro-level matters such as the identification, acquisition and transfer of technology and complete project planning and management services, to more micro-level concerns such as pre-investment studies and related investment activities. During construction, UNIDO can provide supervision and inspection services. In the shake-down period and early operations, it can offer technical and managerial support programmes as well as manpower development programmes. Later on, as the plant matures, UNIDO can indicate diversification and expansion programmes or, if the plant falls ill, it can carry out revamping, retro-fitting and rehabilitation programmes.

In developing and industrialised countries alike, the aim of UNIDO is to provide a service to industry, with the emphasis on the individual enterprise. Experience has shown that in its capacity as an impartial intermediary free from the profit motive and commercial pressures, UNIDO can be particularly effective in helping industrialists take the right decisions at the right time about the right choices of technology and business partners. It can save them both time and money, and can assure benefits to both sides. The unique nature of this service is enjoying growing recognition.

Over the past two years, UNIDO has intensified its dialogue with the industrial and business communities in the third world as well as in the industrialised countries. It has developed a host of contacts with managers of industrial plants in a number of developing countries, studying and analysing the problems and constraints of industrial enterprises, as distinct from more general sectoral or subsectoral studies. It is also fully acquainted with the resources and capabilities of numerous companies and industrial institutions in the developed countries.

Its links at the practical level are supplemented by the industrial research and studies that UNIDO carries out. At both the regional and country levels as well as on a sectoral basis, UNIDO investigates the potential for industrial cooperation and identifies new areas where UNIDO assistance might be required. Furthermore, through the UNIDO System of Consultations, which brings together representatives of Government, industry and labour to exchange information on the prospects of a particular industrial sector, specific solutions are sought in terms of the policy, economic, financial, social and technical points of view. Within that context, opportunities for new investment are identified and preliminary contacts are promoted among potential joint venture partners as well as with suppliers of technology, capital equipment, management expertise and marketing know-how.

DIRECT SUPPORT TO MANUFACTURING PLANTS

THROUGH its industrial cooperation projects, UNIDO provides services direct to manufacturing plants. In some instances, it diagnoses the plants' problems, determining their needs and identifying a broad range of sources that can supply the goods and services they need. UNIDO can also help to obtain those goods and services at competitive prices and on favourable terms. If so required, it can supervise the subsequent de-

livery of those goods and services which may range from process technology, technical know-how, professional services, expert advice, training, expert teams for plant operation and management, market/feasibility/diagnostic studies, to the procurement of equipment, machinery and spare parts.

UNIDO, for example, has already provided teams of experts to manage and operate a number of plants in Egypt, Nigeria, Libya and the Yemen Arab Republic. This was done through self-financed trust fund projects and the sectors covered included cement, steel, textiles, petroleum refining and petrochemicals. Professional and advisory services have also been rendered to private companies in the Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Nigeria, the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia and the Sudan.

As part of its programme of direct support to the manufacturing industry, UNIDO has assisted in the operation of the Amran Cement Plant in the Yemen Arab Republic. In addition to providing plant operation services, UNIDO was requested by the Yemeni authorities to assist in procuring spare parts worth \$16 million. It contributed to negotiating the contract price as well as the terms and conditions of the supply contract with a major supplier from Japan. As a result of the Organisation's endeavours, the Yemeni company secured savings of \$2.4 million on the equipment purchased, while the terms and conditions of the supply contract, particularly those referring to equipment warranties, were palpably improved.

In another instance, negotiations are taking place on UNIDO establishing a procurement service office in a Latin American country. It is intended to purchase equipment and supplies for both the public and private sectors of industry, thus underscoring the plurality of UNIDO operations in this field, UNIDO has also arranged, through a trust-fund facility, for cooperation between North American and Asian enterprises in the modernisation and rehabilitation of mining operations.

Under other self-financing trust fund arrangements, UNIDO assisted manufacturers in a number of countries to acquire manufacturing technology from abroad through the identification of technologies, as well as through the negotiation and conclusion of transfer of technology contracts. The technologies involved related to the manufacture of polymers, organic intermediates, inorganic chemicals and pharmaceuticals.

SERVICE TO DEVELOPMENT FINANCING INSTITUTIONS. PROJECT MANAGEMENT SERVICES

UNIDO has also established close links with international financing institutions such as the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, Commonwealth Development Corporation, Islamic Development Bank, African Development Bank, International Development Agency (IDA), and the Industrialisation Fund for Developing Countries (IFU) of Denmark. For example, UNIDO recently launched a trust fund project to develop a training programme for the Sudanese sugar industry drawing on funds made available by IDA. Trust-fund arrangements have also been set up to assist national development financing institutions such as the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank (NIDB). In the latter instance a revolving trust fund was set up with UNIDO to identify investment opportunities in three industrial sectors in Nigeria: agro-industry, engineering and chemicals. Seven opportunity studies were carried out in each sector which will ultimately serve as inputs into an industrial development master plan for the country.

True to its role as an impartial intermediary, UNIDO contributed to launching a major industrial project in Egypt with an investment value

of about \$100 million. Involving the participation of a state-owned company in Egypt and a private company in India, the project entails building a plant in Egypt to produce phosphoric acid from locally available phosphate ore. The acid will then be shipped to India for use in the manufacture of phosphate fertilizers. UNIDO not only identified the project but also actively searched for partners and participated in the negotiations. For their part, the business partners have agreed to request UNIDO, under a trust-fund arrangement, to conduct a detailed feasibility study and later on to participate in the provision of equipment and management services.

Phosphate fertilizers and mining operations also played an instrumental role in another instance of enterprise-level cooperation that UNIDO initiated between India and China. Arrangements have also been made for a Chinese enterprise to cooperate with enterprises in Brazil, Chile and Peru and in the production of fish powder for high-grade fish feed in China. Discussions are currently taking place between enterprises in China, India and the United States on developing the continuous production of large solar panels for use in villages and remote areas of India and China. The technology for the continuous production of solar panels, which was developed by a United States company, is to be transferred to both India and China. The two countries will cooperate in manufacturing prototype lamps, cookers and refrigerators (needed for the storage of medical supplies).

PROMOTIONAL SERVICES

BY ESTABLISHING closer working relations with individual companies as well as industrial associations, such as chambers of commerce of federations, of industry in the developed countries, UNIDO has been able to secure "seed money" for the identification, development and formulation of joint projects. This has been matched by offers of expertise and other facilities such as training, testing and analyses, free of charge or at reduced rates. Over the past two years, an ever-increasing number of companies have come to UNIDO to demonstrate their capabilities and specialisations.

A steady flow of technical information and countless project ideas have originated from these companies that UNIDO can use to good effect, designing bigger and better projects for the benefit of its partners in the developing countries. Several world-renowned companies, such as Bechtel of USA, SNC Inc. of Canada, Energoprojekt of Yugoslavia and Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. of Japan, have concluded standby agreements with UNIDO that permit the provision of expert and other services at short notice. Among the bodies that have established trust-fund projects for the purposes of project identification and formulation are the Danish Federation of Industries (utilising funds from the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA)) and the Danish Pharmaceutical Industries Association, as well as a number of Canadian, Danish, French, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese and Polish companies. Negotiations are at an advanced stage with many others and UNIDO is confident that the list will expand rapidly.

One trust-fund project deserves special mention. It was established by the Engineering Consulting Firms Association of Japan (ECFA) specifically for the development of export industries in the ASEAN region. A joint UNIDO-ECFA mission visited the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand in 1987 and 1988. In the course of its work, that mission identified a number of enterprise-level cooperation projects. A second Japanese

initiative has also yielded encouraging results in Africa, following the launching of a special \$ 1 million programme for the agro-industry sector in sub-Saharan Africa financed by the Government of Japan.

Negotiations are now in progress between the USSR and UNIDO to establish an international industrial cooperation service in Moscow. To be operated by UNIDO, the service is expected to act primarily as a promoter of international industrial, scientific and technical cooperation between Soviet enterprises, combines, scientific institutions, industrial co-operatives, associations and other State and public organisations, on the one hand, and foreign partners from developed and developing countries, on the other.

UNIDO is also sponsoring the establishment of an industrial cooperation centre in China. The basic aim of the centre is to encourage enterprises to cooperate with their Chinese counterparts in China, as well as to encourage Chinese enterprises to cooperate with or invest in enterprises in other developing countries. This two-directional flow has caught the attention of several other countries which have expressed interest in establishing similar centres.

Ensuring the flow of financial resources to appropriate projects is one of the tasks of the UNIDO investment promotion network. At present, UNIDO maintains nine Investment Promotion Services in Cologne, Milan, Paris, Seoul, Tokyo, Vienna, Warsaw, Washington D. C. and Zurich. Their principal function is to identify foreign partners interested in sponsoring investment projects in developing countries. They provide developing countries with direct access to technological, managerial and financial resources in industrialised countries. The staff at the various offices are in close touch with the business community and development agencies in their host countries. They have established data banks which provide details of the companies interested in industrial partnerships in developing countries as well as of the type of opportunities they are seeking.

The network also runs a special programme, entitled the Delegates Programme, which permits the developing countries to play a greater role in the investment promotion process. Under that programme, officials from investment promotion agencies, ministries of industry and other institutions in developing countries are seconded to one of the offices for a period ranging from a few months to a few years. This gives them a unique opportunity to participate in the day-to-day work of the network and develop direct contacts with industrialists and development/financing institutions in the host country. For their part, the "delegates" constitute a valuable informal source of information on investment conditions in their home countries and can provide details of the incentives offered to foreign investors. The "delegates" also dispose of the latest information about priority private-sector and public investment projects in their home countries, on which basis they can set about identifying suitable foreign partners.

For those countries without an IPS office UNIDO also maintains an information data base on those firms that have expressed interest in investment projects in developing countries. Those firms receive regular details of all new projects identified in the subsectors and regions of interest. They are also apprised of the project identification and promotion programmes of UNIDO in countries with IPS offices and are sent details of forthcoming investment promotion forums and other promotional measures.

These promotional and other activities that UNIDO has taken on in the course of its evolution reflect its gradual transformation from an agency delivering technical assistance to one that is endeavouring to fashion a coordinated approach to industrial development and cooperation

in the broadest sense of the term. That it has succeeded in increasing its technical assistance delivery by leaps and bounds while breaking new ground in the realm of enterprise-to-enterprise cooperation merely underscores the validity and viability of its new approach.

UNIDO: GENERAL INFORMATION

THE UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION IS the youngest of the specialised agencies in the United Nations system. With 154 Member States, it is devoted to the promotion and acceleration of industrial development in the developing countries with a view to assisting in the establishment of a new international economic order. It also seeks to promote industrial cooperation between North and South and between countries of the developing world and between East and West.

The Organisation has about 1,300 staff members at Headquarters in Vienna, Austria, and about 700-1000 experts working on different technical cooperation projects in many different parts of the world at any given time. In 1986, its first year as a specialised agency, UNIDO delivered technical cooperation projects to the value of 99.6 million dollars. Two years later, this had increased to a record level of 119.8 million dollars. A similar growth was to be seen in investment activities. In 1986, UNIDO successfully promoted 64 industrial investment projects in developing countries valued at just over 265 million dollars. By 1988, it was promoting 121 industrial investment projects valued at 414 million dollars in a twelve-month period. At the same time, pledges to the Industrial Development Fund maintained by the Organisation have doubled in the past four years. This reflects growing recognition of the important role that the Organisation plays in providing innovative technical assistance to the developing countries in a broad range of industrial applications.

The operational activities of UNIDO are devoted to the delivery of technical assistance to developing countries through technical cooperation programmes and projects for the rehabilitation, expansion and modernisation of production facilities in the main branches of industry and the operation of such facilities with maximum efficiency and productivity. The developing countries are also assisted in strengthening their own capabilities at every stage of the industrial development cycle and in developing the appropriate industrial institutional and support services, with particular emphasis on human resource development and small-scale industries.

The promotional activities of UNIDO are devoted to assisting developing countries by fostering all forms of business-oriented industrial cooperation between sponsors of investment projects in developing countries and foreign partners. The Organisation provides a variety of promotional and information services designed to increase the flow of industrial and technological information to developing countries and strengthen their capability to select, acquire, adapt and absorb industrial technology, as well as develop and adapt their own industrial technology. UNIDO also evaluates current industrialisation strategies, policies and trends at the country, regional, global and sectoral levels. Through its System of Consultations, it develops approaches to solving the problems of international industrial cooperation in specific sub-sectors of industry in terms of the policy, economic, financial, social and technical issues involved.

All these activities are complemented by the dissemination of publications over a broad range of technical and industrial subjects; the imple-

Who Has Power in a Rule-of-Law State

Vladimir STUPISHIN

A REVOLUTION is a revolution only when it restores the working man's human dignity, i. e., his natural rights. If the inevitable arbitrariness of a revolution does not lead to the removal of all manner of arbitrariness and the restoration of the natural and inalienable rights of the individual and citizen, then this is not a revolution, in any event, it is not a social or socialist revolution, but merely another rebellion, insurrection or coup. And this is irrespective of who its victim is—nobleman or bourgeois, peasant or intellectual, Jacobin revolutionary or proletarian.

When they decided to become part of the Revolution, the Russian Social Democrats demanded above all:

1. The convening of a Zemsky Sobor made up of representatives of all citizens so as to draw up a constitution.
2. Universal and direct suffrage for all citizens of Russia who have reached 21 years of age, irrespective of religion or nationality.
3. Freedom of assembly and organisation, and the right to strike.
4. Freedom of the press.
5. Abolition of social estates, and complete equality of all citizens before the law.
6. Freedom of religion and equality of all nationalities. Transfer of the registration of births, marriages and deaths to independent civic officials, independent, that is, of the police.
7. Every citizen to have the right to prosecute any official, without having to complain to the latter's superiors.
8. Abolition of passports, full freedom of movement and residence.
9. Freedom of trades and occupations and abolition of guilds.¹

To my mind, this is precisely the Leninist model of a truly democratic state committed to the rule of law, although Lenin did not use this terminology himself.

In October 1917, swept up in the revolutionary fervour, and seeking a society without a state and law (which were considered as nothing but purely "bourgeois" institutions doomed to wither away, especially after the world revolution), the proletarian party that came to power in Russia scuttled both the idea of a rule-of-law state and the theory of natural rights. All understanding of how a civil society should be disappeared in the process.

Lenin admitted that the Bolsheviks, on the example of Napoleon, "did first engage in a serious battle in October 1917, and then saw such details of development".² Yes, they saw a great deal, including the need to master juridical forms of administering social development. They were building a new state. But the machinery was getting out of hand, it was operating not quite the way it should, and even quite the way it should not. Having stated this, Lenin considered how to overhaul the state machinery that had been inherited from the past and reforge it in accordance

with the fundamental conclusion on the need for "a radical modification in our whole outlook on socialism".³ However, he only began to approach specific proposals regarding a revamping of the state mechanism and sense of justice. He failed to advance not only a detailed but even a general doctrine of the establishment of a democratic state in accordance with the demands of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, which had once been his demands, too.

Then events took their course. A rule-of-law state in the age of total lawlessness was recalled only to censure it. And the more successfully such a state was built in the East and West, the more viciously it was attacked by Soviet "theorists" of the state and law and other political scientists. Natural law, especially that sphere of it which has to do with the natural human rights, encountered the same attitude in this country. That is why we arrived at perestroika with great problems in knowledge in this field. Attempts of individual Soviet legal experts at different times to raise the issue of the merits of a rule-of-law state had been nipped in the bud.

Today, when we have begun to understand that without reviving a civil society, natural rights and a rule-of-law state we can only get side-tracked from our goal, we are naturally returning to the sources. For if we have entered a dead-end alley, we must not go forward, as this would be senseless and dangerous. In such a situation we must turn back, and not only to Leninist sources, but to universal ones. By them I mean both the experience of different peoples and the rich theoretical heritage we have received from this nation's jurists who were unjustly consigned to oblivion.

One example is the legal expert and politician Sergei Kotlyarevsky, who was popular in his time. After the October Revolution, too, this prominent Constitutional Democrat, or Cadet, as the term was then, spent a rather lengthy time lecturing at Moscow University. Let us carefully examine his words uttered 80 years ago: "The idea of a state committed to the rule of law is in the focus of contemporary juridical thought. It is the ripe fruit of the struggle for law which represents one of the main chapters in the history of world civilisation, and, having grown up on this soil tilled for centuries, it can safely face an intensive reassessment of values and the upsurge of a wave of skepticism and criticism."⁴

One gets the impression that this is one of our contemporaries speaking. Beginning to realise the intransient importance and priority of the common values of world civilisation, we could not but pay attention to the need to rehabilitate some juridical ideas. Without them it is not only impossible to introduce into everyday practice the fundamental moral laws elaborated by humanity over at least two millennia of its history, but also to create a common European juridical space. It is one of the prime building blocks of the foundation of a home common to all Europeans (the other blocks of this foundation are ecological, spiritual, cultural and other values).

The juridical space of a region or subregion is the system of international legal norms regulating relations among the participants in the respective interstate community; it is the system of institutions common to these participants or a part of them; it is a system of such national norms as have been adopted and embodied in the law and order of the partners. This very interesting formula for Europe was proposed by French President François Mitterrand during his visit to Czechoslovakia in December 1988: "draw the principles of public law as closely as possible".⁵ At the Paris Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, the delegates of the USSR and France, supported by those of Austria and West Germany, tabled a motion to make the establishment of a common juridical space on the basis of a Europe of rule-of-law states the long-term

goal of the European process.⁶ To what extent the norms according to which we live in our own country are mutually understandable is a question assuming a special importance in this connection. What is meant is not only norms that are specific to each state but also those which are formulated seemingly identically everywhere but which can be interpreted differently, which spawns misunderstandings and disillusionment. The problem of finding a common language through an unequivocal understanding of the content of generally accepted juridical definitions and terms is of great practical importance, including for mutually enriching and drawing closer the principles of public law.

Thus, European juridical space is a multifaceted notion. Each of its facets is a rule-of-law state, without the totality of which there is no rule-of-law space. Hence the need to elaborate models of a rule-of-law state.

LEGAL EXPERTS and philosophers of the distant and recent past who tried to derive a rule-of-law state from the self-limitation of power by the law usually found themselves stymied: in this instance any state is a rule-of-law one, for no state exists without laws, without a legal system, without law and order in whose framework state bodies themselves function in one way or another. Nothing is changed in this situation by the declaration of the primacy of law as the preeminent quality of a rule-of-law state, even if this law is called, in the Kantian fashion, a juridical law. Such a state of affairs can readily emerge in a totalitarian state, as this, strictly speaking, took place in the Third Reich, which called itself none other than a "rule-of-law state".⁷

Where there are not democratic institutions, where the people is deprived of sovereignty, and the nations, of the right to self-determination, where all power is concentrated monopolistically, i. e., indivisibly, in the hands of a political group possessing it, a sort of oligarchy—there exist their own, totalitarian, laws. With the primacy of *such* a law, *such* a state acquires the quality of a totalitarian juridical rule-of-law state.

For this reason we should not approach a rule-of-law state from the law. I think that even if we draw on positive rights, we will not necessarily receive a model of a state with democratic content. We should move towards such a rule-of-law state from a civil society, a modern understanding of which matured in parallel with the perfection of notions of a democratic rule-of-law state.

A civil society is formed in the process of subjects becoming citizens, i. e., into such a community of inhabitants of a state who acquire a sense of their own dignity and a capacity to make a political choice based on a clear-cut understanding of what their natural rights are. This formation takes place simultaneously with the transformation of an ethnic union into a sovereign people that perceives itself as a nation. A people whose sense of justice is elevated to an understanding of the need to recognise and exercise the natural and inalienable rights of the individual and the citizen, on the one hand, and to subordinate to himself absolutely all state bodies, on the other, for only a sovereign people is a legitimate source of power.

The sovereignty of the people was recognised by the Roman state. The fathers of the theory of sovereignty proceeded from this principle even when they, say, Jean Bodin or Hugo Grotius, derived the sovereignty of the monarch from the sovereignty of the people. A civil society is, to my mind, precisely a sovereign people that has taken shape. Interestingly enough, Aristotle always identified civil society with the state. Of course, both were *lave-owning*; however, Aristotle's idea that *political justice* is possible only between *free and equal people*, and that *a citizen is a*

person who subordinates himself to power just as much as he exercises it is of intransient importance.⁸ Cicero, too, considered the juridical equality of citizens imperative for state forms making it possible to avoid tyranny. The Renaissance enriched the notion of citizen with humanistic content and made it palpable: an individual's place in the socium should be determined by personal merits which are acquired exclusively by his own activity; it is not a long way from that to equality of people as citizens and to the natural rights of the individual, the exercise of which makes him a citizen.

The age of the Enlightenment, which drew the finest elements from the Renaissance, awakened in people a civil sense through their comprehension of their own *natural rights*, i. e., those which are given to a person from nature and which can be either recognised by the state or limited and even trampled upon by it. They are not at all someone's gift for which the individual should feel obligated.

What are the natural and inalienable rights of the individual?

The first is the *right to life*, which was first juridically formalised in the Declaration of Independence of the United States of July 4, 1776. This natural human right was codified in international law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was passed by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948.

Recognising the right to life, we inevitably must recognise the *right to a decent existence*, which is logically derived "from the value which is possessed by any human individual, aside from his merits",⁹ as well as the *right to family, homeland, ethnic identity, and protection of the environment*.

The Great French Revolution named as a natural right of the individual and citizen his *right to the freedom* "to do anything that does not harm another", thereby stressing that "the natural rights of each individual do not have limits other than those which provide the other members of society the exercise of the same rights. These limits can be determined by the law alone" (Declaration of Human and Civil Rights of 1789).¹⁰

A person is free to choose his own world outlook, faith, cultural predilections, place of residence, and form of employment. From the natural right to a world outlook obtain such inalienable rights of the individual as a citizen as free election of his representatives to state bodies and to the administration of public organisations, freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association and demonstration.

The declarations of human and civil rights of 1789 and 1793 number among people's natural rights *equality* before the law and also their *safety*, including a clearly formulated *presumption of innocence*.

They invariably elevate to this lofty juridical rank the *right to property*, which Article 16 of the Declaration of June 24, 1793 defines as the right of each citizen "to use and dispose, at his discretion, of his property, his income, and the fruits of his labour and his trade".¹¹ This definition was also reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which we recognise. Karl Marx also believed that "the practical application of man's right to liberty is man's right to *private property*".¹²

Indeed, isn't it the natural right of those who work to possess as their own property the means of labour, including land, as well as the fruits of their labour? Without this right, formalised and guaranteed juridically, no sense of being a master is possible, for this sense is a function of ownership and cannot be the result of some upbringing or even auto-suggestion. If there is ownership this sense is born of itself. If there is no ownership, no conviction will help.

The notion of private property has been in existence since ancient times. It is not a concrete class-based notion but an extratemporal juridi-

cal one. Exploitation begins not with private property but with its blending with slave, serf or hired labour which makes the appropriation of the surplus product possible. If, however, this does not exist, private property becomes a prime parameter of the citizen's economic freedom and, consequently, his political freedom without which there is no civil society in the modern sense (as opposed to the medieval one, where a society based on estates was considered a civil one). Of course, exercise of this economic freedom required a normally functioning economy, i. e., one where all the participants in production relations are equal and have a maximum of possibilities for utilising their capacities in the competition to sell their output.

No one gave the individual his natural rights. No one, nothing, not even the law itself, has the right to deprive anyone of these rights. If the law does not correspond to natural rights, it is illegal. If organs of state power carry out any actions infringing upon a person's natural rights, trample upon the principles of law and freedom, perpetrate travesties of justice and in general behave immorally, the sovereign people in the person of civil society has the *right to resist and depose* those who do this.

This concretisation of the idea of the direct dependence of the state on a civil society is observed back in Chancellor Salutati (1331-1406), a Florentine of the age of the Renaissance, and Erasmus of Rotterdam (1469-1536). Subsequently this motif would be echoed more forcefully in John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau and would be embodied in the recognition of the right to resist oppression as one of the natural and inalienable human and civil rights (Art. 2 of the Declaration of Rights of August 26, 1789), and also in the following postulate: "When a government violates the rights of the people, insurrection is for the people and for each part of the people the most sacred of rights and the most necessary of obligations" (Art. 35 of the Declaration of Rights of June 24, 1793).¹³ I think that it is this, strong civic society as the embodiment of national sovereignty that Immanuel Kant had in mind when he maintained: "The greatest task of humanity to the accomplishment of which it is called by its very nature is the attainment of a united, law-setting civil society."¹⁴

HOWEVER, the political existence of a civil society is realised, of course, not only in the legislative activity of its representatives. It is effected through political parties, trade unions, public organisations, cultural associations, the press, and through different forms of expression of public opinion. This role of "extraparlimentary organisations" was very well noted by Kotlyarevsky, who wrote in 1909: "Revealed here is all the enormous significance in the modern state of freedom of association and the actual skill of exercising it: this freedom may to a greater extent than any other represent an amendment towards the facets of a parliamentary regime which are criticised for their certain incongruity with the democratic principle. The main thing is that in exercising it, the individual does not remain helpless in the face of an omnipotent state, and a chance electoral failure does not deprive him of a possibility to exert a certain impact on the course of state life in general and on the drafting of legislature in particular. Of course, forecasts are extremely risky; all the same, one can think that it is in this direction that the state structure of Europe's advanced countries will develop. Since parliamentarism in general, as the record has shown, favours in greater measure civil freedom in general, and freedom of association in particular, ...it is conducive to the elaboration of amendments itself. And since influential extraparlimentary factors have been set into motion, this also lessens in

the extreme the danger of political parties turning into self-sufficing organisations which from means become the end and develop in their fellow-members the spirit of the sectarian narrowness or unscrupulous opportunism capable of depriving them of the requisite sensitivity to the most fundamental needs of life." ¹⁵

Kotlyarevsky was extremely cautious in making forecasts. Perhaps because of this his brilliant prevision came true regarding the development of West European states along the path of perfecting the democracy of political pluralism, which presupposed a certain balance among legislative power, the government, extraparlimentary political organisations, public opinion, and the natural rights of citizens, a balance that ruled out any monopoly of power, be it one person, some organ, a social segment or political organisation (party). No one can lay claims to the role of an exclusive exponent of popular sovereignty. *This role is immanent only to the electorate*, i. e., totality of citizens vested with the suffrage (i. e., civil society). For this reason representatives in any body who have not gone through a freely expressed vote of confidence by the electorate on an equal footing with other people's deputies cannot be regarded as representatives of the sovereign people.

These discourses of mine fully accord with the following tenet formulated by Marx in 1875: "Freedom consists in converting the state from an organ superimposed upon society into one completely subordinate to it." ¹⁶ Engels, too, wrote, in 1886, that "in modern history at least, ...the state—the political order—is the subordinate, and civil society—the realm of economic relations—the decisive element". He believes that "all the needs of civil society—no matter which class happens to be the ruling one—must pass through the will of the state in order to secure general validity in the form of laws. That is the formal aspect of the matter... The question arises, however, what is the content of this merely formal will... If we enquire into this we discover that in modern history *the will of the state is, on the whole, determined by the changing needs of civil society*, by the supremacy of this or that class, in the last resort, by the development of the productive forces and relations of exchange" (my italics-V. S.). ¹⁷

Engels is clearly not reducing civil society to a kingdom of economic relations or to the rule of one class; he seems to presuppose the possibility of variants. This is all the more correct since in his subsequent arguments he admits that, though being a manifestation of the economic needs of the class that dominates in production, the state defends the interests of the whole of society. Admittedly, no sooner does it emerge than it "makes itself independent *vis-à-vis* society; and, indeed, the more so, the more it becomes the organ of a particular class, the more it directly enforces the supremacy of that class". ¹⁸ However, recent history knows of many instances of the opposite tendency manifesting itself, when the state of one class turns into a state whose will is determined by the needs of the entire civil society, whose underpinnings are the natural rights of the citizens.

The extent to which the juridical system of a state corresponds to the degree and scope of the recognition, ensuring and exercise of citizens' natural rights can serve as a reliable benchmark making it possible to adjudge whether the state meets the needs of a developed civil society and can be considered a truly democratic, rule-of-law state. Democracies have been born only where the doctrine of the primacy of reason and of the individual's natural rights has triumphed. ¹⁹ And it is only by drawing on the individual's natural rights which are such because they accord with his nature, it is only through the formation of a civil society capable of producing a democratic, rule-of-law state that we can arrive at socialism without coercion against the "nature of man".

However, a civil society itself requires that public opinion be born in it that is permeated with a respect for rights that would imbue juridical principles and notions in the whole of society. Without a high level of a sense of justice on the part of citizens, society is incapable of dictating its writ to the state apparatus, for, having placed themselves over society, officials in *any* state find a host of ways and means to veil themselves from the control of society, not stopping at deceit and swindling. Juridical self-education of society is imperative not only for imposing limits on the omnipotence of officials and any autocracy. It is imperative for subordinating the state to such rules as would ensure citizens freedom and security even in instances when a group of citizens is in the minority. Protecting the rights of the minority in no way runs counter to the sovereignty of the people, for the minority is a part of the people, and any part of the people can find itself in the minority at any moment.

IT IS FROM the sovereignty of the people which crystallises during the formation of a modern civil society that the *theory of a democratic, rule-of-law state* obtains. The main point of this theory is to build some ideal model as a goal for which any civilised, i. e., civil, society strives. In constructing such a model we naturally pay particular attention to the role of law with, admittedly, the substantial reservation that it is not the state that we consider the source of this law but civil society as the embodiment of popular sovereignty.

The meaning of all the theories of a rule-of-law state usually boils down to binding a state with law, establishing juridical limits of its might and this protecting citizens from arbitrariness on the state's part, and disallowing the mutation of statehood into tyranny, i. e., as Cicero put it, into a non-state.²⁰

We find approaches to this in Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), who introduced the term "stato" (hence "staat", "state", "etat", "estado") and saw the future of the state to lie in the republic, since the voice of the people is the voice of God, and "the masses are more intelligent and more consistent than the prince".²¹ Another Florentine, Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540), believed that "popular government should be the foundation of freedom", but warned of the possibility of its mutating into tyranny and advanced the establishment of legality as an impediment to this.²² The French jurist Jean Bodin (1530-1596), the first to formulate the term "sovereignty", introduced the notion of "righteous government" into common scholarly usage: "The state is the righteous government of many households and of that which for them is common with sovereign power." "The state [should be] given what belongs to it, and each private person, that which comprises his property." Bodin bound the sovereign with "divine", "natural" and "human laws common to all peoples" (*Six Books on Republic*, 1576).²³ The terms "rule-of-law state" and "legal law" were invented by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).

The contract theory is one of the serious approaches to defining the limits of power. For Locke, Rousseau and Kant the "social contract" was not a vulgar historical fact, as this was often ascribed to them in different times. They desisted in it a juridical principle which not so much explains the origin of the state as substantiates it. They gave a theory, not formulas, for the future, for they were bound by notions of their times regarding the forms in which the ideas of a rule-of-law state could be embodied. However, the social contract, if we take this to mean a democratically adopted democratic constitution, is a quite modern idea which can be of quite practical importance.

The teaching about the self-limitation of power that was developed during the 19th century chiefly by German legal experts, such as Rudolf von Ihering and Georg Jellinek, was a patent step backwards in comparison to the social contract concept. A state that sets about self-limitation can probably call itself a rule-of-law state, but since it establishes the bounds of its power itself without necessarily reckoning with the will of the people, it can hardly be placed under the category of democratic rule-of-law states, for the activity of the latter is not limited by themselves but by civil society. It is for this reason that "the doctrine classical in France derived the juridical nature of the state from popular sovereignty. Only power that obtains from the will of the people, only the law that is an expression of this will meet the requirements of legality; only usurpation can exist outside them."²⁴

Strictly speaking, revolutionaries argued similarly. "...The people has spoken: this is sufficient; no objections, no vetos are possible against its sovereign will. Its will is always legitimate: this is the law itself," claimed Camille Desmoulins. The idea of popular sovereignty, noted the Russian legal expert Pavel Novgorodtsev, was a "central moving nerve, the living soul of all conclusions and constructions" touching upon the theory of a rule-of-law state. In his opinion, this idea "was not only of judicial but also of philosophical and ethical importance. It provided the moral and philosophical substantiation of the rule-of-law state."²⁵

However, the experience of the Jacobins amply showed that people's sovereignty should have its limits, too. Benjamin Constant de Rebecque (1767-1830), a French liberal of the restoration period, engaged in a search for them. In his major work *A Course of Constitutional Politics*, he advanced the "eternal principle": "There is no unlimited power on earth—neither power of the people nor of those who call themselves its representatives, nor power of the monarch, nor power of the law which, being an expression of the will of a monarch or people, depending on the form of government, should be included in the same limits as the very power which gives it."²⁶ This is a very good formula for a rule-of-law state. However, if a sovereign people becomes a civil society which realises and defends the natural rights of all its members without exception, it thereby already incorporates itself into bounds beyond which violation of the natural rights of citizens and the disappearance of a civil society begin. In other words, a civil society is precisely the power which "gives the law" and limits itself with this law. Instead of the self-limitation of the state there emerges the self-limitation of a civil society, while state power is placed within bounds defined by society and for itself. Only in this instance does the state become a democratic, rule-of-law state.

What are these bounds? First of all, *the rights of the individuals*. This was Constant's view. Limitation of government by the people by certain higher principles was championed by the 19th-century French political scientist Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), who maintained that "justice, which limits the rights of each people, stands over the popular will", and that in the world there should not be "power that is so strong in itself or vested with such sacred rights that it could be permitted to function without control and rule without impediments". De Tocqueville saw justice to lie in protecting the rights of the individual against unlimited power, no matter whom it belonged to.

No less interesting views on this subject were expressed by Russians, and not only legal experts. "When the individual and his freedom are made dependent on the will of people, when the sovereignty of autocracy is recognised, the individual loses his absolute nature, and his rights to freedom collapse from chance human desires, from human subjectivity, from human passions. Then the subjective will of the proletariat, the tsar, or another human power can deprive the individual of freedom of

conscience, the right to life and all other rights." This was penned by Nikolai Berdyayev in his article *On the People's Will*, published in 1907. Vladimir Solovyov called *the principle of the individual the only moral norm*. Pavel Novogorodtsev, drawing on Solovyov's ideas, formulated a theoretical juridical postulate to the effect that "the idea of the individual is not only the limit but also the standard and basis of the popular will... If the majority has rights inasmuch as they accord with the idea of the individual, this also means that this idea is a guiding standard." Neither individual, collective nor popular will "can be a source of firm standards if it itself does not recognise any higher or firm standard over itself. And in social relations only a principle that is the moral foundation of human communication, i. e., the principle of the individual, can serve as such a standard." ²⁷

I believe that these arguments are a thinly veiled hint at what is in effect the socialist ideal. Its only meaning lies in ensuring a decent and free existence for the individual in a civil society that subordinates to itself the state which can become a democratic, rule-of-law state only by virtue of this subordinating.

SOVIET LEGAL EXPERTS have readdressed themselves to the rule-of-law state only very recently, especially on the eve of the 19th Party Conference and after it formulated the principles governing the reforms of the country's political system and set the task of forming a socialist state committed to the rule of law. However, many publications give the impression that an understanding of the framework in which the state should function often boils down to measures undertaken by itself; in other words, the point at issue is the self-limitation of the state. It is also very difficult to single out a direct answer to the question of what real juridical and political mechanisms are capable of providing conditions for limiting the might of a state and for materialising as full as possible popular sovereignty, which is respected, in principle, by everyone. People talk most often about the primacy of law and less frequently about the importance of its quality. However, they overlook the fact that the very quality of the law depends not so much on the procedure by which it is passed as on the "quality" of the legislative body. Abbot Jean Duvergier de Hauranne (1581-1643) realised that the decisive voice belongs to a parliament (as the creator of law as well) only when elections are not a fiction.

The primacy of the law, law that is "qualitative", i. e., precisely formulated and not permitting ambiguous interpretations, over all other sublegal standard and executive acts, is a very important demand made of any state. However, the binding of a state even by such law is nonetheless the result of its self-limitation and not subordination to civil society. Furthermore, a law that possesses the above qualities can readily prove not to correspond to, say, the country's constitution and legal system and principles and norms of law accepted in the civilised world. It is probably for this reason that many legal experts of the past and present proceed to a rule-of-law state through the primacy of law. And also because, in the wake of Celsus (1st century A. D.) and Ulpianus (2nd-3rd centuries A. D.), they also believe that "law is the art of kindness and justice".

The law marches ahead of expediency in a number of 19th-century German jurists. They regard the law as the "limit counterpoised to the arbitrariness of power", including unwritten norms to be reconsidered only through the passing of a more authoritative juridical act than a parliamentary decision. Law that would dominate the life of a state was

sought by supporters of the contract theory, too. According to Jellinek, the law of civilised peoples is something before which a legislator's power is impotent: "This is the sediment of the entire historical evolution of the nation which is solidly imprinted in legal institutions as a prerequisite for the entire historical existence of the people". An illustration of such a conclusion is the fact that no lawmaker can recognise murder as unpunishable. "State power is ...not power in general," Jellinek wrote, "but power exercised within the bounds being established by law, and is therefore lawful power."²⁸

Today, too, the search should be geared not to ensuring the primacy of the law, for this leads away from subordinating the state to society and from forming a democratic rule-of-law state. "It is not the law that gives rights validity, but rights that give the law validity", said the Russian jurist A. S. Alexeyev.²⁹ The law itself is something broader than a product of a state's law-creating. For this reason the primacy of the law makes possible not so much the self-limitation of state power as its limitation from without.

In our day "no one any longer considers judicature the only source of law". Law is "something more than the legislation alone. It is not dissolved in the legislator's power; law should be created through the joint efforts of all legal experts, by all who take part in the administration of justice."³⁰

This is probably a rather incomplete characterisation of law. After many years of a scornful attitude, some lawyers are again beginning to address themselves to natural law which I believe is nothing more than universal law that has taken shape over millennia. It is comprised of eternal moral postulates. "Thou shalt not have false idols", "honour thy father and thy mother", "thou shalt not kill", "thou shalt not steal", "thou shalt not commit calumny", "thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour", "thou shalt not envy", "thou shalt not commit adultery", and other Biblical commandments are no legal norms but they are the basis for many of them. Kant's imperative that man is the end, not the means is an ethical principle. However, Roman jurists recognised as an element of the "general juridical law" in effect the same principle: "Recognise yourself and others in everything not as a means but the end", demanded Ulpianus when calling upon a countryman "not to tell untruths to anyone".³¹ Peoples keep arranging norms in their cubby-holes, but these cubby-holes ought to be cells in the world legal system. Man has arrived at an understanding of natural law through his own and others' positive and, even more so, negative experience.

Legal experts often name other important sources of the law in addition to judicature. In English law this is judicial practice and precedent, sublegal acts, custom and doctrine. In Roman-German law it is custom, judicial practice, doctrine and general principles. Particular attention should be paid to the latter. France's Council of State, for example, annuls legal acts when they run counter to "general principles of the law" that are reaffirmed in the preamble to the Constitution of the French Republic. The law is not created a priori and is not contained exclusively in legislative norms. The ancients knew that the law was morality.

For this reason recognition of the supremacy of the law means more than the obligation that judicature and sublegal acts accord with the principles of the law. This is also an understanding of the fact that legal norms cannot be immoral and run counter to customs and traditions (e. g., national ones) that have been "legalised" by society. This is also the high level of a sense of justice on the part of the authorities and the population, a level which does not permit acts of arbitrariness, including on the part of the legislative bodies, not to mention other bodies of the state. Lastly, this is institutions of the civil society and the state that

are capable of adequately expressing the sense of justice of a sovereign people, of which respect for the minority's rights is a component.

Soviet publications on aspects of the rule-of-law state, with rare exceptions, give the impression that someone wants very much to emplace the "rule-of-law state" only in the courts and the militia. Obviously, it should be there, too. However, the main thing, of course, is the cogent implementation of the principles of building a rule-of-law state in relations between society and bodies of state power.

The rule of law is the antithesis of the rule of arbitrariness, if we take the law to mean the totality of norms established by the legislative body freely elected by the citizens of the state and within the bounds outlined by the principles and rules passed by civil society, i. e., norms whose primacy is also limited—by the sovereignty of the people. The legal principles and rules of a civil society include above all human and civil rights, moral standards accepted in the civilised world, and stable elements of common law, including unwritten norms, a reexamination of which requires a more authoritative resolution than the adoption of even a legislative act, including such ones as "everything that is not prohibited by the law is permitted"—they can be violated, but then this will no longer be a civil society but something else. Another component is equitable international accords which enjoy priority over national law.

With the recognition of the primacy of the law we are right at the point of identifying the mechanism of subordinating the state to a civil society, without which neither the "unshakeability of the freedom of the individual" nor "reality of individuals' rights and freedoms", which are advanced by Soviet jurists as the distinguishing traits of a rule-of-law state, is possible.³²

The primacy of the law, which plays a limiting role for bodies of state power, is possible only when a civil society places this power under its control by formalising the social contract in the form of a constitution and other organic laws, necessarily including a suffrage law. They are approved solely via the direct will of the sovereign people through a referendum. This contract must necessarily provide for the primacy of the electorate and, under its control, the highest legislative assembly, which is formed through direct universal and equal elections. Without the pre-eminent, decisive participation of these two facets of a civil society, no substantial changes in law and order can be undertaken. Only they enjoy the inalienable right of full, unrestricted, supervision of all aspects of the activity of all government institutions which bear responsibility to the legislative assembly and, what is more, are under the jurisdiction of the judiciary, which is independent of all other authorities.

It is obvious, however, that we must not overlook such principles of building a civil society, principles generally accepted in the civilised world, as mandatory political pluralism, which presupposes the possibility for constructive opposition and alternate possession of power and which rules out any political monopoly. For any monopoly, as Lenin put it, leads only to stagnation and decay.³³ And not only this but also to the destruction of civil life and to the disappearance of a civil society, without which there can be no rule-of-law state.

It is only in these conditions that the primacy of the law leads to the exercise of the sovereignty of the people which constitutes a civil society, and to the subordination of the state machinery to this society, i. e., to the people, which makes it possible to implement the idea of a rule-of-law state.

ORIGINAL LAW EMERGED as natural law, which was believed to be of a divine nature. Essentially it was rooted in the nature of man. Law arose as a means of regulating social relations without which no society can exist, just as a brick house cannot be built without cement. Herein, incidentally, lies the workability of law for society where the general and universal enjoy priority.

The state began with the defence of the natural rights of some and the limitation (up to and including deprivation) of the natural rights of others. It turned the law into an instrument of class rule, thus distorting its original essence. This was no longer law but arbitrariness, which assumed a semblance of the law, which ceased to be natural.

Under the circumstances, the class that rules politically, juridically and economically no longer settles for natural rights, but seeks to acquire new ones. This is possible only at the expense of the other part of society, the part that does not rule. "Acquired" rights have been rarely used for the common weal. However, during the struggle of the social groups, comprising society, natural rights gradually became standard. "Acquired" rights, however, gradually became closer to them, inaugurating a process in which *common natural law*, natural in the sense of its expediency and universal justice, took shape. It is only when a state begins functioning according to this law that it becomes a rule-of-law state.

Thus far, this goal has not been fully achieved anywhere. There are states, however, that have travelled a considerable part of the road initiated by the British Magna Carta, the American Declaration of Independence and the French human and civil rights declarations.

We want to embark upon this road, too. In any event, we have stated our intention to build a socialist rule-of-law state both in party documents and in the decisions of the Congress of People's Deputies. For me, a socialist state means a democratic one, i. e., a state which is materialised rule by the people. However, this materialisation is proceeding with great difficulty, for it has to overcome opposition from a certain part of the persons running the country for whom the people is never "ready" for self-government. At their services are new-fangled political scientists, who persistently argue that the transition from totalitarianism to democracy is, so it turns out, impossible without an authoritarian stage. They are tagging the label of bad "populist demagogues" precisely on the politicians and true people's deputies who are waging a real fight for rule by the people by advancing constructive, concrete programmes. Peddling their authoritarian ideas through periodicals known to be "leftist", the authors of these ideas are willy-nilly similar to champions of a firm hand, strong centralised power, from a quite different, openly reactionary camp (with which one can readily associate supporters of the revival of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" from which everyone, including the workers, suffered in their time). With their "theories" they are helping them slow down this country's advance to democracy.

In the meantime, under the veil of politological philosophising, all sorts of political and juridical tricks are being devised, their only aim being to emasculate the decisions of the party and the Congress of People's Deputies on the building of a rule-of-law state, decisions which won extraordinarily broad-based support in virtually all the social strata comprising the Soviet people. Ample proof of this is provided by the practice of state development over the past year and a half that has elapsed since the 19th Party Conference.

Let us recall the constitutional reforms of 1988. The nationwide discussion of the major amendments to be introduced into the Fundamental Law evoked serious objections to numerous "innovations" proposed, especially those aimed against direct and equal elections to the highest bodies of legislative power of the USSR. Without such elections there can

be no government by the people and, consequently, no rule-of-law state. The USSR Supreme Soviet that was "elected" in pre-perestroika times and has lost the trust of the people ignored the most essential proposals of the participants in the debate and rubber-stamped the creations of sycophant jurists. The elections of people's deputies this past spring amply showed that the people rejects the anti-democratic tenets of the constitutional reform and above all the corporative principle of selecting one-third of the make-up of the Congress of People's Deputies and such a filtering of candidates as district electoral assemblies.

The same Supreme Soviet endorsed the July 1988 decree of its Presidium on rallies and demonstrations and on the use of special-purpose troops. Their utilisation in Minsk and Tbilisi against large, entirely peaceful, meetings showed that by passing these laws we took a step backwards in building a democratic, rule-of-law state.

It was after the first, main round of elections of people's deputies that there appeared the notorious decree of the Presidium of the same, old USSR Supreme Soviet of April 8, 1989. Its illegal essence was revealed by the public and press literally the next day. The USSR Supreme Court attempted to defend this decree, resorting to such an interpretation of it (which, incidentally, it does not have the right to do) as in essence restored the norms of the criminal legislation it had "repealed".³⁴ Despite these ruses and the lamentations of those who are very dissatisfied with the criticism being levelled at the newly concocted acts, the Congress of People's Deputies repealed the most odious Article 11, Part 1. Later the new USSR Supreme Soviet introduced amendments into Article 7 of the decree of April 8, 1989.

Thousands of pages have been written about the attempts to stifle cooperation, but they successfully continue, including with the involvement of legislators. The latter help the government step up the tax pressure on cooperatives and often ban, without due cause, those which are not to their liking. Lease-farmers are still having a rough time. Things aren't shaping up that well with the introduction of true *khozraschet* in the cities, either, for that matter. But then, when it comes to "window-dressing", everything's just fine. If we give a mine to a work group on guarantee only after a lengthy strike, we can translate fundamental science into *khozraschet* right now. Of course, as an experiment, in order to go through the motions, and then quietly return everything to where it was.

I believe that all this is happening because we still often take government by the people to mean real power being in the hands of the "finest representatives of the people" who can guide and direct it either directly or through the state structures. But this "government by the people" in the USSR is over 70 years old, and the people is on the sidelines of power, just as it has always been. Regrettably, the fundamental problem of government by the people has also remained unresolved in the resolution³⁵ released on behalf of the Congress of People's Deputies, which contains many interesting tenets. It does not formalise the principle of direct, general and equal elections by secret ballot with alternative candidatures to all government bodies without exception; nor does this document make mention of referendums, this prime form of the direct will of the people. And there is a strange ring to the statement that the people has supposedly "entrusted its destiny to the deputies"—has it really "entrusted" it even to those whom it has not elected, and if it has "entrusted" its own destiny to someone, then how can it really be sovereign?

The reason the Great October Socialist Revolution is Great is that it was carried out for the sake of such fundamental goals as peace to the peoples, land to the peasants, factories to the workers and power to the

Soviets. If, certain aberrations notwithstanding, peace has, by and large, always been the lodestar of Soviet foreign policy, everything else turned into meaningless slogans: the peasants were deprived of land, workers did not become masters at their plants, and the Soviets were made into registration chambers for rubber-stamping everything that was handed down from above. The point of perestroika is to achieve the goals of the October Revolution, naturally, with due account for the current level of socialist consciousness. And this means, first and foremost, returning power to the entire people, which consists of different social strata, and not to some part of it, even if it is the most proletarian one.

This goal has yet to be attained, but we are beginning to work towards it. We are taking the first, sometimes rather timid, but very important, steps. We have yet to sort out everything; we do not always know what we want and what we are capable of. But we have already realised that in order to build socialism we cannot do without a democratic, rule-of-law state. A democratic rule-of-law state which is guided in its legislative, executive and judicial activity by the principles of common natural law and serves a civil society as the exponent of the people's sovereignty is, strictly speaking, socialism in the political sphere.

¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1960, p. 97.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, 1966, p. 480.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 474.

⁴ Sergei Kotlyarevsky, *The Rule-of-Law State and Foreign Policy*, Moscow, 1909, p. 1 (in Russian).

⁵ *Le Monde*, December 11-12, 1988.

⁶ CSCE/CDHP. 17, Paris, June 16, 1989.

⁷ See Sergei Alexeyev, *The Rule-of-Law State—the Destiny of Socialism*, Moscow, 1988, p. 90 (in Russian).

⁸ See Nikolai Korkunov, *A. History of the Philosophy of Law*, St Petersburg, 1896, pp. 45-51 (in Russian).

⁹ Sergei Kotlyarevsky, *Power and Law. The Problem of a Rule-of-Law State*. Moscow, 1915, p. 400 (in Russian).

¹⁰ Maurice Duverger, *Constitutions et documents politiques*, Paris, 1988, p. 17.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

¹² Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 163.

¹³ See John Locke, *Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1988, pp. 390, 404 (in Russian); Sergei Kotlyarevsky, *The Rule-of-Law State and Foreign Policy*, p. 339, and also Georges Burdeau, *Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques*, Paris, 1969, p. 275; Maurice Duverger, *op. cit.*, pp. 17, 81.

¹⁴ Quoted from Georg Jellinek, *General Teaching on the State*, St Petersburg, 1908, p. 276 (in Russian).

¹⁵ Sergei Kotlyarevsky, *The Rule-of-Law State and Foreign Policy*, pp. 424-425.

¹⁶ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1973, p. 25.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 369-370.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 371.

¹⁹ See René David, *The Main Rule-of-Law Systems of Today*, Moscow, 1988, p. 87 (in Russian).

²⁰ See *A History of Political Teachings. The Ancient World*, Moscow, 1985, p. 281 (in Russian).

²¹ *A History of Political and Juridical Teachings. The Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, Moscow, 1986, pp. 313, 320 (in Russian).

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 329, 327, 331.

²³ Quoted from Georg Jellinek, *op. cit.*, pp. 329-330; *A History of Political and Juridical Teachings. The Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, pp. 334, 337.

²⁴ Sergei Kotlyarevsky, *Power and Law*, p. 92.

²⁵ Pavel Novgorodtsev, *The Crisis of the Modern Sense of Justice*, Moscow, 1909, pp. 19, 243 (in Russian).

²⁶ Quoted from Sergei Kotlyarevsky, *The Rule-of-Law State and Foreign Policy*, p. 30.

²⁷ Pavel Novgorodtsev, *op. cit.*, pp. 234-240.

²⁸ Georg Jellinek, *op. cit.*, pp. 273, 281.

RUSSIA AND SOUTH AFRICA

Boris ASOYAN

THE MORE IMPENETRABLY the iron curtain of apartheid isolated South Africa from the rest of the world, the fiercer was the attack of the ruling regime on communism and the Soviet Union. The South African propaganda was trying to create the impression that there was no greater threat for the South Africans, both Blacks and Whites, than the communist onslaught from all directions.

Propaganda against apartheid in its turn spread through the whole world, enraged by the racial discrimination legalised by the Nationalist Party.

In that "cold war", there was an intriguing point concerning South Africa and the Soviet Union. It was too conspicuous that Pretoria was obviously overdoing with its accusations of the USSR, ascribing some inconceivable actions and intentions to it.

On the other hand, the tone and scope of the Soviet propaganda against the South African regime also exceeded the level of the USSR's involvement and of its interests in that region.

Gradually the outlines of the conflict between the two totalitarian systems thousands of kilometres apart were coming into focus. Each of them was a godsend for the other.

Stalinism allowed the ideologists of apartheid to reduce socialism and communism precisely to the Soviet practice of those years and to justify apartheid as the only proper response to communist threat.

Apartheid was a suitable target for propaganda attacks on the West during the cold war battles.

It has been generally noted that totalitarian systems feeding on the fear of their populations, the systems flushing with anger and making cannibalism the dominating principle of foreign and home policy, were acting according to yet unknown laws, and copied the most heinous features of each other, transforming them and adapting them to their own specific ends.

For all the historical, cultural, economic, and ideological differences between them, they had common basic characteristics: total monopoly on power and privileges; one or another form of racial or national discrimination; deprivation of the majority of people of the right to run the state; limitation and constant suppression of the rights and liberties of the citizens; a criminal system of non-economic coercion, a powerful repressive machine, and a psychological war against one's own population and those of other countries.

Hitler Germany, fascist Italy, our own Stalinism, China under Mao Zedong, the regimes of Pol Pot in Cambodia and of Idi Amin in Uganda—all these phenomena are in the same category.

Boris Asoyan, Cand. Sc. (Hist.), is Deputy Chief of the African Department, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Continued from issue No. 11, 1989.

If we take a closer look at Stalinism, we shall see, that it was a form of apartheid brought to the extreme, or rather to absurdity.

Stalin's system of concentration camps, with its slave labour system, surpassed in its brutality, its scope and duration the most adhorrent methods of oppressing people at all times.

The practice of establishing Beack reservations—the source of unskilled labour for industry and farming in South Africa and filter for the incapable—differed from that “experiment” perhaps only in the level of cruelty.

So, reading, for instance, about the horrible conditions in Black ghettos, let us remember those of our own people who died in wood-cutting camps in Siberia or in northern mines. Let us not forget about millions upon millions of our compatriots who are dragging a miserable existence today, about hundreds of thousands of children, who grow without parents, about our short life-spans. Let us think of industrial zone dwellers suffocating in the poisonous air polluted by industrial gases, of regions where infant mortality is close to the figures in the poorest countries of the world and where environmental degradation is becoming irreversible.

South African election system in its idea copied the Stalinist one. The majority of people in the first case *de jure*, and in the second one—*de facto* was deprived of the right to vote: its role in society was confined to providing cheap labour. And each time when we, driven by the spirit of internationalism, demand the implementation of the “one man—one vote” principle for Blacks in South Africa, we should not forget that we still do not have such an election system ourselves, that it is still our remote goal.

The system of passes in South Africa which regulated the migration of the Black population from the countryside to the cities, from one region to another, was similar in the spirit and the letter to the passport control system introduced under Stalin. In both cases the norms of international law, above all the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which incidentally, was signed by all totalitarian states, were crudely violated.

In the Soviet Union thousands of dwellers of the countryside and suburbs looking for a better life seek residence in urban areas and rush to big cities just like the dwellers of South African Bantustans. They suffer hardships and humiliation, often being deprived of an opportunity to get married—and all this for the sake of using a loophole in the passport system and settling in cities. Authorities, in their turn, like proper monopolists, offer those people the most unskilled work, promising them housing in a few years.

Stalin's system of privileges permeated all social spheres—public health, education, catering, information, transport, places of residence, rest and recreation, trade, and even crematoriums and cemeteries. We did not need the signs “Only for...” to know perfectly well who, where and why the entrance was strictly forbidden. No wonder, the expression “It is not for a white man” is widely used in this country meaning anything below the mark.

The totalitarian regimes in any part of the globe have much more in common in the methods of the propaganda warfare they conducted against the whole world, in hypocrisy and falsity of the laws, in the ways of solving the national question, and in the paranoid distrust for their own and other peoples.

One more point is that the collapse of such regimes entails similar social, economic and political shocks. The free human thought breaks through ideological dogmas and helps us to see the world in its true shape. Undistorted by propaganda cliches the things and events take on an unexpected, often fearful character. Yesterday's gods turn out to be no

more than primitive idols. The false monolith crumbles to pieces revealing an ugly skeleton.

But all this may and should be a subject for a separate study. By this digression we tried to show that South Africa can hardly be regarded a completely unique phenomenon in the modern world. That would be too simple. This, however, is just what is done by many, for such an approach rules out doubt and makes the South African equation absolutely clear: the oppressed Black masses are confronted by a handful of White oppressors: exterminate the oppressors and the eternal reign of freedom will come.

Alas, it is not as simple in South Africa. Apartheid has become a way of life for Whites and Blacks alike. It had penetrated their blood, and became genetically encoded. More than one generation will succeed each other before it becomes possible to "squeeze it all out", drop by drop.

We know it too well from our own experience, for the virus of Stalinism affected not only the generations of the 1930s-50s. Even our children are not immune to it.

The Enemies

THE 1950s PASSED BY, bringing no desired warming in the world where stiff propaganda schemes and stupefying myths were still predominant. The image of the "Russian bear" maintained by propaganda in South Africa was counterbalanced by the "white racist" stereotype in our consciousness.

At that Time of Troubles, which lasted almost until the mid-1980s, it was an almost heroic deed to write in an article or a document "the Government of the Republic of South Africa" instead of "the Pretoria regime" or, which the censors preferred, "bloody fascist regime". An article on South Africa written in an open, honest way was practically unfeasible. And if someone tried to do so, he was strongly censored, and sometimes even reprimanded for being "incompetent and politically weak".

Hack-workers lived an easy life then. At that time even a secondary-school pupil could cook up a commentary on South Africa for the radio or for the Novosti press agency (APN). In the central press the requirements were stricter, but the set of abominable word clichés was obligatory.

Those-who-were-in-charge would watch the observance of this rule with almost religious meticulousness. One could often see on the desks of bosses at editorial offices and departments articles written by light-minded authors crisscrossed by red and blue pencil marks. I myself had to have it out with editors on several occasions. In 1981, for instance, a few months after the independence of Zimbabwe was proclaimed, I managed to get through to the former Prime Minister of Rhodesia, Ian Smith. The meeting was an interesting one. For the first time a Soviet journalist interviewed so odious a person in modern African history; and it was for the first time that Ian Smith met with a man from Moscow. The Soviet *New Times* magazine, for which I worked as a correspondent, approved of the interview, but recommended me to "politically adjust the text". The "adjustment" didn't do any good.

An elderly and very vigilant comrade, spicing his angry language with four-letter words in a comradely manner, demanded an answer as to why I was trying to get an anti-Soviet material to be published: "Smith is a rabid anti-communist and you chatter with him!"

It was in those hard times that rumours swept, saying we had had an embassy in South Africa and had even traded with the racists. To recall those facts was as indiscreet as to mention of the USSR's former support to the struggle of Eritreans for independence. "Never! I repeat,

never did the Soviet Union have, nor could it ever have, any relations with the racist and fascist Pretoria regime," shouted the elderly comrade, choking with indignation (a man who gave Africa a big part of his life) when anyone ventured to speak about that in his presence.

One of our leading experts in African studies once cited an episode that was typical of that time. Addressing a meeting at a research institute he spoke bitterly about the African dictators who had flooded their countries with blood. The immediate response of the head of the institute was: "I didn't know that you disliked Africa..."

Propaganda entirely replaced politics. And so the circle was closed. To use the words of George Orwell, the society had entered such a phase when people were not only required to believe that two by two was five, or six, but believed that in earnest.

A very interesting coincidence was that the ruling party in South Africa had done all it could to wipe out from the memory of South Africans the fact that we had been allies in World War II, and that some time in the past we were going to exchange embassies and trade profitably—that information would have marred the image of "pure anti-communism" of the Nationalist Party.

In April 1988, I read a brief lecture on relations between Russia and South Africa to the students at the Rand Afrikaans University. Among those present were students of most different political views—from the Left to the ultra-Right. Some of them had been through the battle fields in Angola and Namibia. Some had visited Europe. All of them, naturally, followed the international events and believed they knew the history of their country well enough.

I did not tell them anything more than they could find in popular literature on history: about the Russian interest in South Africa since the time of Peter the Great, about the first expeditions to South Africa in which Russian researchers took part, about the Pallada frigate, about a Russian soldier who had been taken prisoner by the French during the Napoleonic invasion of Russia and ultimately found himself in South Africa, and about the flows of immigrants from Russia early in the 20th century and after the October Revolution, and, of course, the Russian aid to the Boers in their war against the British in 1899-1902.

Most of them knew practically nothing about that. A hum of surprise rolled across the hall when I named the books by South African prose writers, poets and playwrights that had been translated into Russian.

It was not before the late 1960s that the first, very timid attempts were made to see what in actual fact was going on in South Africa. However, those efforts were not in academic circles, where people were preoccupied with profound studies of the prospects of a non-capitalist path of development, the inevitable victory of the national liberation movement, the three motive forces of world progress and the all-winning power of the ideas of socialism in Africa. It was quite understandable why such attempts were thwarted as soon as they reached the chiefs of the departments and organisations in which they had originated.

At that time even a mediocre scholar understood everything in what was going on in South Africa: as in any other part of the globe marked on our political maps as "liberation movement zone" (that favourite word "zone" again!), the victory of those whom we supported was inevitable. If so, why look into details about the life of, say, the white community which consisted entirely of super-racists, colonialists, man-haters, and anti-communists' details that were redundant and could lead one astray from the main lines of truly scientific analysis?

In those years optimistic scholars were gaining strength, inspired by the ideas of yet another Party congress, ideas which, for their part, had been derived from the writings of the same optimists. Some of them

argued in earnest already not just about a possibility but a probable date of a revolution in South Africa. In a remote perspective, of course, but with unavoidable repetition of the key events of the October overthrow in Russia. They mused on which phase of the Russian revolution the events in South Africa were to be compared with. Some were careful, believing that the events were exactly like the 1905 developments in Russia. So the victory is still not too soon. Others countered them by quotations from Marxist classics, trying to prove that resemblance with 1915 was beyond any doubt—the entire system of colonialism and racism was falling to pieces, and the liberation movement in South Africa and along its frontiers was gaining momentum at a rapid pace. A revolution was inevitable. The world socialist system would help them...

In that propaganda intoxication no one, perhaps, could answer this question: what interests could our country have in South Africa? Judging by the documents of the payst years, that question was rarely asked then.)

Perestroika

I WAS FLYING from Johannesburg to Harare in May 1988. A man sitting beside me, a middle-aged European, produced from his bag a thick book and opened it somewhere in the middle. The title on blue cover read: Michael Gorbachev. *Perestroika and New Thinking*. Naturally I couldn't help asking him what interested him in the book.

He turned out to be a businessman from Zimbabwe coming home from a business trip.

"It is a very useful book for us living in the south of Africa. There is a good deal that could be applied in our country as well. I was lucky to get it. In Johannesburg it is sold like hot cakes".

President Botha read *Perestroika* in April, and said he was impressed by it.

In the late 1980s, the Soviet theme suddenly returned to the mass media of South Africa without the usual hostile colours.

Various articles appeared now and then on Soviet culture, politics and economics and interviews with our historians and public figures. The play "Sarcophagus" by V. Gubarev was on in South Africa, running full houses, and was extolled by critics. The State Opera Theatre in Pretoria staged Aram Khachaturyan's ballet "Spartacus". A Sunday magazine carried an article praising ballerina Galina Stepanenko of the Bolshoi Theatre: "The youngest and most brilliant ballerina, to emerge from the Soviet Union". South Africans got acquainted with Soviet cinematography. Among them were "War and Peace" by Bondarchuk and "Go and Look" by Klimov. Soviet books appeared in South African book shops. In May 1988, the *Sunday Star* announced a chess competition among readers, entitled "Teledecks-Kasparov South African Open Championship". The winner was to receive a chess computer, "Kasparov Stratos" or "Kasparov Turbo King". The sports sections in South African periodicals began to publish chess problems designed by Soviet chessmen: "A sharp theoretical duel from Leningrad: Salov vs. Gurevich. A nice sacrificial idea by the former Soviet Champion, now ranked 7th in the world."

Pictures of Soviet "Lada-Niva" cars (nobody knows though how they got to South Africa), which had shown excellent results in the prestigious race on mountain roads in South Africa and Swaziland were published on front pages. "They are the Iron Curtain's answer to cross-country romps and four wheel challenges. It is a 'Jeepnik'. It's selling like hot cakes!"

Harsh anti-Soviet cartoons gave way to mild and well-meant caricatures. Two South Africans are reading an announcement: "Have you heard the news? Russian consul meets South African students in

Lesotho!" "I suppose the next step is for P. W. to meet Russian students in Upper Tashkent..." says one of them. A character in a James Clarke story in the *Sunday Times* comes to Moscow and complains to a Soviet minister, "Comrade Wostoc", that Pretoria is tired of Reagan, scared of Thatcher, nervous of Strauss, distrustful of Mitterrand, pinning its sole hope on "Mother Russia".

Old-timers in Pretoria recalled anecdotes of the times when the Soviet Consulate-General was there. A resident of Government Avenue, where our consulate was situated in block 721, told in an interview to a newspaper about "the horrible fire of 1949", which severely damaged the house. "I heard cries for help coming from the room with iron bars in which a Soviet prisoner was locked". An old fireman confirmed that it was really so, and that he even had to saw through the bars to free the poor man who, however, "disappeared mysteriously after having been released".

A note was unearthed in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which foreign minister Eric Low, a stubborn opponent of relations with the USSR, accused the staff of the Soviet Consulate of violating the provisions of the Liquor Act, "notwithstanding a previous warning". The matter was that at the reception on November 7, 1955, alcoholic drinks were served to the invited Blacks and Indians in violation of that "law".

The South Africans made a few gestures of goodwill.

The people of Port Elizabeth brought gifts to the Soviet sailor who had fallen ill and was taken to hospital. The local radio station appealed to anyone who spoke Russian "to visit a lonely Russian". According to the press reports, even linguists from Johannesburg responded to the appeal.

The Soviet Ambassador to Lesotho who felt unwell was rushed by plane to a Bloemfontein hospital. He underwent a very complicated heart operation. Foreign Minister Pik Botha made almost daily reports to newsmen on the Ambassador's health. The press gave a broad coverage of that event, sometimes making most fantastic forecasts concerning relations between South Africa and the USSR.

Philip Nel, director of the Centre of Soviet Studies at Stellenbosh University, arrived in the USSR where he had meetings with Soviet scientists and public figures. His visit in a way opened the door to the USSR for other liberal-minded South African Whites. Such outstanding personalities as Alex Borein, Andre Brink, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, and Allister Sparks visited the USSR between 1987 and 1989.

Previously South African pressmen were reluctant to talk to the Soviets—what can one write about such a meeting?—whereas now requests for talks, interviews, and even articles came pouring in. The Soviet theme has become fashionable now. Several South African journalists visited the Soviet Union. Their articles were full of sincere amazement: a good deal of what they saw had nothing in common with the stereotypes, they got used to.

A Soviet person rarely set foot on South African soil since 1956. Occasionally seamen arrived there when Soviet ships called at South African ports in emergency. A few Soviet journalists could take a look at South Africa when they happened to go out during transit stopovers in the Ian Smuts Airport in Johannesburg. In 1988, an *Izvestia* correspondent was the first to make an official trip to South Africa. In 1989 he was followed by visits by journalists from TASS, TV and APN.

South African vercrampste took several months to recover from the shock of it all. And after that they bombarded the government by unusual accusations of trying to "Bolshevise South Africa."

However, it went further than just changes in propaganda cliches.

In February 1988, scientists, journalists, businessmen, politicians and

government officials held a discussion at the S. A. Ministry of Foreign Affairs on whether the "window of opportunities" was really open for improving relations between Pretoria and Moscow. The very fact that such a discussion took place testified to big changes in Pretoria's policy.

Disillusioned by the tough policy of the West with regard to apartheid and by the imposition of quite disturbing economic and trade sanctions by the United States and other Western countries, South Africa ventured to turn its face to the hostile East and to try and solve with its help a number of problems: to break out international isolation and to use new interest of the East in a political settlement of regional conflicts so as to bring pressure on the African National Congress and the "front-line" states with the ultimate goal to undermine the anti-apartheid movement.

President Botha's advisers asserted that Moscow was rapidly revising its policy with regard to South Africa and, they believed, the views on the entire range of problems, including the role of Whites and the possibility of accomplishing a revolution in South Africa in present-day conditions, were changing. Besides, they paid attention to the fact that there occurred an obvious diversification of the USSR's relations with South African political groups and organisations.

The pragmatics in the government tried to prove that it was practically impossible to find a way out of isolation by trying rapidly to settle the internal conflict. Though they managed to damp down the anti-racist movement, all attempts to destroy its structure, its militant leadership, to discredit the ANC and push it away from the struggle by making economic concessions to a large part of the Blacks were obviously unsuccessful. Foreign policy offered more opportunities. Certainly here again compromises were inevitable and also rather traumatic for Afrikaner pride. Besides, the Right-Wing opposition could obtain new and strong arguments against the Nationalist Party. Still, success along those lines promised not only a breakthrough from the international isolation, but also a real way out of the political impasse at home.

In favour of this concept was, in particular, the fact that the "front-line" states also got tired of the war and were prepared, by Pretoria's estimates, for going over from confrontation with South Africa to cooperation in settling disputes and eliminating regional difficulties.

"Only yesterday we were into total onslaught, into the encirclement of South Africa by the Red Bear", wrote Harald Pakendorf in the *Johannesburg Sunday Times*, commenting on the meeting at the South African foreign ministry held in February 1988. "What has changed? The West, mostly the US, has turned its back to the Union Building (a group of government houses in Pretoria—B. A.) preferring to sanction rather than to exhort. Meanwhile Pretoria has taken hold again of the internal situation..., shaken the ANC, turned the economy around. At the same time Gorbachev has taken over in Moscow, talking of glasnost and perestroika. Still: can that be enough reason for Pretoria even to consider Moscow to be within a distance of handshake?" The newspaper said the participants in the meeting answered this question in the affirmative.

They were contemplating a really big game. The mounting domestic and foreign political difficulties demanded a risk. And something unprecedented occurred in the policy of South Africa: the information about concessions which Pretoria was ready to make in order to establish relations with the USSR leaked from the government quarters into the press.

Among them were as follows: cessation of the S. A. military activities in Angola; the ending of support to UNITA leader Savimbi as a step towards an internal settlement in Angola, which would include a complete withdrawal of Cuban troops; a proposal that the USSR would buy

South African strategic mineral raw materials on profitable terms; a toning-down of anti-Soviet propaganda; purchase of a number of Soviet goods, in particular, the Niva cars, on beneficial terms.

Remember, that was in February 1988. There were no significant changes in the south-west of Africa yet. South African troops still occupied Angola. Military and financial assistance to UNITA was in full swing. Pretoria still would say that SWAPO "would never get power in Namibia".

After the above-mentioned discussion, the South African television showed a special programme, "Perestroika of Mikhail Gorbachev and Its Significance for South Africa", in which a number of South African and Western scholars took part.

Kane-Berman, the director of the influential South African Institute of Race Relations, wrote an article in which he drew a parallel between Botha's reforms and Soviet perestroika and declared that South Africa and the USSR were confronted with quite similar problems.

His colleagues Steven Friedmann and Monti Narsoo wrote after their visit to the USSR that contacts with the Soviet Union once viewed by white South Africa as the ultimate act of betrayal may have become an "indispensable contribution to South Africa's future".

Philip Nel was more cautious: "The way is open for closer links between the Soviet Union and South Africa not only to help to resolve the problems in the Southern Africa, but also to exchange views on the internal situation."

S. A. Minister of Defence Magnus Malan, known as an "ultrahawk" in the government, made a sensational statement. He said that South Africa recognised the USSR as an influential factor in the Southern Africa and was ready to cooperate with Moscow in defusing the conflict around Angola.

Newspapers quoted President Botha as saying that the Soviet Union had a better understanding of the situation in the South of Africa than the US.

After that, as we know, Pretoria entered a phase of active diplomatic moves towards a settlement in south-western Africa. A few months later, in December 1988, those efforts culminated in signing agreements on the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola, compliance with resolution 435 of the UN Security Council on granting independence to Namibia, and a phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

It was during those talks that the South Africans had an opportunity to have direct contacts with the Soviet representatives who attended the talks as observers. During those contacts in 1988-1989, the USSR deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs met with his South African counterpart and other official representatives of South Africa.

In April 1989, Soviet diplomats arrived in Cape Town, for the first time in 34 years, to attend a session of the Joint Commission on South-West Africa. They were accorded an especially warm welcome.

Its own increased political activity and contacts with the USSR could not but raise Pretoria's hopes for making a breach in the international blockade, which, in turn, drove some South African leaders into an almost euphoric state. It was alleged that the USSR had entered into "secret talks" with South Africa on restoring diplomatic relations, or, at any rate, it had stated its readiness for such course of events.

"Relations between Moscow and Pretoria have changed more in the past few months than at any time since the Russians translated the *Communist Manifesto* into Afrikaans in 1922," wrote Eddie Koch, a *Weekly Mail* observer, in an article under a typical headline: "South Africa and the Soviets: from Cold War to a Hot Peace".

And again, as in the 1920s, the 1940s and 1950s, South African

businessmen and politicians spoke eagerly about potential opportunities of trade with the USSR, about thrilling prospects of economic cooperation and joint business on the markets of mineral raw materials. The conversations were conducted in a tone which suggested that the USSR had already given up its support to the sanctions imposed by the United Nations and renounced its stance on apartheid. In April 1989, for instance, Bruce Cameron, an observer of the Johannesburg *Star*, feigning that Soviet Union had agreed to trade with South Africa, declared that his country had no objections to promoting broad trade relations with the Soviet Union, since the economic sanctions closed the door to Western countries. Nil van Heerden, general director of S. A. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, went even farther, saying at a press conference that South Africa had first to see how the situation in the USSR would be developing before drawing a final conclusion on trade with the Soviets.

Such information, naturally, could not but evoke general curiosity. Many Western newspapers at that time repeated the argument of the South Africans and, for their part, forecast further rapprochement between the USSR and South Africa.

That could not be overlooked by the African countries who wondered whether the Soviet Union had given up the struggle against apartheid.

Indulging in wishful thinking, Pretoria now paid less attention to the warnings by serious scholars that meaningful moves of the USSR towards South Africa were unlikely so long as the apartheid system remained intact.

Philip Nel, director of the Institute of Soviet Studies at Stellenbosch University, wrote way back in March 1988: "I see no reason to believe that the Soviet Union will all of a sudden change its approach in mid-stride, abandon its anti-apartheid stance and establish formal relations with South Africa. Objectively speaking, the asymmetrical positions of Moscow and Pretoria on the international stage, rule out the possibility of a realignment that will amount to more than just informal contacts and perhaps indirect negotiations on the Angolan issue... Moscow's commitments in the region have grown to such an extent that a too close relationship with Pretoria will have far too many costs in terms of its status in the Third World and its positive image among Western opinion groups... Unrealistic expectations can only prevent concerned parties to exploit the real opportunities these changes herald."

Nel proved right: unfounded hopes gave rise to disillusion when Pretoria saw that the new thinking in Soviet policy did not in the least mean abandonment of support to the struggle against apartheid, while the extension of contacts with the South African public was not aimed at establishing diplomatic relations with the Republic of South Africa but at helping to dismantle the unjust system.

However, something of this kind had already happened in the past. More than once in the history of our relations South African politicians tried to play the "Russian card" in a bid to gain a more honourable place in the world.

At the same time, it is quite obvious that in the past few years a good deal has changed in our attitude to South Africa. Our sources of information have grown more varied. We have seen that there are far more actors on the South African scene than we had supposed. We have realised that in the present international situation, when any armed conflict in any part of the world threatens the security of the whole of mankind, there is no alternative to political settlement of critical situations. At last we begin to understand that the mistakes and delusions are rooted in our past, in the numerous myths that were part and parcel of our existence for decades.

(Continued on page 144)

THE EMBASSY IN THE ETERNAL CITY

Nikolai LUNKOV

IT IS EASIER to work now—people have begun to trust us. A turnabout in their frame of mind has been taking place right before our eyes.

WHEN I ARRIVED in Italy in 1980 I encountered a highly negative attitude to the USSR in government quarters and amongst public forces and political parties, the Communist Party included. Relations between our two states were tense. The reasons here were the same as everywhere else—the SS-20 missiles, Afghanistan, human rights. Even though I was well received in Rome, there were plenty of difficulties at the first stage. Soviet diplomats were in a plight at the time, as no one was accepting our proof of the veracity of the Soviet leadership's actions. I think that the main task at that period was to keep Moscow informed, precisely and without embellishments, of attitudes to the Soviet Union abroad.

April 1985 inaugurated a radical improvement in Soviet-Italian relations. The decisive role was played by new political thinking of the Soviet leadership. Then, of course, Mikhail Gorbachev visited Italy in June 1984. He was heading a delegation of the CPSU attending the funeral of Enrico Berlinguer, General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party (PCI). General Secretary Gorbachev's frank and honest statements at press conferences and on television, and his unusually (for Soviet leaders) candid style of communicating, especially during the warm meeting with Italy's popular President Alessandro Pertini (incidentally, I presented to him on behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet the Order of the Patriotic War, First Class, as an energetic fighter against fascism and one of the leaders of the Italian Resistance), made a deep impression on the Italians. Newspapers wrote about the completely different tone in which General Secretary Gorbachev spoke and pointed to his attractive personal traits. Mr. Pertini underscored the great competence of the Soviet guest. General Secretary Gorbachev also held frank comradely talks with the PCI leadership and with the Soviet Embassy staff.

This began to melt the ice of distrust towards us. The seed fell onto good soil. The fact of the matter is that Italians are quite close to Soviet people in terms of character. They are friendly, sociable, hospitable and always ready to do a good deed in turn and to try and understand the next person. It is mostly for this reason, that we Soviet diplomats now have no difficulties with contacts with very many strata of Italian society. The main thing, however, is that the country well remembers the USSR's

contribution to the rout of fascism and the involvement of Soviet people in the Italian Resistance Movement. All our compatriots who died—there were some 500 of them—are revered as heroes, and monuments and memorial plaques have been erected to all of them and are maintained in ideal order. Three Soviet citizens have been awarded the title of National Hero of Italy.

April 25, 1985 was the 40th anniversary of Italy's liberation from fascist rule. The festivities marking this event were grand and extensive. Soviet diplomats received many invitations to speak on television and radio, at rallies, meetings and so on. Feelings of sincere gratitude to the Soviet people were expressed in one way or another at all the events. I cannot forget the ovation I received for my speech at a rally of some 15,000 people. Although, frankly, my Italian wasn't that fluent at the time.

In short, after June 1984 we began working in much more favourable conditions. However, that was only the first swallow, a minor breakthrough, not a major advance in Soviet-Italian relations.

THE SOVIET UNION'S prestige and popularity in Italy has grown unprecedentedly over the years of perestroika. The respect which people have for us can perhaps be compared solely to the period immediately after the Second World War. I would even go so far as to say that a unique situation of sorts has taken shape in the country, what with the state leadership, major political parties together with public organisations, and most segments of the population openly voicing their trust in and support for the Soviet Union.

We at the embassy constantly hear words of approval for perestroika and best wishes for success and expression of understanding for the difficulties on this path. There is now a Perestroika Cafe in Rome, and buses carry posters with inscriptions like "I really benefit from glasnost". Large numbers of people often attend meetings with Soviet diplomats, and in small towns with population of five to ten thousand literally everyone turns out. In such instances we really take pride in our country. It is only a pity that members of some Soviet mass media here in Italy are sometimes rather sluggish about covering how the local population feels about the USSR today.

Let me cite one example. The day after a great misfortune—the earthquake in Armenia—befell our country, first the President of the Republic, Francesco Cossiga and then the head of the government, Giulio Andreotti, arrived at the embassy. They signed the book of condolences and stated that the entire country had perceived the Armenian tragedy as their own. The president and the prime minister said that they had instructed the proper ministries to begin furnishing Armenia as much assistance as possible. Coordination of the effort was entrusted to the Ministry for Natural Disasters headed by Vito Lattanzio, whom we came to know in those grim days as a wonderful man and expert. The very next day he and I saw off to Yerevan the first two Italian aircraft with rescuers, medical personnel and medicines.

If only Soviet television and radio and the press could have brought home to Soviet people what was taking place in Italy at the time. There were thousands of phone calls and offers of help; people brought clothing, footwear, blankets and medical instruments. There was a stream of planes and trucks loaded with supplies for Armenia. The government adopted a decision to expeditiously build an "Italian village" in Spitak, and 204 homes, fitted with all the requisite equipment (plumbing, kitchen, refrigerator, etc.) was put up extremely quickly. Today construction of a

school and hospital is drawing to a close. Fiat concern president Gianni Angelli immediately offered trucks, bulldozers and cranes free of charge. As they were being sent from Turin a spontaneous mass rally of solidarity with the Armenian people took place. That is what Italy and Italians are like today!

SWEEPING CHANGES in Soviet-Italian relations have occurred in the political sphere. The Italian leadership has set about honest cooperation with the Soviet Union in tackling many international problems, naturally, within the framework of its allied obligations. It appears to be one of the most committed supporters of new political thinking in world affairs. Specifically, Italian statesmen and parliamentarians promoted the resumption of Soviet-American dialogue. According to press reports, they maintained energetic contacts with US congressmen, especially those of Italian descent, persuading them of the need for progress in Soviet-American relations. So it is not fortuitous that despite the skepticism of some countries about the Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik, the then Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti assessed it as being very important. And Rome's efforts in development of the Reykjavik talks were rather persistent and skilful, for that matter. It is not for nothing that it was in Italy that diplomacy emerged in its modern forms.

Italy supported the Soviet-American INF Treaty and approved our line for creating a common European home. There are doubting Thomases, of course, but I cannot remember a single statement by a more or less major Italian statesman or politician against them. Italians, incidentally, believe that by the end of the current year it is possible to conclude work on a USSR-EEC agreement on trade and cooperation. Obviously, interaction between our two countries in international affairs can be more fruitful, too. We are prepared to further this.

Trade and economic relations between the Soviet Union and Italy have broadened notably. Whereas, say, seven of eight years ago it was our eighth biggest partner in the West, today it shares third place with Japan. The Italian business community is very active in its ties with the USSR. The point at issue is not only major companies such as Fiat, Montedison, IRI and ENI, but also medium- and small-size firms, which is a specificity of Italy.

By and large, another reason why the local business community deserves a word of praise is that, all things notwithstanding, it did not interrupt trade and economic ties with the Soviet Union for a single day. At times it was even helped out at a difficult moment, as was the case, for example, with the construction of the export-oriented Western Siberia-Centre pipeline. The USA and a number of other countries refused to sell us compressor stations and other equipment for it. The Italians boldly did so. One can also recall Fiat's setting up in Togliatti the Volzhsky Motor Works, the giant of the Soviet automotive industry, without which it would be having difficulties.

Today a host of joint projects are at the development and implementation stage. One typical example is the almost finished construction of a large plant for the production of large-diameter pipes by the Italimpianti company in the city of Volzhsky near Volgograd. We used to incur considerable hard-currency expenses from importing them.

Great efforts are being taken, including by our embassy, to establish cooperation with the Italian consumer industry. It is marvelously developed and functions on the highest world level. Embassy and trade mission staff members have literally been all over the country searching for profitable, reliable and experienced counterparts producing clothing

and footwear first and foremost. And they found them. We prepared and sent our proposals to the Centre. Initially the Ministry of the Light Industry seemed to receive them with interest, displaying special attention to cooperation with Marzotto, one of Western Europe's largest clothing firms. The latter set forth 23 specific ideas regarding the construction or renovation of the appropriate enterprises in the USSR. But things did not go any further, and the whole idea was scuttled.

The USSR Ministry of the Light Industry's slowness and sluggishness (and perhaps reluctance) prevent it from adopting the enormous experience of the Italian knitwear industry as well. After all, we unforgivably lost our own a long time ago. We could also take interest in why not only "giants of industry", which we like so much at home, but also small- and medium-size knitwear and other enterprises, for that matter, function so efficiently in Italy. But no, we don't get around to this.

The situation is the same in other areas of "cooperation" as well. Despite all our extremely serious domestic difficulties, almost nothing has been done along the lines of the agro-industrial complex over the past five or six years. In Italy, it, specifically animal husbandry, is on a very high level. Our staff members have visited a great number of farms in a bid to reach agreement on possible cooperation, but, regrettably, we failed there, too. The following is a sad and very telling example. Not far from Rome there is a prospering dairy facility which belongs to a person who is almost a compatriot of ours—Luigi Albertini, a great-grandson of Leo Tolstoy. He has 240 milch-cows which yield 10,000 litres of milk each per year. There are no miracles here; it is just that operations are arranged well. Albertini expressed a sincere and quite natural desire to cooperate with the homeland of his great forebear. But even this idea did not come to fruition.

Cultural ties between our two countries, which have long become traditional, continue to develop intensively. It is common knowledge that many of the most prominent Russian writers, composers, and artists worked fruitfully on Italian soil. For example, Fyodor Dosloyevsky created the novel "The Idiot" in Florence, Nikolai Gogol wrote "Dead Souls" in Rome, and the artist Alexander Ivanov spent 20 years there working on his painting "Christ Appears to the People". Pyotr Tchaikovsky composed several symphonies in Florence and Venice. One can recall the round-table debates of Russian artistic and cultural celebrities in Rome organised by Princess Zinaida Volkonskaya, whom Alexander Pushkin valued very much.

The great Soviet writer Maxim Gorky spent many years on Capri and in Sorrento. We visit these places every year, especially since Lenin visited Gorky twice on Capri. In keeping with tradition, on April 22, Lenin's birthday, the entire Soviet staff and members of the Italian public lay flowers at the foot of the monument to Lenin and hold a jubilee rally.

Over 2,000 Soviet artistic and cultural figures visit Italy every year. Our prominent musical ensembles, theatres, and circus regularly perform here, and with success. This year the tour of the Bolshoi Theatre at La Scala in Milan, and that of the latter in Moscow were a major cultural event of the year.

The exhibition *Russian and Soviet Painting. 1870-1930*, which was also mounted this year, in Turin, is truly unique. Speaking at the opening ceremony, Fiat president Gianni Agnelli, who was in effect its main sponsor and organiser, noted that this exposition was a weighty contribution to the preparations for the forthcoming visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to Italy.

I would like to note an interesting fact. The Soviet circus again came to Italy on a tour. Under the contract it was supposed to last a month and a half. However, the performances were so successful that it was

extended for another six months. What is more, Pope John Paul II invited it to perform in the Vatican. When Vatican Television and Radio reported this, a veritable Babel began. Some 45,000 people gathered in St Peter's Square, and the Soviet artistes had to perform not in a hall as planned but right in the square, where the Pope was in attendance, too. The performance was brilliant. The Pope thanked the artistes and presented each of them a commemorative medal. Incidentally, at his request the Song and Dance Ensemble of the USSR Interior Ministry Troops performed at the Vatican last year

SINCE I HAVE BEGUN TALKING about the Vatican I will continue this topic. It is common knowledge that the USSR does not have diplomatic relations with it. However, there are contacts, and there could be no other way, for that matter. Meetings with the Vatican are held both at our initiative and its. I, for one, have had talks with Pope John Paul II and with the Secretary of State (prime minister) of the Vatican, Cardinal Casaroli. In keeping with tradition, their content is not made public. The meetings were held in a frank and, I would say, constructive atmosphere.

Of late, there has been an exchange of messages on major problems of the day between the leaders of our two countries. Today the Vatican is showing itself to be a supporter of the fight against the arms race, of peace, the salvation of civilisation from a nuclear catastrophe, and the development of a common European dialogue. In its time, for example, it censured the Star Wars idea. The statements by Cardinal Casaroli at sessions of the UN General Assembly and International conferences on disarmament are very typical in this respect. Beginning with the Conference in Helsinki, the Vatican has been active in the European process as well. The Holy See supported the Soviet-American dialogue and the INF Treaty. From my meetings in Vatican, it appears that its supreme leadership is realistic and seeks to see the present-day world the way it is.

For example, it has been understanding and even supportive of the Soviet perestroika. Last year, when I returned from the 19th Party Conference, I had a long talk with John Paul II, who displayed genuine interest in the life of the Soviet people and the course of the restructuring drive. He wished us every success in this difficult endeavour. The next day Italian and foreign newspapers carried headlines to the effect: "Perestroika in the Vatican", "Pope Takes an Interest in the CPSU", and the like. In a sermon he was delivering just recently, this past September, the Pope said in Russian: "May the Lord bestow His blessing upon all the peoples of the Soviet Union and grant them all the material and spiritual boons they require." The Italian press assessed these words as the Vatican's positive reaction to General Secretary Gorbachev's September 9 address on Soviet television.

The statements of its officials prompt the conclusion that the Holy See is encouraging the West to cooperate more closely with the Soviet Union to resolve its formidable problems of today. In 1988 John Paul II sent a representative delegation headed by Cardinal Casaroli to the USSR to attend the festivities devoted to the millennium of Christianity in Russia. At the request of the Pope and of Cardinal Casaroli himself, the latter was received by General Secretary Gorbachev. USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze also took part in the businesslike and constructive talk. Mutual understanding and, whenever possible, cooperation between the USSR and the Vatican would unquestionably be of benefit not only for both states but also for Europe and the rest of the world.

LET ME GET BACK to Soviet-Italian relations. It would be incorrect not to underscore the special role which a group of leading Italian statesmen play for them. The fact of the matter is that a frequent change of governments is typical of the country's political life. It is widely believed that the absence of stability is a natural phenomenon since, for example, 13 political parties and groups are represented in parliament.

However, a rather small group of major politicians who as if turn over the baton of national leadership to one another rather stably dominate. Italians speak with respect in this connection of the "historical leaders" of the Christian Democrat Party of Italy. They include, first and foremost, Giulio Andreotti, the current Chairman of the Council of Ministers, who is in his sixth term at this post, and Francesco Cossiga the President of the Republic, who also used to head the government and occupied ministerial posts, and such prominent people as Amintore Fanfani and Arnaldo Forlani, to name but two. The high status enjoyed by these figures is due to their intelligent and balanced approach to pressing domestic and international problems and their desire to work with partners and rivals to find a common language and arrive at compromises.

All this also applies to relations with the Soviet Union, and it is patent in their talks with me and in their public statements. Their aspiration to work with us in a serious and calm manner, with due regard for mutual interests, is an especially attractive element. It is very instructive and interesting to meet with them, even to discuss difficult matters, since they are magnificent interlocutors who readily understand everything.* Of course, there are the invariably not very flattering statements made regarding us; however, I believe that the benevolence they show towards the USSR is genuine.

I would like to make special mention of Giulio Andreotti, a veteran of Italian and international politics. He first entered the government back in 1947, and he has been a permanent member of parliament since 1946. Italians duly consider him a foremost statesman who espouses pragmatic, realistic views. Incidentally, in his youth he was an aide to Cardinal Montini, who later became Pope Paul VI, who was known for his beneficial actions in the international arena.

Mr. Andreotti has repeatedly visited the Soviet Union and met with Mikhail Gorbachev. As Chairman of the Council of Ministers he signed a Soviet-Italian Protocol on Consultations in Moscow in 1972. Despite his heavy schedule, he wrote, thanks to his astonishing work capacity, a book about the Soviet perestroika entitled *The USSR Seen at Close Quarters*. In it Mr. Andreotti positively evaluates the changes apace in the Soviet Union, emphasising that there is no alternative to the restructuring drive and noting the special innovative role played by the Soviet leader. The book's presentation to the public took place on December 26, 1988, i. e., the second day of the Christmas holidays. Usually at this time no one goes outside, but on that day one of the biggest theatres in Rome was filled to capacity. As I see it, this bespeaks the author's popularity and interest in his book. As far as I know, a Russian edition of it is to be published in the Soviet Union in the very near future.

In his two latest addresses the head of the Italian government once again called for the creation of "favourable external conditions for the success of the sweeping Gorbachev reforms", singling out the need for attaining immediate progress at the disarmament talks. In his opinion, arms reductions strengthen trust and release resources for economic revitalisation. He called to mind the statement which former US President Ronald Reagan made on the eve of a Soviet-American summit: not promoting the renewal processes begun by Mikhail Gorbachev would mean assuming responsibility to society and history. He stressed that he was

even more convinced of the truth of these words. Speaking about the nationalities problem in the USSR, he noted that "after the first wave of tension subsides, wisdom and moderation should help constrain unorganised upsurges and prevent matters of religion from becoming involved here".

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WHEN WE SPEAK about Soviet-Italian relations, we cannot, of course, fail to mention the Italian Communist Party, the biggest in the West. It has some 1.5 million members. This is truly a mass party in which all social strata are represented. Like any political organisation, it has had its ups and downs, which, however, have not always depended on it or the domestic political situation. Regrettably, the mistakes of the former Soviet leadership told on its status and prestige. Thus, in 1976, the time of the PCI's greatest influence, it received 34 per cent of the votes at the polls, and Communists were mayors of almost all the major cities, including Rome.

Today, however, the number of votes being cast for it has declined considerably, and there is only one Communist mayor, in Bologna. All the same, the party appears to be gradually overcoming the crisis in its ranks. The departure from it of workers and young people, especially in the big cities, has ended. As was pointed out at the 18th PCI Congress this past March, it is now firmly implementing its new course, a course for renewal and for broadening its representation in society. It is focusing on organisational consolidation, improvements in ties between grassroots organisations, and especially on constructive experience among them. Exchange of party membership cards is held annually. The PCI is energetically preparing for important elections to administrative bodies of power which are scheduled for next spring.

A typical feature of the Communist Party's activity is its exceptional mobilising ability. Communists, like most Italians, are very quick on the uptake. For example, the annual *L'Unità* holidays gather up to a million people. The Berlinguer funeral in Rome drew over three million mourners. This is indicative of a great deal.

As far as relations between the PCI and the CPSU is concerned, they are comradely and businesslike. Both parties conduct a constructive exchange of views at all levels on matters of interest to them. There is, of course, a certain divergence of opinions at that. Their approaches to international and regional problems fully coincide. There have been several meetings between Mikhail Gorbachev and PCI General Secretary Achille Occhetto (they have known each other for many years). The CPSU delegation headed by Alexander Yakovlev that attended the March Party Congress showed a videotaped greeting from General Secretary Gorbachev to its participants. Such an address was unprecedented. We observed the attention and interest with which the delegates looked at the TV screen, taking in every word by the Soviet leader. The complete sense of his talking to them directly was created. This produced a great impression on all the Communists, and Italian television made good reports of the event.

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IN THE CONTEXT of the reforms in the USSR's political activity and its diplomatic service, the work of the Soviet Embassy in the Eternal City is changing as well. The new situation has made us take a critical look at our performance and map out guidelines for improving it. Perestroika has not only facilitated our work; it has simultaneously complicated it as

well. Its range has broadened drastically. Nowadays Soviet diplomats have to engage in virtually all problems imaginable—from medicine to space exploration. And not merely engage in them, but understand them rather well, otherwise it is virtually impossible to work.

It was imperative to substantially raise the level of the embassy's informational work, which used to be extremely poor, if not neglected entirely. When, after I returned from the 26th CPSU Congress in March 1981, I first proposed arranging a press conference on its results, people said: "Why is this necessary? We have never done this!" I held the conference in an embassy hall filled to capacity, where I frankly spoke about the proceedings of our party forum. The next day it made the front page of newspapers, and the biggest of them, *La Repubblica*, entitled its article "Revolution in the Soviet Embassy". This was a big psychological boost for the embassy staff members, and subsequently we constantly broadened the scope of our informational work.

The following is a relatively recent, now routine, example. When I returned from the January 1987 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, there were some 80 journalists and representatives of eight Italian broadcasting companies waiting for me at the Rome airport. For approximately 50 minutes I familiarised them in detail with the results of the plenum proceedings. This improvised press conference was broadcast live on many TV channels, of which there are 76 in Rome.

By and large, embassy staff members today often appear before a wide range of audiences, on radio and television and in the press. There is enormous public attention to them, and Italians listen with great interest to our stories about the omissions and mistakes of the past, the current difficulties in the Soviet Union, and its hopes and prospects for the future. Naturally, this work has drastically heightened requirements regarding the diplomats' competence, erudition, overall cultural level, and knowledge of Italian. Some of them still have room for improvement.

To further improve our informational work, we have made it a rule to regularly hear reports by our colleagues, beginning with the ambassador, on meetings held with Italian audiences. This enables us to gain a better understanding of what Italians are most interested in at a specific moment and what they advise us and what they criticise us for. And, correspondingly, it helps us make adjustments in our everyday operations. Curiously enough, at one of these "hearings" we tried to recall an instance of a provocative question being put to us, but we failed.

Several structural changes have taken place at the embassy, too. Even though we have a small staff, we had to form a "strike" economic group including diplomats from the scientific and technological subdivision and staffers of the trade mission. Today, as I have already pointed out, we are focusing on the development of Soviet-Italian economic cooperation (I devote approximately half of my work time to this). This group is playing a very useful role in studying the economic situation in the country and elaborating our proposals to be submitted to the Centre.

A few words about the ambassador's work. Demands have risen substantially, this work having become more notable, important and diverse. The ambassador's coordinating and initiative functions have broadened. Today he definitely needs to know as much as possible about the host-country, especially its language and people, i. e., he must be very well prepared professionally. This is an imperative today for a diplomat, especially an ambassador. I am not even mentioning his overall cultural level and ability to be sociable and dispose others towards himself as an interlocutor—all this is axiomatic.

Most importantly, unlike the past, when an ambassador frequently confined himself to sending simple information borrowed from the media

to the Centre, today dispatches containing his own assessments, analysis, comparisons and generalisations are required of him. Preferably, extensive and, of course, correct ones. That is, in the spirit of the time, the personal but fully substantiated opinion of the ambassador is demanded.

THE SOVIET EMBASSY, just like all of Italy, is looking forward to the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev in the country. The state visit is scheduled for November 29 to December 1. Intensive preparations for it are apace today. Everyone is talking about the visit—from the man in the street to the top leader. Italians believe that it will make it possible to display once again feelings of sincere friendship and affection for and trust in the Soviet people and its leader, and also to prepare psychologically for the development of Soviet-Italian cooperation in all fields.

As far as can be judged, the Italian leaders are taking a very serious attitude to the visit. They are of the opinion that it should as if summarise all the work done this year, above all by Mikhail Gorbachev, to improve the international situation and lay the foundations of the common European home. Indeed, the Soviet Union has accomplished a great deal here, and it would very useful to summarise what has been done. Rome thinks (and we, too, think for that matter) we could take a glimpse into the future and compare the new constructive ideas of both sides. What is more, the Soviet state visit is regarded as one to be made in return for the visits of the Italian leaders to Moscow in May 1985 and October 1988.

I have no doubts that the Italians will receive General Secretary Gorbachev and the entire Soviet delegation very warmly and cordially.

BRASILIA AND MOSCOW: CAPITALS WHICH HAVE BECOME CLOSER

Ronaldo Mota SARDENBERG

SUMMING UP THE RESULTS of his diplomatic work in Moscow, the head of any foreign mission proceeds from his own experience and his intrinsic manner of addressing himself to Soviet readers. In each instance such factors as the ambassador's personality and family status, knowledge in the field of culture, and also his professional and political experience take on great importance. On the other hand, especially from the standpoint of events in the international arena, such more objective circumstances as the extensiveness and nature of bilateral relations and the real potentialities for furthering their development, and the scope and level of the personnel of the diplomatic mission he heads, its work rhythm, etc. exert a direct impact on this.

I arrived in Moscow in February 1985 as the new Brazilian ambassador accredited at the Soviet government. I had received this appointment in my country's capital, Brasilia, where for the previous 11 years I had worked in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or Itamaraty, as the Brazilian Foreign Ministry is customarily referred to. As is the case in many other countries, the diplomatic service in Brazil is a career, when appointment to an initial post is made only on the basis of a competitive examination given at the national level and promotions in which are regulated. The long and uninterrupted tradition of the Itamaraty's diplomatic activity draws its beginning from the times when Brazil was an empire.

The academic education which I received can be considered typical of Brazilian diplomats of my generation. At the conclusion of my education at the law department of Brazil University, I entered Rio Branco Institute, the Brazilian diplomatic academy, which I graduated in 1962. My choice of a diplomatic career was unquestionably influenced by the fact that most of my family members and other relatives have long devoted their lives to state service.

Professionally, my first work experience abroad was obtained in the USA. For seven years, from 1967 to 1974, I, a young diplomat, engaged in economic and political matters in the Brazilian Embassy in Washington, D. C. and in the Permanent Mission to the UN. It was in New York that I first met my Soviet colleagues. I have preserved friendly ties with them and deep impressions of them from my UN period. One of these impressions is associated with the fact that I discovered for myself the

Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg has been Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Federative Republic of Brazil in the USSR since February 1985. The author donated the fee for this article to the Children's Fund of the USSR.

existence, if I may put it this way, of the Soviet diplomatic school, whose salient features are professionalism, efficiency, teamwork, and clarity of stands. The style of this "school" has evolved with the passage of time, but its main qualities have remained unchanged.

After my return to Brazil I held different posts in the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, including staff member and, later, head of the group in charge of political planning. I took part in the shaping and conduct of external diplomatic actions carried out by Brazil beginning with the establishment of diplomatic relations with China in 1974 and our recognition of the Portuguese-speaking countries of Africa in 1974-1975. I taught at the departments of international relations at Brazil University and Rio Branco Institute. From 1978 to 1984, I was a political adviser to two prominent foreign ministers—ambassadors Azeredo da Silveira and Saraiva Guerreiro. In 1980 I began taking part in Itamaraty efforts to revitalise bilateral relations with the Soviet Union.

I have always been interested in the Soviet state. I can recall that while I was a secondary school student I had read a good deal about the USSR, using, ironic as it sounded in the 1950s, the library of the US Embassy, which was situated in the same neighbourhood in Rio de Janeiro where I lived. I find some instances rather curious. Thus, in my last year at secondary school I figured among the winners of a contest about the Soviet Union and received a prize—a fine publication on the history of the United States by Morrisson and Commager! I can remember how in the late 1950s, when I was just 18, I had, completely by chance, an opportunity to speak with members of the first Soviet trade mission which had arrived in Brazil within the framework of the efforts being taken at the time to restore diplomatic relations which had been severed between our two countries in 1947. Later, when I took my competitive exam at the Itamaraty, the Soviet Union was the main topic of one of my exams.

Before my assignment to Moscow I had gone through the "sieve" of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal Senate, where aside from a discussion of the foremost matters of bilateral relations, my competence was checked. The education I received does not attest to the fact that I am a Sovietologist as such. It is my conviction, however, that my stay in the USA, and also my extensive knowledge, which usually enables me to assess the entire gamut of opinions, my experience in teaching and in political planning and promoting the adoption of key foreign policy decisions largely helped me analyse the innovative processes taking place in the USSR and evaluate the development of bilateral relations.

I arrived in Moscow in February 1985, literally on the eve of sweeping changes not only in the USSR but in Brazil as well. I thus was an eyewitness to two simultaneous transitional periods: while the Soviet Union was ushering in the era of perestroika, democratic transformations were apace in Brazil. By coincidence, both countries were moving, each in its own way and in accordance with its own social choice, to the same goal—the building of a rule-of-law state.

I perceived my appointment as a natural and very important turn in my career. The years that lay ahead provided me with a broad opportunity to test my competence and obtain valuable life experience. I had spent two months in Moscow prior to that, in 1982.

As could be expected, in Moscow I maintained contacts chiefly with the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs although, of course, I turned, to other organisations as well which dealt with trade, culture and science and technology. I was often received by Minister Shevardnadze, with whom I had fruitful talks. I was thus able to directly acquaint myself with his vision of international politics and assess his interest in the development of relations with Brazil.

In the different sections of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including the Protocol Department, I had an opportunity to discuss, either personally or through the Brazilian diplomats working with me, all aspects of bilateral and multilateral relations of immediate interest to Brazil. Both at the level of the Deputy Minister and the officials of the Latin American Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs I invariably encountered politeness, consideration and competence on the part of my Soviet colleagues. This attitude is indubitably facilitating better relations between our two countries.

More changes have occurred here over the past four years than at any other peacetime period in history. Thanks to its ability to take advantage of the possibilities opening up in the international arena and also owing to its ability to create new political structures and broaden the horizons of cooperation in foreign policy, Moscow has become one of the main capitals of world diplomacy. Over these years stands have been reassessed, basic conceptions have been reevaluated, and new foreign policy initiatives have been formulated.

Contacts are broadening with political circles, journalists and the intelligentsia. Press briefings have become part and parcel of the work day for foreign diplomats and journalists. It has become easier to follow developments in the country and correctly understand the tasks which the Soviet government and society are setting themselves. Additional possibilities are emerging for international contacts and for strengthening friendship among countries.

The everyday work of the head of a diplomatic mission, like that of any other person, does not, of course, consist solely of work. Frequent visits to the Bolshoi Theatre, the Tchaikovsky Conservatoire, museums, fine arts exhibitions, and also the Moscow Circus, football and hockey games, and Moscow's parks, let alone trips to different regions of the country, are numerous channels for obtaining information, for recreation and for meeting Soviet people.

A SHORT TIME AFTER MY ARRIVAL in the Soviet capital and the presentation of my credentials, I realised that if I was to discharge my duties effectively, I had, in addition to representative activity, to keep the Brazilian government informed as objectively as possible of the sweeping changes that were under way in the Soviet Union and also to work to galvanize bilateral relations.

Providing information was the overriding consideration. A multifaceted vision of the rapidly unfolding developments in the USSR needed to be formed in Brazil. And, what is especially important, paths of developing bilateral relations that corresponded to this vision needed to be found. Unquestionably, perestroika and glasnost immediately began providing the best possible conditions for accomplishing this task. I think that this policy clearly showed the entire complexity of the problems facing the USSR, inspired public discussion of new topics and made it possible to analyse the country's socio-economic development in a new way.

As I understood it, the Soviet Union had to be viewed from the outset in critical but not biased fashion. The point at issue was avoiding ideological filters and not being guided by power politics, which is intrinsic to East-West relations but which should not take place in relations between the USSR and Brazil.

I considered this approach a prerequisite for work to broaden bilateral ties. The main steps that had to be taken were to study and understand Soviet problems, including those which touch upon relations with Brazil,

and certain stereotypes in analysis had to be rejected. It is useful to recall in this connection that when Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev took office in March 1985, the USSR's relations with the West, and especially with the USA, were still under the influence of the period which some observers called the Second Cold War. The exacerbation of tensions that had become typical of the early 1980s had exerted an impact on international affairs as a whole and on each of our two countries separately.

In this respect Brazil was in an especially unprofitable position. For internal reasons the country failed to take advantage of the detente of the 1970s in order to improve its relations with the Soviet Union properly. It seems to me that the real base of Brazilian-Soviet relations was extremely narrow and still lacked mutual understanding. Relations were confined almost exclusively to individual trade and the economy. The task was to rapidly change the situation, shape a new thinking and surmount the obstacles in the way. I want to note that this began to be effected even before the Second Cold War had come to an end.

To my mind, in 1945, when diplomatic relations were established between Brazil and the USSR, three basic interdependent factors directly conditioned these relations, namely, patent ideologisation, the low level of ties (aside from two brief periods) and the emphasis on trade.

The key problem was normalisation of bilateral relations, i. e., it was necessary to extricate them from a state of lethargy and force them to develop, and to broaden their base so as to ensure long-term stable success.

It is a known fact that at the very beginning of the 1980s top-level Brazilian-Soviet diplomatic dialogue, which had been frozen since 1964, began to be restored. In 1981 the practice of meetings at the foreign minister level during the proceedings of the UN General Assembly sessions was resumed by a talk in New York between Saraiva Guerreiro, the Brazilian foreign minister at the time, and Andrei Gromyko. Even though these meetings were very general, they were unquestionably useful, since they demonstrated the interest in raising the level of relations. The Fundamental Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation was signed later that year. Despite the fact that it got off the ground slowly, I believe that it eventually became instrumental to the development of ties between our two countries.

The Brazilian government began taking decisive steps in foreign policy to make it more flexible and universal and to modernise concepts. This long-term process which began in 1974 pursued the aim of gradually overcoming the primacy of ideological orientations in what affects the shaping and protection of Brazil's foreign policy interests.

In the early 1980s Brazil avoided any sanctions or similar measures against the USSR by taking part in the 1980 Moscow Olympics, and continued normal trade with Moscow, maintaining diplomatic ties at the existing level and even consolidating them somewhat.

In general, however, bilateral relations from 1964 to 1985 went through a long period of stagnation, at the end of which they were still underdeveloped. As I understood it, we found ourselves in a vicious circle—there was no progress in our relations because the sides were not well disposed to each other, which happened because relations were limited and poorly developed. Politically, neither Brazil nor the Soviet Union gave priority to the development of their bilateral ties, which were based on an insufficiently flexible practical foundation.

A new stage began in late 1984-early 1985. In Brazil's opinion, the prospects for cooperation broadened at that time. A re-examination of the state of affairs in which cooperation boiled down to trade was beginning, i. e., changes towards a more comprehensive approach occurred. For example, we arrived at an understanding of the fact that the USSR

should not be viewed solely from the standpoint of its military might. We needed to take into account its political influence, natural wealth and its successes in the economy and in science and technology. It was recognised that in its strategic balance with the USA the USSR was one of the determinants of world politics.

Beginning in 1985, a trend towards tapping as fully as possible the potential of a dialogue with the USSR, however, with due account for the actual level of mutual relations at the time, established itself in Brazilian official quarters with the support of the Itamaraty. In the intervening years it was planned to set about concrete cooperation, the principle of pragmatism and mutual benefit being the guide.

A patent readiness to cogently broaden political relations with the USSR, specifically in the sphere which had the most obstacles, was already manifesting itself. The emphasis was shifted to establishment and maintenance of regular contacts with Soviet government circles, the intelligentsia and the press.

Bilateral relations came to be perceived as something of independent significance. It was admitted, however, that they would be developed only given mutual good will in the political sphere. Thus it was also deemed necessary for the Soviet government to demonstrate its readiness to develop relations on the basis of compliance with the universally accepted principles of relations between sovereign states with different political systems. That is precisely what happened.

This did not mean, however, that Brazil intended to pay less attention to trade and economic cooperation. Quite the contrary, it continued and strengthened.

In other words, there began a process of normalisation of relations, the culmination of which was the visit of President Jose Sarney to Moscow and Leningrad in 1988. Pragmatism, clarity, objectivity and mutual benefit became the new watchwords in the efforts to launch a more productive dialogue. I would like to stress that the new elements in our relations became possible thanks to the changes in Brazil's foreign policy, its transition to democracy, the establishment of the New Republic, and, afterwards, the broader framework of political debate during the elaboration of the new Constitution.

For its part, there began almost simultaneously the process of Soviet society's economic and social reforms, which is known throughout the world as perestroika. The internal transformations gave rise to new thinking in Soviet foreign policy as well, substantially changing its style and content.

The galvanisation of Soviet diplomacy led the USSR to new horizons on the international scene. One result of this was the fact that Latin American countries and the region as a whole appeared on the new diplomatic map of the USSR. I am not taking into account here such specific matters as the position of Cuba and the situation in Central America, as well as Moscow's statements in crises, such as the one surrounding the Malvinas.

The USSR's approach to Brazil began to be re-examined, albeit cautiously. With the passage of time this process accelerated thanks to the positive changes in the international arena and also to the Soviet initiatives and the sweeping reforms that had been carried out in Moscow's foreign policy.

The appointment of Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, who by coincidence had already visited Brazil as the head of a parliamentary delegation, to the post of Foreign Minister, was still another important factor. When he arrived in New York in September 1985 to open the general debate at the UN General Assembly, President Sarney received the Soviet minister. During the talk that was held within the framework of the aforemen-

tioned annual meetings, the president directly stated Brazil's new stand.

Certain parameters had already been formulated by that time which, in Brazil's opinion, should determine the development of our bilateral relations. The following can be singled out:

- respect for each other's sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs;

- recognition of the fact that Brazil and the Soviet Union, notwithstanding the difference in stands, the international circumstances and the different social systems, should be guided by a common principle in accordance with which all states are duly bound to strengthen peace and international security;

- emphasis on amicable ties between states which should develop in a regulated and realistic form;

- subordination of these relations to the logic of mutual interests which make it possible to avoid the injection of factors alien to them;

- a systematic search for mutual benefit and also the development of stable relations devoid of a didactic tone.

A short time later, in December 1985 Olavo Setubal, the Brazilian Foreign Minister at the time, visited the Soviet Union. In Moscow Setubal stated Brazil's vested interest in galvanising relations and frankly admitted the problems existing in the trade and economic sphere. At Brazil's initiative Memorandum of Mutual Understanding was discussed and signed. It stimulates political consultations between the foreign ministers of our two countries on a broad spectrum of diplomatic matters. Afterwards the USSR drew on this experience for broadening its relations with other countries, including Latin American ones.

Mr. Setubal's innovative visit, the first visit by a Brazilian Foreign Minister to the USSR, and the visit which Renato Archer, the then Minister of Science and Technology, made the following year, were successful. They marked an important stage in Brazilian-Soviet relations. I believe these visits were conducive to changes in modes of thinking and to an opening of fresh horizons by clearly demonstrating the existence of wide possibilities for our cooperation.

When preparations began for the visit of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to Brazil in late 1987, a broad understanding had been reached regarding the fact that the conditions had become ripe for a new type of relations, relations making it possible to proceed to a diplomacy based chiefly on negotiations. In order to develop relations, a desire to lessen the possibilities for the emergence of misunderstandings and disagreements in all areas had already appeared at the time.

We realised that our rapprochement with the USSR was taking place in a complicated period of relations between Brazil and the industrialised countries headed by the USA, the most notable facet of which continues to be financial and trade problems. In the face of external pressure, it was politically imperative for the Brazilian government to become convinced that relations with the USSR could be of long duration and viable and were of vital importance. That the Soviet Union would take the place of the USA or the West in Brazilian diplomacy was not the point at issue. Neither Brazil nor the USSR set themselves that goal. However, efforts were taken to make relations between Brazil and the USSR as amicable, effective and comprehensive as possible. In Moscow it was always impressed upon me that the Soviet Union would go just as far as Brazil on this road.

In our times of rapid change and of the risk of the world economy disintegrating, especially along North-South lines, the policy of normalising our bilateral relations has facilitated the protection of Brazil's interests in the international arena.

On the other hand, political and economic rapprochement has already been felt in these times not only between different European capitals and Moscow but also between the USSR and the USA. Specifically, beginning in 1987, one could expect a wide-ranging involvement of top-level diplomacy and, as a result, the possibility that accords between the USSR and the USA would encompass so-called regional crises in addition to global problems. It was also becoming obvious that the USSR would review its attitude to its involvement in conflict situation and would also display great constraint in terms of the arms race. In the light of such developments it no longer made sense to slow down or limit the development of relations with the USSR. Quite the contrary, they needed to be raised to a new level.

It was in this atmosphere that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze was received in Brazil. The first visit of the Soviet Foreign Minister to Brazil generated—I was a witness to this—a broad response in government circles and among the public. A considerable impetus was imparted to bilateral relations, in the development of which the sides were guided, as Minister Abreu Sodré put it, by a "mature and constructive spirit". At the same time the visit was a contribution to the affirmation of the USSR's new image in Brazil.

Speaking in Itamaraty, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze expressed feelings of admiration for our country and pointed to the unique opportunity for promoting relations that were opening up. He also expressed hope that Brazil's historically established ties with its neighbours would not be broken. I recall his words to the effect that "...such countries as the Soviet Union and Brazil, which possess enormous potential and inexhaustible dynamism, are capable of giving a great deal to humanity as a united family and to the cause of peace, since peace is the natural and the best state of the human community. And if you and we were allies in the most ruthless war of our age, why can't we be partners in creating a new world?.. We want to know the viewpoint of such a great country as Brazil regarding the problems of peace, security, cooperation and the future of humanity."¹

It was these developments that made the visit of President Jose Sarney to the USSR in October 1988 possible. In less than four years Soviet-Brazilian relations were filled with new content and became more diverse and comprehensive. The governments of Brazil and the Soviet Union elaborated fundamental measures at different levels to impart fresh impetuses to the normalisation and revitalisation process.² For example, a new stage in our relations was inaugurated in August and September 1988 when meetings were held between Brazilian and Soviet military officials.

President Sarney's visit to the USSR was undoubtedly a success. Its specific tasks of formalising the transition to the new type of relations and the top-level dialogue with the Soviet leadership were accomplished. Another task was a striving to show in terms of developing relations with the USSR that Brazil is a modern and democratic country. The other aims of the visit were to acquaint the Soviet Union with my country's economic development trends and the measures being taken to enhance its well-being, and also to voice concern over such global problems as war and peace, disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament,

¹ In Brazil, foreign ministers Roberto Costa di Abreu Sodré and Eduard Shevardnadze signed, on September 30, 1987, important agreements, including the Agreement on Cultural Cooperation, talks on which had been held for several years and which is expected to make development in this field possible on a regular and balanced basis.

² President Sarney not only received Soviet guests frequently; he exchanged messages with President Mikhail Gorbachev on important political issues.

hunger and poverty, utilisation of scientific and technological progress for social development, respect for human rights, and protection and rational use of the environment.

In the broad sense, the visit spelled the end of the period of ideologisation of Brazil's foreign policy. The aim was reached of substantially improving our relations with the Soviet Union, which we now consider a partner. Brazil, which is not a member of any bloc, is offering the USSR dynamic and mutually beneficial cooperation. On the other hand, as President Gorbachev stressed in his speech welcoming President Sarney in the Kremlin, "...the possibilities are limitless for economic cooperation between the USSR and Brazil with their vast natural resources, their enormous potential and their orientation for rapid economic advance."

The Declaration on Principles of Cooperation for Peace and International Cooperation which Jose Sarney and Mikhail Gorbachev signed in Moscow on October 19, 1988, symbolises the success scored by the normalisation policy and constitutes a proper basis for work in the general interest. One of the main provisions of the declaration is the common viewpoint that the preservation of civilisation and the development of international cooperation presupposes peaceful and harmonious coexistence and the establishment of a more just, balanced and democratic political and economic order.

I believe that "peaceful and harmonious coexistence" is the key idea of the last decade of our century. This idea implies something more than the existence of neighbouring but isolated states. It is geared to relations that would indeed bring countries closer together and unite them much more than the mere need for survival in the face of a nuclear nightmare. Such ideas as "peaceful and harmonious coexistence" can anticipate a new stage of civilisation at which the human race will indeed live as one family within the framework of a just, balanced and democratic order.



OWING TO THE SUCCESSES SCORED as a result of President Sarney's visit, the stage of the formation of Brazilian-Soviet relations that began in 1985 can be considered effectually concluded. They no longer suffer from the problems that used to be intrinsic to them. A new stage in the development of relations and cooperation on a stable and unbiased basis is beginning.

The year 1989 witnessed inspiring shifts in this direction. Contacts and cooperation are being enhanced as differences in approaches are being overcome. Relations already patently exhibit common elements in the views of prominent political, trade and economic and scientific quarters.

The normal development of Brazilian-Soviet relations on the whole requires, for example, great advances in trade and the economy. It would not make sense to turn this sphere, which is constantly in a state of flux, into a brake on the further development of Brazilian-Soviet ties. I know of a number of innovative projects and initiatives for cooperation involving state-owned companies and private Brazilian firms. It is planned to focus on organising and utilising new joint enterprises in Brazil, the USSR and third countries. It is imperative to speed up the implementation of these projects and broaden cooperation and make it concrete and effective. I also think that the conditions are ripe for the start of a direct dialogue between Brazil and CMEA, irrespective of the relations which this organisation already maintains with the Latin American Economic System.

If the agreement on cooperation in the field of culture is complied with, a constant increase in the number of cultural events held by Brazil and

the USSR is a prime task. Over 1,000 Soviet artists and cultural celebrities visited Brazil this year. If the mass media cover Brazil more and if it becomes closer to Soviet people as a result, mutual friendship and all-round cooperation, including that in the trade and economic sphere will be fostered more quickly.

Of late, the Soviet public at large has had an opportunity to acquaint itself with Brazilian culture (folk music, films, television) and sports (football, volleyball, etc.).

This is only the beginning, however; the normal development of bilateral relations requires, both in these and other spheres, incomparably more than mere curiosity or interest in exotics. I believe television has a decisive role to play here.

It will be noted that scientific and technological cooperation has broad possibilities for development. Although Brazil cannot be compared to the USSR in scope, it is the consensus that it is a dynamically developing country in the application of research in different spheres. For example, joint space research with satellites, in particular, analysis of photographs received through remote-controlled space probes is opening up possibilities for cooperation in other spheres as well. In view of the urgency of ecological problems, the current project to simultaneously measure the content of ozone in the atmosphere and the level of space radiation is of special interest. Another example of environmental protection measures is the proposal for cooperation in the production and transfer of ecologically pure energy, biogenetics and forest planting. We would like to believe that cooperation in these spheres and also in fine chemistry and the study of superconductivity is opening up promising and qualitatively new prospects for the development of contacts between our two countries.

There is every reason to believe that bilateral relations will develop successfully in the years to come. In terms of world politics, it appears that the resumption of the processes of a lessening of tension is stimulating a general favourable trend towards more extensive cooperation between Brazil and the USSR. The fact that the above-mentioned Declaration signed by presidents Sarney and Gorbachev stress that both countries will seek to have their relations exemplify equitable cooperation between states with different socio-political systems is of great importance. There is thus a favourable international situation and a mutual readiness for cooperation on the part of Brazil and the USSR. Such a coincidence cannot but be taken advantage of.

On the other hand, there is an increasing realisation of the fact that the development of bilateral relations has realistic underpinnings by virtue of the enormous size and potentialities of our two countries. It is my conviction that their role in tackling global problems will grow considerably in the years to come. Today, when East-West relations are improving markedly but unresolved North-South problems still exist and are even worsening, Brasilia and Moscow, like other capitals, cannot but feel an impetus to explore new avenues of diplomacy. If the leading powers of the capitalist and socialist camps, which are in the much-touted "state of decisive rivalry" could improve their relations, this would unquestionably make it easier to set other mechanisms of international politics in motion as well.

It was this that President Sarney had in mind when he proposed, in Moscow, bending special efforts to make East-South relations more effective. This aspect of international politics and the economy, which in effect has not been utilised to this day, is becoming increasingly significant as the USSR reaffirms its renewed interest in international cooperation.

The USSR is not the only country to figure prominently in Brazilian diplomacy, but Soviet political quarters are assigning Brazil an ever

more important role. This is evidenced by the addresses of President Gorbachev in the UN last December and his recent visit to Havana. By all appearances, Brazil, which possesses valuable experience and is one of the industrial giants emerging in Latin America, is regarded by Moscow as a country whose voice should be heard in the international arena and which should be intensively cooperated with. All this attests to the fact that the Soviet leadership recognises the process of democratisation and modernisation in Brazil and Latin America as a whole and follows it closely. What is more, it has voiced the conviction that such countries as Brazil should play an important role in the modern and future world process.

For this reason both sides have a vital interest in broadening the present practice of talks and political consultations. Such poignant topics as a multilateral search for a solution to the foreign debt problem of the developing countries, on which Brasilia and Moscow have repeatedly expressed their views, can possibly be included on the agenda of these talks at the proper moment. Furthermore, as the record of the past two years has shown, the markedly more frequent summits between the two countries tend to become the centre-piece of the search for new possibilities for attaining progress in relations.

THE GENERAL CONSULATE: INSIDE AND OUTSIDE

Victor KARYAGIN

SEVERAL YEARS AGO, on a January morning, I landed from a Baltic ferry on the Swedish coast and travelled on to Göteborg, capital of southwestern Sweden, to take up my new post. I had in my attaché case a patent by which the Soviet Foreign Ministry confirmed my powers as Consul-General in that city and ten provinces of the country. An exequatur put on the patent indicated that the Swedish Foreign Ministry recognised me in that capacity.

Posted on the roadside at frequent intervals was an ad portraying a mischievous boy astride a goose. A flock of real wild geese flying along the seashore parallel to the highway seemed to suggest that it was from those parts that he had set out on his wonderful journey to which generations of youngsters and grown-ups are indebted for an entertaining geography of Sweden.

However, my thoughts did not really dispose me to contemplate scenic landscapes. I recalled the direction and advice I had received at various levels before I left. In those days, Soviet-Swedish relations were palpably affected by the blasts of depth bombs dropped into the peaceful waters of fiords from minesweepers and helicopters of the Swedish coastal patrol chasing "unidentified" submarines. As for the press, it carried reports about "spies" and "saboteurs", making a point of specifying their nationality.

I was not entirely a newcomer in Sweden. Twenty years earlier, I had gone there on a fairly delicate mission: prevailing on the Swedes to accord the Soviet premier during his forthcoming visit the honours due to a statesman of his rank. There would have been no particular problem but for the main point of my mission, the national salute. The vessel in which the visitor was to arrive was not a warship and so could not return the salute in conformity with Swedish naval regulations. A solution was found after a week-long search. It was the first time I had an opportunity to appreciate the high professionalism of Swedish diplomats, their negotiating style, a seemingly soft but actually tough position which they do not abandon until offered cogent arguments. I also had occasion to meet with the Swedes at the negotiating table later on.

My previous experience was likely to come in handy but I realised that it was nothing but a means. I held a consular job for the first time. It differed essentially from an ambassador's or negotiator's diplomatic job. Say, a consulate's political and information work contributes to and is subordinated to the work of the embassy concerned. At the same time,

Victor Karyagin, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, served as Consul-General of the USSR in Göteborg from 1984 to 1989.

there are functions which consulates must discharge on their own, conformably to the given region and the peculiarities of their duties. I mean contacts with the local authorities, the public, the press and the consular corps, study of the activity of municipal bodies, assistance to trade and economic ties, shipping, cultural, scientific, sporting and tourist exchanges, the defence of national interests and the property interests and rights of citizens living permanently or temporarily in the foreign country, and so on.

Work in a new place always abounds in impressions. During the courtesy visits I paid to members of consular corps, I learnt an amusing fact of history. My American colleague showed me a photocopied page of a local directory published about a hundred years before. It said that in the 1870s the Russian Vice-Consul in Göteborg (a baron, I believe) had represented US interests in that city. Some of my other impressions had to do with internal matters; among other things, I discovered rather frequent errors and inaccuracies relating to purely consular functions (issuing visas, the arrival, stay and departure of Soviet citizens, notarial acts) on the part of very experienced officials.

I felt that most of those errors were due to the imperfection and archaic nature of official regulations. Exchanges of "courtesies" between the Ministry and the Consulate-General served no purpose other than putting positions on record just in case. At the same time, they made one subconsciously aware of a latent threat. This feeling was reinforced by recollections of the advice of experienced friends, who had told me that any blunder in the performance of purely consular functions due to a carelessness could prove harmful in other spheres. I called on the staff to bear this in mind.

PERESTROIKA in the Foreign Ministry was accompanied by sharp criticism of the Ministry's apparatus. Looking back at the recent past, I can draw some conclusions.

By the time perestroika started, the consular service, which had long been the Ministry's weak point and whose old troubles were ignored for decades, was probably in a more vulnerable state than any other echelon. In earlier years, consular subdivisions at home and abroad had somehow maintained the requisite standard of service in providing legal protection for our missions abroad in general and their staff members in particular, as well as for officials arriving to join in various exchanges. Until recently, however, Soviet citizens living permanently abroad or travelling there privately (their number is steadily growing) failed to receive proper care and attention from the consular service as a system representing the state.

"Train from Paris", an article published in *Izvestia* in February 1987 and depicting the misadventures of a Soviet citizen who found himself in trouble abroad, furnished striking evidence of the backwardness and helplessness of our consular service.

Shortly afterwards the Foreign Ministry Collegium, prompted by the *Izvestia* article as it were, discussed and condemned shortcomings in the consular service. The decision adopted by it instructed diplomatic missions and consulates to render assistance, including material aid, to Soviet citizens who found themselves in a difficult situation abroad.

Meanwhile a Soviet citizen who called at the Consulate in Göteborg asked to be immediately sent home with her child, likewise a Soviet citizen. She had married a Swede but, being unable to get along with her husband, had decided to go home although she had no money even to buy

food. From what she told us, it was obvious that she was on the verge of a nervous breakdown.

We took care of her and her child but where were we to get money for her journey back? The bookkeepers of both the Consulate-General and the Embassy said in no uncertain terms that our foreign missions had no appropriations for such purposes. Luckily enough, there was a Soviet cargo ship in Göteborg harbour just then. Its master took the two passengers aboard in violation of regulations, obtaining an official letter from the Consulate to be on the safe side.

We asked the Ministry to inform us in what situations we could grant loans, how much we could lend and on what security, what items of expenditure we could draw on, and so forth. These were by no means idle questions, and we realised that our colleagues in other countries, too, wanted to know the answers. But we never got a response.

The need to study the problem was pointed out explicitly at the conference of consular officers held in 1988. Early this year we thought we could see the light at the end of the tunnel. We received a circular authorising us to spend on aid 10 per cent of the above-plan receipts acquired as fees for consular operations. These receipts include fees for the prompt granting of a visa to an applicant who asks us without regard to the time limits agreed between the two countries to speed the operation. In such a contingency, we are compelled to discuss the matter with Moscow by telephone, send urgent messages, assign work on holidays or days off to people who are not on the staff, and so on.

A further service of this nature is the dispatch of requests for archival and other historical records, microfilming and other operations entailing additional, often substantial expenditures and involving services exempt from stamp duty.

We cannot count on "above-plan" receipts in the form of such fees, for it is clear even to the uninitiated that the fees cannot be steady and hence do not lend themselves to planning (not on the basis of the achieved levels, anyway). But even assuming that "above-plan" receipts are likely in, say, West Germany, Sweden, Italy or the United States, it should be remembered that this is out of the question in the overwhelming majority of countries for perfectly obvious reasons.

It follows that the circular I have mentioned can hardly solve the problem even in part. Yet on July 30, 1989, *Pravda*, quoting a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry (inaccurately, as it emerged afterwards), wrote under the headline "If You Were to Fall Ill Abroad" that "in a critical situation... consular officers can undertake to immediately pay a doctor's bill". It would be wrong to believe that solution of the problem depends entirely on the financial department of the Foreign Ministry. The department's possibilities are strictly circumscribed by the Finance Ministry, whose attitude is easy to predict and explain.

Still, financial officials of the Foreign Ministry should press more strongly for a solution. The most promising approach seems to be the one that we have come very close to. I mean deriving funds from all real consular fees and not just those "over and above plan". This would provide consulates with more or less identical opportunities according to the likely redistribution of funds and depending on the situation in the given region.

A need for financial aid to compatriots in trouble will recur for as long as the problem of such aid remains unsolved. Last summer I happened to travel with a large group of Soviet tourists from Armenia and several other Soviet citizens who were to board in Stockholm a Soviet liner bound for Leningrad. Due to an accident, they were transferred in all haste onto the deck of a Finnish ferry plying between Stockholm and Helsinki. In these circumstances, the Swedish tourist company which had

been paid for the tours and was responsible for providing appropriate services should have seen if only to it that our tourists did not go hungry. Yet they did, for nearly 24 hours. The group's arrival in Helsinki was only made known to the Finnish frontier guards, whom their Swedish colleagues had notified of it to ensure that transit visas were issued.

The tension was lessened by the head of the Consular Department of the Soviet Embassy in Finland, who happened to be in the harbour just then. He immediately called his aides and other Soviet representatives, who supplied their compatriots with food and saw them off to Leningrad. After the problem had thus been solved, our officials were asked how they were going to render account for the expenses of the operation. They shrugged uncertainly, as if to say they would see what could be done. (You will agree that the above incidents were far more dramatic than the one described in "Train from Paris", for in the latter case our citizen could at least complain of his misfortunes and comment ironically on the bad manners of the Consulate's janitor, relaxing in the cosy apartment of his relatives overlooking the Champs Elysées.)

THE CONSULAR SERVICE should draw on the experience of the central apparatus and missions abroad to work out a clear concept of how to evolve, revise or improve consular standards with due regard to what has been accomplished in recent years as well as to the requirements of perestroika. This year we have joined the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963). And now we will obviously have not only to work out new consular regulations but to thoroughly update all standard-setting documents.

Speakers at the conference of consular officers discussed the matter competently and in sufficient detail. I can hardly add anything from the theoretical point of view but still I think there is nothing wrong with my making some practical suggestions intended for my young colleagues who will have to shoulder the heavy burden of consular work.

To begin with, it would be useful for standard-setting to be geared to long-term requirements, for recent experience has shown standard-setting acts issued on the spur of the moment if with good intentions to be imperfect and shortlived. It is advisable not only to discuss draft documents in the appropriate echelons of the central apparatus but to circulate them for the same purpose to missions abroad so as to ensure that ideas suggested by the experience of everyday work are taken into account as far as possible. Also, it is desirable to see to it that the fundamental consular standards to be evolved are complete and precise enough to preclude misinterpretation. Above all else, it is necessary to prevent them becoming "barnacled" with any departmental regulations or addenda many of which currently detract from or emasculate the main standard, so much so that none but consular officers who have been keeping various records for their own use can take their bearings in the maze of all sorts of exceptions, amendments and reservations.

In Sweden, a typical bourgeois law-governed state whose experience we speak of so often, standard-setting acts (those on passports, immigration and tariffs as well as other acts regulating consular work) are issued by parliament in the form of laws ruling out all interpretative acts or departmental instructions. These laws are accessible to all—anyone can acquaint himself with them in a periodically updated collection of laws.

The problems of our consular service are becoming more and more evident. The necessity of updating it, which arises from rapid perestroika processes, leads to numerous innovations relating to entry and exit visas

and to many concomitant problems. In this situation, our consular officers abroad need to show particular efficiency in introducing innovations. But their task is often made difficult by the circumstance that innovations do not reach them until after coming into force.

Consulates could look deeper into the substance of customs regulations, in particular on tariff rates. New rates have been in force since August 15, 1989. Duty on imported personal computers, for example, is up from 400 to 5,000 rubles and duty on cars, car parts, tyres, and so on, remains high. Is this wise? Although 30 to 50 per cent reductions have been announced for the latter, these percentages do not reveal the fact that in money terms duty on some items is as high as, and in some cases higher than, the retail price of these items.

From the point of view of trading and economic principles, this policy should be one of the measures adopted by the state to safeguard the interests of manufacturers against an invasion of the home market by competitive foreign products. But our current consumer goods shortages make me consider such measures counterproductive.

New regulations decreed in the middle of last year offered Soviet people ample opportunities for foreign travel. They are to be superseded by still more democratic regulations. I hope they will simplify technicalities and leave no room for our agencies in charge to insist, as they did last year in keeping with an earlier "tradition", that applicants should observe formalities not envisaged by the new rules.

That was also when the Interior Ministry's Visa and Registration Office charged relatives of those about to pay a brief private visit to employees of Soviet missions abroad 200 rubles for a passport, or as much as it charged emigrants. It was not until months later that the fee was cut to 40 rubles.

According to a provision still in force (and likely to stay so), Soviet citizens of this category are not allowed to buy foreign exchange for rubles so as to pay at least their travelling expenses. Yet citizens invited by relatives or acquaintances who live permanently abroad have the right to exchange a fairly large amount of money. What is the reason for this discrimination?

Continuing my comments on Soviet customs regulations, I suppose I must call attention to a rule by which no undeveloped film may be taken out of the country. Recalcitrant foreign tourists ask for a coherent explanation of the reason why slides made as souvenirs of the tour are confiscated. This is also what consular officers are wondering about, for it is hard to imagine that foreign tourists would try to smuggle out our state secrets in that way. Granting that among the many thousands of tourists arriving in our country there may be a few ill-wishers who record certain of our negative realities, the likely damage does not compare with the damage we cause to ourselves. Indeed, thousands of people who come to our country at least out of well-intentioned curiosity if not because they are prompted by friendly sentiments return home annoyed or antagonised.

Problems go much further than purely consular functions. Specifically, why cannot a rail ticket for a Soviet through car be used in say, Brussels, if its holder cannot leave with it from Paris? Why doesn't this ticket entitle its holder to the services of the railroads of any other country, including even socialist countries? Lastly, why cannot it be exchanged for an Aeroflot ticket if necessary? These seemingly rhetorical questions bring out shortcomings in the international agreements signed by our transport agencies, meaning the Ministry of Railroads in this instance.

To return to the predicament of the tourists from Armenia, who were compelled to travel to Leningrad via Finland. Why was it that when they arrived in Helsinki, no representative of the tourist company which had been in charge of them in Sweden was there to meet them, offer them a

meal and distract their minds from the mishaps that had befallen them? The obvious explanation is that the missions of our commercial agencies—the Ministry of Sea Shipping and Intourist—in Stockholm deal with either unscrupulous or unsuitable partners and that the consular service overlooked this in the past and did nothing to put things right by offering timely advice. (Incidentally, the American tourists who sailed for Leningrad in the same ship but were under the charge of another firm were promptly picked up in the harbour and got both food and lodgings.)

The foregoing is a direct or indirect part of consular work. The responsibilities of consular officers have grown immensely, and this calls for effort to influence standard-setting and practical activities involving the consular service. Seeing that the service is expected to defend the country's interests in common with other agencies and to bear its share of foreign political responsibility for this, it should also contribute directly to the formation of a proper line. The consular service should insist on its rights, for ultimately any measure involving it puts a burden on its members and bears in broader terms on the interests of our entire foreign service.

CONSULAR ACTIVITY INCLUDES a line that is still underestimated. Yet it has a direct relation to the very sensitive concept of national prestige. People serving in the consular departments of embassies or in consulates concern themselves with practically every aspect of the legal status of Soviet missions as well as of the stay of Soviet employees abroad. They deal with, among others, the problems of building or renting premises and living quarters, purchasing, importing and using motor vehicles and other property, applying for visas, registering employees, ensuring respect for the regime of residence and travel in the foreign country, and seeing to the granting of established personal privileges and customs facilities.

Yet most consular officers have a vague idea of how these matters are settled in the case of foreign diplomats and other representatives in the Soviet Union, for this is mainly a function of the Protocol Department, the Diplomatic Corps Service Bureau and the Information Department (journalists).

Familiarity with our rules is necessary for a competent approach to the principle of reciprocity. Compare some situations involving diplomats at home and abroad. Every diplomat about to board a plane in a foreign country has to go through personal examination at the airport, where he has all his belongings checked, including his fountain pen and the keys of his suitcases. Nobody is exempt but VIPs. At Soviet airports, however, people travelling with diplomatic passports, whatever their rank, are respectfully allowed to cross to the plane without examination.

Articles 16 and 17 of the regulations on the diplomatic and consular missions of foreign states on the territory of the USSR provide that by the terms of a special agreement, privileges and immunities granted to diplomats may be extended to members of administrative, technical and service staff. Only a few countries have chosen to conclude such agreements with us, and yet staff members of the missions of other countries having signed no such agreements are generally treated by Soviet administrative, customs and other authorities informally and benevolently.

If this results in no particular complications to which we must react, we good-naturedly shut our eyes to the approach taken by other countries. The Swedes examine the baggage and personal belongings of non-diplomatic employees of the Soviet Embassy, Trade Representation or Con-

sulate-General arriving in or leaving the country. There have been cases of a similar treatment of Soviet officials travelling to Norway with diplomatic passports by way of Sweden.

During traffic accidents abroad, police occasionally demand that the driver of a diplomatic car pass a test for alcohol, and this is understandable even though the demand is unlawful. But demands for selective or other tests of a similar nature are unacceptable in principle for all that they occur everywhere. In our country, militiamen never make such demands on members of the diplomatic or consular corps or on other foreign representatives.

Now try when you are in the United States, Britain, France, West Germany or some other Western country to park your car in the wrong place. You can rest assured that on coming back, you will find a sticker under the windshield wiper. Your diplomatic immunity will save you from a fine but a note from the country's foreign office is certain to mention your name among those of other offenders from your mission, the list covering a period of three to six months. In London, your car is likely to be hauled to some obscure neighbourhood beyond the Thames even if the police know that you are a guest at an event attended by members of the royal family or the government, and you can only secure the release of your car after going through a tedious and humiliating procedure.

Not so in Moscow. In this city, not only embassy officials but reporters and employees of foreign firms park their cars anywhere with impunity. You can satisfy yourself of this at, say, 148 Leninsky Prospekt. The side streets around the block are cluttered with cars owned by foreigners, who park them even on sidewalks, right under "No Parking" signs, in defiance of several militia posts. Similar scenes can be watched in other parts of the capital.

Mention should also be made of certain forms of taxation. There is a precise international standard written into the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Art. 34) and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. It allows for only an indirect tax that is included in the price of a commodity or the fee for a service, but practice varies greatly from country to country.

In New York, ordinary customers pay for every commodity 10 per cent more on the average than is indicated on the price tag. It is a direct municipal tax. On showing the cashier a document certifying your diplomatic status, you are exempted from this tax. A similar practice exists in Ottawa, if I am not mistaken; in Montreal you pay the price plus tax but afterwards the tax department reimburses you the tax on being presented with the bill.

In Sweden the trade and service sphere charges you a direct 19 per cent direct state tax (*moms*), which is included in the price of commodities and services and stated in bills. But you can only get back the amount paid as tax if you have bought expensive equipment, furniture or other durables or gas.

All articles of clothing, food products and other goods in everyday demand are subject to the above tax without reimbursement, which means—to put it plainly—that the Swedish Treasury deducts about one-fifth of the earnings of foreign representatives. The latter never complain in public, being deterred by their sense of respectability. But now that I am writing these notes in an unofficial capacity, I must say that many members of the diplomatic and consular corps in Sweden do admit that this encroachment on their privileges affects them quite painfully.

There is a ticklish question involving both the consular service and protocol. It is that of the language of official correspondence. Soviet missions abroad carry on their correspondence with the foreign office and other departments of the country in Russian, supplying the Russian text

with a translation into the foreign language concerned or a language widely used in the country.

In Britain and elsewhere, we have repeatedly been asked by official entities to supply letters or other documents received from their Soviet partners with a translation although we knew that those entities had specialists who spoke Russian. In Moscow, it is only the embassies of socialist countries as well as of West Germany, Sweden, Japan and a few other capitalist countries that observe diplomatic courtesy. The rest conduct their correspondence with us in their own languages or in one of the international languages, without a Russian translation, thereby showing a lack of respect for our country and discriminating against the Russian language. This tells particularly when we have to do with a country which limits the staffs of our missions. In spite of a rigid quota, we are compelled to keep translators on the staff to the disadvantage of some lines of work whereas those countries' missions in the Soviet Union have no such problem because they employ as secretaries and translators Soviet citizens who are not included in the quota.

Our Consulate-General in Göteborg has for years been troubled by a minor problem. The fact is that after its office and housing complex had been built, the municipal authorities set up right in front of the main entrance to our mission a bus stop for air travellers, saying that it was a temporary measure forced by construction under way on the nearby square. People with baggage cluster around the stop day and night. On a summer evening, tipsy tourists get together there, and cabs and private cars continuously deliver more passengers. Incidents are frequent. They include suspicious objects thrown onto the grounds over the enclosure, anti-Soviet slogans written on the plinth of the enclosure with indelible paint, unidentified individuals who make their way onto the grounds, brawls. On one occasion, a Swedish policeman guarding the Consulate-General opened fire on a trespasser.

Construction on the square has long been over, yet the authorities, which had promised to transfer the bus stop, ignore our repeated polite reminders.

Yet Article 22 (2) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations says that host countries are specially bound to take all necessary measures to protect the representation's premises from any intrusion or damage and to prevent any breach of peace of the representation or insult to its dignity. This provision is repeated almost word for word in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Nevertheless, the Swedish authorities, including the Protocol Department of the Foreign Ministry, assure us that there is no problem although we unfailingly call their attention to incidents like those listed above. I have often wondered how my colleagues in the Swedish Consulate-General in Leningrad or Embassy in Moscow would comport themselves in a similar (hypothetical) situation.

Comparisons bring to mind events of the early 1960s. At that time our propaganda, as well as presenting Utopian programmes, assured us that all crime in our country showed a marked decline. To the accompaniment of this talk, it came to the abolition of the Union Ministry of Justice and Internal Affairs, the law-enforcement bodies painting idyllic pictures of a generally healthy society. In that atmosphere, the departments concerned saw through the government and with the consent of the Foreign Ministry to the removal of all militia posts outside embassies and houses having numerous foreigners among their tenants. The move told immediately. There began burglaries that hit both embassies and the apartments of their staffs. The posts had to be restored.

I also recall various episodes. The Moscow directorate of local industries complied with an earnest request of the British Embassy by

shutting down a small factory whose power station was said to disturb the Embassy. In another case, the militia was compelled to shift traffic signs outside the Moroccan Embassy. In all situations such as these, the Soviet authorities proceed from their international responsibility.

Fulfillment of international obligations is universally recognised to be a merit of Soviet diplomacy, and we are entitled to our interests being treated accordingly by our partners. This matter cannot be neglected—the principle of reciprocity must be scrupulously upheld. But my colleagues will pardon me if I say that it does not receive proper attention in our country. True, we occasionally witness a firm Soviet response to a particular move by a foreign state but this comes mostly when the highest interests of the country and its prestige are affected.

In everyday practice, however, in situations calling for a definite reaction, both the heads of our missions abroad and senior officials of the Foreign Ministry generally evade a principled approach to acute problems on the plea that ours is a great power which it does not benefit to bother about "trifles". This suggests an inferiority complex probably akin to the stereotypes used for decades to edify us on ethnic relations as well.

Yet in other countries big and small, the attitude to whatever concerns the principle of reciprocity, respect for parity, abuses of immunity or privileges is very jealous, and the press keeps the public posted on all that. Not so long ago, the *International Herald Tribune* carried an article headlined "The Golden Rule in Diplomacy: Tooth-for-Tooth". It told readers how the State Department had adopted tough retaliatory measures to force the Mexican government into revoking a rule by which foreign diplomats might only use cars of Mexican make; how the telephones of Polish and Czechoslovak diplomats had been cut off because the Americans found the telephone service in Poland and Czechoslovakia unsatisfactory; how the French government had been pressured into reducing the tax imposed on the US Embassy in connection with repairs.

It may be opportune to note that the Soviet press carries little information of this nature because the subject is still beyond the reach of glasnost.

I could list other facts but what I want is to merely indicate a problem we cannot shut our eyes to but must discuss so as to find a solution. Our consulates, which have gained vast experience in this respect and recorded numerous precedents, could do more to assist the central apparatus, primarily the Protocol Department and the Consular Department, in evolving a system and a common approach to the issue of respect for the principle of reciprocity with a view to maintaining our national prestige.

INHABITANTS OF GÖTEBORG like to tell every newcomer from abroad a joke about how one of them spent a few days in Stockholm. Asked by a Stockholm friend what he liked in the capital best of all, the guest replied: "The train to Göteborg". Now while this is no more than a joke, behind the amusing conceit it betrays there are important realities of today having to do with rivalries between the capital and the provinces with their mechanism of local government and experience of democracy.

The case of Sweden is certainly interesting and instructive. The country's communal system as it now stands is as old as Soviet power. The jurisdiction of Swedish communes largely coincides with that exercised by our local government bodies under the Constitution. But the two bodies are entirely different as regards the actual possibility of exercising power, which depends on the extent of financial autonomy.

The autonomy of Swedish communes in the financial, economic, admi-

nistrative, social, cultural and other spheres encourages their socio-political activity. The latter, without any doubt, reflects the trend of social thought, apparently playing a role in the formation of definite policy lines. Three years ago, the Göteborg City Council, in which the Social Democrats hold a majority, resolved to boycott ships of nuclear powers that refused to announce before visiting Swedish ports whether or not they were carrying nuclear weapons. This treatment has already been applied to British and US ships. The action is symbolic, of course, since the government entrusts the ceremony of receiving a visiting ship to the governor, who is directly controlled by the central authority. However, it is a reflection of public opinion.

Some Swedish communes have in recent years decided to declare their territories nuclear-free zones. The decision is expressive of the same processes even though the government does not recognise it, being in charge of all foreign policy matters. However, there have also been unsavoury things, such as the racist decision adopted by a commune to deny jobs to immigrants or the fact that some other communes have discussed similar problems.

International cooperation, which Swedish municipalities are carrying on at the level of friendly ties, covers an interesting range of questions. In our case, such cooperation normally takes the form of political propaganda and cultural events coupled with exhibitions, performances by amateur art groups or professional companies, and so on. The Swedes are more pragmatic. When the Mayor of Göteborg went to Shanghai he closed a deal with the Chinese authorities for the purchase of 200 Volvo buses complete with a Swedish model of traffic organisation and control. And when a municipal delegation arrived from Chicago, the Swedes signed an agreement on exchanging experience of the utilisation of urban waste.

Most Swedish communes and municipalities are staffed by people who are really concerned with the problems and interests of the population. They are well-educated, competent and, above all, democratic. I saw a municipal councillor responsible for culture and education attend rehearsals by an amateur choir in the People's House. Also, I repeatedly watched the Mayor join other townspeople in jogging in the local recreational area. Yet it would hardly occur to a Soviet mayor to engage in such a pastime.

I cannot help making a sad comparison. The press occasionally reports the story of how a local government body was taken to task for defending a rural militiaman who had dared to admonish drunken relatives of the chairman of a collective farm. Such a thing is unthinkable in Sweden, nor can, say, a Siberian militiaman imagine his British opposite number stopping the Queen's sister to fine her for exceeding the speed limit.

At already mentioned conference of consular officers, it was suggested that we should study the functioning of local government bodies in foreign countries with due regard to the tasks facing our own local bodies. Some of our missions were criticised for failing to devote proper attention to the problem. The criticism was called for. What has been done so far is clearly insufficient in view of the fundamentally new role which local government bodies are expected to play throughout our system of state power in the context of perestroika. At the same time, there is an understandable need for a feedback mechanism that could evaluate and generalise information supplied by consulates.

CONSULATES CANNOT DO WITHOUT COMPETENT PEOPLE,
who often have to act in an uncertain situation without the right to

make a mistake, for a faux pas or an inaccuracy mostly has unpleasant consequences. With perestroika going on, realisation of this exigency of the consular service and the need for a new approach to the staffing of consulates has found reflection in personnel policy. There was fresh evidence of this at the conference of consular officers, which admitted that staffing had for years been done on the "residual principle". The conference adopted guidelines for the years ahead.

We know from the history of our diplomatic service that the predecessor of today's Diplomatic Academy and Institute for International Relations was the Institute for the Training of Diplomatic and Consular Personnel under the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. It gave special attention to the training of consular personnel, as its name indicates. We know from its graduates (who have long been retired while many of them are regrettably no more) that the curriculum comprised not only political sciences, history, philosophy, economics and law but diplomatic and consular techniques, foreign service personnel having to take an examination in the so-called required minimum of technical knowledge, which included diplomatic etiquette and fundamentals of consular work.

It is interesting to note that consular jobs were never considered too humble for senior party officials or statesmen. Vladimir Potyomkin, for one, served as Consul-General in Istanbul and Vladimir Antonov-Ovseyenko, in Barcelona.

At present it is hard to say just when our consular service began to decline but as early as the 1950s, people commented on it ironically. They used to tell jokes about consular work. Jobs in the Consular Department were given to either people who were unlikely to get on or had bungled their previous job. Clerks who filled in morocco-bound passport forms in a copybook hand, using indian ink, were a remarkable phenomenon in the consular service. Whereas every reasonably important echelon of the Ministry was controlled by a deputy minister, the consular service was for a long time the only responsibility of a Collegium member and then of the Ministry's Secretary-General.

It is only fair to say that these abnormalities were also noticed in the past. Efforts were made to reinforce the leading and technical staffs of both the Consular Department and consulates and to improve their functioning, and over the past decade a deputy minister has been in charge of the service. But these are all half measures bearing scant fruit. What are our possibilities now that we are revising our personnel policy towards the consular service?

First of all, neither the Diplomatic Academy nor the Institute for International Relations trains consular workers proper. Both institutions train economists, lawyers and customs officials but not consular personnel. I am not suggesting that future officials of the Ministry should specialise in consular work in the narrow sense of the term. But it would apparently be advisable to include in the curricula of the Diplomatic Academy and the Institute for International Relations an advanced course in consular law, including lectures and seminars on practice. This work could be assigned to the more competent members of the consular service versed in its theory and practice alike, who ought to be remunerated on a par with professors, fellows or senior lecturers (according to rank and office).

Training specialists while important, is not the only aspect of the problem. It is equally important to form a body of consular workers. However, active use of people with experience in consular work is limited because they are reluctant to give up plans for eventual employment at posts which they find more attractive and more interesting politically because these offer opportunities for both training and promotion. This

may be the invisible boundary beyond which the residual principle begins operating. It must be offset in an effective manner, possibly by means of incentives in the form of, say, a rise in pay for length of consular service, a guaranteed maximum pension such as is granted to diplomats, and so on.

There are some other underlying reasons for the application of the residual principle. For instance, not one of the deputy chiefs of the Consular Department has been appointed ambassador over the past 20 to 30 years, as far as I know. People holding this rank end their careers right there in the Department, realising that they have no chance. Section heads of the Department are in a similar situation, for the posts they are appointed to abroad are one or two rungs lower than those they hold at home.

The regular staff of every embassy (even large ones) normally includes a consular department head holding the rank of second or first secretary. On reaching this ceiling, many experienced officials retire from the consular service.

IN CONCLUDING MY NOTES, I wonder why their workaday tenor contrasts so strongly with the ideas and problems that accompanied the beginning of my mission and several years of service as Consul-General. After all, there were state visits and visits by delegations, symposiums, fairs, cultural events, sports championships, major business deals and projects, morning colours, trips, meetings with interesting people, informal receptions—in short, all that went hand in hand with the process of normalising relations and restoring confidence between our two countries.

I see the reason in the circumstance that large-scale actions, even uncommon and dynamic ones, have a beginning and an end. They begin with the assignment of a task, go on to preparations, execution, fulfilment of the task and end with a report drawing conclusions and putting forward proposals for the future. As for workaday matters, they tend to last long, are invisibly present when global actions are taking place, and occasionally have a noticeable impact upon them. They are tenacious and also dangerous, for they cease in time to be perceived as problems.

Much of the foregoing has been stated by this writer in one form or another in official reports and other documents. My mission is over now but these problems remain. And perestroika is also concerned with prosaic, workaday problems.

ON THE CLASS STRUGGLE

Oleg SHAKHNAZAROV

THE SEEMINGLY INDISPUTABLE TENET of the priority of universal interests over class ones is evoking a far from unequivocal reaction in us. This is only understandable, as the very word "class" has become all but synonym for the Marxist theory of classes, and a symbol of the Marxist beliefs. Such notions are not the appurtenances of an abstract academic science: we persistently stress that the CPSU is the party of the working class, from time to time we discuss the idea of a "congress of workers", and during the preparations for the last election campaign a great deal was said, at all levels, about elections from "production districts" and about the need for workers, the "advanced class of our society", to speak out in full measure. In short, we thus reaffirmed what had already entered the flesh and blood of the Soviet person, namely, that the working class is the leading force of the modern age, and that it is the USSR, a society of liberated labour, that expresses the interests of this very class on a world scope, being as it is the bastion of those who are fighting for their rights where capital rules.

In a nutshell, we continue to be faithful to the militant proletarian spirit. And this has found the following corroboration, a surprise for us: according to official statistics released in this country for the first time, over the first six months of 1989 losses of work time from strikes amounted to over two million man-days. Furthermore, it was explained that this figure does not include the "July peak of the miners' strikes". But the approximate significance of this peak can be calculated by multiplying 500,000 strikers by six days, which yields another three million work days. This is as much as was lost from the strikes in France annually between 1977 and 1980. (In 1981 this number dropped to 1.496 million, and in 1987, to 949 thousand man-hours.)

All these figures are impressive, but no more than the very fact that this was the first time in the 70 years of Soviet power that an entire branch of the economy went on strike in this country. For the first time, miners, one of the most militant contingents of the working class, called a strike, submitting to the government not only economic but in effect political demands as well. For the first time the crisis in our structures of power became patent: the miners demanded the "word" only of Mikhail Gorbachev as guarantees of compliance with their demands, and the entire system of local power was rejected by the strikers, for, according to the findings of polls, they do not trust the mine management, the trade union committees, the party committees, or the local government bodies. One of the detachments of strikers advanced, through their deputy in the Supreme Soviet (we saw this on our television screens), the demand that the tenet of the leading role of the CPSU be deleted from the Constitu-

tion. The same party which was originally created as a proletarian one and which workers throughout Soviet history joined on a preferential basis as compared to other categories of citizens.

How can all this be explained? Of course, the statistics can say a great deal. It turns out, for example, that in the worker and peasant state expenditures on the proletarians are between 33 and 50 per cent lower than in the industrialised capitalist countries and even in prerevolutionary Russia. According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the average length of the work week in different countries is between 35 and 40 hours, which with the aid of flexible timetables and individual schedules and other measures is brought down to 17 to 20 hours. In this country, with a five-day work week and eight-hour work day, overtime and work-time-make-up Saturdays and Sundays have become fixtures. There is no need even to compare the living standards of the average Soviet working man and his counterpart in the capitalist world. What is more, public opinion polls consistently show that in the "money-grabbing society" most people consider their lives quite successful, and they increasingly prefer to have more leisure than earn more money. (Doesn't this remind us of Karl Marx's well-known idea that a person's true wealth is his free time?).

The miners' strike also shed considerable light on what the notion of "proletarian solidarity" is all about. During the strike our trade union officials handed out soft drinks and sandwiches to the strikers, substantiating their actions with the claim that they had long "informed" the management of the miners' problems. In the "society of class antagonism" the trade unions provide for the strikers from specially created funds, and they have their own insurance companies and also banks through which they buy their companies' stocks and prevent the causes of labour conflicts themselves.

The situation is no better with our participation in international agreements. After signing ratifying in the 1970s the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, we began labouring over a bill on strikes only in 1989. This country has still to ratify Convention 154 passed by the ILO back in 1981. Its implementation would make it possible to set up a collective agreement system that would protect the working people's economic interests. Of course, we have not forgotten how our trade unions, in a display of proletarian solidarity, supplied a ship with food for British miners striking in 1984-1985. But do many know that at that time people's Poland continued coal deliveries to Great Britain, and one of the secretaries of our trade union's central committee lost his job for stating to foreign journalists that the USSR would not do this?

Of course, all this can account to a certain extent for the phenomenon of the miners' strike in the summer of 1989. However, as they say, perestroika is more a time for questions than answers. But too many questions have piled up. Can we answer these: Where has the class struggle in a socialist country come from? Against whom are the working people striking in their own state? Why have we been bypassed in the standard of living by such countries as Norway, Sweden, Ireland, Portugal, Iceland and Finland, which in prerevolutionary times were backward in comparison to Russia? Where is the growing self-awareness of the proletariat in the industrialised capitalist countries? By all predictions, they should have been at the point of a victorious socialist revolution long ago! Why do fewer and fewer working people "there" consider themselves proletarians, categorising themselves instead as middle class, or has the insidious bourgeoisie bought them out wholesale? And that is this bourgeoisie itself? Why do parties of working people in which plant workers comprise a minority attain political

success? And why are those which staunchly subscribe to proletarian ideology losing prestige in the working class environment itself?

Much, of course, can be explained away by perversions, distortions and retreats from principles. But perhaps the point lies elsewhere—in the principles themselves? Perhaps it is worthwhile to touch upon, at long last, the holy of holies and talk about the role of the working class (proletariat) in Marx's theory of class struggle, in the development of our and Western societies, and in the evolution of civilisation itself? I think that a new view of our theoretical legacy will help us answer not only the above questions but all the others that perestroika is setting before us.

THE ECOCENTRISM OF SOCIAL FORMATIONS

LET US BEGIN with a few laws governing the changes in socio-economic formations. Obviously, after a lengthy period of the classless evolution of primitive societies, humanity proceeded to class development, which sped up its advance. The antagonistic pair changed from one formation to another. However, the development of civilisation was ensured not by some one class but by their *totality*, for the revolutionary element is built not into some one of the classes but in the rivalry between them. It's just the same as in the case of the difference of potential in classical physics—by themselves, poles are inert: they generate energy only if they are united.

Truly, if we turn to the history of humanity, it comes before us as the history of uninterrupted rebellions, insurrections and wars of the exploited—be it a slave-owning, feudal or capitalist society. But, it will be noted, a slave was freed not by a slave, and a feudal peasant not by a feudal peasant; it was only to the proletariat that Marxist theory assigned the role of its own liberator. We are dealing with a patent paradox: a teaching that is strong precisely for its logic and propaganda of objective historical determinism and of the law governing the change of formations contradicts itself by making an exception for capitalism.

Indeed, the proletariat was proclaimed the revolutionary, advanced class, and it was a matter of elementary logic to recognise its antipode as being counterrevolutionary and decaying. Thus, in theory one of the two principal elements ensuring the viability of the socio-economic system was deprived of the historical initiative. But this, too, is at odds with the laws of world historical development which attests to the fact that antagonistic classes acquire and lose this initiative *simultaneously in indissoluble connection with each other*. As a rule, none of the participants in the class rivalry survived—slaves disappeared together with the slave-owners, and the feudals, together with the serfs. Before leaving the historical arena they began to transform, en masse, objectively, and “unconsciously” into their successors, and the remnants of the former classes lived out their days on the periphery of society. For this reason the desire to “abolish” only one of the subjects of the formation—the owners of the means of production—also patently runs counter to such Marxist values as the law of negation and the law of the unity and conflict of opposites, a law which solely in its anti-property context was reduced to the mythologised struggle between “good” and “evil”.

How can this inner contradiction of Marxism be explained? Evidently, the fact is that Marx was exploring the source of social development directly in society itself. He linked social advance with a change of forms of property, with greater motivation in boosting labour productivity and with the attendant upgrading of the productive forces.

Meanwhile, in reexamining the past, we can see that most peoples did not go through the stages of the classic scheme of primitive society—slave-owning—feudalism—capitalism. And it was far from everywhere that the new system emerged where favourable prerequisites theoretically existed—in the transition to slave-owning, to feudalism, or to the market formation. What is more, the last did not always develop where feudalism reached its highest development level, where trade flourished and property stratification was becoming incommensurable. Why?

I believe the reason for all these theoretical incongruities is that theory ignores so "external" a factor of social evolution as the *ecocentricity* (the state of being conditioned by the character of nature management) of social development. To my mind, it was natural geographical conditions and the accessibility of natural resources in the Earth's bowels that were the main catalyst to formation shifts.

It was for this reason that entire civilisations flourished in the past, civilisations that exhibited forms of ownership, labour productivity and productive forces that were sophisticated for their times, but by the very same token they perished if they did not acquire a rather powerful, man-made foundation for further development. This was the case with the civilisations of the Incas, Mediterranean and the Ancient Orient.

The emergence of new formations was always determined by qualitative advances in the society-environment system and above all in the exploitation of natural resources. Initially people learned to use natural resources in a new way, and on this basis there emerged the corresponding property relations, means of production, and the tools and subject of labour. It was this circumstance that made it possible to "skip" seemingly mandatory stages in the upgrading of productive forces. The market economy differs from others not in that everything turns into commodities but that *natural wealth becomes the main commodity*. Commodity-money relations, however, became commonplace as a prime socio-economic regulator much earlier than capitalism, and will not disappear with it. They first stimulate management of nature and then restrict it with the unacceptability of negative side-effects. If we accept this viewpoint, the evolution which humanity has experienced in general and the market formation in particular becomes more understandable.

Indeed, the history of nature management should be traced from the Stone Age. From pieces of basalt and obsidian primitive man created implements of labour and provided for himself. Although he made an axe from stone from beginning to end, the cave man was not a craftsman, but truly a creator, for each new object was unique and required enormous mental effort. However, by expanding utilisation of the environment, man dehumanised his labour, which was divided into mental and physical labour, and the latter began to be broken down into a host of simple operations. This dehumanisation of labour grew spasmodically as people dug into the Earth's depths and tapped its resources, attaining the summit of the routine operations of the modern assembly line worker.

A developed market economy is a host of semi-skilled getters and processors, on the one hand, and owner-organisers of property, on the other; it flourishes at the expense of the utmost exploitation of minerals, land, water and the atmosphere. Externally it seems creative, as mass production means mass consumption. In reality this society is parasitising. To ensure his viability the industrial man takes gratis from nature a thousand times more than his forebears did.

An understanding of the ecosocial essence of the market formation provides the prerequisites for reassessing Marx's theory of value. It

does not give a satisfactory explanation for the reasons why the industrialist of the late second millennium, while delivering himself of the factory proletariat, continues to get rich. After all, according to Marx, only the unpaid labour of the latter is the source of the growth of capital. Meanwhile, in certain countries as many as three-fourths of the population does not take part in industrial production. Profit-making workerless technologies—automated plants, which are theoretically impossible under capitalism, are becoming a reality. There is no answer to this question, and another has already gradually taken shape: What about the tenet according to which the working class is the creator of all the material wealth, and by rights political power should therefore belong to it?

Let us try to get at the heart of the issue. Let's take any concrete or aggregate commodity. It is a combination of the raw materials, energy and creativity put into it. What creates value in this item? The raw materials and energy. And the consumer value? The intellect, which predetermines the orientation and results of the transformation of the first two components. This is obvious, but what obtains from this? The answer is that in the context of the division of labour into mental and manual, the latter in the form of the biomechanical energy of a person (the factory worker) is incorporated into the natural value of the good and has social meaning to the extent in which it is managed by the released mental labour. So in industrial production consumer value is created not by any "specific person", as the theory maintains, but by an entirely definite "specific person"—a researcher, engineer, technician, manager. The share of the natural value is inversely proportional to the consumer value. With the transition from the quantitative to the qualitative model of development the former decreases while the latter simultaneously grows.

The same thing is happening to another benchmark of the productivity of man's activity—his capacity to create surplus value. At the initial stage of industrialisation, the use of man's biomechanical energy was a need which was dictated by the state of productive forces. With the appearance of less expensive energy sources and energy-saving technologies, the reproduction of the physical energy of the worker, which is incorporated in the cost of the item, and therefore production costs, becomes socially unjustified. Simply put, the worker consumes more than he creates, i. e., his labour does not create surplus value and is not a source of the growth of capital.

This value, in effect, comprises the totality of the consumer values produced and is created by the intellect. It is for this reason that manpower, which supposedly enriches the capitalist, is vigorously being elbowed out by automated production, i. e., by a commodity in which the consumer value—the capacity to produce new goods—has been created by mental labour.

This accounts for the statistics of the last 25 years which show that in the 1980s, what with the general growth of the social well-being, the profitability of enterprise has begun dramatically outstripping the growth of wages and salaries. Such is the effect of a lower share of workers in commodity production. And, what is extremely important, brainpower is not at all pushed out by automation; quite the contrary, its sphere of application is even growing. What is taking place means only one thing: the intellect is creating a greater value than the costs for the reproduction of a mental worker.

Now we can amend the theory slightly. According to Marx's theory, surplus value is the only source of the growth of capital. This is not quite so. It is, as has already been pointed out, natural wealth and only unpaid, not just any, mental labour that plays an increasing role

as natural resources dwindle. For this reason, exploitation, which is understood as the alienation of the surplus product from the producer, exists merely in relation to the hired mental worker. But the blue-collar worker together with the manager divide up the value "expropriated" from nature, in unequal proportions, it is true. However, what is most important here is that this system of mutual relations is coming to an end.

In order to avert ecological ruin, world civilisation, after having made an impressive spurt, is again seeking an equivalent exchange with the environment. The orientation to an artificial raw material base and resource- and waste-free production is providing the conditions for free creativity. We can see that individualisation and intellectualisation of labour underlie the emerging new productive forces.

Recognition of the ecocentrism of social formations enables us to take a new look at many political processes, specifically, the changing role of the state. In the market formation it seeks to centralise or to control in some form the development of natural resources so as to ensure, through distributive and redistributive measures, an even development and public wealth within the confines of the nation. This function is reflected in the legislations of all market countries. Reorientation of the economy to rational management of nature and artificial raw materials makes rigid centralism unnecessary. Preservation of a strong state is gradually becoming an anachronism.

This likewise applies to relations among states. Maximal utilisation of resources by the market economy became the determinant in interstate relations of the first half of the 20th century. The colonial policies, international division of labour, and the world wars are a consequence of the contradiction between political ecosocialism. The transition to the new model of development is accompanied by a growth of resource and economic self-sufficiency and political independence of regions. The principles governing the international division of labour are changing, with mother countries granting trust peoples the possibility to use their natural resources themselves. The colonial system has been destroyed. Simultaneously, a possibility for the development of peoples with meagre resources is appearing. It is not for nothing that a number of countries whose stores of natural resources are, in comparison to the USSR, extremely small (Japan), or paltry (Taiwan, Singapore) have wrought an "economic miracle". International cooperation is giving way to inter-regional, with the traditional scheme of interstate relations enriching and borders opening up.

Let us summarise our theoretical argumentation. The development of a market formation has been ensured until recently by unlimited tapping of natural resources, a deepening division of labour, concentration of manpower, monopolisation of capital, centralisation of the state, and national fragmentation. Further evolution points in the direction of resource-free technology, an integral worker, diffusion of manpower, democratisation of ownership, disintegration of the state, and internationalisation of the economy. These last factors are the determinants in forming a new socio-class structure of society and for defining the role which particular elements play in them.

Let us now address ourselves to the question of who the bearer of progressive views in any society is—those who are the element of outmoded productive forces or those into whom the element is turning, embodying as they are qualitatively different productive forces. The answer is obvious—all classes are liable to universal historical laws, and they pass, by implication, different phases of maturity right down to decrepitude and disappearance. So, at one and the same time a definite class in societies standing at different development levels can

exhibit a wide range of interests, from extreme revolutionary to ultra-conservative ones.

FROM THEORY TO PRACTICAL CONCLUSION

THUS, what is the working class in the West, and what is it in Soviet conditions? Or, how does the market society of the industrialised countries differ from our, also market, society? Despite the fact that there is so much heated controversy over the introduction of market principles in our economy, it, I will stress, is precisely a market one. What do I mean?

Our market is a special one. The fact is that from the standpoint of ecocentricity the October Revolution in Russia did not alter the foundations of the market formation. The interest of Soviet society—of living at the expense of greater utilisation of natural resources—has remained unchanged. It was impossible even to hope for anything else, because formational problems are not decided by decree. The source of the social conflicts in the USSR, for all the specificity of the economic and political structure, is the same as in capitalist countries—division of the natural legacy. But the revolution changed the class structure of society and therefore introduced a difference into the form and, most importantly, the results of the resolution of the conflicts that arose.

We are thus dealing with a *distorted* market society which is hard to identify because the country has turned into a huge monopoly-state, where the working people were alienated to the utmost from property, the products of labour and power. In other words, no socio-economic shift of principle took place: all the currently existing national "capitalisms" and "socialisms" are different versions of the market formation. However, drifting in different directions, the natural and distorted market societies have parted ways to such an extent that *we are now living as if in different epochs*. There obtains from this the impossibility of comparing the place and role of the proletariat in the capitalist and the socialist worlds.

What, for example, is the logic of the development of the natural market economy? The owner-organiser of production in his time sought to become the sole heir of superhuman riches and to rid himself of hired partners. This stimulated constant technological renovation of enterprises through dismissals and through constraining proletarian consumption. While declining at individual enterprises, industrial employment on the whole grew, but after peaking in the 1960s and 1970s, it has now begun to drop.

For his part, the hired worker also fought for his share of the "inheritance", restricting as he did the carte blanche of the entrepreneur and forcing him to pay more. Now his greater well-being enables him to gain knowledge and become an owner or co-owner of capital goods himself. Even though neither of the sides set themselves this goal; the resolution of the contradictions existing between them objectively leads to a deproletarianisation of the working people, intellectualisation of labour, and rationalisation of resource utilisation. In the final analysis the class struggle is shaking the foundation of the market formation and the last class society based on it. However, proletarian values are devaluating simultaneously, and the proletarian himself and his interests are becoming conservative. Generally speaking, the revolutionary nature of the proletariat lies not in some capsulisation of the human spirit but in the doggedness with which he fights for his share in the heritage that has been "expropriated" from nature.

This has enabled him to stand firm in the class struggle and begin turning into a non-proletarian.

In short, if in the capitalist world an industrial worker (proletarian) is drawing close to the conclusion of his historical mission, here he still has to travel a long road. Herein perhaps lies the main difference between the natural and distorted market societies. A wide range of figures and indices amply attest to the extent of the divergence between our civilisations drifting in different directions.

In the USA and Britain the number of engineers, technicians and managers has already equalled that of workers of all qualifications. Almost one-third of the growth of the US GNP from 1948 to 1982 was the result of a higher level of education, approximately one-half, of engineering and technological innovations, and only 15 per cent, of an increase in the number of machines.

In the USSR the situation has shaped up differently: the ideological orientation that the proletariat of physical labour is the main productive force continues to hamper intellectual capital from yielding profit. In the second year of perestroika, when two-fifths of the workforce in industry were semi-skilled manual workers, some four million certified experts worked at jobs not requiring this knowledge. Of 500,000 experts of the highest qualification, 32 per cent were employed as workers because those jobs offered higher wages, 24 per cent, because their speciality did not correspond to the nature of the enterprise, and 9 per cent, due to a lack of the appropriate job openings. However, persons not having a special education were appointed to over four million managerial posts. That same year someone needed to launch a "worker" struggle against management. It is not fortuitous that 75 per cent of the miners who went on strike in 1989 were in favour of a reduction in the number of managers and only 20 per cent declared in favour of the mines going over to full budget autonomy (*khozraschet*).

As of 1985 there were twice as many people with a higher education in the Western countries than in Eastern Europe. Britain, which is noted for its universities, opened another one in 1988 almost exclusively for training managers (in the USSR the college admissions quota was reduced for 1989). For every ten engineers employed in the US economy there are 114 experts with a higher non-technical education; in the FRG the figure is 37, in France, 32, and in the USSR, only 14. French catalogues for 1988 contain descriptions of 280 freelance professions. Some of the graduates of Western higher educational establishments never get to know the "delights" of hired labour.

Little in the modern Western social consciousness is reminiscent of the mentality of the indigent proletariat who "has nothing to lose except his chains". Interesting diverse activity, an occupation requiring intellectual independence is becoming the main value orientation of the overwhelming majority, especially the young. Seventy-eight per cent of young West Germans polled say that they view work above all as a way for their self-realisation. Only 28 per cent of Soviet youth think so.

French and Italian studies show that there is a socio-political differentiation among owners, too. On the one hand, there is the small shopkeeper the Soviet consumer is well familiar with, and on the other, the worker-owner, the hallmarks of whose activity are creativity, individual responsibility, and features of freelance labour. Similar conclusions have also been drawn by a team of British sociologists who have been questioning over 2,000 people under a constant programme since 1973.

The Western social consciousness is undergoing sweeping changes. The rigid delimitation of the political and nonpolitical sphere is receding into the past in step with the broadening of the social segment for

which supraclass interests are no longer a hope but are becoming a reality. The alienation between the individual and power is being overcome not by the seizure of the latter but by the enhancing influence upon it. Success at elections depends less and less on electors voting according to organisational affiliation. At the same time, politics is becoming "non-political", since centralisation of societal life is being elbowed out by self-government at the level of the region, city, district, enterprise and individual citizen.

Society is reaching the stage of maturity when a person not tethered to industrial production extricates himself from the shackles of dulling hired industrial labour and acquires a personal stand and is able to adhere to it while preserving his material well-being. His priorities are at the same time narrower and broader than proletarian ones, for the interests of the individual and humanity, not of a group or class, emerge to the forefront. He is a principled foe of war, violence and militarism, no matter what packaging they may be offered in. Pacifism, which is steeped in the ideas of humanist thinkers and was defamed for so long, is enriching the world outlook of tens of millions. What is taking place is prompting a more realistic attitude to the tenet of the role of the masses in history—it is intensifying as the masses begin to acquire a personal identity.

How does the traditional industrial worker, the classic proletariat which the classics of Marxism-Leninism wrote about and pinned their hopes on, look against the background of these trends?

Marx wrote of the "feeble-mindedness and cretinism", the brutish running wild and oversimplification of the needs of the industrial proletarian. Of course, working conditions have improved and work time has decreased since then, but studies by Western sociologists invariably register a weakening of the mental activity of the conveyor worker, his memory and understanding of cause-and-effect relations. The alienation from the implements of labour, the lack of an integral conception of production, the total control and full subordination to the implacable rhythm of industrial labour are shaping a special type of consciousness—as sense of one's unimportance outside the mass of people like oneself.

Independently conducted studies suggest that the subjective element of productive forces that are becoming outmoded is increasingly dissatisfied with its life, but does not want change. The point is that it does not want to live in the old way but is not capable of living in a new way. But this is not its fault; it is its misfortune. According to French data, it is not for nothing that the greater part of the population of France is in favour of change, and the traditional worker heads the minority which is demanding "radical transformations". But his radicalness in a radically changing society exhibits a nostalgia for an age when he was needed and appreciated. This in effect is a doomed species' struggle for survival.

Indeed, today, for example, a positive process of disintegration of state power is taking place. Many prerogatives are being delegated below, right down to the individual citizen, but the industrial worker is opposing this, demanding a "strong" state, centralised government and levelling, for all this corresponds to the nature of his work. Nor does he want independence, preferring to remain hired manpower. He is frightened by the responsibility of freedom, i.e., the status of an independent producer.

Nature does not withstand overloads, and, in order to save jobs the industrial proletariat is retarding environmental protection, for it owes its well-being to its ruthless exploitation. All these and other manifestations of conservatism have been observed to a greater or

lesser extent over the past 10 to 15 years in France, Italy, the USA, Great Britain, the FRG and the other leading industrialised market countries. The traditional capitalist subscribes to the same stand. He bases his opposition to a remodelling of society on his own interests, but his reaction is essentially identical to the reaction of his class opponent. For this reason a stratification into progressive and conservative strata is also taking place in the owner environment, which today numbers not thousands, but tens of millions of people.

Lastly, there is the international aspect. The source of world development built into national fragmentation is close to exhaustion, but the industrial worker is against internationalising production and the mobility of capital. He is in favour of the international division of labour based on natural specifics, of the export of goods against their import, and, conversely, against the export of capital and for its import. It is not fortuitous that the age in which the proletariat attained its highest development went down in history with two world and numerous local wars.

All the above about the proletariat of countries that have begun to surmount the barrier of ecological dependence likewise applies, with certain reservations, to the proletariat in the USSR. Our social world has long been buttressed by extremely rich natural resources which for a while could be exploited ruthlessly owing to the suppression of commodity-money relations (which made this exploitation go completely unpunished) by paltry expenditures on an uncomplaining manpower. Thus, from the 1920s to the 1940s, while mighty extracting and manufacturing industries were being created, the problem was "solved" by pillaging the peasants and using the slave labour of tens of millions of workers recruited from the number of consumers. From 1950s to 1970s, this was done by consuming irreplaceable natural resources. However, in the 1970s the well began to run dry, but the system had not created the basis for new productive forces because it had not been programmed to do so. For this reason, in the 1980s society entered a period of crisis transformations. Symptomatically, individual strikes assumed the nature of a mass strike movement precisely in the extracting industry, and not, say, in metallurgy or chemistry, where the situation is no better. The mining industry comprises the very foundation of resource consumption and is the first to experience a need for formational shifts.

The incipient strike movement is proof that contradiction, which in any normal society is a source of movement, is returning to social practice. It is a revealing paradox that the class of industrial workers, a class which, according to all intransient world trends, is on its way out and is historically doomed, has been objectively called upon to play an active political role in this country. These Soviet specifics are one of the prime factors setting apart our proletariat from its brethren in the industrialised Western countries. However, many dangers threaten the revolutionary transformations in Soviet society. The main one is the decline and ideologisation of the economy.

TOWARDS A DEIDEOLOGISED ECONOMY

OUR ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY is still wandering in a mirage of myths. One of them is making a fetish of the proletariat, immanently the "advanced" class, whose interests have to be protected at all cost. We have already discussed this in the language of lofty abstractions, but personal impressions and the empiricism of life are quite a

different matter. In 1976 this author, who used to mine coke for the iron and steel industry, visited a coal mine in the town of Tkvarcheli.

A neat little town, gracious hosts, the standard community centre, a fine children's dance ensemble. The mine is fitted with antedeluvian equipment and is a loss-making affair. But executives explained that it would not be closed "so that the population would not have to go picking fruit. A reduction of the working class cannot be permitted!"

Evidently, the folks at the mine in Tkvarcheli are not the only ones who figure like that. In 1989 loss-making mines became commonplace in this country. Subsidies to the coal industry stood in 1988 at 5.4 bln rubles. Beginning in the 1970s labour production at underground facilities declined by 50 per cent and was 17 per cent of that in the FRG. A similar picture has shaped up in all the traditional branches of the Soviet economy. By implication, the living standards of the proletarians have declined, which the miners, specifically, made abundantly clear last summer. This is what "defence" of the interests of the Soviet working class has led to.

The fact that power has from the outset belonged to one class is forcing this power to take decisions that objectively run counter to the interests of society, such as artificially maintaining unprofitable branches, fixing prices far from actual production cost, and inflating wages and salaries, thereby aggravating inflation and undermining the economy. And, all this notwithstanding, cultivating in workers a consciousness of their invariably advanced, messianic role, and their primal and eternal historical veracity. However, the conclusion to be drawn is a simple one: any decision that runs counter to the interests of society cannot be a long-term basis for the well-being of even one of its classes.

In order to climb out of the abyss of poverty that we continue to fall into, we need to bring property relations in line with the needs of the market formation, i.e., we must finally comprehend the full harm of another myth as well—the myth of "exploitation based on the expropriation of surplus value created by the factory proletarian". Theoretically false, it became simply destructive when it was accepted as a guide. The problem, after all, is simple: property can be of any type—individual or collective, state or joint-stock, with or without hired labour, as forms of property themselves adapt to the level of social development.¹ The main thing is that the owner should have a vested interest in reducing expenditures for industrial labour, for the productivity of the modern worker does not cover social expenses for him. The role of the authorities in this situation consists not in implanting some "good" form of ownership but in pursuing a competent distribution and redistribution policy that stimulates an upgrading of the country's productive forces and social progress.

Of course, these and other myths hardly have a mystical foundation. Let's get at the heart of the matter: it is our diligent embodiment of the "labour theory of value" that was the reason that this country, one of the richest in the world in natural resources, has plunged into the quagmire of a crisis. Here are quite predictable counter-arguing quotations. For this it is sufficient to be able to read. It is enough to use one's grey cells to clearly see a chain of outwardly unrelated failures in which the first link is the conviction that "labour is the basic source of the material and spiritual wealth of the society". No, not every kind of labour. The dehumanising labour of a factory proletarian is not. It is an instrument of pumping over the existing material wealth from the state of an unclaimed wealth to the disposal of the society regardless of our consciousness. Only intellectual labour creates well-being exceeding the natural potential.

By primitive manipulations quartz and silicon can be accumulated without any practical use in unfinished construction or put into a dam of a power station. Or they can be turned into a microprocessor which multiplies thousand-fold the life-giving potential of the ecological system, eliminates the need for drab workshops and dams reducing manifold the living space and are detrimental to human health.

The labour theory of cost is not only a social theory of ecological squandering. Is it not here where we can find the basis of profound social and economic distortions: dumping prices for primary and other materials, staggering prices for more or less sophisticated products, the reduction of the scientific, technical and creative intelligentsia to the level of a semidestitute stratum with curtailed rights, the proclamation of a work collective (instead of the family) as the "basic cell of the society", a woman working as a navvy, the growth of the child mortality, the general physical exhaustion of the labour resources draining seas, the swamping of the steppes and other "construction projects of the century", a short life—span? Things went so far that the permanent consumer dissatisfaction of the Soviet people was declared a law of socialism simultaneously with a "solemn promise" that the present generation will live under communism. It was alleged that a "new man" was developing faster than in the West and thereby his requirements objectively leave behind the indicators of the material production growth and, consequently, determine its parameters.

Hostages of our own plans we did not replace manual labour with intellectual labour but eliminated the differences between them with "the decisive role of the working class in that process". As a result, the country once famous for its scientists, thinkers and inventors has slid down to the shameful 42nd place in the world by the mental development of the young generation.

Indeed, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. The labour theory of costs has become an economic substantiation for the concepts of equality and justice which had emerged already in the first class society. Its pathos lies not in an explanation but in changing the world. Meanwhile, no attention was paid to the fact that mankind with all its isolation is a part of a multi-component and multi-factor system—nature. The ideas of equality and justice are objectively unattainable until the lost balance and an equivalent exchange is restored between the society and the rest of the animate and inanimate nature. Their compulsory imposition in a market society leads to barrack-type socialism. No partial measures, however correct, are of help since linear dependences do not operate in a curved space.

We have to return to the channel of the general historic laws if we really intend to put the socialist ideals into life. And we hold the same ideals as before: a free, just and prospering society and the flourishing of personality.

For details see *International Affairs*, No. 7, 1989.

IN RUSSIA, SIXTEEN YEARS AFTER

Zhores MEDVEDEV

IN AUGUST 1973, or six months before the expiry of the term of my stay on business in Britain at the invitation of the London National Institute for Medical Research, I was called to the Soviet Consulate and informed that I had been deprived of Soviet citizenship. The official assured me that the Embassy itself had nothing to hold against me. Two days later, I took to the Consulate a written protest giving detailed arguments against the decision. I got no reply.

AN EXILE IN LONDON

EVER SINCE THEN, for sixteen years past, I have served at the Institute, doing research into molecular and genetic processes of aging, just as I had done before I went to Britain. I regularly attend national and international conferences and congresses on biochemistry, genetics, cellular biology and gerontology and write frequently for professional journals. What I had always aspired to is a reality now: I do research freely, paying no heed to political or ideological factors, and cooperate with colleagues regardless of national boundaries. I have achieved some success in science that won me international gerontology prizes in 1984 and 1985. Generally speaking, however, it is not very easy for a researcher of my age who finds himself abroad to adapt fully to a new milieu. But my purely academic achievements were relatively modest mainly because, ever since 1974, I have devoted all my free time to Sovietology, a field of knowledge new to me.

I have always been interested in the role and place of science in society, above all those of Soviet science. And I must add that biology and genetics found themselves at the centre of a complex political struggle in the Soviet Union. In the West I extended the sphere of my interest to the interaction of state and science in the Soviet Union, the history of agriculture, ecology, atomic energy and some other problems. In 1980, I took part together with my brother Roy, a Moscow historian "unemployed" for years, in the debate on nuclear disarmament. Along with other "founding fathers", we joined in the Campaign for European Nuclear Disarmament (END).

I never had a chance throughout those years to visit my native land, and as for my attempts to maintain contacts with colleagues and friends there, they encountered numerous difficulties. I noticed as I met

The writer is a senior researcher at the Genetics Department of the National Institute for Medical Research, London. He contributed this article to INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

them at international congresses that they were increasingly wary of contacts with people in my position. Though, I succeeded in speaking privately to my colleagues from time to time. Everything changed following a new outbreak of cold war caused by the dispatch of Soviet troops to Afghanistan late in 1979. At the Third International Congress of Physicians Against Nuclear War (Cambridge, 1981), I tried to talk to Soviet delegates I had known for a long time. But I failed. An old friend of mine, with whom I had worked in Obninsk under Nikolai Timofeyev-Ressovsky, said bluntly that we had better stop meeting.

It was not until 1987 and especially 1988 that I noticed a change. Some colleagues resumed correspondence with me and hinted at the likelihood of my being invited to the Soviet Union. In 1989, intellectual freedom became more evident. Many emigres and "exiled" scientists, cultural figures and authors had already visited the country. The formalities involved in travelling to and from the Soviet Union were simplified. For the first time ever, the article "Our Aliens" contributed by Daniil Granin to *Izvestia* in January 1989 called for the repeal of all decrees on withdrawing Soviet citizenship as acts out of keeping with legal standards and new political thinking. I realised that in 1990 at the latest, I would be able to visit the Soviet Union like others and to see my brother, my elder son and my two grandchildren who were born, grew up and began attending school while I was in Britain.

I actually received an invitation, except that it came from Sussex in southern England. Mary Kaldor, an activist of CND and editor of its journal, who works for the University of Sussex, suggested that I go to Moscow as a member of the British delegation to the international seminar on "East—West: Global Security and Arms Control".* I was asked to present a paper on the future of nuclear power in today's world and the connection between nuclear programmes and regional conflicts. I accepted.

I had no particular difficulty getting an entry visa, which I applied for by mail. In fact, I got it nearly one month before departure. This was certainly a sign of change. In earlier years, Soviet consulates adhered to the unaccountable practice of issuing a visa just one or two days in advance. My wife, who remained a Soviet citizen, went to the Soviet Union every year but even she needed a visa, which she got almost invariably on the eve of her departure.

Soviet citizens living permanently abroad could not travel to the Soviet Union other than with the assistance of Intourist or other tourist agencies and had to pay for their stay at a hotel even if they had no need for it. This year regulations have been simplified. You no longer have to apply to Intourist nor to pay for hotel accommodations beforehand. Besides, you can now make as many trips to the Soviet Union as you like whereas formerly you could only go there once a year. You don't have to obtain a visa but are merely granted permission to travel which is entered in your Soviet passport.

But a certain relaxation notwithstanding, there are problems, as the long queues forming daily outside the Soviet Consulate in London indicate. British nationals going to the Soviet Union privately or on business, students, foreigners living in Britain and many others line up for five or six hours to get a visa, certificate or a form or to solve some other problem. The number of visitors to the Soviet Union is growing. The new Soviet policy of building a common European home requires a further slackening of rules for travel to and from the Soviet Union, at least for Europeans.

BACK HOME

I EAGERLY WATCHED EVERYTHING from the very beginning of the flight to Moscow.

Trips abroad are a routine matter for British researchers. My attention in the early years of life abroad was attracted to the smallest details, including those of a flight. I did my best to watch life in various countries even from the sky. But afterwards I got used to everything and provided myself with newspapers, magazines or books before boarding a plane bound for a foreign country, especially America. I used to start reading right after take-off. But on July 10 last, I put reading aside. I was interested to watch fellow passengers flying to Moscow as well as to look at the country from above, to see landscapes familiar from geography lessons at school.

The plane was half empty in spite of midsummer. Besides, British Airways, unlike other companies, had reserved too many seats for first-class passengers, mostly businessmen and diplomats, who were very few this time. Most of the economy class passengers, including us, were non-British. They included an elderly Ukrainian couple from Canada, a grandmother of about 90 who only spoke a mixture of Ukrainian and Russian, and many young people from South America. London is a way station on the air route from North and South America to Europe, especially the Soviet Union, as well as to South Asia.

Because of clouds I only saw familiar landscapes somewhere in the area of Byelorussia. In the Soviet Union, the geometrical character of human activity disappears by contrast with Western Europe, to say nothing of the United States. All American highways are straight and only cross at right angles. Some US states prohibit building any diagonal roads. Byelorussian and Smolensk Region have almost no highways following a straight line. Most of the roads there are dirt roads winding from hamlet to hamlet in the most fanciful manner and skirting rather than crossing fields and forests. Many of them widen and narrow alternately, no doubt creating problems for road traffic when, in spring and fall, they become almost impassable. Among the forests I saw what was clearly abandoned villages, with no roads leading to them. Those must be the ones described as "unpromising" in plans for the development of the Non-Black-Earth Area. Sown fields vary in size and form—they may be triangular, round or oval. In America, nearly all fields are square or rectangular, which makes both crop rotation and cultivation easier.

The closer to Moscow, the more numerous the areas cleared of forests. Irregular grain fields cut into forests inside which you can see numerous clearings used as farmland. This year's grain crop in the central belt is modest. With the plane lowering altitude, you can see bare patches. Americans use satellites to keep an eye on the state of the sown area in the Soviet Union. This enables them to make a rough advance estimate of Soviet grain purchases abroad. As early as May, the crop yield to come is estimated accurately enough according to plant density. Subsequently computers make allowances for weather conditions.

This year's grain crop in the Soviet Union was set by the Americans at 210 million tons, and the figure remained unchanged in June and July. This is 15 million tons more than in 1988. The winter crops planted last year within more favourable time limits than usual bore up well through a fairly mild winter. Besides, spring came early and was dry, which helped complete sowing at an early date in 1989. Even so, the Americans expect the Soviet Union to import the usual amount of grain, 33 million tons (against 38 million last year). There will only

be an increase in the share of fodder grain. To meet all its requirements, in particular for more animal products, the Soviet Union is estimated to need a minimum of 242 million tons of grain.

My latest book about the Soviet Union, published in 1987, deals with the past and present of Soviet agriculture. This is why I said to myself as I watched rural landscapes from above that I must use my very first free day in Moscow for a visit to the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy. I studied there from 1944 to 1950 and worked until 1962, when Nikita Khrushchev unexpectedly ordered that the Academy be shut down and transferred to some state farm.

At Sheremetyevo, an airport reconstructed for the 1980 Olympics, you are struck by the crowdedness of the place. Passports are checked very slowly, at the rate of three or four minutes per passenger. The young frontier-guard sergeants on duty make no decisions by themselves but wait for orders which are apparently issued after someone has studied visa and passport numbers. In July 1989, the Moscow custom-house examined the baggage of all incoming passengers, with interminable waiting as a result. (In August it moved at long last to selective examination.) In the case of women, it examines every piece of jewelry and enters it in the customs declaration, a procedure non-existent in any other country as far as I know. Finally all formalities were over, and we rushed to the exit. Blinded by the floodlights of Swedish television, I could see nobody but my brother Roy. He looked tired. A badge on the lapel of his jacket indicated that he was a People's Deputy of the USSR. He had come to the airport straight from a sitting of the Supreme Soviet. He was no longer like the jobless dissident historian who had seen me off to Britain in January 1973.

SEMINAR AT THE MOSCOW INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

IN APRIL I attended the 42nd annual conference on world problems, a forum which the University of Colorado has traditionally sponsored ever since 1947. The agenda of the conference, held in the small provincial town of Boulder, comprised security, disarmament, regional conflicts and many other items which made it akin to the Moscow seminar.

The conference and the seminar had much in common in the organisation of work and the composition of the participants. However, the Moscow forum differed greatly from the conference in Boulder, nor was the difference in the latter's favour. In the United States, the University of Colorado had a stake in giving the event maximum publicity. The programme of the meeting and special issues of the local newspaper with biographies and photographs of the participants were circulated to all local and national media. Discussion was public and took place before large audiences, mostly students, who were free to ask any questions. The sponsors wanted the audiences to join in discussing global problems. Over the years, the conference has become, in effect, part of an educational programme dealing with international and domestic politics.

In Moscow the delegates discussed all problems among themselves, in a narrow circle. We were admitted to the small conference hall on passes. As for the media, they were not represented, nor did they know anything about the seminar. I believe it was never reported in any national daily. Discussion was neither taken down in shorthand nor tape-recorded.

Such "closed" seminars may occasionally be necessary but not those sponsored by universities. Be that as it may, British disarmament activists found the Moscow approach unsuitable. In this period of glasnost,

when much more acute problems are wide-discussed in the Soviet press and when debates at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and at Supreme Soviet sessions are televised live, I think "confidential" international conferences on current problems can only be useful to a very limited extent. These things were seen differently in the past. At that time, even Pugwash meetings were expected to produce results. Held in pleasant localities in various latitudes, they brought together well-known scientists, who met behind closed doors. But these expectations never materialised. Where the theme under discussion is a draft treaty between countries, closed meetings of diplomats and experts are certainly called for. But this form is manifestly outdated in the case of scientists, academics and public figures. I hope the fourth seminar in this series, if held, is organised differently even in the Soviet Union.

Generally speaking, Moscow is still ill adapted to hosting international conferences and congresses. Besides, these are very few in comparison with similar forums in other European capitals. The tourist service is inadequate. Foreigners outside groups find it very hard to take their bearings in the city because all notices and traffic signs are in Russian whereas the Russian alphabet is unknown to most foreign visitors. In the capitals of civilised countries using other than the Latin alphabet (Greece, Egypt, Israel, Japan), all inscriptions in public places are also duplicated in English and often also in other languages.

Travel in the Soviet Union is still intended in the main for elderly and reasonably well-to-do people who arrive in organised groups. But they look on the Soviet Union as a country to be toured only once. Such are all countries where foreigners are isolated from the population in housing, meals, services, transport. Most of these countries are poor, and people visit them out of curiosity, not to spend their vacations or to travel. The creation of an isolated tourist world in Egypt, Tunisia, India, Algeria and other countries is primarily a sanitary measure aimed at providing a higher standard of hygiene inaccessible to the population. In the Soviet Union, the reasons are political and economic, and far from all guests can understand this. The country has numerous promising areas where tours by foreigners could be organised on large scale but no real tourism will ever develop there unless artificial barriers between those arriving from abroad and Soviet people are removed.

RUBLES AND HARD CURRENCY

THE STATE BANK OF THE SOVIET UNION, like the banks of practically all East European CMEA countries, has almost lost control over exchange of convertible currency. Due to an unrealistic official rate, exchange has become an area of private business, at least in Moscow. Hard currency is exchanged on the black market and taken out of the country by tourists and various slick operators without ever reaching the state budget. The Soviet Union is badly in need of hard currency and has a large foreign debt, and yet it fails to use numerous channels through which hard currency is normally put in circulation in many even relatively poor countries. Its leadership (and partly the population) is still spellbound by the myth of the country being rich enough to ignore non-traditional sources of funding the economy. The Soviet Union *is* a rich country but its people are poor.

To judge by the ratio of the national income to the number of inhabitants, the Soviet economy is roughly at the same level as Britain's. In Britain annual per capita income in 1986 averaged 8,920

dollars against 8,410 dollars in the Soviet Union (according to Western estimates). These figures are higher than in Poland (6,929), Yugoslavia (6,220), Spain (4,840) or Argentina (2,350). But the real standard of living, especially in terms of food consumption, trade turnover or even housing, is lower in the Soviet Union. This has nothing to do with the country's overall economic potential, for a considerably smaller part of the Soviet national income is spent on providing the population with food and basic services. Britain, for one, spends on health more in absolute figures (23 billion pounds sterling) than the Soviet Union although its population is less than one-fifth of the latter's. Besides, the Soviet Union has too many costly government programmes having nothing in common with the standard of living.

The difference in the pattern of government spending priorities tells primarily on life expectancy. For Soviet men in 1986/1987, it was 65 years. Yet in practically all developed countries the average exceeds 70 years, coming close to 80 in the case of women.

Big economic problems also face East European countries to which the Soviet Union is comparable in economic level. These countries' national currencies are inconvertible and are depreciating fast. But they get substantial support in the form of hard currency remittances from their citizens living or working abroad as well as from former citizens finding themselves abroad for various reasons. The more than eight million Poles living in the United States and Western Europe send money or parcels to their native country. The Polish government does its best to use their financial possibilities for helping the economy. Poles living in Poland and Britain carry on very close cultural and economic exchanges. The situation is similar in some other socialist countries and elsewhere. Every year sees about a million Yugoslavs go to Austria, Italy and West Germany to work. The four million Turks living in West Germany and the three million Algerians who have settled in France seriously help their countries.

The Soviet Union did not begin cooperating with former and present-day compatriots in this way until 1965. The government set up Vneshposyltorg, which proceeded to issue certificates for hard currency remittances. But late in 1976 this practice was abolished, chiefly for ideological reasons. Besides, oil sales rapidly increased the hard currency earnings of the country, and it therefore neglected other sources of replenishing its revenues. Its policy did not consist in prevailing on former Russian and Soviet nationals to engage in economic and cultural cooperation with their native country but in ignoring them as "emigrés". Yet this century has seen millions of Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Armenians, inhabitants of the Baltic region and many others emigrate. By far most of them retain their national characteristics, remember their languages (as a rule, up to the third generation), know where their ancestors were born and are willing to maintain ties with their kith and kin if possible. Many foreign tourists come from precisely this group. But there is no infrastructure to help them maintain contacts with the country they hail from.

Soviet embassies only keep up ties with Soviet citizens living permanently abroad. Most of these are women married to foreigners who studied in the Soviet Union. Women of this category now exceed 100,000. It is for them that the Society for Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad functions in the Soviet Union, which publishes its newspaper, *Golos Rodiny* (The Voice of the Motherland). Few are those abroad who know about the existence of this organisation. It has no supporting structures in any foreign country, being merely a bureaucratic office headquartered in Moscow. There are numerous Polish clubs in European capitals, including six in London. And there

also exist two Armenian, a Georgian, Lettish, Lithuanian and Estonian clubs. But you will find neither Russian nor Ukrainian clubs even though there are both Russian and Ukrainian churches.

The dispatch of parcels to the Soviet Union, with the sender paying a duty in hard currency, had come to an end by 1976. This was due to a sharp increase in the amount of the duty. When the latter came to exceed the value of the parcels people stopped sending them. Exorbitant prices for Soviet goods, charged with the aim of earning more hard currency, often prove counterproductive. Here is a simple example. In 1986, *Moscow News* cost in Collets' bookstore, which has a monopoly of selling Soviet press and literature in Britain, 25 pence a copy (nominal price, 20 kopecks) and *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 70 pence (same nominal price). The price of *Moscow News* has not changed, and the paper sells fast. But *Literaturnaya Gazeta* now costs £1.3, or enough money to buy a decent meal at McDonalds', and so the paper has almost stopped selling. It lies in batches for weeks and ends up as waste paper.

Hard currency prices for Soviet books are raised three or four times over against the nominal price also in Moscow's Beryozka bookstores. The underlying idea is that foreigners, too, are prepared to overpay for whatever is in short supply. But the books do not sell except very few works by particularly popular authors. This practice results in blocking rather than promoting sales of Soviet literature for hard currency.

There are very many other inexplicable measures limiting the Soviet Union's hard currency earnings. They include restrictions on the hard currency incomes of the hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens working abroad. Throughout my two weeks in Moscow I daily witnessed instances of an uneconomical or just incompetent approach to the problem. At Sheremetyevo airport I noticed that the Beryozka store was closed for no obvious reason although it was a "rush" hour of outbound traffic.

THE WEST AND SOVIET PERESTROIKA

PERESTROIKA, glasnost and resultant changes in the Soviet Union's relations with neighbours, partners, allies and ideological adversaries are a focal theme of the Western press, academic and political debates and diplomatic talks.

The ongoing process of nuclear disarmament and of renouncing confrontation is understandably associated with Mikhail Gorbachev. Western leaders are now speaking of the end of the cold war, which formed the basis for the foreign policy of the superpowers and the blocs headed by them. Such perestroika induced changes on the international scene as the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in Europe, the reduction of the Soviet military presence in the GDR and some other socialist countries are of tremendous significance for the West. So are the democratisation of the Soviet political system and similar developments in Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia. They tend essentially to reduce fundamental distinctions between the two socio-political systems and to create an affinity between them on the principles of a law-governed state. This is a road which many Western countries have travelled since World War II.

After 1945, the ideas and structures of socialism were also carried forward in Western Europe but the forms used were democratic. Education, the health service, social security in a whole number of countries came to be dominated by socialist trends; transport, the steel

and coal industries and some other key sectors of the economy were nationalised. Nor is this surprising, for socialism as an ideology originated in the west of Europe and was therefore viewed without particular alarm there. What was seen as dangerous for Western civilisation was Stalin's totalitarian socialism, above all the expansionist trends stemming from it.

The "developed socialism" of the Brezhnev period, too, posed a threat although its methods of expansion were not the same as before. Skirmishes on the Soviet-Chinese border, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the troops moved into Afghanistan, huge, practically gratuitous arms deliveries and economic aid to radical forces in various countries all illustrated that threat. In 1981, the West considered it very likely that Soviet troops would be used for settling the inner political crisis in Poland. The persecution of all dissent in the Soviet Union and the absence of any sign of democracy were interpreted by Western leaders and opinion as inherent in the Soviet political system. Mounting economic difficulties completed the picture. The Soviet Union was clearly heading into an economic crisis. Increasing purchases of grain and food and growing exports of arms as well as of oil and other raw materials were typical manifestations of the process.

The West actively studied and forecast developments in the Soviet Union. In the mid-seventies, a question widely discussed, in academic and political circles was what would happen to the vast sphere of Soviet influence when the state ran out of financial resources. Some scenarios of the likely course of events were extremely unfavourable; they ranged from forecasts of the disintegration of the "Soviet empire" to attempts to obtain the requisite hard currency, technology and food products through military blackmail, by smuggling, and so forth. This was the subject of *The Fall of the Soviet Empire* and other academic writings, detective novels such as *The Devil's Alternative*, political analyses.

Immediately after taking office in 1977, Jimmy Carter ordered the CIA to prepare an analytical survey of Soviet economic prospects. The survey submitted by that agency predicted that Soviet oil resources would begin running out in 1979 and that this would automatically entail a drop in hard currency receipts. The country would enter a crisis period. I recall an article published in the American monthly *Science* in 1979 under the heading "How Much Is the Soviet Empire Worth?" On the strength of detailed estimates of Soviet expenditures in Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia and other countries, its author came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union was spending around 50 billion dollars just to support friendly regimes—mostly socialist, nationalist and military dictatorships—in Asia, Africa and Latin America. To stick to such a policy for a reasonably long time would obviously be impossible but a reversal was regarded as unlikely because no one expected Leonid Brezhnev to take any initiative.

In 1979 it emerged that oil production in the Soviet Union was still going up (it is now known to have been frankly wasteful utilisation of natural resources). And so the CIA corrected its forecast by naming the year 1981 as the time when a crisis would set in. Basic to the American approach was the theory of direct dependence between Soviet foreign policy moves towards further ideological expansion and growing Soviet trade in power-generating resources and other raw materials. This explains the US embargo on sales of oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union as well as America's attempts to make Western Europe refuse the Soviet Union aid in building the West Siberia—Centre gas pipeline and cut purchases of Soviet natural gas. In 1979-1981, all economists believed that world prices for oil and gas

could only go up. The Iraq-Iran war merely confirmed them in this belief, and the dispatch of Soviet troops to Afghanistan bred total panic and led to a steep rise in oil, gas and gold prices.

The West was waiting with some anxiety for Brezhnev's death. None of his prospective successors offered any optimistic hopes. Gorbachev was not among them at the time. Analysts used large screens to scrutinise Brezhnev's latest photographs. Doctors and computers made tentative forecasts of the General Secretary's last days according to changes in his looks and to other indices. All signs were that he would die some time in the first quarter of 1983. The forecast missed by just a few months.

Early in 1982, or long before the dénouement, the Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies attempted a political, social and economic analysis of likely changes in the Soviet Union following a change of leader. It started a series of research projects and discussions under the common title of "After Brezhnev" and continued it in the period of the new policy adopted under Yuri Andropov. The team included over thirty Sovietologists, among them Robert Byrnes of Indiana university, Seweryn Bialer of Columbia University and Adam Ulam of Harvard. The work resulted in publishing a detailed report late in 1983.¹

The report stated that the Soviet Union was at the threshold of a political and economic crisis. The country's technological lag was increasing, which meant restricting its possibilities for further expansion. What was in the offing was not merely the advent of a new General Secretary but the departure of a whole generation of political leaders. However, the authors of the report failed to foresee the perestroika processes now under way, the glasnost and openness that Soviet society was advancing to. They presumed that the new and younger leaders of the state would embark in their turn on increasing repression and cultural isolation and make more resolute efforts to gain access to the technological achievements of the West without providing conditions for the adoption of Western ideas; bureaucratic inertia would not be broken; military spending would stay on the same level. American experts felt certain that the new generation of Soviet leaders would try to invigorate the economy, especially food and consumer goods production. But they affirmed that it would do so by the method of organisation and mobilisation, not through innovation or reform, which it would consider too risky. In the foreign policy sphere, the Soviet Union would only have limited room for manoeuvre due to purely ideological factors. On this issue too, the Soviet leadership would follow the same course as before because it would have the same scale of values and enjoy the same privileges granted by the country's one-party system. This path was leading nowhere, however, and so the Soviet Union could be expected to effect more fundamental changes but not before the 1990s.

After Andropov's death, under Konstantin Chernenko, that forecast came true almost completely. Repression against dissidents intensified, contacts between Soviet people and foreigners were curbed in every way, the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the CPSU CC started preparations for the rehabilitation of Stalin. Gorbachev's election as General Secretary in March 1985 led initially to a change in style, not of the substance of the matter. The methods of leading the country remained based on organisation and mobilisation—it did not become reformist. The call for "acceleration" was backed by restrictive and prohibitive legislation. The anti-alcoholic campaign turned out to be ill-considered politically and economically. The decree on combating "unearned incomes", an act which dealt a blow at cooperatives and

private trade, tended to throw the economy back to the command system. The state committees that were established to run the agro-industrial complex and supervise the quality of output added bureaucratic rather than economic methods of management. The leadership realised the need for scientific and technological progress but tried to stimulate it by means of resolutions passed at full meetings of the party CC and at various conferences whereas it should have reorganised the system of research. There was a brisk replacement of people but not of methods or approaches.

Economic crisis, nevertheless, was aggravating, industrial production showed no growth and there was no money either for modernisation or reconstruction of industrial enterprises. On top of this there came something which neither economists nor industrialists had forecast: world prices for oil and gas plummeted. The drop also hit Soviet products, needless to say. It was a strong blow made worse by huge losses resulting from cuts in the production and sale of liquor. Furthermore, large sums had to be spent on removing the effects of the Chernobyl accident, to say nothing of the cost of the war in Afghanistan. All of this led to a gigantic budget deficit and a bad shortage of hard currency and greatly deteriorated the country's financial and economic situation by calling a halt to traditional economic growth on extensive and input-intensive lines. Of course, these were developments hard to predict.

In 1986 Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader, was seen by everybody as a more determined reformer than Gorbachev because he went further in economic reform than the latter. But restructuring in China only involved the economy, being an attempt to borrow foreign achievements and know-how without effecting political reforms to match. It therefore led to the student "explosion" and the ensuing repression in June 1989. The fact that the Soviet Union ventured on sufficiently serious democratic transformations came as a surprise to Western observers and analysts.

I, too, found many things astonishing. In the first two editions of my book *Gorbachev* (1986 and 1987), I took a rather sceptical view of the new Soviet leader's measures, regarding them as not going deep enough, let alone as a "revolution from above". But I was far more optimistic in the third edition (late 1988). It covered the period of preparations for and the signing of the Soviet-American INF Treaty as well as the 19th CPSU Conference, which approved a programme for political reform in the country. Both events were of tremendous moment. I saw that a real perestroika had begun.

Western reaction to it varies. There is no doubt that the West now considers Gorbachev the most popular political leader. Public opinion responds favourably to his domestic and international initiatives, and in some countries, such as West Germany or the Netherlands, its response is enthusiastic. But those who work out and adopt political decisions show a measure of reserve. This applies above all to the United States and Britain and expresses itself if only in both countries being in no hurry to meet perestroika half-way in concrete terms. For instance, they might lift controls on trade with the Soviet Union, primarily on sales of sophisticated technology. Western leaders are not yet sure that perestroika is irreversible and express some doubts about whether Gorbachev will stay in power.

The sad finale of Khrushchev's reforms is a particularly striking if far from the only fact of Soviet history that may be seen as justifying this attitude. Another fact is the winding down of Alexei Kosygin's economic reform in 1965-1968 and the return to economic management according to party directives. In a still earlier period there was the

fate of the New Economic Policy (NEP). Western leaders do not find two or three years of real perestroika enough for them to draw final conclusions. They are all the more reserved because in the recent period, too, there have been enough events suggesting the possibility of a reversal: the meeting of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, which relieved Boris Yeltsin of his post (November 1987); Nina Andreyeva's two weeks which shook perestroika (March 1988); the Tbilisi tragedy (April 1989).

Some Soviet radicals counsel the West to take its time in rendering real assistance to perestroika, saying that aid might slow down perestroika rather than speed it. A member of the Moscow group of People's Deputies of the USSR, speaking in London in June, claimed that Western support might force the disease within and turn out to encourage reactionary forces. It would be wiser, therefore, to sit and wait for further developments.² Many in the West share this point of view. They regard perestroika as a forced response by the Soviet Union to an increasingly deep political and economic crisis, not as a logical and natural measure in favour of democratisation and East-West rapprochement.

On taking over, the new US administration set about studying eventual changes in its policy towards the Soviet Union. To this end it held a series of meetings and discussions involving noted politicians, Sovietologists, economists, military, CIA and other officials. As a result of the analysis carried out by it, the White House came to the conclusion that it would be well advised to stick to its chosen line of conduct. The situation in the Soviet Union was found unstable. Many in President Bush's entourage held that deteriorating ethnic problems and mounting economic difficulties, particularly chronic food and manufactured goods shortages, would lead to still worse unrest. The situation would become even more uncontrollable. It might either compel Gorbachev to alter course in favour of reinforcing the central authority or prompt his colleagues to replace him unless he did so.

Last summer an oft-recurrent claim made by the Western media was: "Perestroika doesn't work". But *Science*, *Nature* and some other serious periodicals given to scientific analysis take what I see as a more realistic stand. They are of the opinion that radical recipes for almost instant democratisation are even less likely to yield positive results than a reasonably prudent perestroika and more likely to bring about a change in favour of conservatism. Scientists know better than politicians that major changes in the life of a state, particularly a superpower, cannot come about rapidly. For politicians, perestroika is primarily something relating to power or the form of organising and running the economy. As for scientists, they associate it with the ability of the country to advance and update its economy and raise its scientific and technological potential to the level attained by the world. Yet processes of this nature unfold rather slowly and amid difficulties.

Thanks to perestroika, Western opinion is ceasing to look on the Soviet Union as a state seeking ideological and military political expansion. The current democratic changes in the Soviet Union and some other socialist countries are noted with deep satisfaction in the West, for they are visibly lessening international tensions. This is not to say, however, that the West is going to offer any one of them charitable aid—after all, they are by no means poor. The socialist community countries are rich by all world standards, and as for the Soviet Union, it is probably richer in natural resources than any other state in the world. It can only be a question of extensive mutually beneficial cooperation but this is a serious problem to be solved jointly.

To begin with, it is necessary to restructure East-West trade, especially trade between the Soviet Union and the West, if it is to meet present-day requirements. This explains the West's increasingly visible desire to help the Soviet Union switch from selling unprocessed raw materials on the Western market to trade in semi-finished products. Now that many capitalist countries have attained a higher economic level by using sophisticated technology, it is unprofitable to enterprises to do initial processing of raw materials, which generally involves environmental pollution to boot. Currently there is a bid to shift processing to countries where raw materials are extracted. This also goes for processing agricultural products. All of this is part of an objectively necessary international division of labour. Hence such projects as the organisation in Tyumen Region of chemical processing of oil and gas to manufacture plastics. The West is prepared to offer lavish credits for the projects.

However, the recent miners' strikes and new outbreaks of ethnic strife revived the West's fears concerning the outlook in the Soviet Union. It is now more aware than before that political uncertainty, ethnic destabilisation and ultimately the possibility of perestroika falling through would also hit the economic and political interests of the West, where nobody wants to lose the investments he has already made or plans to make in the Soviet Union as a gigantic source of raw materials and a vast market. Nor is anybody eager for a resumption of the cold war or a worsening of "hot" regional conflicts. Also, it is realised more and more that a passive policy of waiting for the complete democratisation of the Soviet Union and for the transformation of the country into a law-governed state is making the process more difficult. All this has induced the West to speak more specifically about the need to help Gorbachev, to prevent perestroika failing. As a result, there have been calls for lifting restrictions on trade with the USSR, grant it credits and to loosen control over technology exports, as well as for sending food and medicaments to the Soviet miners, so as not to miss a historical chance of creating a safer world.³

SOME SUGGESTIONS

SINCE PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES of the USSR find it possible on arriving in Britain to tell Western politicians how they believe the West should treat perestroika, I will venture some advice for my part.

Even in the two weeks spend in Moscow and Kalinin, I realised that the Soviet Union will be unable to end its economic and technological lag if it only relies on its own forces plus Western credits and investments and trade with the West. Nor will joint ventures make much difference unless they employ foreign engineers as full-fledged production managers. The Soviet Union ought to widely employ Western specialists on contracts in both joint ventures and other enterprises, selecting them by examination. Let Soviet workers try to work under the direction of Englishmen, Frenchmen, Americans or Japanese. Incidentally, Japanese agree to set up enterprises in Britain only if their engineers are allowed to run the enterprises as they see fit and do not have to follow the British tradition of what they regarded as a lukewarm attitude to work. Let foreign experts see how Tyumen oil is extracted, how hospitals are functioning in Turkmenia or how Volga cars obsolete on all counts are made in Gorky. At any Soviet meat-packing plant or creamery, one Western specialist could introduce a greater number of useful innovations for less money than the whole, very costly apparatus of a ministry with its network of research institutes.

When living in the Soviet Union, I overlooked many things and ignored obvious absurdities because I did not perceive them as such. Foreigners arriving as tourists cannot notice much, either, or if struck by something unusual, they are bound to dismiss it as an exotic peculiarity of the country. As for me, I found many things strange this time, and had it been my business, I would have tried to change the situation (as invited foreign specialists are certain to do). Here are some examples.

Western specialists would prove their worth above all in agriculture. One Canadian farmer could help a whole district more effectively than the whole staff of a district agroindustrial association. I cannot understand, by the way, why exportable crops like rye, buckwheat and flax have dropped out of the list of agricultural crops to be sold for hard currency. After all, prerevolutionary Russia and the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s were invariably in the lead as suppliers of these crops to the world market. All three are still popular in Western Europe, and as for rye bread, it is three times as expensive as wheat bread because of its properties. But buckwheat comes to Britain from China, and flax and rye are imported from Poland and the GDR. Sales for hard currency would make for a substantial increase in the production of these crops, which are always certain to sell on the world market.

Foreign architects would probably discover many opportunities to improve construction in the Soviet Union. I saw no really imaginative buildings even in new urban development areas. Most buildings are of a standards type, the standard being that of West European mass architecture of the 1950s. The incongruity of some solutions in terms of architecture and construction strikes even the layman. And what about those huge slogans on house walls and tops, such as "Glory to advanced Soviet science" or to something else? Who ever wants them? It is a sheer waste of money, materials and labour.

In wish to stress the special importance of offering Soviet students of construction as well as other students adequate opportunities for vocational training abroad. Compared with other countries, the Soviet Union sends very few young people abroad to study. How, then, is it to attain world educational and technological standards, which are necessary to its future?

There are too many public buildings that you cannot enter without a pass. In the West, you rarely need a pass. If you seek admittance to a "closed" institution, you can gain it by applying to the person on duty in the hall. As regards a passport, you need one when entering or leaving a West European country or checking in at, say, an Italian or Spanish hotel. That is all. In the Soviet Union, however, you must carry your passport everywhere. What is the reason for this distrust of people, this suspicious attitude?

In what is a classless society, everything is done to divide people into various privileged groups on the most absurd grounds. Libraries have rooms reserved for the general public, for holders of candidates' degrees, for professors and academicians, for foreigners. Everywhere you come across notices saying that veterans of the Great Patriotic War, the CPSU, and so on, are entitled to priority attendance. Why has this privilege been granted to veterans and not to disabled people? There is nothing of the kind in the West "divided into classes". It is precisely invalids—all invalids—that enjoy many privileges there on an equal footing.

People still wear war and other medals, doing it more frequently than in the 1960s. Is this because there are too many queues? Why decorate anyone at all for ordinary things: collective farmers for crop yields,

milkmaids for milking, workers for fulfilling production plans, authors for novels, sportsmen for records? The United States has no decorations whatever for civilians and somehow does quite well without them. It therefore needs no apparatus to select candidates and decorate them nor factories to make decorations. Medals and titles are a legacy of the past, probably the feudal era. Britain, too, goes for this sort of thing, but then it is a monarchy. As for West Germany, for instance, it hardly has any decorations or titles. The Soviet Union has more of them than any other country, especially titles, such as "honoured", "people's" or "honorary", which are further classified as to level (Union, republican, and so on). And each title normally provides a privilege. Even pensioners are granted honorary titles, such as "personal" or "all-Union category". On the other hand, no convenient wheel-chairs are made for invalids, nor are dogs trained to guide blind people.

There are a lot of gradations in science, and if anything, their number has grown. In 1973, there existed two basic jobs, those of junior and senior researcher. By now three more have been added: "chief researcher", "leading researcher" and just "researcher". It certainly takes more effort to climb five rungs of the ladder and more time to be certified. But this tells on actual research. There are numerous state and other prizes, and they are often awarded for no real achievement. Also, there are a great many socially useless organisations to see to all of this. Degrees have to be approved by the National Certification Commission even after being conferred. But does this help improve research? In the West, a degree or title given by a university or college is in the nature of a final decision. The state machine has nothing to do with such decisions. It does not equalise Harvard or Oxford and small provincial colleges by issuing universal diplomas. The scientific value of a diploma is proportional to the scientific leverage of the institution concerned. In the Soviet Union, however, the existing costly and cumbersome system which robs noted scientists of much of their time, seems to be designed to reduce everyone to an average level of mediocrity. And the number of academies of all sorts! They are nothing but exclusive bureaucratic research set-ups making it difficult to promote gifted youth.

The institution and distribution of honours, titles, awards and challenge banners in the Soviet Union has been elevated to the rank of government policy disuniting rather than uniting people. This pompous, costly policy is too great a luxury for a country where nearly half the population is living at or below the poverty line. The formation of diverse hierarchies in all population groups is a waste of time and national resources, an occupation unnecessary to any civilised society. Yet there are those who invent all this sitting behind their desks, a bureaucratic apparatus tirelessly seeking to ration and distribute at least something and hence to reproduce its own job.

The command system plainly refuses to give ground. Abandoning its positions in one sphere, it promptly wins new ones in another. The methods it uses are the same as ever: distributing goods and services through a system of coupons, privileges and "special" stores (the new Soviet parliament has already contributed its bit to this). This system keeps up pressure on the economy and society and uselessly swallows a sizable part of the national income.

I did not have time enough to see many things but still I realised that since 1973 the gap in living standards between the Soviet Union and Western Europe has regrettably widened and goes on widening. During the period of stagnation in the Soviet Union, the West made much further progress by accomplishing a scientific and technological revolution. It thoroughly reshaped its economy, being prompted in the main by the energy crisis of the seventies. This process—the introduction of new, less

power-intensive technologies and the rundown of traditional heavy industries—lasted six or seven years and was crowned with success. Governments hardly intervened in it, everything developing primarily on economic lines.

Ever since 1986, the energy crisis has also affected the Soviet Union. The Soviet economy now needs to cover the same distance as the West in order to change to less power-intensive technologies. It will have to roll back its heavy industry and military-industrial complex and expand industries producing consumer goods. This is an arduous and painful process; it will have to be carried on chiefly by drawing on internal resources and is bound to force down living standards as a result of the abolition of many subsidies.

Now economic restructuring in the West was neither easy nor free of conflict. Steel plants, mines and shipyards had to be shut down, passenger ship lines, such as the French trans-Atlantic line and then its Italian counterpart, went bankrupt one after another. The same lot befell several airlines. Due to growing economic difficulties, the British Labour Party lost power in 1979; President Carter failed to win re-election (1980), and the Social Democrats were defeated in West Germany.

What made the situation easier, however, was that economic restructuring took place against the background of an immense inflow of banking capital and credits granted on easy terms. In other words, it was lavishly funded with petrodollars, which countries rich in oil remitted to Western banks anyway to be invested. The banks, amassing enormous wealth, offered everyone credits on easy terms. Incidentally, these are still available in large quantities.

In those Western countries that used credits primarily for modernising their industries, setting up progressive production facilities and advancing science and technology, restructuring culminated in the economy rising to a new and higher plane. As a result, living standards in the United States, Britain and other Western countries, which had declined noticeably in the 1974-1980 period, picked up again. From 1981 on, all economic indices steadily registered substantial improvements, with inflation and unemployment going down. Those were fruits of patient, persevering effort aimed primarily at reorganising the economy technologically and structurally.

Some other countries, however, spend the large funds put at their disposal on solving current problems and meeting consumer demand rather than use them for a far-reaching reconstruction and modernisation of industry. To be sure, it is not difficult to raise the standard of life on credit, which is why many poor countries took precisely this road, all the more since they had no stable governments thinking of the future. In Europe this was done by Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania and Poland. As a consequence, all these countries plus Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Nigeria and other Third World states found themselves fettered by a debt which it will be very hard for them to pay back. As for a deep-going restructuring of the economy, they have neither resources of their own nor opportunities of obtaining foreign credits; they derive money from their own population mainly through inflation. This is why personally I disagree with some certain Soviet economists who call for borrowing from the West to import consumer goods.

Those who claim that economic restructuring in the Soviet Union will not precipitate a drop in living standards are completely wrong. This would have been possible in the 1970s, when oil and gas earned the country large amounts of hard currency. At present the Soviet Union has no surplus foreign exchange and is handicapped by a huge budget deficit. Saving is the only internal source from which to fund perestroika. The country has major opportunities for this—it can secure billions of rubles

by reducing or discontinuing many expenditures that are not indispensable or are downright useless. I would list priorities as follows:

- Reduce the bureaucratic apparatus by a substantial margin.
- Cut or abolish subsidies for the provision of goods and services that are not vitally necessary.
- Spend more to develop public transport.
- Refuse to subsidise the extremely unprofitable postal and telephone services, which are manifestly overwhelmed by the flood of glasnost. Place them on a commercial basis.
- Invest more in public health but refuse to pay for the maintenance of departmental holiday homes because this is a luxury. At no health resort anywhere else are there holiday homes owned by ministries or other entities. There are only more or less expensive hotels open to all.
- Stop displaying slogans and holding festive demonstrations, parades and other expensive anniversary ceremonies.
- Desist for a time from building memorials. Don't keep guards of honour posted around the clock at the graves of the Unknown Soldier in every regional capital.
- Stop building fine edifices for district, city or regional party committees, government country houses, "special" distribution centres, creative workers' holiday homes, and so forth. Make an inventory of them and run them on a commercial basis.
- Reduce or discontinue the funding of regimes and political forces for ideological or political reasons. Support peoples, not parties or governments. Poor countries do need aid but it is for the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to decide on this, and the amount allocated should be included in the state budget, not in a special fund of the Council of Ministers or the Political Bureau.
- Rid costly government programmes, such as the space programme, of elements prompted by considerations of prestige and leave only those that are justified economically.
- Do away with pass offices, "first departments", Glavlit (censorship office), residence registration desks, research centres that have failed to deliver the goods, and other offices and subdivisions which are of no real social use.

In short, the task is not to fritter away the people's money or to march at parades but to work hard. There is no reason to regard a gradual return to an economy governed by common sense as betrayal of the ideas of the October Revolution. Indeed, the revolution envisaged creating precisely this kind of economy, except that nothing came of it.

EVERY REVOLUTION produces both a national and a global effect. There is no assessing the October Revolution without analysing its impact on the world, for it not only brought about a new social system in Russia and then in other countries but also altered the trend of capitalist development in the West. Capitalism borrowed many useful things from socialism in education, public health, social security and other spheres. And what is more, it outdid many socialist countries in these spheres. There is no purely capitalist or purely socialist system anywhere in the world and computers are more useful than quotations from the classics. Socialist ideas have benefited countries where they "worked" on the principles of liberal democracy and proved harmful to countries where they were dogmatically imposed by totalitarian regimes.

THE WALK IN THE WOODS

Paul NITZE

THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED

BY THE TIME the Reagan administration took office in 1981 the number one arms control issue had shifted from the SALT II treaty to the growing imbalance in theater weapons, especially in Europe. The problem originated in Soviet Union's decision in the mid-1970s to deploy substantial numbers of its newly developed SS-20 intermediate-range mobile missile. With a range of over three thousand miles, much improved accuracy, and the capability of carrying three MIRVed warheads, the SS-20 posed a threat to virtually every target of importance in NATO Europe and in Asia as well. The decision to deploy these more precise and more usable weapons soon resulted in a growing disparity of military power in Europe. This was noted by President Ford and Henry Kissinger at the Vladivostok summit.

While Ford and Kissinger were in charge of policy, efforts had been directed in the main toward working out a settlement of the SS-20 problem within the framework of the SALT II negotiations, as part of the resolution of the forward-based systems (FBS) question. Indeed, there were some among Henry's entourage and in the intelligence community who sincerely believed that the Soviets had decided to deploy the SS-20 system exactly for this purpose—as a bargaining chip to get the United States to negotiate on FBS. When Ford's bid to retain the presidency failed, his successor, Jimmy Carter, decided to try to negotiate a somewhat different SALT II agreement than the one Ford and Kissinger had sought. And as Carter did not think that the SS-20 posed a serious threat to Western Europe or to the strategic balance, he saw no reason to include them within the SALT II framework.

It was at this point, in the fall of 1977, that West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt appeared before the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, urging the United States to take steps to offset the SS-20 deployment. Schmidt was afraid that Carter, in his zeal to reach a SALT II agreement, would make concessions that would weaken or even remove the extended deterrence provided by U.S. strategic weapons. He therefore wanted reassurance, in the form of U.S. deployment of intermediate-range weapons in Europe. This would both counterbalance the Soviet SS-20 threat and add to the coupling of the US nuclear intercontinental capability to the defense of Europe. Carter was

Paul Nitze is a notable figure in the US politics. From 1946 to 1953 and 1961 to 1969 he held senior posts with different administrations including the position of Director of Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, Secretary of the Navy and Deputy Secretary of Defense. In 1969 to 1974 he was special advisor to the Secretary of Defense and member of the US delegation to SALT negotiations. In 1981 to 1983 he headed the US delegation to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations. This is the first of the two articles contributed by the author to INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

not enthusiastic about accepting Schmidt's challenge, but decided that as leader of the Western alliance, he should take some kind of action. Finally, in January 1979, Carter met on the Caribbean island of Guadeloupe with British Prime Minister James Callaghan, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and Schmidt. There they worked out an arrangement to proceed with the deployment in Western Europe of two new U.S. intermediate-range systems—a force of 108 mobile ballistic missiles, the Pershing II, all of which would be based in West Germany; and a force of 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), most of which would be deployed in other European NATO countries that agreed to accept them. After a further exchange of views, the NATO foreign ministers in December 1979 adopted what they termed the "two track decision" which, in addition to providing for the deployment of the Pershing IIs and GLCMs, called upon the United States and the Soviet Union to enter into negotiations aimed at securing limitations on their respective systems, as the NATO communique put it, "consistent with the principle of equality between the sides."

When I first heard about this decision (I was not in the government at the time), I was dubious whether it was a wise move, especially with respect to the deployment of the Pershing IIs. These were improved, longer-range versions of the Pershing Ia a missile that had been in Europe since the 1960s. The Pershing II was to have a range of 1,800 kilometers (more than twice the range of the Pershing Ia) which would give it the capability to strike Soviet territory, though not enough to threaten Moscow, which the Germans considered too politically sensitive a target. In fact, there were not many strategically significant targets in Russia that the Pershing II could reach. For NATO Europe the most important behind-the-lines targets were the time-sensitive ones, such as the staging bases for second- and third-echelon Warsaw Pact ground forces, virtually all of which were in non-Soviet Eastern Europe. For these targets, the added range of the Pershing II was unnecessary. That job could have been done just as well with a mix of GLCMs and a weapon called the Pershing Ib, which was identical to the Pershing II except for the absence of the second rocket stage, a design that limited its range to around 750 kilometers. In other words, it seemed to me that the case for deploying the Pershing IIs was more political than military.

What also bothered me about the missile decision was its divisive effect on European public opinion, especially West German opinion. Not only did it give the so-called peace movement a ready-made issue; it also threatened to undermine the fragile consensus on defense issues that the West German political parties had struggled so painstakingly to develop and maintain for two decades or more.

A further complication was the emergence in the late 1970s of a German political movement known as the "Greens", made up of a combination of radical environmentalists, anarchists, leftists, pacifists, and a few hardened Communists of the Trotskyite persuasion. Their strongest appeal was to the young, more liberal-minded who had traditionally gravitated to the left wing of the SPD. At the grass-roots level, SPD organizers found they were losing new voters to the Greens and reacted by endorsing more radical positions themselves, including toughened demands for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Soviet, for their part, helped to stimulate the peace movement. It was, in sum, a complicated and delicate situation that did not make pursuing a consistent American policy any easier.

Nonetheless, by the time the Reagan administration came into office, I saw no other choice than to proceed with the two-track policy. To hold the Western alliance together, we could not afford to repeat the mistake that President Carter had made with respect to the neutron bomb, which

he had endorsed and then repudiated. If we were to maintain the solidarity of the alliance, we should not make commitments and then abruptly back away from them. I thought that in the case of the Pershing IIs and GLCMs, we had an opportunity to achieve what we wanted through negotiations. It would be advantageous for the West to see these weapons eliminated on both sides, if this could be negotiated with the Soviets. I was therefore in favour of promptly proceeding with INF negotiations. The task of doing so became mine when in July 1981 Eugene Rostow, the new director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, asked me to join him as his candidate to be head of the delegation being assembled to negotiate in Geneva what was then called the theater nuclear weapons issue.

Behind the eventual name of the talks—the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces, or INF, negotiations—there is an interesting story. Shortly before being designated as chief INF negotiator, I flew to Europe for preliminary consultations with our allies. At that time nearly everyone in the press and in the United States government was referring to the upcoming talks as either the “Euromissile talks” or the “theater nuclear forces negotiations.” During my trip it became clear that our allies disliked this terminology. They thought that the phrase “theater nuclear weapons” gave the wrong impression in that it suggested a disassociation of a nuclear war in Europe from one involving an exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union. What the allies wanted was a coupling of the relatively weak deterrent in Europe to the stronger U.S. intercontinental deterrent. I thought they had a valid point with respect to the name to be given the negotiations and raised the issue at one of our subsequent delegation meetings in Washington. After we had examined the problem from a variety of perspectives, I finally proposed that we call the talks the “intermediate-range nuclear force” negotiations instead of theater nuclear force negotiations to establish the concept that the weapons we were to deal with were determined by their range, not by their geographic place of deployment. That was consistent with the line we had taken in SALT, and it seemed to me equally proper in connection with these negotiations.

After some further discussion the entire delegation concurred in the name I suggested we use. Then we all had to persuade our bosses. Generally speaking, people in the State Department, including Secretary of State Alexander Haig, agreed with us, so we had no problem there. The Joint Chiefs were a little uncertain, but they too were eventually won over, so that by the eve of the talks, everyone in Washington was referring to them as the INF, rather than TNF, negotiations.

The next step was for Haig to persuade the Soviet when he and Gromyko met at the UN in September 1981. Haig’s formulation for the title of the talks was “Negotiations for the Reduction and Limitation of Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces in the Context of START”—START being the acronym for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (the title that President Reagan preferred over SALT) which were to be conducted parallel to the intermediate-range negotiations. Gromyko wanted the title to be “Limitation of Medium Range Nuclear Systems in Europe”. His aim was to confine the talks to those weapons deployed in Europe in order to avoid any connection with SALT or START and to leave the Soviets a free hand to deploy whatever they wanted against China and Japan. We continued to insist that the talks deal with all intermediate-range weapons whatever. Gradually our view caught on in the press and was the one that prevailed.

What was meant by “intermediate-range” forces became something of a floating concept. My idea was that it should include all ground-based nuclear systems between battlefield-range weapons and intercontinental

missiles with a range greater than 5,500 kilometers. The Soviets did not want any of their shorter-range systems (i. e., their SS-21s, with a range of 150 kilometers, and their SS-23s, which had a range of 300 to 500 kilometers) included in the negotiations. Eventually, it came down to discussion of the Pershing IIs and GLCMs on our side, and the SS-4s, SS-5s, and SS-20s on their side.

Shortly after Thanksgiving I arrived in Geneva for the opening round of talks and my first meeting with my Soviet opposite number, Yuli Kvitsinskiy. Before the INF negotiations began on November 30, 1981, I had never met Kvitsinskiy, although I heard a great deal about him. The day before the first formal meeting between our two delegations was to take place, we met informally for an hour and a half. He spoke English, so we had no need for interpreters. He was forty-four, more than thirty years my junior. I found him, at least superficially, easy to get along with. Unlike many other Soviet negotiators I have known, he had a sense of humor.

From the start we tried to expand the informal contacts between the two delegations as much as we could. Kvitsinskiy and I frequently met one on one, and my wife, Phyllis, and I would invite Kvitsinskiy and his wife, Inga, to dinner, and to all manner of other social gatherings, such as outings on the lake, picnics, and formal receptions. Mrs. Kvitsinskiy was a handsome Ukrainian woman, with blue eyes, pale skin, and black hair; she spoke good French. Phyllis's French was excellent and mine passable. After a period of time we came to know the Kvitsinskiys about as well as it is possible to know a senior Soviet official.

In his formal statements at our plenary meetings he had no hesitation in putting forward a continuous stream of one-sided propaganda arguments which he knew in advance were lacking in factual basis and logic and would therefore be wholly unpersuasive to me and the U.S. delegation or to Washington. He appeared to be under instruction from Moscow to enter these statements into the record so that on the appropriate occasion they could be used by *Pravda* or other Soviet propaganda organs. When in the more informal postplenary discussions, I would demonstrate the errors and lack of logic in Kvitsinskiy's formal statement, he was wholly impervious to embarrassment. Sometimes he would as much as say that what he had stated in the plenary meeting had been on instruction from Moscow. On other occasions he would ascribe my remarks to my deputy, Maynard W. "Mike" Glitman, and rebut them.

In private discussion he was generally quite a different man. He could be charming, a good conversationalist, interested in an amazing array of subjects.

Before the first formal negotiating session in the fall of 1981, Kvitsinskiy and I met and quickly agreed on several basic points, agreement on all of which I thought necessary if we were to have a serious negotiation rather than a mere competition for propaganda advantage. There would be no agenda; either side could at any time raise and discuss any subject it wished. We would meet in Geneva for a period of approximately two months and then return to our capitals for two months. (Setting such a schedule in advance would avoid endless useless argument as to which side was prepared to work harder and sit longer before a break.) Kvitsinskiy and I agreed that work with our respective bosses at home would probably be as important as, or more important than, the work the two delegations would have with each other; therefore it was right to give the home front equal time.

We agreed that he and I would attempt to preserve the confidentiality of the negotiations. I made it clear that I had to be free fully to brief the committees of the Congress and our NATO allies, but I believed they also would wish to foster success in the negotiations by maintaining con-

fidentiality. I said I could make no commitment with respect to higher authority in the U.S. executive branch but could assure him with respect to myself and the members of my team. He said the Soviet side was much better disciplined than that of the United States, but admitted that he could give me no assurance as to what *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, or higher authority in Moscow might say. It was far from an airtight understanding, but for a long time it worked reasonably well; there were no leaks from either delegation.

During the first round, the U.S. delegation took the initiative. We introduced President Reagan's proposal of November 18, 1981, to forgo deployment of our Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviets would eliminate their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missile systems. This proposal became known as the zero-zero option, or zero-zero outcome. We explained the underlying considerations, outlined our view of the essential elements of an agreement designed to meet the interests of the two sides, and in February 1982 tabled the text of a draft treaty which presented in detail the way we proposed the issues involved should be dealt with.

The Soviet delegation used the early sessions in late 1981 and early 1982 to sketch out major elements of their position but left much to be explained later. In contrast to our proposal to eliminate all longer-range INF missiles globally, the Soviets proposed a limit that would pertain to Europe only, permitting NATO and the Soviet Union each three hundred "medium-range" missiles and aircraft, with the proviso that the United States would be allowed to deploy no missiles. (By NATO the Soviets meant the United States, Britain, and France and by "medium-range" they meant systems with a range or combat radius in excess of a thousand kilometers.) In the second round the Soviet side revealed more of their position and finally presented a draft treaty text of their own.

Our delegation had been keeping what we called an "issue book" to which, as one issue after another between the two sides arose, a new section was added. Every word said by anyone of our delegation and every word said by anyone of their delegation on one of those issues was entered into the book under the appropriate section. By the summer of 1982, the issues book contained some thirty-five sections. By that time, each side had reason to believe that it thoroughly understood the other's position, as well as all the ins and outs of the issues that divided us.

The two delegations normally met twice a week in plenary session. In these meetings each side would present a formal statement which represented the official view of its government on whatever question or facet of the INF issue it wanted to address. After these statements were exchanged, the sides would break up into smaller groups for postplenary meetings, where questions were asked and answered about the respective statements or about a side's statement from an earlier session. Though less formal than the plenary meeting, the postplenary session were still "on the record". Interpreters were present and both sides took scrupulous notes.

In the spring of 1982, Kvitsinskiy told me that a basic review of Soviet policy toward the INF negotiations was scheduled for that summer in Moscow. He stressed the importance of progress in the negotiations prior to that review. A review of that kind would result in freezing the Soviet position; thereafter it was likely to be much more inflexible. I took his warning seriously.

I also had come to the conclusion that it was important to make progress rapidly, if at all possible. From the beginning of the negotiations it had been my view that the U.S. team in Geneva was negotiating as much, or more, on behalf of the interests of the European members of NATO as it was on behalf of the direct interests of the United States.

After all, the SS-20s directly threatened every military installation, airfield, port, rail junction, command center, and city in Western Europe. They did not directly threaten targets in the United States. The U.S. interest was thus indirect; or NATO allies considered their territory to be under direct threat and a threat to them was a threat to us. The European members of NATO were anxious for a prompt agreement.

By the end of June 1982 the members of the U.S. negotiating team were near a consensus that the time had come to cut through the morass of issues and to try to find a basis for a deal. We did not see how we were going to achieve agreement involving substantial movement on the Soviet side unless we were prepared for substantial movement on our side.

My instructions directed me to explore with my opposite number any possibility of significant movement on issues of interest to us. I was not authorised to commit the government to any change in the U.S. position as set forth in my instructions. I saw no way of exploring the possibility of significant Soviet movement without at least indicating the U.S. movement I personally thought commensurate with the movement I was soliciting from them.

I did not think a "step-by-step" exchange of concessions was likely to be the best path to a sound agreement. When two negotiating partners have laid down their formal positions, there are strong reasons against making unilateral concessions. If one side perceives that the other is about to make a move, the first side has an incentive to stand pat and pocket the other side's anticipated concessions. This naturally slows down the negotiating process, which is usually slow in any event, particularly when it is the Soviet who are on the other side of the table.

I came to the conclusion that the best hope of solving our problems was to explore informally with Kvitsinskiy a joint package entailing concessions by both sides leading to a mutually acceptable final outcome. Such a package could be developed without commitment by either side and no element would be agreed unless and until all elements were agreed, thereby protecting each side's formal negotiating position.

Indeed, I had had some experience with such explorations during SALT I, when my Soviet counterpart Aleksandr Shchukin and I engaged in informal discussions on limiting ABM radars. Those discussions led to our working out a package proposal for consideration by our respective bosses, Ambassadors Gerard Smith and Vladimir Semenov. Though they rejected one of the features that Shchukin and I valued highly, the package nonetheless remained basically intact and embodied the essential elements of what became the ABM treaty.

I recognised that, while I was authorised to probe for real movement on the issues, the explorations that I had in mind would be seen by some in Washington as going beyond my instructions. However, the potential payoffs seemed immense and I was prepared to run the risk. In any event, the informal nature of the exploration would allow the U.S. government, were it to find the results unsatisfactory, to disavow my efforts.

THE TALK

AT EXACTLY 3 p. m. on July 16, 1982, I was driven to the entrance of the Soviet mission, which occupies a large, partially wooden tract across the Avenue de la Paix from the entrance to the United Nations Palace. The entrance to the compound is through an electronically controlled, militarily guarded gate. As the gate opened, I saw Kvitsinskiy waiting for me on the front steps of the main building. We both were dressed in rough walking clothes. We got into his Mercedes and drove off, my car and driver following behind, in the direction of Lausanne.

After about twenty kilometers, we turned off and climbed to the crest of the Jura mountain range, which at that point divides Switzerland and France.

The Mercedes stopped at an open pasture above the little town of St. Cergue on the Swiss side of the border near the crest of the pass. We got out the car and began to walk up a country road through mountain pastures with a fine view of the higher Jura Mountains behind us. Kvitsinskiy led me to a logging road which appeared to lead down through the woods to the right. He said that in the wintertime he and some of the members of his delegation had gone there from time to time to cross-country ski.

Kvitsinskiy and I walked together along the logging road above St. Cergue. We had planned our informal conversation for weeks. After a few minutes we got down to business. He said that he had decided to consult Gromyko and seek his advice. I said that, as he knew, I had talked with Eugene Rostow, the head of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who had been in Geneva a few days previously, about our projected walk, but that Rostow and I proposed to talk to no one else about it unless my talk with him led to a positive result.

Kvitsinskiy said Gromyko had told him to insist on compensation for British and French nuclear systems. As it happened, I had presented, in the formal meeting of our two delegations the day before, a major paper setting forth in detail the reasons why compensation for British and French systems was procedurally incorrect, substantively unjustified, and politically impossible for the United States and NATO. I told Kvitsinskiy that my formal statement of the day before on this subject had been completely serious. If his side chose to be adamant on compensation to British and French systems, there was no possibility of a deal.

Over the preceding weeks Kvitsinskiy and I had had a series of private discussions in which we had laid the groundwork for this walk. Now he repeated a point he had made earlier: that his side was adamant in rejecting the U.S. proposal calling for the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet longer-range INF missiles worldwide. He said his people considered that proposal to be a demand for unilateral disarmament by their side; they would never agree to it. I then repeated a point that I had made earlier: President Reagan's zero-zero offer was, in our view, the optimum outcome, both substantively and politically, and we had no intention of backing off from it. If we were to do so, the logical and political basis of our negotiating position would be weakened and from that point on, we would be negotiating from a less strong position. I suggested to Kvitsinskiy that the Soviets' refusal to budge on any part of their position relating to the central issues might be based on similar considerations. He said that that could be true.

I then continued by saying that if this were so, the only way to get to a "well-prepared" summit that fall through the INF route was through an integrated package of the necessary and sufficient elements for a definitive and comprehensive deal. If we could conceive of such a package, no weakening of either side's bargaining position need take place because any agreement between us would be ad referendum to our governments. Unless and not until both governments came to the conclusion that the advantages of the integrated package exceeded in value the costs of the concessions from its current bargaining position would there be any agreement between them.

I asked him whether the interest in Moscow in a "well-prepared" summit that fall was sufficient to justify the attempt to define such a package. He said he was not sure; it was a decision that would have to be taken by higher authority. I said I was equally unsure as to the position of my side.

I said I personally did not want to pass up an opportunity to progress in our negotiations if there was a significant chance that such an opportunity might be made to exist. Kvitsinskiy said he agreed to that.

I said I had given much thought to how such an integrated package might be constructed. I had four memoranda I had prepared earlier in the pocket of my jacket.

At this point in our talk I pulled out of my pocket and showed him the following paper, Paper A, saying that our discussions up to that point had covered most of the ground, but I wanted to be sure he understood what I had in mind. He read the paper and said he understood it.

Paper A

THE ONLY WAY to proceed is by way of a package solution containing all the necessary and sufficient elements of an agreement. Step by step won't work.

U.S. not *demandeurs*—prepared to take our time, but I personally do not want an opportunity for progress to slip, if it exists.

Gather from our dinner conversation you're backing away from taking any personal initiative or risk in developing a package for the development of which we could take equal responsibility, even though each attributing more of the initiative to the other. You have reported in full to Gromyko. I only in part to Rostow and he and I to no one else.

I am prepared to take more personal risk than you appear to be willing to take in the interest of progress. But only if there is some point in it. If Moscow is adamant in wishing a one-sided deal, or will incorrectly assert that the package I am prepared to discuss is a proposal by my government or that I consider individual parts of the compromise package worth considering apart from the package as a whole, there is no point.

If you think the package as a whole is not acceptable, I will report back to my government that I tried to find some path to a "well prepared" summit this fall based on INF and was unsuccessful.

If you think the matter is worth exploring further, you will know how to reach me in Washington.

By now we were sitting side by side on the top of a pile of felled trees on the edge of the logging road. I showed him Paper B, which outlined the basic premises for a compromise package. He read it with care and commented only on subparagraph e, having to do with China. I said that would become clear when I showed him the next two papers.

Paper B

WHAT IS NEEDED IS a package approach. No prospect U.S. will fall off zero/zero unless the alternative is an equitable deal that it knows will stick.

No signs of movement on the Soviet side on matters related to central issue, probably for similar reasons.

What is needed is a package containing a balance of compromises on the significant issues resulting in agreement on all the necessary and sufficient elements of a deal. Let us accept:

- a. that Soviet side will not accept zero/zero,
- b. that U.S. will not give on UK/French inclusion or compensation,
- c. that Soviet side requires some ceiling on medium-range dual-capable aircraft but that U.S. will agree to no significant reduction in them,
- d. that SLCMs (sea-launched cruise missiles) are not an appropriate matter for discussion in INF but can be discussed in START,

e. that Soviet side requires consideration of its China problem, but there can be no export of European problem to Far East,

f. that limits must be equal in appearance and justifiable as to equality of effect.

If one accepted these points, what might a package of the necessary and sufficient elements for an agreement look like?

On thinking about it at your suggestion, it seemed to me that the following 15 elements might balance out in an equitable way.

I said the package I had worked out would not include British and French systems; it would not include sea-based systems; it called for no significant reductions in U.S. dual-capable aircraft; it called for more INF missile warheads in Europe for the U.S. side than for the Soviet side; but it made ten important concessions to the Soviet side. I then showed him Paper C, which listed those concessions. He read it with care but made no comment.

Paper C

WITHIN THOSE PARAMETERS it makes the following concessions to your side:

1. It is not zero/zero.
2. The subceilings are equal in appearance but unequal in effect—ballistic missiles for you, cruise missiles with their longer flight time for us.
3. The limits are based on location, not on characteristics regardless of location.
4. The limits include aircraft.
5. The limits include only aircraft with a combat radius greater than 1000 kms.
6. The limits include FB-111 aircraft which are not located in Europe.
7. The limits do not completely ban any present or future systems, including their deployment, production, test and evaluation, etc.
8. The collateral measures are broadened to include U.S. and German Pershing SRINF (short-range INF) *.
9. The package accepts Soviet terminology, i. e., "medium-range" rather than "intermediate range". **
10. It provides for some reductions on the U.S. side.

I then showed him Paper D, which outlined the elements of a possible compromise outcome.

Paper D

An integrated compromise package for consideration by both sides; nothing is agreed, or even proposed, until everything has been agreed.

1. Each side agrees to reduce its "medium-range nuclear delivery systems in Europe" in approximately equal annual increments to no more than 225 such systems by 31 December 1987.

2. Each side agrees to limit its "medium-range nuclear missile delivery systems in Europe" to a subceiling of no more than 75 on each side by the same date.

* In contrast to British and French nuclear forces, which are under the sole control of the British and French governments, West German Pershing Ia missile systems had nuclear warheads that were under U. S. control.

** Afterwards during the elaboration of the INF Treaty the sides agreed that the term «intermediate range» would correspond to the term «medium range». — Ed.

3. The U.S. agrees, in exercising its rights under the missile subceiling, to deploy only cruise missile systems. The Soviet side agrees, in exercising its right, to deploy only ballistic missile systems.

4. The Soviet side agrees not to deploy "medium-range nuclear missile systems" east of the Urals and west of 80 degrees east, not to deploy more than 75 such systems east of 80 degrees east and not to deploy those within range of targets in NATO Europe.

5. "Europe" includes Spain and the land, islands and inland waters eastward thereof to the Urals, etc.

6. "Delivery systems" are, with respect to missiles, transporter erector launchers and their associated missiles and base facilities; with respect to airplane delivery systems, the airplanes and their immediately associated equipment.

7. "Medium-range nuclear missile delivery systems" include all missile systems with a range greater than 1000 kilometers and less than 5500 kilometers. "Medium-range airplanes" on the Soviet side presently include Backfire, Badger and Blinder (not Fencer); "medium-range airplanes" on the U.S. side include FB-111 and F-111 (not F-4 or F-16).

8. The inclusion of Backfire and FB-111 in this agreement is without prejudice to their possible treatment in a global context in a SALT/START agreement.

9. New types of airplanes with a combat radius in excess of 1000 kilometers and less than intercontinental will be included as "medium-range delivery systems" subject to agreement between the sides on each such type.

10. New types of "medium-range nuclear missiles" will not exceed existing types in numbers of warheads, i.e., three for Soviet ballistic missile systems and four for U.S. cruise missile systems.

11. The number of "medium-range" nuclear missiles in storage, etc., will not be in excess of normal maintenance and training requirements.

12. All medium-range nuclear delivery systems in Europe that become excess to the relevant limit or sublimit shall be destroyed pursuant to procedures developed in the SCC (Standing Consultative Commission).

13. There will be no increase in the present aggregate number of SS-12/22 and SS-23 missile systems or of Pershing missile systems (whether U.S. or German) deployed in Europe, and such missile systems will not be MIRVed or extended in range beyond that of the present SS-12/22 system.

14. Verification procedures will be worked out and mutually agreed.

15. The sides agree to resume negotiations for further reductions after conclusion of a SALT/START treaty.

When Kvitsinskiy had finished reading the first and second paragraphs, he said his side had hoped to get 150 missile systems. I said that that, in our view, was excessive, that even the 75 was too high from the U.S. perspective. I said he could recall an earlier conversation in which I asked him whether he was suggesting a division of their proposed 300 ceiling on their side into two subceilings—one of 150 on missiles and the other of 150 on medium-range airplanes. I had taken his 150 on airplanes and added one-half of his 150 on missiles to come out with an overall ceiling of 225 with a subceiling of 75 on missiles.

When he came to the third paragraph, he pointed out that the language would permit the United States to go above 75 systems prior to 1987. I said that was not the intent; if he wanted to make it a paper of joint authorship, we could add the words, "and agrees at no time to exceed 75." He concurred.

When we got to the fourth paragraph, he said he could never sell a reduction to 75 SS-20s in the eastern USSR to his people. He suggested

that we change the language to "not to increase the number of such systems presently deployed east of 80 degrees east." I said I understood there were 90 such missiles and suggested we add the number "90" in brackets. He agreed.

When we got to the fifth paragraph, I said I understood his side preferred to define the boundary of Europe by the crest of the Urals rather than 60 degrees east longitude but that I did not know how they described the boundary of Europe south of the Urals; that was what I meant by "etc". He said their line runs down to the Caspian Sea. He suggested I add the words, "being the geographical border of Europe".

Kvitsinskiy asked what I meant by "the land, islands and inland waters." I replied the landmass of Europe. He said, "What about the islands?" I said that included, for instance, Great Britain and Ireland. He asked about Iceland. I replied, "Maybe, but certainly not the Azores." Kvitsinskiy asked, "Why not the Azores?" I said they were not in Europe, they were a stepping-stone between Europe and America.

He noted the words "and base facilities" in the sixth paragraph and inquired why I had included them. I replied that, if they went down from present total of approximately 225 operational launchers to 75, the base facilities for some 150 systems would need to be destroyed; otherwise the argument that the Soviets had made that they could not promptly redeploy from the Far East because of lack of base facilities would be untrue.

When we got to the seventh paragraph, he asked me why I had included the FB-111s, which were not in Europe. I said I had included them because to do so was necessary to make it possible to say that the agreement required reductions on both sides; 63 FB-111s plus 165 F-111s currently deployed in Europe equaled 228, which was just over 225. (As the FB-111s were already based in the United States, the package would have forced the removal of 15 F-111s if the U.S. deployed 75 missile launchers in Europe.)

He asked why the eighth paragraph was necessary. I said this package dealt only with aircraft in Europe. START dealt with systems on a worldwide basis. It should be made explicit that the issue of the Backfire bombers on a worldwide basis could be raised in START.

When we got to the ninth paragraph, I commented that this was the formula used with respect to heavy bombers in SALT.

Kvitsinskiy read the tenth paragraph and said that this would give the United States more INF missile warheads in Europe than the Soviet Union. I said that the Pershing missiles were much more threatening than the ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). It was not correct that any warhead could be equated with any other warhead. I asked him whether he would wish us to substitute 75 Pershing IIs for the GLCMs. He replied, "No." I said I understood that they were testing a longer-range GLCM that could be launched either in an air, ground, or sea mode. He said yes, and added that it took forty-five minutes to switch from one mode to the other.

He made no comment on the eleventh paragraph.

When we got to the twelfth paragraph, I said the words "in Europe" should be struck out; to leave it in would imply that Soviet missiles in the east in excess of 90 would not have to be destroyed.

Kvitsinskiy said that he found the language in the thirteenth paragraph hopeless for him; his people would say that there was no such missile as the SS-23. I said that we had to put in some bottom limit to the shorter-range INF range band. Would he prefer 300, 400, or 500 kilometers? He said 500. He asked what the range of the Pershing Ia was. I said that while I had forgotten the precise range, I thought it was 760 kilometers. In any case, it was less than that of the SS-12/22. He wanted to be sure the provision would cover the range of the Pershing

Ib (a missile, as I mentioned earlier, incorporating the Pershing II's accuracy but having the same range as the Pershing Ia) and ensure that its range would not be increased beyond that of the SS-12/22, which they claimed was 800 kilometers. I said our people estimated SS-12/22 range to be 925 kilometers. We finally agreed on language amended from mine, as follows:

There will be no increase in the aggregate number of missile systems with a range greater than 500 kilometers and up to and including that of the SS-12/22, and such systems will not be MIRVed or their range increased beyond that of the SS-12/22. This provision will cover, on the U.S. side, the Pershing missile (whether U.S. or German).

When we got to the fourteenth paragraph, I said that because the deal outlined in our package provided finite limits, not zero, the verification problem would be serious, and we would need a package of agreed additional measures. It had not been possible to work those out in the absence of knowing the outline of the deal we might finally arrive at on the central and related issues. It was for this reason that I had not gone beyond the language in that bullet.

He said that the fifteenth paragraph would be helpful to him.

He then said it would also be helpful to him if something could be added about a moratorium until our "Statement of Intent" could be transformed into a definite agreement. I said we would have to limit the time period, otherwise one side could stall forever. I said I would try my hand at drafting a sixteenth paragraph.

It began to rain. His car had driven up to find us. We got into it; his driver got out and disappeared into the woods.

I said I had brought a pad of paper and a pen with me; I assumed he would wish to take full notes on the papers I had gone over. Kvitsinskiy said he had brought his own pad of paper; he took long and complete notes. While he was doing so, I finished drafting the sixteenth paragraph; it read as follows:

16. After signature by both sides of this Statement of Intent, and pending a definitive agreement, a moratorium will go into effect on construction activities related to the deployment in Europe of medium-range nuclear ballistic missile delivery systems. A definitive agreement will be concluded in no more than three months from this date.

I asked him whether he had taken down the heading on Paper D. He had not. He took it down word for word.

He said he was troubled that sea-based systems were not included. I said sea-launched cruise missiles could be discussed in START. I had talked to U.S. START negotiator Edward Rowny about it, and he had agreed. I said it was an immensely complicated subject; we certainly should not let ourselves be bogged down in it. As for carrier-based air, we had only two carriers normally in European waters. Each had thirty-eight A-6s and A-7s. The Soviet side should forget about them. We would get endlessly bogged down otherwise. The U.S. Navy was not about to let their conventional capabilities be limited in our negotiations, particularly as the Soviets had put so enormous an effort into arms designed to attack our carriers. The carriers could not be limited without limiting the arms deployed against them. He said he regretted this; they had hoped to get our agreement not to station more than two, or at a maximum three, carriers in European waters. I said it would not go; they should forget it.

Kvitsinskiy raised a final point concerning the freeze on Soviet SS-20s in the eastern portion of the USSR. He noted that the United States would not be limited as to the number of INF missiles it was permitted to deploy in the Far East. I replied that it was better to leave the package as it was. The United States had no intention of deploying such missiles in the Far East; to put in such a limit would get us back into global limitations which would raise other problems. He did not insist further on this point.

Kvitsinskiy said he did not know what the reaction in Moscow would be to our package; they might reject it out of hand, they might wish to offer substantial amendments. I said I also could not predict Washington's reaction. He asked me where I would be after I returned to the United States. I said for a week in Washington, and then I planned to go to Maine, as I usually do in August. He asked how they could get in touch with me. I said the White House operator could always find me. I said I would go wherever he wanted me to, at whatever time, if it would help get a deal through.

He asked through whom in their embassy they should send a message to me. I replied the only one I knew was Ambassador Dobrynin; I had heard of Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, the number two man at the Soviet embassy, but had never met him. Kvitsinskiy asked me about Oleg M. Sokolov. He knew him, he was an experienced man. He would communicate with me through him.

He said he hoped I would say nothing about the substance of our conversations until I heard from him. I did not reply.

At 5:30 p. m. he called loudly for his chauffeur, who then came running from the deep woods. I was driven down to where my car was waiting and we said "good-bye".

Immediately after our meeting I jotted down on a pad a close-to-verbatim reconstruction of my conversation with Kvitsinskiy. Over years of negotiating with the Russians I had trained myself to recollect and immediately get down on paper word by word what had been said. The Soviets are masters at rewriting history to their advantage, so a precise record is essential. Having gotten it down on paper, I had that internal glow that comes from having done something truly constructive. But that glow soon cooled as I thought of all the probable roadblocks ahead.

"INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS" GUEST CLUB

IN SMOLENSKAYA SQUARE AND ALSO IN 122 COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD

THE FOREIGN MINISTRY COLLEGIUM'S CALL for readers of **International Affairs** to give their views on how to lend greater dynamism to perestroika in the foreign policy sphere, how to make the Soviet diplomatic service, the work of Soviet embassies, more efficient, has found ready response. It has aroused lively discussion among professional diplomats, politologists and spokesmen for public opinion. Their ideas and recommendations will certainly be taken into account at the conference which the Foreign Ministry plans to hold in order to improve the Soviet diplomatic service, primarily the functioning of our missions abroad.

The latest Guest Club meeting was attended by

Alexander Bessmertnykh, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR;

Felix Bogdanov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR to Belgium;

Nikolai Neiland, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Latvian SSR, People's Deputy of the USSR;

Boris Pyadyshev, Collegium member, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR;

Mikhail Shatrov, author, State Prize winner.

The theme of the discussion was largely predetermined by readers' letters and questions put to **International Affairs**.

Pyadyshev. The year 1951 saw the completion on Moscow's Smolenskaya Square of what was a fine, mighty skyscraper by the standards of the time. When construction started it was not clear which of the ministries would be housed in the prize building. The arguments given by diplomats won the upper hand, and the Foreign Ministry moved in from Kuznetsky Most Street. However, it only got a section of the building, from the seventh to the 24th floor. The other floors went to the Ministry of Foreign Trade. This coexistence has gone on to this day although both ministries have expanded in the meantime by taking over further premises in various parts of the capital.

Diplomats associate the high-rise building on Smolenskaya Square with the Foreign Ministry's central apparatus. Reaching out from the skyscraper's floors are invisible but strong, pulsating threads and information channels linking the Ministry with 122 Soviet embassies, six permanent missions (New York, Geneva, Paris, Vienna, Brussels, Nairobi), 71 consulates-general and nine consulates. Besides, each of the 15 Union Republics has its own Foreign Ministry and diplomatic service.

Soviet diplomats are taking an active part in perestroika irrespective of whether they serve abroad or at home. Opinions on what should be the starting point for big changes in foreign policy and diplomacy may vary. We will probably agree that to choose the main line correctly, it is important to define something which is both simple and tremendously complicated, namely, the essence of the Soviet Union's national interest in the area of foreign policy. Once we've defined it, we can search for effective solutions to subordinate problems.

And so, let us discuss our national interest in international affairs. To make a start, I wish to quote a reader from Leningrad. "We have been talking about a balance of interests in an interdependent world", he writes. "But what is the Soviet Union's foreign political interest? Has it changed in comparison with the past? Shouldn't we ease the burden of this 'great power'?"

Bessmertnykh. It all comes down to a correct definition of the interest which the state defends and upholds, to bringing it into line with the country's potentialities. Strictly speaking, this is the point of departure for any policy, for its success or failure. It is easy enough to imagine a situation where foreign policy is trying to uphold and defend too ambitious an interest even though that is more than can be done. Such cases have actually occurred.

On the other hand, the interest being pursued may be too modest, with considerable loss for the state at world level as a result. I would say, therefore, that the national interest upheld by Soviet foreign policy today consists in ensuring the vital activity of this country on the international scene as an independent, sovereign and territorially integral state. This is a general statement.

But there is another general requirement that is equally important and has emerged in recent years. I mean the need to guarantee progress in perestroika in the Soviet Union, that is, to provide favourable external conditions for our reformatory activity.

Behind these general statements are perfectly concrete national interests in various sectors. We have, say, a special interest in developing relations with European countries, that is, both neutral states and NATO members. An interest differing from it in character is what may be called our natural Russian interest in promoting ties with neighbours. It can only follow the principle of neighbourliness, which must daily be given substance. A further interest is our stake in maintaining strategic parity with the United States, etc.

Pyadyshev. I like Alexander Alexandrovich's idea that one of the essentially new objects of Soviet foreign policy today, a new aspect of our national interest, is to provide guarantee for our internal perestroika. We must carry on our foreign policy in a way that will help us in internal affairs. It is already estimated that by adopting new political thinking in our international affairs, we've saved around 30 billion roubles, which we can spend for our domestic needs. If we succeed in cutting military spending by 25 or 50 per cent of the present amount as we want to, we can get another 20 to 30 billion roubles. This is a road leading to the solution of many of the country's internal problems.

I don't mean economic problems alone. Right now our new foreign policy is helping raise Soviet society to universally accepted international standards in the legal, humanitarian, information and many other spheres. Since we've put our signature to the Vienna accords, are a party to the London Information Forum and the Paris Humanitarian Conference and have joined the Council of Europe, if as a "special quest" for the time being, we must work—regardless of whether or not this suits some in our country—to bring our internal standards, traditions and regulations into harmony with existing high international standards.

Bogdanov. One of the meanings of the Russian word for interest is "benefit", "gain" or "profit", according to Vladimir Dal's dictionary. It follows that we need not be excessively modest on this point. Interest in foreign policy should really be beneficial and profitable to our country. Yet what we had more than once in the past was that our policy in this or that region was not really our own but that of a foreign country or rather of its leadership because we were linked with it by friendly relations. We ought naturally to reckon with the interests of other countries but should probably treat our own national interests as decisive.

Dal's dictionary says that the Russian word for interest also means "sympathy" and "care". This has a direct bearing on foreign policy activity,

as when it is sympathy with the national liberation struggle of other peoples or just with people in trouble. And this raises the question of the relationship between the international and the human ties. We often regard the former as a kind of political game in which one side understandably wants to defeat the other. We may be said to ignore the connection between international relations and human behaviour and nature. Hence a biased attitude to each other, the emergence of an "enemy image", a tendency to regard even a sincere concession as a trick or fraud. Hence also the fear of making concessions lest you should be accused by people at home of anti-patriotism, of a departure from ideals or, indeed, of betrayal. It's extremely important for us to have a better understanding of the world view of other nations, whose history, geography, experience of life and present situation differ greatly from ours. If we do we may be able to realise why capitalism is still there notwithstanding our repeated announcements of its failure. And when we've realised this we will be able to shape our foreign and domestic policy, our propaganda and much else more correctly.

Bessmertnykh. Speaking of the "burden of a great power", isn't it too heavy for us?

I suppose being a great power is very burdensome. I mean primarily the degree of responsibility which a great power is compelled to assume both for the fortunes of its people and for the evolution of the situation on the planet. For a great power to set aside its burden is to renounce part of its great responsibility. This would hardly be right.

However, there is another aspect to the matter. Is there nothing in our activity on the world scene that we could renounce without detriment to our national interest? I think there is. And this brings us to the concept of the dimensions of the national interest. Due to much too broad an interpretation of it, we proceeded at times without regard to our potentialities. Occasionally we did so because we were prompted not so much by our national interest but by our ideological conception of it. This is something we can renounce in some cases. We have no need for excessive involvement in regions where no direct interest of ours is at stake and where involvement is onerous both politically and economically. And so, being at the stage of new thinking, we see one of our tasks in framing our policy pragmatically, in pursuing it on a realistic basis. As soon as policy goes beyond that, it becomes onerous.

Shatrov. In carrying on our policy, we used to forget for a long time that the principal method of influencing the world was our own example, primarily a strong economy. True, we were talking about it constantly, quoting sources, which we are very good at.

Bessmertnykh. You are right.

Bogdanov. Don't let us talk here about the historical reasons for that approach, reasons that may be called objective. It wasn't typical of us alone but of many other nations which had accomplished revolutions and lived through decisive changes in their destinies. Think of the Great French Revolution, the American War of Independence, the Chinese revolution. Our greatest trouble was obviously our conviction that we had a monopoly of the truth and that this faced us with a missionary's task: preaching our faith, converting others to it and thus doing the world a great favour. We proceeded from theoretical propositions about the superiority of our system. I say "theoretical" because we had yet to prove it in practice. We were only just beginning to build our "new world" and were genuinely surprised because others didn't realise that it was the most just of all worlds, the most humane, and so on. We mistook that incomprehension, that reluctance to regard us as a model, for immaturity or, worse still, and ill-intentioned attitude and intrigue. But there really was no model as yet, nor is there any even now, from what has come out.

We must accomplish a very very great deal, must remake very many things to demonstrate the advantages of our system. We must not do this theoretic-

cally but in strictly practical terms, by concentrating as much as possible on our domestic problems: on restructuring our economic mechanism, reforming our political system, promoting democracy and glasnost. In short, we must not merely proclaim and fight for principles and ideals but live according to them. It seems to me that to be really useful to humanity, a country must primarily satisfy the needs of its own people.

Neiland. Our country is still called a superpower. I remember how this definition was played up in the seventies. On the one hand, it sounds like a compliment. But on the other hand, let us say frankly that even if we do lay claim to being defined as a great power, it is only from the point of view of the country's area, population, resources, military strength. Let us recall that there are quite ironical opinions, to put it mildly, of what our power is like otherwise. I think it was Helmut Schmidt who said: "The Soviet Union is an Upper Volta with nuclear weapons." That is the kind of description that we should think about hard, no matter how we may resent it. To be a real superpower, our country must become strong not only militarily but economically as well, for it cannot remain a great power for long if it has nothing but a powerful military capability.

We are faced with big tasks in this respect.

Bessmertnykh. Yes, we owe our superpower status chiefly to the outcome of the Second World War, to our victorious military power. Many countries having larger populations than ours aren't considered great powers. We may ask ourselves whether we cannot give up some plans we regrettably made in the past, plans which are exaggerated and exceed our possibilities, as we now realise. We would stand to gain not lose if we discarded them. Such plans increase the burden of military spending.

Shatrov. Indeed, it's the burden of expenditures for military purposes that we must get rid of to begin with. Incidentally, this applies to great powers and small countries alike. I would go as far as to say that the burden of armaments has a more tragic effect on small and developing countries than on others. The Middle East, for one, ranks third after NATO and the Warsaw Treaty as to saturation with armaments. How is any country to sustain such overburdening? By contrast, West Germany and Japan don't spend much on defence and have become economic superpowers.

Bessmertnykh. Was participation in the arms race a mistake in all circumstances? I feel that we need clarity on this point. My opinion is that, up to a definite historical juncture, the Soviet Union had to participate in the arms race. When the United States became an atomic monopoly while we lagged behind in strategic offensive weapons, with the ratio during, say, the Caribbean Crisis being 9 : 1, the very need to guarantee the country's survival compelled us to participate. It was also a moral task because the survival of a whole nation was at stake. But when strategic parity was achieved, which came at the very beginning of the seventies, both our participation in the arms race and America's became meaningless as I see it. Both countries ought to have stopped and said it was enough because they had reached parity and that to make more missiles meant merely exhausting the resources of both sides. But unfortunately the arms race went on in spite of talks over many years and the signing of SALT-2 in 1979.

Neiland. Alexander Alexandrovich, you lived in America for many years. Did you never have a feeling that the United States deliberately "invited" us to the arms race, seeing it as a means of exhausting our economy?

Bessmertnykh. I believe that aim was there and still is. But it wasn't the only one. The main spiral of the strategic arms race began when the Americans adopted a programme to make a thousand ICBMs. I've always wondered what strategic, military political, economic or other analysis led them to that figure. Why should it be a thousand and not, say, a hundred, two hundred, three hundred or five hundred? And you know, years later I got a fairly convincing answer as I talked to one of President Kennedy's close aides.

He told me frankly that they had chosen the figure at random. It looked impressive, the President could present such a programme to the nation, and the nation would have to back it. When the programme was announced the Soviet Union was forced to get involved in a new spiral.

Pyadyshev. To confirm that the "ceiling" approach of the other side was occasionally countered in the past by a similar approach on our part, I can give you a story told by somebody who heard a conversation between Leonid Brezhnev and Dmitry Ustinov. Brezhnev: "Why do we need so many missiles in Europe, Dima?" Ustinov: "Let them stay there. We don't have to feed them, do we?"

Bessmertnykh. The trouble is they have to be "fed".

Neiland. Yes, it often costs less money to manufacture arms than to keep them at the ready.

Pyadyshev. And then to scrap them.

Neiland. I can say as a deputy that our country's foreign policy enjoys very great confidence among people's deputies. This is one reason why they mention it fairly seldom. But the important thing is something else: we've discovered that the "enemy" is within ourselves, inside our country. And it is for us to defeat him, with foreign policy providing external conditions for this. Everybody realises that the war menace has diminished and that we've made big gains in foreign policy. After all, polls conducted among deputies showed Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to be unchallenged as holder of first place. At the Supreme Soviet confirmation hearing, he was the only minister to win 100 per cent of the vote.

Shatrov. There's a problem that is worrying me in this connection. New ideas are undoubtedly gaining ground in international relations. At home, however, we are still floundering. Don't you think ideas cannot win by just being proclaimed? They can only win through people. Our foreign service now includes many new people free from the burden of the past. But in home policy we've been shy of promoting new people, and this is why our cart is creaking. You will recall that Mikhail Gorbachev said in Leningrad that we should allow people one year to decide whether they could join in and were willing to. Many of the people in question found those words idealistic and so decided that they could but wouldn't and stayed where they were. Four and a half years on, we have achievements in so complex a sphere as international relations but inside the country things are still going poorly, with people refusing to make way for new thinking.

Pyadyshev. Mikhail Filippovich was right in saying that there is much that's novel in the high-rise building on Smolenskaya Square. Beginning with the new minister. Of the 12 deputy ministers now serving, ten have been appointed in perestroika years.

The situation is similar in the Ministry Collegium, which is headed by the Minister and includes deputy ministers and the heads of key echelons of the Ministry. At present Collegium meetings on the seventh floor bring together 29 members, who discuss fundamental aspects of the Ministry's activity, work out and approve various measures, plans and proposals covering a wide range of international and diplomatic activities. Most of those who sit at the Collegium table are newcomers.

The meetings themselves differ from what they were like a few years ago. They are now characterised by lively yet substantive discussion and concrete opinions and decisions. Whereas earlier meetings took place sporadically and didn't last long because many participants preferred to keep silent, the situation is different now, so that the chairman is even compelled to restrict the number of speakers according to an unannounced time-limit. They include both Collegium members and invited directorate chiefs and department heads of the Ministry plus experts. Participants advance many new, non-standard ideas concerning the most diverse problems, such as preparations for a further round of Soviet-American talks, the situation in the Asia-Pacific area,

environmental protection, relations with specific countries, further steps to guarantee the rights and dignity of Soviet citizens abroad, and so on.

Bessmertnykh. That's right. I think there is yet another circumstance. Few are those who realise that the Foreign Ministry is no administrative body. While other ministries are linked with groups of interests and may be described as something of a lobby, the Foreign Ministry is different. We don't control anybody except ourselves. And we owe our "output" to ourselves. We can't push a button and tell somebody to do this or that and then to submit reports and figures. In other words, the Foreign Ministry isn't represented in the 18-million-strong administrative apparatus still existing in our state. Our Ministry is more like a production unit.

Secondly, I believe the reason why foreign policy is the sphere in which we have made more active moves than in other fields is the differing perception of the danger threatening our country. In foreign policy you are constantly aware of a risk because it is close at hand. Where something isn't done properly the result tells on the whole country. It is sad that there should be those who don't realise how risky it is for the country to be in bad shape economically or to have to wrestle with acute inner political problems. The risk in this case is as great as the threat from without. We must mobilise our energies and tackle internal problems in good earnest.

Shatrov. It is more than some can do—they've got the wrong genes.

Bessmertnykh. Many believe there are things that can still be postponed and put right under plans to be made for the 21st century. Perestroika allows us no such time limit. We must proceed most purposively. Mikhail Gorbachev told the Supreme Soviet that new thinking must pervade our entire effort at home in the same way as it pervades our foreign policy activity.

Bogdanov. We need common principles. We cannot base economic relations at home on principles differing from those we are following abroad. Our failure to do so accounts for the lack of dovetailing with the world economic complex and for the biggest of the shortcomings, difficulties and problems we come up against in our foreign economic effort. You cannot encourage democracy and glasnost at home and yet approve, if tacitly, of the approach of some countries which has nothing to do with universally accepted legal, humanitarian, interethnic and other standards. This is bound to tell sooner or later on both the internal policy and the leadership of the country concerned, which it may deprive of support from the progressive forces of society advocating its transformation on democratic principles.

Our past knew such things. Take, for example, the period after the 20th CPSU Congress. Our reaction to the events in Hungary revealed the limitations of our "thaw" policy and had its effect on the subsequent evolution of the situation inside the country. As for our reaction to the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia, it was rightly described recently by someone as a watershed marking a turnaround towards stagnation. He who uses force and not dialogue outside the country as a means of resolving contradictions comes to the false conclusion that he can resort to the same device at home, and vice versa.

Neiland. As a spokesman for one of the republics, I wish to point out that new thinking in foreign policy is also translating into a bigger role for the Foreign Ministries of the republics. Whereas previously the existence of our ministries was more form than substance, currently their role is changing.

The Constitution entitled the Baltic republics, like the rest of Union Republics, to establish consular and diplomatic relations with foreign countries. But while this was put on paper and sounded fine, it only went as far as that. At present Sweden is setting up a branch of its Leningrad Consulate-General in Riga and Tallinn. The Danes plan to open in April 1990 their seventh cultural centre abroad, this time in Riga. Also in April, passenger services are to be started by SAS and Aeroflot between Stockholm and Riga.

The time has come to extend our representation abroad. Latvia and Estonia have traditionally had representatives in the Soviet Embassy in Sweden. A question under discussion now is that they should perform the duties of both diplomats of the Soviet Union and consuls of the Latvian and Estonian SSRs, with the Swedish Foreign Ministry registering this in its diplomatic list. Contacts between our republics now involve mostly Baltic states. This is only natural, for the problem of, say, conserving the Baltic Sea by combating pollution is primarily a task facing the countries of the Baltic region and uniting them. We are really in one boat in this respect. There are also many problems such as can be solved through cross-border ties.

We are well aware, of course, that we can have no foreign policy of our own. Our federal state can only have one foreign policy. We may and do have particular interests stemming from our geographic location and the distribution of our emigrants, who have settled in the course of history in the United States, Canada, Sweden, Britain, Australia, West Germany.

Bogdanov. Nikolai Vasilyevich, I think those particular interests have to do not only with the republics' geographic location but apparently with their history, cultural traditions and ethnic and economic realities. We are faced with a very serious problem whose solution is coming to the fore in the context of the restructuring of our federation. I mean the need for the central apparatus to take account of these particular interests and for the republics to bear in mind the interests of the state and federation as a whole. This is a complex and sensitive process requiring further work on a whole number of major theoretical problems relating to the sphere of international law. One of them is the problem of the subjects of international relations and international law.

Bessmertnykh. Perestroika has made big demands not only on the Moscow apparatus of the Foreign Ministry but on our embassies. The embassies are part of our Ministry and are functioning in a vast area comprising 122 countries. This is why, in speaking of perestroika, we also mean perestroika in our embassies. Some changes have already come about there.

Shatrov. That is beyond question. The standard of our diplomatic service abroad is no longer what it used to be. What the Foreign Ministry is beginning to put first at long last is talent, culture, personality, not a nominally clean record.

Pyadyshev. It's important to stress that the Soviet diplomatic service today has a solid basis and sound professional traditions. Postwar decades in Soviet diplomacy have seen the rise of a generation of experienced, knowledgeable people, professionals who may be said to know the fine points of international affairs. In short, we now have a diplomatic school of our own. In any case, it is nothing short of the diplomatic schools of countries having a centuries-long record.

As far back as the war years and the early postwar period, prominence in world politics was gained by Andrei Gromyko, Valerian Zorin, Arkadi Sobolev, Georgi Pushkin and some other Soviet ambassadors. They made up a constellation of diplomats operating in extraordinary conditions. They contributed to the drafting of so unique a historic document as the UN Charter and of treaties and other documents relating to the postwar organisation of Europe and the world.

Our diplomatic school in later years had its peculiarities.

A rule repeated for decades at Foreign Ministry meetings implied that it was better not to say a hundred times what should be said than to say once what should not be said. Diplomats were taught very well not to say what should be said but then they were also weaned away from speaking, reasoning, putting forward and upholding new ideas.

Nevertheless, by and large, we had reason to be at least satisfied with the standard of the Soviet diplomatic service in earlier decades if not to be proud of it. Most officials were well-trained people who spoke foreign lan-

guages, were cultured and had a capacity for contact as well as for analysis and for the proper formulation of political texts.

In that constellation of diplomats, which immediately preceded the present generation, much was done by Vasily Kuznetsov, Alexander Dobrynin, Georgi Kornienko, and some other veterans of Smolenskaya Square.

In the course of complicated diplomatic talks held in recent years, with the Ministry's central apparatus working hard to formulate and then implement foreign policy decisions, new people entered the scene to become Soviet diplomats, deputy ministers, ambassadors, experts at conducting negotiations. With regard to new trends on Smolenskaya Square and in our missions abroad, it is fair to say that perestroika in the diplomatic service made rapid progress precisely because it had a solid basis and able people waiting for their chance.

Neiland. If diplomats who lived abroad for years were not blind, deaf or—excuse the word—stupid they must have compared many things happening in this country with what they saw outside it, must have asked themselves a lot of questions beginning with "why". Of course, they may have gone no further than that or discussed what they saw and heard with colleagues or family members. But when the country embarked on what we occasionally call a revolution the reserve of energy which I think many had immediately found an outlet. Every individual understandably uses it according to his ability. It isn't accidental that many diplomats readily and gladly undertook to work for perestroika in foreign policy, for the realisation of new political thinking.

Bessmertnykh. One would like our embassies to show greater imagination, to extend the range and depth of their effort, to grapple with their tasks in a more creative spirit. There is still a tendency to see and report primarily what appears on the surface. As for things lying deeper down, they are occasionally overlooked. But, of course, this depends on the training received by ambassadors, councillors, specialists serving in embassies. Also, our embassies are committed to quantity, which is a trouble typical of our economy. There are ambassadors who believe for some reason that their work will be considered particularly fruitful if they send as many dispatches as possible every month. Our cryptographic equipment is often overheated by an avalanche of unnecessary messages. Yet, it's better to receive one really useful dispatch than ten descriptive ones, as has been the case. Over the past three or four years, however, our embassies have been approaching their job more creatively. Besides, many ambassadors have been replaced by younger people. These new people are competent and imaginative.

Bogdanov. Basic to perestroika in our missions abroad is the adoption by their staffs of the principles of glasnost and democracy that are now coming into their own at home. One-man management is all right but surely we cannot leave command methods in missions abroad intact at a time when we are combating them at home. One must reckon with people's opinions. There is no tolerating a situation where the atmosphere in an embassy isn't very healthy because the ambassador does as he pleases. I think the key to perestroika lies in our people participating extensively in decision-making on all official, social, party and everyday matters.

Shatrov. The composition of embassies has changed greatly. I remember the time when I, an author, talked to diplomats in embassies. "Have you seen that play?" I would ask. "Oh, no," they would answer, "tickets are so expensive!" "But you go to museums, don't you?" "Why, no, admission fees are so high!" That was the kind of excuse I heard every time.

Neiland. I wish to support Mikhail Filippovich. I suppose many of my colleagues were dismayed in the past at how arrogantly and boastfully some of our people used to talk in the West about our achievements. The response was skeptical smiles, to put it mildly. Unfortunately, some still use this arrogant manner out of misconceived patriotism. I realise that it isn't very easy

for anybody to admit to himself or his children that much of what was said or written before has turned out to be a lie. But one must pluck up courage and take an objective look at oneself as one might at somebody else. I wish to stress the vast importance of this ability to look at oneself in this way. We must cultivate it all the time.

Bogdanov. It is also very important for members of our profession to learn to understand a partner, to put themselves in his place so to speak and try to see the world as he does. We must do so if we are to recognise that a partner's interests have a right to legitimate existence even if they are entirely different from ours, and hence a right to be met to a definite extent. That will provide a basis for dialogue and compromise.

Shatrov. Nowadays you hear embassy people talk as they never did before. Diplomats lead politicised lives like anybody else. The standard is higher now.

Bogdanov. It certainly is but a lot remains to be done. Currently the main thing for missions abroad is to allow maximum scope for the initiative of staffs and hence for their thinking. What should be seen as a model, especially on the lower rungs of the diplomatic ladder, is original ideas and not acquiescence in orthodoxy. We need to train the greatest possible number of intelligent, courageous diplomats who can do their own thinking. Let us admit that at one time many people who had free and non-standard thinking were nauseated at the behaviour of overcautious embassy people. Besides, we showed a strong inclination to frame policy by analogy, according to precedent. Precedents are very important in international relations but absolutising them can bar the way to new approaches, new ideas, new thinking.

Neiland. When you served in the United States prior to perestroika, Alexander Alexandrovich, I often heard you speak in English over the Voice of America when you held debates with Americans. That was something sensational at the time. Working over there today is easier in some respects because we are now seen as human beings.

Bessmertnykh. These are normal human relations.

Neiland. I suppose the new situation connotes a change in the role of our diplomats abroad. Formerly a diplomat could live peacefully in a country for three to five years without trying too hard to learn the language because he sought no contacts. He read the press but spoke neither on the radio nor on television and never joined in discussions. Nowadays every diplomat worth the name must speak well the language of the country of residence. He has ample opportunities to help form a better opinion of the Soviet image. He can grant TV interviews, contribute articles, join in discussions, give a talk. Our diplomats are in high demand today. The question is how far we meet it.

Bessmertnykh. It's more difficult and risky for mediocre diplomats to work today because they are out in the open. And as exigencies have increased immensely, diplomats are expected not only to speak the language of the foreign country but to mix with the most diverse people there to spell out our policy to them in plain terms and have a proper knowledge of the public mood. The diplomat's tasks now extend beyond political issues, which we used to be concerned with most of all. They cover the economic, military, cultural and many other spheres. We tackle not only general problems but specific problems of promoting trading, economic, scientific and technological ties and recommend as reliable partners as possible to our government agencies.

Our embassies receive numerous Soviet people. This is a welcome reality but I regret to say that many business trips abroad by our specialists are meaningless. Our representatives in the United States repeatedly witnessed, as I know by personal experience, a situation where one and the same firm or farm was visited over, say, two or three years by dozens of delegations that asked for and were supplied with one and the same kind of documentary information. The heads of the firms or farms wondered what that could mean,

why visitors kept arriving although our centralised economy had obtained the same information a dozen times before. Americans just simply can't understand so typically Soviet a phenomenon as our glaring departmental approach to things.

One of our ambassadors' tasks today is to keep tabs on this, to take a critical view of everything and assess our ties correctly and objectively.

The job is certainly harder now because the world has really become more diversified and colourful, and sometimes it isn't easy to see the crux of the matter amid its political and other intricacies. But the main purpose of ambassadorial work is unchanged—it's objective information. The ability to be objective is very difficult to develop for any analyst, scholar, diplomat or people's deputy, and it takes years provided that he is loyal to principle.

Pyadyshev. One of the new lines that have emerged in our diplomatic service in this period of perestroika is that we now have more embassies playing a key role. What I mean is that until recently we only had from five to ten leading diplomatic missions abroad—I don't know exactly how many. They included our missions in, say, Washington, Bonn, London, the UN, Tokyo—

Bessmertnykh. — Vienna.

Pyadyshev. Yes. But we regarded vast areas as just a remote periphery. After all, it is a fact that Eduard Shevardnadze didn't go to Latin America until recently and that it was the first visit to be paid to the region by a Soviet Foreign Minister. Nor did any Soviet Foreign Minister visit Australia and Southeast Asia until Eduard Shevardnadze did so not long ago. Incidentally, I don't think we've yet visited Africa at the level of minister.

Bessmertnykh. I would add that Soviet Foreign Minister didn't visit Mongolia and the DPRK until recently.

Bogdanov. There are "unexplored areas" in Europe as well. Vienna was mentioned here as an important centre of international activity. I believe we have every reason to put Brussels on the same list. It is a really unique centre, and I hardly need demonstrate that. Suffice it to name two international organisations headquartered in Brussels: NATO and the European Community. But that's what lies on the surface, if I may say so, whereas there is also Belgium itself, a small European country with its own history, culture, political system and a corresponding foreign policy. Belgium has its own interests and priorities and takes an original approach to a number of international problems. Yet we haven't been there since 1976. I don't think this is normal.

Pyadyshev. The responsibility and role of our embassies are also growing in other countries in addition to those of our traditional centres in Washington, New York, Bonn, Paris, London and a few other capitals, for the world is really becoming more and more interdependent and interconnected. Of course, the United States, the Soviet Union and other big powers are very vocal in world politics. But they aren't alone. Other countries are gaining in leverage irrespective of their size and the distance separating them from world political centres. This means that our embassies in those countries must review their role and accomplish their tasks with a particular sense of duty and in a statesmanly manner. They mustn't mark time as if they were several light-years away from Moscow and Smolenskaya Square, mustn't expect Moscow to "forget" about them. This is a time when our country is making foreign policy there as well.

Bessmertnykh. Absolutely everywhere. Indeed, interdependence implies that if something positive occurs somewhere it will reverberate in other parts of the globe, and as for something negative, its repercussions are even stronger. This is one reason why all ambassadors are responsible no matter where they are. A crisis even in a very distant region may have a direct impact on our interests and the interests of our allies. I consider your comment quite correct.

And here is another point. You were right in saying that formerly the trouble with our ambassadors and embassies was that they bore our inte-

rests in mind only within the framework of the country they were accredited to. Yet a country may be small, and its interests may be narrow accordingly. We insist on our ambassadors taking a broader look at things, on approaching them in regional and global terms, because an analytical view from any point is likely to contribute to an overall assessment of the world situation. I'm sure our embassies in any small country would show a better performance if the ambassadors went about their job energetically, creatively and on a broad basis.

Neiland. I would like to call attention to the change in our stand on emigrés. Our relations were confrontational for years but now they are assuming the character of dialogue. We've jettisoned a principle which says that he who isn't with us is against us.

Pyadyshev. I wonder how correct it is to say that now is the time to change our approach to evaluating the importance of information from embassies. Many of our government departments, including the one on Smolenskaya Square, now have in some offices TV sets broadcasting CNN programmes live. In other words, they are in a position to learn instantly what's going on in America, to get prompt information from all over the wide world. The world is becoming transparent. There is less and less need for ambassadors to supply current news on a regular basis. The task is to move on to deeper-going analysis, to ascertaining fundamental aspects of the situation in any given country. And then, we should take better care of Soviet citizens abroad.

Bessmertnykh. You are right. In this age of information technology, the problem doesn't lie in a shortage of information but in the fact that we are being overwhelmed by information. This applies to the highest leadership of the Soviet Union as well as to the Foreign Ministry and other entities. The flow of information is truly tremendous. We now have not only TV sets but telefaxes and teletypes installed by major news agencies of the world. I have computers in my office. Our offices are quite different today, and this means a different style and different standard of work.

Ambassadors lacking a capacity for analysis often conceal that lack by pouring in information of middling value. A gifted and competent ambassador never goes in for nonsense, never makes his subordinates copy articles from the press. He does his best to analyse events in depth and to visualise their likely evolution, which is what we need. To adopt foreign policy decisions, it is necessary to have objective, reliable information. If the information we get lacks authenticity and is therefore unreliable, we risk failing in our search for the right solutions.

Pyadyshev. The words "information" and "press" uttered here prompt me to read to you a letter received by *International Affairs* from Belozerskaya, a Moscow reader. "Our press has lately been taken to task," she writes, "mainly over our internal affairs. But now criticism is also reaching out for those who cover international problems. They are said to do that insipidly and often euphorically."

Shatrov. She is probably right. The year 1985 was a definite watershed for our journalists dealing with international problems. I would say that formerly our press reverted time and again to two subjects: a further drop in the rate of the dollar and moral degradation in the West. It did so every year. True, the dollar is still going strong for all that its decline has been announced a thousand times.

We are now in the presence of quite serious changes. Journalists who have made a name for themselves as analysts of internal or international problems have been enabled to write as they see fit. We have a fairly interesting group of journalists who analyse developments and are unafraid to criticise the Foreign Ministry or even the leadership. In other words, life is getting normal, with common sense prevailing. I don't think this is a crisis—it's simply that life is putting everything where it belongs. We have midling ambassadors who ply the Foreign Ministry with information, and

there are also quite a few journalists who keep writing about moral degradation and a declining dollar. Well, that's the way it is.

Neiland. Nearly every issue of *Izvestia*, *Moscow News*, *New Times* and other publications carries what I see as very interesting and profound articles. I wish to thank such noted and serious commentators as Kondrashov and Bovin. I read everything they write. And I've completely changed by opinion of *International Affairs*. Time was when it occasionally took me a mere ten to fifteen minutes to study the journal from cover to cover. But now it takes me days to read red pencil in hand. Not long ago, I was strongly impressed by Alexei Arbatov's and Andrei Kozyrev's articles. I could name many other articles. I note with satisfaction that the Editor-in-Chief of the *International Affairs* offers a topical commentary on the last page, possibly after the long-standing example of *U. S. News & World Report* or according to his own idea.

Bessmerthnykh. I've mentioned diplomats—middling a minority among our diplomats. I consider that most of our commentators, too, are clever and lifted. They've begun to express their own views. Occasionally they may be wrong but a wrong opinion can be used as the starting point to arrive at the right opinion. The only thing I regard as intolerable in the work of any journalist is inaccurate facts.

Shatrov. Information.

Bessmertnykh. Inaccurate information. That won't do at all. As for dissenting opinions, they are welcome. We can argue with those who express them but we must in all circumstances respect them whether they are right or wrong.

Journalism is the complement of diplomacy, isn't it? It lends colour to events, shows the reader what is really going on, and occasionally digs deeper and describes the atmosphere more exactly than a diplomatic document does. These two teams—diplomats and journalists specialising in international problems—are linked by common interests and are doing a common job, international politics.

Neiland. I sympathise with journalists because certain themes are still half forbidden, especially those relating to our allies. I believe the Foreign Ministry and Soviet diplomats must help eliminate stereotypes both we and some allies of the Soviet Union still have. Besides, what a journalist writes or a Soviet newspaper publishes isn't the voice of Moscow or the Kremlin. It merely states the opinion of the journalist and the paper. Needless to say, stereotypes handicap many of our journalists and commentators, with the reader as the loser because he is thus denied complete and objective information on developments in, say, the DPRK, Romania and other countries. I hope we can also overcome this hurdle.

Bessmertnykh. I subscribe to Nikolai Vasilyevich's comments. For all our openness, for all that journalism concerned with international problems has undergone a tremendous change, we still have "grey", half-closed zones of sorts.

Shatrov. Our press is doing a big, important job. It is helping advance perestroika. The 19th CPSU Conference put it correctly when it stated: "The press is and will be a socialist opposition. It will criticise party and other officials. It will show how they work, what they are doing, the mistakes they make and the shortcomings they have, the positive experience of work gained by them".

One witnesses a bit too frequent attacks on the press, many of them unfounded. And one is really struck by words like the following: "I must say that some media are trying to get away from party control. They discredit our socio-political system under the guise of criticising past mistakes. Actually they are out to influence people's thinking. The press and television are using the most diverse forms to defame our achievements and set off the people against the party. And they are scoring some gains in this." These

words didn't come from a chance speaker but from the First Secretary of a republic's Communist Party CC. How can anyone lump things together by smearing all mass media? What kind of democracy or glasnost is that?

Bogdanov. Boris Dmitrievich, you led the Soviet delegation to the London Information Forum last May. Speakers insisted on improving the situation in the information sphere within the framework of the European process. Has anything specific been done yet?

Pyadyshev. At the Information Forum, both delegations and individual participants submitted about seventy proposals. Most of the proposals were useful because they were aimed at extending glasnost and informing people more objectively. There was no call for proceeding immediately to implement the proposals. They are to be examined at the next CSCE meeting in Helsinki.

But there is really no point in waiting. Life often surpasses our regulations, instructions and restrictions, leaving them far behind. The Soviet leadership has adopted a decision of principle intended to carry out a series of measures extending the range of glasnost for Soviet people and for foreign journalists who arrive in our country. I mean such things as, say, giving greater access to sources of official and unofficial information, allowing contacts with official institutions, private individuals and non-governmental organisations with the aim of obtaining data wanted by the press. Or giving Soviet citizens unhampered access to the foreign press, foreign satellite television programmes, copying machines, audiovisual aids. Perestroika has a stake in enabling the press to fully play its role as part of civil society, to renounce prohibitive and restrictive procedures running counter to international law and militating against the obligations assumed by the Soviet Union in accordance with the documents of the European process.

Shatrov. All that is correct. But diplomacy involves the relationship between politics and morality, between diplomacy and morality.

Bessmertnykh. It is an exceptionally important subject that is also vast and therefore calls for special discussion in detail. I've been struck by few publications that may be said to question the correctness of the trend of development of our relations with some countries. I recall the case of Iran, for one. I feel that in this period of pluralist opinion, every point of view is entitled to be heard. I don't want to guess at the motives of the authors of particular articles, nor do I want to create the impression that they are all completely wrong.

Still, a word on this matter, seeing that the time left is limited. Aristotle said that intentions brought out people's moral qualities. Applying this principle to our foreign policy activity and diplomacy, we can say without hesitation that they are motivated by noble aspirations. I know this exactly because I see the mechanism of decision-making from within, so to speak. For instance, the Soviet Union's effort to promote ties with the most diverse neighbouring countries is prompted by the intention to create something of a zone of good-neighbour relations around us. Does this imply that, being prompted by national interests, we must shut our eyes to what goes on in this or that country, must ignore violations of the laws of morality and humanness? Of course not. No country must have interests going beyond moral ideals. Politics today are less cynical than in the past centuries, when political achievements were measured by the proportions of seized territory.

Speaking of certain publications mentioning Iran, I think their authors have overlooked the big changes that have occurred or go on occurring in that country. They may not know that our two countries have a common frontier about 3,000 kilometres long. Also, they may be unfamiliar with the centuries-long history of Russo-Persian relations. In other words, it is necessary in seeking normal relations with other countries to bear in mind the totality of reciprocal interests and numerous factors. Should the Soviet Union promote relations with a nation that has changed its fate and is building its future in

difficult conditions, using its right of choice in its own way? Of course it should.

The moral dimension of our foreign policy is becoming more explicit because the tasks of Soviet diplomacy fuse increasingly with the spiritual requirements of both the Soviet Union and humanity as a whole. Indeed, our country is championing the ideals of peace, freedom, democracy, prosperity and tranquillity not only for its own sake but for the sake of all. I don't mean to say that the altruism of a country's foreign policy is proportional to its morality. There is no doubt that reasonable selfishness remains a component of foreign policy. But this aspect of it shouldn't outweigh universal interests.

In upholding the ideas of perestroika, a phenomenon of truly historic magnitude, on the international scene as well, our foreign policy and diplomacy show high moral qualities that I trust will characterise them at all times.

Notes from New York

THIS MAY BE the first time in many years that the atmosphere at the UN General Assembly Session—the 44th—is favourable. The majority clearly tends to abandon the propaganda rhetoric which the Organisation had been immersed in for so long. In the Middle Ages, the Crusaders nuderlook military expeditions to distant yarts to impose their faith. Post-war decades saw able and respected leaders travel to the border of the East River with the equally unrealistic aim of imposing their ideology and views. How many cataclysms their attempts occasioned!

Current expectations have their source in multilateral and bilateral efforts unfolding in parallel and designed to find solutions to problems big and small. And it is understood that solutions must by all means meet the interests of the entire world community and follow the principle of consensus as far as possible. Since the two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—are held responsible for the fact that in the past the dominant trend at the UN was tough confrontation, it is only right to look forward to the same powers taking resolute steps in the opposite direction, or towards deideologising the UN.

This process seems to have begun. In any case, the Soviet-American dialogue in the form of Eduard Shevardnadze's September-October talks in Washington and Jackson Hole, Wyoming, became a curtain-raiser for the 44th Session. Few delegations failed to say so.

The dialogue continued in New York. The Soviet Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State spent many hours on conversations in an effort to specify and carry forward accords and ensure the smooth operation of the mechanism of joint work.

Every General Assembly session is not only a forum for official addresses but a series of informal conversations, discussions and consultations. In the brief ten days of his stay in New York, the Soviet Foreign Minister had over 80 meetings with presidents, prime ministers, ministers and other statesmen of various countries.

There was a long substantive conversation with Foreign Minister Yakub Khan of Pakistan. The interlocutors stated their conception of world developments. They put it on record that Soviet-Pakistani relations were entering a period of opportunity. Yakub Khan spoke of Soviet perestroika and of democratic changes under way in his country. It was on this background that the Afghan problem was broached.

E. Shevardnadze. I would ask you to comment on the Kabul leaders' idea of calling an international conference on Afghanistan. The Afghan sides would find it difficult to come to terms in the absence of an international mechanism. If you stand in principle for it, a convening group can be formed. I attended the recent Paris conference on Camodia. Not all questions were settled in Paris but the conference created a mechanism and started an inter-Khmer dialogue. The hardest nut to crack is how to bring the Afghans to the negotiating table.

From the Pakistani side it was said that this was the crux of the matter. Afghan realities should be taken into account. The need for an international mechanism for Afghanistan was appreciated. The idea was useful and acceptable. As for an international conference, the point was not whether Pakistan was agreeable to it. There could be no progress

until the Afghan groupings were prevailed on to accept the idea. This was a reality. The Afghan opposition refused to sit at the same table with Kabul. One should think about other ways for an international mechanism. Afghanistan differed from Cambodia. The Geneva accords on Afghanistan bound the UN Secretary-General to continue his efforts—this could produce a mechanism. Pakistan preferred an initiative within the framework of the UN.

E. Shevardnadze. The possibilities of the UN must certainly be used. There is a need for greater effort. The UN Secretary-General is doing a useful job but he has many problems, and unless we are more active the idea is going to make slow progress.

In reply it was said that what was meant in speaking of the possibilities of the UN was not a lengthy process. Time was really short and the situation critical. No proposals had yet come from the UN but they were expected and would presumably be set out in reasonably precise terms.

E. Shevardnadze. The war is going on, nonetheless. I must say plainly that the Geneva accords remain on paper. Their only provision to have been implemented is the Soviet troops withdrawal. I wouldn't like to start a debate but that is how it is. What we are worried about is not the future of Kabul, for the Kabul government has strengthened its positions. We are deeply concerned about the fact that there is a war on. I say with a full sense of responsibility that should any Soviet national become a victim of the continuous missile raids on Kabul, our response would be very stern. This is no threat—it is a real situation. I want to ask you to think this over. Time presses.

The Pakistani side agreed. Missile strikes against civilian targets were impermissible and must be stopped. Efforts were being made to bring this home to certain people. The situation could only be settled through a political solution.

E. Shevardnadze. They should be given a warning. If any Soviet nationals will become victims of the raids, we can reach any opposition grouping responsible for this wherever its location may be. I want you to take into account that the Soviet side withdrew its troops from Afghanistan with the majority of the Soviet people approving this, and if now any Soviet nationals will suffer there, it will be very hard to explain this to the people.

In this connection the Pakistani side acknowledged that it was a big mistake when civilians became targets for attack.

E. Shevardnadze. One more question—about our prisoners of war. We are deeply troubled by their fate.

From the Pakistani side it was stated that the Prime Minister was concerned about the Soviet prisoners' fate. Pakistani control did not extend to all who were holding them. Everything possible would be done to ease the prisoners' lot and decide their fate satisfactorily. There was a desire to be helpful on all questions, to talk, to exchange opinions, to discuss differences. It was necessary to meet more often and carry contacts deeper. This would make it possible to wrestle with the problem, not with each other.

Boris PYADYSHEV

New York

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UNIDO'S CONCERNS

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mentation of training programmes and fellowships; the organisation of symposia, seminars and other specialised meetings; and the maintenance of a library and industrial inquiry service drawing on information and data retrieved through the industrial and technological information bank.

POWER IN A RULE—OF—LAW STATE

(Continued from page 40)

²⁹ Quoted from Sergei Kotlyarevsky, *Power and Law*, p. 115.

³⁰ René David, *op. cit.*, pp. 105, 107.

³¹ Nikolai Korkunov, *op. cit.*, pp. 215-216.

³² *Kommunist*, No. 11, 1988, p. 52; *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 2, 1989, p. 7.

³³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, 1964, p. 276.

³⁴ *Pravda*, May 23, 1989.

³⁵ *Izvestia*, June 25, 1989.

RUSSIA AND SOUTH AFRICA

(Continued from page 49)

We are changing, and so is South Africa. Many of the changes that have occurred in South Africa during the past decade can no longer be regarded as cosmetic reforms or tactical ploys. That country is undergoing deep structural rebuilding; painful though steady dying off of the vicious totalitarian myths is also under way there.

We are beginning to rediscover each other, the way we really are.

IN RUSSIA, SIXTEEN YEARS AFTER

(Continued from page 108)

Real perestroika is only just off to a start in the Soviet Union. It can succeed only if it moves towards integrating the Soviet economy into the world economy and follows a path leading to a division of priorities between states. Time alone will put everything where it belongs.

* It was the third US-British-Soviet seminar on the theme and the first to be held in Moscow. The American delegation was formed by the University of California, the British, by the University of Sussex and the Soviet delegation, by the Foreign Ministry's Moscow State Institute for International Relations. The delegations included experts from some other countries. The seminar, organised on the "summer school" model adopted all over the world, had a most varied agenda. It took place at the Moscow Institute for International Relations from July 9 to 22.

¹ See *After Brezhnev. Sources of Soviet Conduct in the 1980s*, edited by Robert F. Byrnes, London, 1983.

² *The Observer*, June 25, 1989.

³ *The New York Times*, July 28, 1989.

